

Ksānti-Pāramitā: The Virtue of Forbearance

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In opening his discourse on *Ksānti* as a virtue, Śāntideva declares in unqualified terms that there is no evil like hatred (*dvesa*), and no fortitude as patience (*Ksānti*): *no ca ksāntisamam tapah*. Before we come to have a fuller statement of the virtue of *Ksānti*, let it suffice to say that *Ksānti* is one of the most important of Buddhist virtues, and that it encapsulates an entire spectrum of truths about moral life. The *Vajracchedika*, a Mahayana work, begins with a reference to the Buddha's reminiscence of his previous birth as the sage *Ksāntivādī*. In that incarnation he was said to have refrained from entertaining any ontological commitments regarding the self (*ātmā*), being (*satta*), soul (*jīva*), or person (*pudgala*). The reason why he did not entertain any such idea was that he did not want to generate any thoughts of ill-will (*vyāpāda*). A belief in a true and real person involves ontological commitment, leading to grasping after the subject or oneself. This grasping can lead to hatred or ill-will. *Ksānti* turns art to be an effective way of overcoming hatred and ill-will. The story of *Ksāntivādī* is an idealized version of patience or forbearance. *Ksānti* is achieved not through external compulsion, as from sense of duty, but through understanding. This is how the perfection of patience or forbearance comes to be related to the perfection of wisdom or *prajñāpāramitā*. *Ksānti* is possible only when one is poised in peace. The term for such abiding is *aranavihārī*. The presence of hatred turns it into *sarana*. A way of non-conflict in the world includes oneself as well as others. Peace on non-conflict (*arana*) involves keeping the doors of communication open.

In terms of Buddhist psychology the basic problem of salvation is summed up as the need to purify the mind of evil. The problem is analyzed in terms of the mind (*citta*) and its modes or concomitant states (*caitta*), and one of the central concerns of this analysis is to identify those states which are conducive to the overthrow of greed, hatred and delusion. We shall see, as we proceed along Śāntideva's argument that the virtue discourse,

finally, rests upon unravelling the skein of false consciousness within which the notions of permanence and selfhood are fostered. What is sought in the process of critical analysis is exposing the illusory 'self', as a projection onto the underlying mental and physical aggregates. The Abhidharma analysis is foundational for ethics. It does have an ethical programme, namely a classification of the whole of reality in terms of ethical predicates. In Buddhism, psychology and ethics go hand in hand, ethical inquiry is conducted from a psychological standpoint, in great part an analysis of the psychological provides data of ethics. Virtues are counteractive in nature; their practice is intended to overcome the weakness and deficiency which is vice. Virtues are 'corrective', said Phillipa Foot. A virtue stands at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good. Whatever it is, virtues are about what is difficult for men, and hence, their relevance for ethics. A close study of Buddhist ethics would show that it betrays a significant link with psychology. For example, *śīla* is a collective term denoting the organization or structuring of the good mental states or *dhamma*. The mind (*citta*) and mental states (*caitta*) are at the heart of the ethical analysis in the *Abhidharma*. In the context of Buddhist soteriology *dharma*s, mental forces or *caitta* are ethically productive. It is with this category of morally related forces, elements or states of the mind that virtue discourse has to do. The three Buddhist cardinal virtues are *arāga* or liberality, *adosa* or benevolence and *amoha*, that is understanding. All evil qualities stem from the negation of these. There is a structured opposition between embedded psychological straits which stand in an intimate relation to the soteriological good. Virtue and vices may be either cognitive or non-cognitive. Intellectual vice is a form of cognitive error and is epitomized by *moha*. Moral vices are forms of non-cognitive error; they are inappropriate emotional responses or propensities marked by craving

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or *lobha* and hatred, i.e. *dosa*. It will be evident that moral perfection, no less than intellectual perfection, is an integral ingredient in the Buddhist ideal. The capacity for moral sentiment is an integral part of human nature.

II

We may now turn to the moral vocabulary of Buddhist virtues and vices. *Ksānti* is always described as the opposite of *krodha* or anger, *dvesa* or hatred, *pratigha*, that is repugnance and *vyāpāda* or malice. It is defined as freedom from anger (*akopana*) and excitement (*aksobhanatā*). This appears to be the primary and fundamental connotation of *ksānti*. The Dalai Lama's commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* chapter on *ksānti-pāramitā* is appropriately named: *Healing Anger*.

Further light is shed on the concept of *ksānti* when we consider the metaphors used for its opposite namely, *krodha* or anger. The two metaphors that Śāntideva uses for *krodha* are 'enemy' (*ari*, VI. 6), and 'disturbing, conception' (*klesa*, VI. 19). Anger is the enemy within. Nobody lives happily with anger. The enemy is to be vanquished by eradicating the conditions that give rise to it. If the enemy within is to be subdued, one should totally eradicate the fuel of the enemy (VI. 8). Taking hatred towards others to be the case, one has to look for the cause of the unwholesome mental state, and would find ill-will or anger, *daurmanasya* as its cause. Śāntideva has used the two terms, *ista* and *anista* to explain the point. *Ista* is such action or thought that generates happiness for oneself and others, *anista* brings suffering for oneself and others. This of course is a provisional premise, since viewed *sub specie paramartha*, the distinction would cease to hold. The distinction is conventional. However, in terms of Buddhist psychology, *anista* is that which is undesirable, and it arises as a consequence of one misplaced belief in ephemeral *vāsanās* or desires. Any action so caused brings about ill-will and rancour. When obstacles impede obtaining of the desirable or *ista*, mental worry ensues. *Daurmanasya* is a two-edged sword, it cuts both ways. Hatred or *dvesa*, having found its fuel of mental unhappiness in the prevention of what I wish for, and in the doing of what I do not want, increases and then destroys me. Therefore, Śāntideva tells us that one should eradicate the fuel of this enemy. The two other terms that occur for ill-will or hatred are *ripu* and *vairi*, both meaning 'enemy'. The point is that the unwholesome mental states (*akuśala*) of *daurmanasya* manifests as anger. It is also a matter of importance that ill-will erodes such wholesome mental state as *muditā* or sympathetic joy. This is impermissible for the practitioner of virtue. The state of *muditā* has to be jealously guarded against the onslaught of *daurmanasya*.

In the Abhidharmic system of ethical analysis mental forces or *caitta* are designated as *dharmas*. They are objective and real, they are not part of the realm of mental construction, i.e. *prajñāpti*, but are actually found within the psyche. Accordingly the metaphor of enemy is quite appropriate. It will be in order if we take note of the thesis that friendliness or *maitrī*, along with *muditā* and *karunā*, is said by the Buddha to be unique in its power to counteract anger by preventing its arising and dissipating it once arisen. The elimination of anger is produced by freedom of the mind through love. In Buddhaghosa's phrase, it is called *metta cetovimutti*. As he explains it, *maitrī* is effective in counteracting hatred, and the other three of the set of *brahmavihāras* are efficacious in eliminating other vices. For example, *karunā* counteracts displeasure, and equanimity, that is, *upeksā* counteracts lust, i.e., *raga*. The fundamental, inspiration for the Buddhist moral life is concern for others, and as Buddhaghosa explains in the *Visuddhi magga* (ix, 106) the *brahmavihāras* are the correct attitudes to adopt towards beings, in other words, correct moral attitudes. They reflect the content of the enlightened moral consciousness. It should be unexceptional to say that for Buddhism morality is not a means to an end but an end in itself. It is not a means to enlightenment but a *part* of enlightenment. Let us consider the conduct of the Buddha. He lived an exemplary moral life with nothing to gain thereby. The motive for morality is hardly ever prudential, and if an action is performed for personal gain, it never can be said to be inspired by *anukampā*. And, it is well-known that the Buddha is described as concerned for the welfare of his fellow men, *bahujana-hitānukampī*, and as sympathetic to all creatures, *sabbabhūtānu-kampī* (*Sutta-Nipāta*, 693 and *Anguttara-Nikāya*, ii, 9). *Anukampā* is a commentorial term, and etymologically, it can be understood as the condition of being moved (*kampa*) in accordance with others, or in response to others (*anu*). What is of moment in our context is that the Buddha's moral concern was not a consequence of his enlightenment it preceded it and, indeed, motivated it. The Buddha is quoted as having said, if with joyous heart he teaches others it is not from duty, but out of compassion and sympathy (*Samyutta-Nikāya*, i, 206).

The other metaphor of *kleśa* or affliction is therapeutic in import. Virtuous consciousness is marked by the presence of non-self-referential concern for the well-being of others. The caring about or regard for other persons is often spoken of as 'natural affection' by eighteenth century British moralists, and it may best be described as a form of love. In the absence of this sentiment there can be no motive for true moral action since the needs of others will fail to make any claim upon us. Now Buddhist psychology distinguishes between the cognitive and affective powers or dimensions of the psyche or *citta*.

These functions are subsumed under the categories of cognition (*sajñā*) and feeling (*vedanā*). The functions of *sajñā* and *vedanā* are only logically distinguished, they do not correspond to any real division in the structure of the human subject. Each is merely a power of the psyche: Yet as the function of each is different so is its respective virtue or excellence. The virtue of the cognitive aspect is to understand and discriminate correctly; its vice is delusion and error. The virtue of the non-rational part of the psyche is to sense, feel and respond affectively in an appropriate manner; its vice is to swing to the extremes of craving (*rāga*) and aversion (*dvesa*). The malfunction of *vedanā* and *sajñā* is the basic soteriological problem of Buddhism. Here one is both deluded as to what is the case (*moha*), and emotionally attached (*rāga*) to the misconception or averse (*dvesa*) to the truth. Immoral conduct is not simply the result of ignorance or emotional maladjustment alone; it comes about through a misapprehension of the facts (most fundamentally involving the belief in a self) together with an emotional investment made on the basis of that factual error, i.e. attachment to the imputed self. The Buddha diagnosed the power of the emotions to dominate and manipulate reason, to drag it around like a slave, as Plato put it, and Hume echoed it later. There is recognition of the power of greed and hatred, and we are to follow the Middle Path which makes for vision, knowledge and leads to tranquility, to awakening. Metaphysical views too get conditioned by the emotional polarization between *raga* and *dvesa*. In that case one extreme is eternalism and another is annihilationism.

However, *vedanā* and *sajñā* are basic and irreducible functions of *citta* and the human predicament may be expressed in terms of a malfunction of these powers which manifests itself in the form of the root vices of attachment, aversion, and delusion. The non-rational dimension of psychic life manifests itself across a spectrum of non-cognitive responses ranging from aversion, hostility, anger and wrath (encapsulated by *dvesa*), to attachment, craving, longing and lust (encapsulated by *lobha*). These are extremes. The middle range this spectrum embraces attitudes such as benevolence, kindness, affection and sympathy. And this is where *ksānti* comes in.

III

Ksānti could be understood as a virtue that make a Buddha. It has been called, in the *Visuddhi-magga* (IX. 124), *Buddha-kāraka-dhamma*. In the *Mahāyāna Sūtrālamkāra*, it is subsumed under higher morality or *adhiśīla*. In point of fact the first three *pāramitās* correspond to the category

of *śīla* of the Eightfold Path. In Mahayana the basic value of *śīla* reflects the emphasis on the functions of moral virtue as a dynamic other-regarding quality, *ksānti* implies the sameness (*samatā*) of all beings existentially, as a result of affective inhibition of *akuśala dharmas*. As a *śīla*, *ksānti* is at one and the same time a source of purification and happiness for the practitioner and an example and benefit to others. The status of the *pāramitās* is designated as *upāya* or skilful means and cover the same ground as *śīla*. In this sense of the term, *upāya* refers to normative ethics. The command, therefore, is: Eschew anger.

Ksānti, in the sense patience, is highly extolled in Mahayana works. Gentle forbearance is to be the spiritual garment of a Bodhisattva. He forgives others for all kinds of injury, insult, contumely, abuse and censure: *sarvaarm cāpakāram ksamyate*, says the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (79 a.b). In a word, his forgiveness is unfailing, universal and absolute. But why should a Bodhisattva forgive others? What could be his reasons? Śāntideva has adduced reasons for practicing the virtue of *ksānti*. A couple of them may be noted. The reason giving begins by asking who should one be unhappy about something if it can be remedied. And what is the use of being unhappy about something if it cannot be remedied? (6.10) This verse is a piece of wisdom, and voices the resolve that whatever befalls one, one should not disturb one's mental joy. It is a road map to happiness. If there is a way to resist or remedy the erosion of *īsta* or to counter the onslaught of *anīsta*, there is no point in being angry or harbouring feelings of ill-will in the process. The remedy to forestall the undesirable should be sought by renouncing anger. Contrarily, if a remedial course of action does not exist, anger will be equally futile. Hence, the best course under both situations is to overcome ill-feeding and eschew anger. An attitude such as this will lead to happiness.

We may summarize Śāntideva's account of the reasons that justify *ksānti* from the philosophical point of view, and make it an essential element of the spiritual life.

Anger is the greatest of sins, especially for a Bodhisattva, who, by definition, is a 'being of goodness'. It destroys all merits. Even during the earthly life it causes great unhappiness. Anger must be destroyed, and the discontent, born of desire or of dislike, that nourishes it. What is the use of discontent?

Suffering is the common lot of men; there is plenty of occasion to get accustomed to it, and it loses, by custom, all its bitterness; it is very useful, as it arouses pious fear of sin, pity for sufferers, love for Buddhas who deliver from it, disgust for existence, both perishable and penible.

Anger, again, is not aroused by physical suffering, because we know that it is caused by the trouble of the

bodily humours. The Greeks, for instance, held a similar medical theory. It is also foolish to be angry with men who injure us for (i) they are acting merely under the influences of causes, and (ii) in the first rank of these causes are the wicked deeds of our previous existences. My enemy, says Śāntideva, takes a stick to beat me, and I have assumed this body, liable to be wounded, and destined to be beaten. For, from being angry with my enemy, I ought to consider him almost as beneficial as the Buddhas, for he affords me the opportunity of practicing patience, as forgiveness of wrongs, which blots out my sins. Am I to make this principle of salvation the cause of condemnation? Let us rather pity our enemies who ruin themselves by their anger, and let us think of means of saving them in spite of themselves, as the Buddhas do. As for anger provoked by slander, loss of property, etc., it is particularly absurd; so also is anger against the enemies of our religion, iconoclasts, etc.

Envy requires special attention, for the envious man makes use of clever artifices to throw a veil of honesty over his selfish feelings. We must also get rid of the gross illusion that inspires the words, 'my enemy is an obstacle to my good works'. Is there a more meritorious work than patience? What does it matter if my enemy tries to injure me? He is nonetheless my benefactor. How can we have our sins pardoned by the Buddhas, how can we please the Buddhas, except by loving the creatures, and by doing good to our most cruel enemies? So long as creatures are suffering there is no joy for the compassionate Buddhas.

They identify themselves with creatures. It is the Buddhas themselves who appear to us in human form.

IV

Having taken note of Śāntideva's reasons for practicing *ksānti*, we may not consider a few points that are of philosophical importance.

(a) The practice of *ksānti* necessitates the presence of person turned hostile to me. This is radical moral thesis. Śāntideva puts it in the phrase, *pratītyotpadyate ksamā* (VI. III). The so-called enemy is the *hetu* or the intentional object of moral consciousness. The moral attitude of *ksānti* is to be appreciated within the matrix of causal relationship. How could mental states such as forbearance or forgiving be there if there was no person to be forgiven? Anger arises when a contra-attitude develops in the mind towards the wrongdoer. When one forgives, it is the contra-attitude towards the person that is changed or displaced by a strong resolve not to be angry with him or hate that person. It is the wrong action that is to be hated, not the person. The negative mode of stating the cause may be quite Buddhist in spirit, since virtue, even

if it be intended to counterbalance *Kleśa* or a negative mental state, it is required to be spontaneous and with a positive intent. A virtue can be acquired by long practice, or meditation, in the Buddhist parlance, or as Aristotle makes it, a matter of habitual choice. It has to belong to the character, it should be characteristic of the person who practices the virtue. A virtuous action needs to have spontaneity and only then a *śīla* can be said to be *pāramitā* or perfected. One of the connotations of *śīla*, as Buddhaghosa has suggested, is composing. The *Visaddhimagga* (I. 20) indicated the etymology as related to 'character', 'nature' or 'disposition'. Such being the *laksanā* of *śīla*, *ksānti* could be construed as having a dispositional effect. There is also an organic metaphor for *śīla*. For instance, in *Milinda's Questions*, it is compared to a seed which yield the fruit of ethical life in the appropriate time. If proper care is taken of the seed, the shoots of vices are unable to take roots and grow in *śīla*. Moral life is likened to a tree with roots of virtue, *kuśala mūla*.

Now understanding *ksānti* in causal terms should be interesting in itself. In VI. 104, Śāntideva briefly defines what is meant by 'cause', and relates the notion to the question of the possibility of practicing *ksānti*. If without it something does not occur, and if with it, it does come to be, so goes the definition in terms of statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. Every effect has to have a cause, as the *hetu-phala* linkage is one of mutual interdependence. Hence the presence of a person hostile to me renders, in-effect, the possibility of practicing forbearance. *Ksānti* being a virtue, the *hetu* of *ksānti* is worthy of respect, but for the presence of the enemy and his action the occasion for practicing the virtue *ksānti* would arise, *bodhicaryā sahāya tvāt sprhāyīyo mayā ripuh* (VI. 107).

(b) Śāntideva has the interesting concept of *sattvakestra* (VI. 112). *Sattvakestra* is the domain of beings. The mental states of *ksānti* as well as that of anger and hatred are directed towards it. Neither of the mental states can occur in a vacuum. A non-solipsist world alone can be the field for occasioning both wholesome and unwholesome mental states. The point about the Bodhisattva way of life is that one practices *śīla* for cooling (from *śīlana*, a *la* Buddhaghosa) the mental afflictions (*kleśa*) by adopting the volitional states of *maitri* and *muditā*, and forbearing with those who might intend to cause one harm. The presence of such a person in the domain of beings offers a precious opportunity in practicing patience and thereby healing anger. The supposed 'enemy' is the *ksamā-hetu* (VI. III), i.e., cause of my success in practicing *ksānti*, and therefore deserves my grateful acknowledgement.

Śāntideva goes on to say further that the domain of

beings is *Buddha-ksetra* as well. The reasons for the co-extensionality of the domains are as follows. A Buddha's qualities are gained from the sentient beings and the conquerors (*jina*) alike. An ordinary sentient being and a *jina* are not similar in their quality of intentions, one cause us harm, while the other leads us to *anuttara* blessedness. The significance of the *samata* or co-extensionality of the domains lies in the fact that the ordinary sentient beings provide us with opportunities of practicing *śīla*, in having a share in giving rise to Buddha-qualities. It may be recalled that *ksānti* is pre-eminently a *Buddha-kāraka* virtue. Hence the domains are similar in so far as they bear fruit, and not in terms of intentions (VI. 114). Both are equal in terms of being factors or conditions leading on to moral perfection. Without interaction with others even a *pratyeke-buddha* will have nothing to achieve, not to speak of one who has taken the Buddhissattva vow. The Dalai Lama, commenting upon the verses VI. 112-114, says that in order to attain full enlightenment we need to practice love, compassion, and many other aspects of the path. In all of these, we find that unless there is an interaction with other sentient beings, there is no possibility of even beginning. And further, 'even though the Buddhas are fully enlightened beings and may be very seared, very precious and highly realized beings, in terms of kindness and their contribution toward our well-being, it seems contribution towards our well-being, it seems contribution toward our well-being, it seems as if sentient beings have a quieter role. So we should be more grateful toward sentient beings than towards Buddhas....The Buddhas... have nothing to do other than serve sentient beings. In a way, it's their duty. In some sense it's nothing to be admired or be surprised about: the Buddhas work for the benefit of sentient beings. However, when we consider sentient beings, with all their weaknesses, faults, and intact delusory states of mind, afflictive emotions, and so on, even with these limitations their contribution toward over well-being cannot be underestimated. Therefore, we should feel all the more grateful to them.' (*Healing Anger*, p. 113).

V

Some writers on Buddhist ethics have argued that within Buddhist parameters there is no room for anger, not even of the Christian 'holy anger'. Such a streak of thought comes from Winston L. King's *In the Hope of Nibbana*. But the truth of the statement can very well be doubted.

In VI.2 Śāntideva juxtaposes *dvesa* and *ksānti*, hatred and patience. There are many afflictive emotions such as conceit, arrogance, jealousy, desire, lust, close-mindedness, and so on, but of all these hatred and anger is singled

out as the greatest evil. What could be the reasons for it? *Anger* and *hate* are often clubbed together. *Rāga* and *dvesa* are antithetical emotions. In English love and hate are taken as opposed. Anger, of course, is more violent a passion than hatred, it erupts, but hate silently eats into the very being of a person. Considered in this fashion, hate or *dvesa* is deadlier than anger or *krodha*, and this may be one of the reasons why Śāntideva opens his discourse with *dvesa* in the context of *ksānti*. Anger burns, while hate freezes human relationships. If one may use the metaphor of fire, anger bursts forth into a conflagration, hate or *dvesa*, on the other hand, keeps smouldering. Anger seeks to destroy the other, but hate reduces to ashes the one who hates. Anger is episodic, one speaks of a fit of anger, but hate turns into a disposition, and it acquires the name *daurmanasya*, i.e. ill-will. What Śāntideva seeks to establish in the opening verses of *ksānti-pāramitā* is an inner linkage between anger, hate and ill-will. Of these anger and ill-will are transitive, and hate consumes the person who bears it towards another. It recoils upon its bearer: *daurmanasyāśanam prāpya dvesa dusto nihanti mām* (VI. 7). Ill-will feeds hatred and finally devours its own perpetrator. It is *dvesa*, therefore, that is to be eschewed by the meditation on *maitrī*.

The Tibetan word for *dvesa* in the *zhedang*, which is usually translated as either 'anger' or 'hatred' into English. It should be translated as 'hatred', because 'anger' can at times be positive in very special circumstances. These occur when anger is motivated by compassion or when it acts as an impetus or a catalyst for a positive action. In such rare circumstances anger can be positive whereas hatred can never be positive. It is wholly negative.

The negativity of hatred and anger is to be deeply appreciated. One will have to reflect upon the destructive effects of generating anger. Śāntideva identifies the need to develop and understanding of the causal mechanism which underlies the arousal of anger. In VI. 7, he observes that the 'fuel' of anger is what he calls 'mental discomfort', i.e. *daurmanasya*. This is an interesting notion, and it can be understood as dejection, unhappiness, or simply as dissatisfaction. It is best understood as a pervasive, underlying sense of dissatisfaction, which need not be felt at the conscious level. It is that nagging feeling that something is not quite right. Śāntideva seems to suggest that it is this underlying sense of dissatisfaction that gives rise to frustration. When this happens, the conditions are set for an immediate outburst of anger when things do not go the way we wish. Once the causal nexus between dissatisfaction, frustration and anger is understood, we can see that much of Śāntideva's approach is aimed at

rooting out the underlying sense of dissatisfaction, and instead of engaging in a head-to-head confrontation with actual full-blown anger, he lays stress upon reflections which aim to create stability of mind.

In dealing with our emotions and developing patience or *ksānti*, Śāntideva shares a belief in what could be called the plasticity of the mind, that is, an assumption of the mind's limitless capacity for improvement. This is supported by a complex understanding of the psychology of the mind and its various modalities. Śāntideva is operating within a long history of Buddhist psychology and philosophy of mind which emphasize a detailed analysis of human emotions. Generally speaking, in this view the mind is perceived in terms of a complex, dynamic system where both cognitive and affective dimensions of the psyche are seen as an integral whole. Śāntideva, in presenting means of dealing with emotions such as anger, does not suggest that one would or should suppress anger that may be harmful, and amount to losing, at times, sight of anger as an outrage toward injustice done to others. This can often be an important catalyst for altruistic deeds. He rejects such possibility with regard to hatred. Hatred can have no virtue. One feature of distinguishing anger from hatred is the presence or absence of ill-will. A person can be angry without bearing any ill-will towards his or her object of anger. Hatred can have no virtue. It only eats the person from within and poisons one's interactions with fellow human beings. As the Dalai Lama has put it, hatred is the true enemy, it is the inner enemy. Śāntideva wants us to ensure that our anger, even when it arises, never culminates in full-blown hatred. This is an important ethical teaching. The Buddhist approach is to get at the root so that the very basis of anger is undercut. What is suggested is a way of reorienting our character so that we become less prone to strong reactive emotions such as anger. The point is to discipline one's mind. In the preceding chapter on *Sampra-janya-rakṣnā*, Śāntideva has summarized his approach (V. 14) by saying that it is not for me to restrain the external course of things; but I should restrain this mind of mine. What would be the need of restraining all else?

VI

The Buddhist moral appreciation is extraordinarily sensitive to our passions and desires. It is also to be noted in the context that our moral appreciation can only exist in the absence of our selfish desires, in the absence of exclusive love of self. The *Abhidharma* seeks to analyze the *caitya* reals, the defilements or *kleśa*, to eliminate them as those factors that impede enlightenment. This is the

Buddhist ethical programme. The practice of *śīla* and *pāramitā* is intended to organize a structuring of the good mental states, *dharma*s. Virtue consists in the cultivation of the *nirvāṇic* emotions or attitudes such as love, kindness, affection and sympathy. The fundamental inspiration for the Buddhist moral life is concern for others. The cultivation of feelings of concern for others is closely linked to the practice of the abiding known as *brahmavihāra*. These are particularly effective in counteracting the *dharma*s identified as moral vices or *kleśa*. Love is unique in its power to counteract anger by preventing its arising and dissipating it once arisen. The elimination of anger is produced by freedom of the mind through love. Buddhaghosa affirms the effectiveness of *maitrī* in concentrating *dveṣa* or hatred.

The question that arises now is: how and why do negative emotions, *akuśal caitya* originate at all? There cannot be a straightforward answer to the question. There is the thesis that consciousness is beginningless, and that be as, then the negative mental tendencies would be likewise. There seems to be consensus among all Buddhist traditions that so far as the elimination of the *ureśa*s are concerned, wisdom is a necessary factor, it is indispensable. Whether one subscribes to the philosophy of emptiness or not there appears unanimity as regards love and compassion as antidotal to anger and hatred. But *Yogācāra* and *Mādhyamika* schools hold that eradication of afflictions of the mind and obstructions to knowledge can be achieved only through generating insight, *prajñā* into the nature of emptiness. This could be done by rooting out the imprints and the residual potencies implanted in one's psyche. The point may be made in more moderate a manner. Granted that ethics and insight are to be in a closer consonance, and it could be so only if *prajñā* is a term of practical import. *Prajñā* and *upāya* (*śīla*) are of binary significance. *Prajñā* is not mere insight, but conduct guided by insight. Good conduct is wise and wise conduct is good. Buddhism does not seek a sterile and incomplete end. Virtue is strengthened by meditation. *Brahmavihāra* is a technique of meditation. In the Eightfold Path, *samādhi* stands between *śīla* and *prajñā* and supplements them both. It is a powerful technique for the acceleration of ethical and intellectual development towards this perfection in *nirvāṇa*. The *Milindapaṇha* has imaged meditation as the focal point and support of all virtuous qualities. All virtuous qualities incline towards it (38). Buddhaghosa says that *samādhi* is the virtuous concentration of the mind (*Visuddhimagga*, 69).

There are two kinds of meditation techniques. *Śamatha-bhāvanā* cultivates moral virtue and *Vipasyanā-bhāvanā* develops knowledge or insight. The purpose of *śamatha* is to cultivate an attitude, by gaining access to the non-

rational, emotional dimensions of psyche. It is a means of penetrating the deeper layers of consciousness and restructuring them in accordance with virtue rather than vice. A correction of imbalance of sensuous desire, ill-will, *rāga* and *dvesa* needs to be made, and the negative tendencies would be brought under control, if not wholly dissolved. This should bring about a transformation in attitude towards others. It is the change of attitude that is ethical, a re-birth of the whole personality taking the emotions and the will in its stride. *Śamatha* is a spiritual virtue, while *vipaśyanā* is a condition of the intellect. The Buddhist tradition is unambiguous on the point that together they bring about birth of a new man, and have important consequences for all areas of human life. Neither *śīla* nor *prajñā* has sovereign autonomy. Mediated by *samādhi*, the matter of moment is to see that their effectual concord is the proper, just and compassionate one.

Śāntideva mentions both meditation techniques in VIII. 4 of the *Bodhicaryavatara*. They are aids to eradicating evil intentions or propensities, or *kleśas*. His point in the *Karikā* is to argue that it is essential that a two pronged meditative techniques of *śamatha* and *vipaśyana* are essential for the removal or subduing mental agitations motivating negative actions contrary to the concern for others. It may be said to involve a gradual emotional realignment and has to be cultivated slowly. Since a sentiment of sympathy or concern cannot be engendered by a cognitive act, rationalization or prudence, *Śamatha* is defined as a state having put aside considerations, both selfish-regarding and discursive, *kāmādi-vitarka-vivarjita*. To borrow a phrase from Husserlean phenomenology, *śamatha* settles one looking for an unclouded vision, by bracketing, as it were, the negative proclivities and predispositions, psychical and discursive. These dull the mind and render it restless. Only after the mind is made stable and unswervingly tranquil can the unclouded vision open into the ontological perspective of affairs, as they really are, or *yatha-bhuta*.

The meditative inward probing into the secret workings of the mind is indeed needed, since the unwholesome mental modalities are subtle, often hidden, and so indistinguishable as one cannot be told from another. Psychoanalysts inform us about misapprehensions between anger and jealousy, malice and hatred. These are emotion words and as names of emotions, it is quite possible to miscall one for the other, if, of course, their nuances and workings are not attended to. The discipline of meditation would go a long way in avoiding the mis-knowledge of our own mental states that we are all prone to.

Apropos of *Śāntideva's* concept of *sattvaksetra*, the

domain of sentient beings, it should be unexceptionable to say that Buddhist ethics has a strong presence of the other in moral consciousness. The mental modalities, *caittya*, as they are called, are intentional in essence, and transitive in character. As *dharmas*, they are either *kuśala* or *akuśala*. Anger and hate are paradigmatically *akuśala* mental modes, and alienates the moral subject from the domain of the *sattvas*. They intend to destroy the presence of the other, and as such are psychical forms of violence, intolerant of the other in a non-solipsist world. The *kuśala* mental modes of benevolence, love and sympathy are tolerant and delineating in throwing a bridge across the alienation between persons. They are other-regarding, and provide an escape from the confines of the shell of the ego. As for the universal validity of *Śāntideva's* account of anger and hate as the 'inner enemies' and the idea of *Ksānti* as a *pāramitā*, Robert Frost's Poem 'Fire and Ice' presents an astonishingly admirable statement. The poem deserves to be quoted in *extenso*:

Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I've tasted of desire
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great and would suffice.

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