

Philosophy, Metaphysics and Ethics: A Critical Response to Analytical Trend

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For the thinkers of antiquity, “the mere word *Philosophia* — the love of wisdom — was enough to express this conception of philosophy. In the *Symposium*, Plato had shown that Socrates, the symbol of the philosopher, could be identified with Eros, the son of Poros (expedient) and of Penia (poverty). Eros lacked wisdom, but he did know how to acquire it.”¹ But to now define and analyse the philosophy and its sub-disciplines has become a herculean task because the world has changed a lot. Opposing disciplines have come up, with some alleging that philosophy was dead and obsolete. But it is also important to preserve any particular discipline and its legacy. So we will try to interpret and preserve the legacy of philosophy and its main sub-disciplines while responding to analytical approaches which have somehow moulded the whole course of philosophy and its discipline. As Socrates once pointed out, “A thirsty ambition for truth and virtue and a frenzy to conquer all lies and vices which are not recognized as such nor desire to be; herein consists of the heroic spirit of the philosopher”.²

Philosophy is an umbrella under which so many important disciplines flourish, and if we miss philosophical spirit in those disciplines then those disciplines wholly lose their purpose. Religion becomes superstition, ethics becomes preaching, metaphysics becomes utopia or intellectual mediocrity, etc. Plato said that “philosophy begins at wonder”, his statement somehow indicating towards those questions which are quite metaphysical and have been the part of human curiosity since antiquity. This intellectual thirst for wonder represents the importance of metaphysics. There are also some questions which are directly associated with everyone’s life, like how one ought to live? What we ought to do? What is a good life? How can we live and

die well? With these important questions, we have given these disciplines special space in our paper to analyse their nature, purpose and importance. The question is bound to arise: what is the genuine aim of philosophy, why metaphysics and ethics have been given a special status while neglecting the others discipline like logic and epistemology, etc.? The paper suggests that metaphysics and ethics deserve a special status, while logic and epistemology presides in the centre to help us to move forward in the realisation of self and reality and also help us to attain well-being, just and good life.

Philosophy as a Critical Inquiry and a Way of Life

In analytic speculation, the central concern is mostly located in the field of philosophy of language, mind and epistemology; few thinkers will handle the problem about the metaphysics and ethics directly. Based on the first criticism, many philosophers inside or outside the analytic tradition think that the problems addressed by analytic thinkers are too trivial and academic. Such criticism is very common in the continental tradition. Despite this criticism, analytical philosophy doesn’t lose its value, it has given so much to the philosophical world with its unique methodology and philosophization.

The lacuna which we find in it can be a fill-up with the help of philosophy of antiquity so that both ‘method and matter’ become rich with the help of each other. To anyone familiar with the modern way of doing philosophy, it may seem quite strange that philosophy itself, as a whole, or any philosophy—a discipline of philosophical, however comprehensive—could all by itself constitute, for its adherents, a total, all-consuming way of life. “Philosophy” modern time represents itself as a rigorous academic philosophy, as opposed to work of consolation and service of humanity, including ones that are spoken to contain and advocate a “philosophy as a way of life”. By contrast with such more popular conceptions of

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philosophy, philosophy in the strict and narrow usage is taken for an enterprise of reasoned analysis of language and words, antagonistic argumentation, rigorously disciplined which give no place for ethics of care or any other positive and essential emotion. It should not be an essence of philosophy as Henry David Thoreau penned, "To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school...it is to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically."³

Modern-day anxiety in philosophy is quite critical. Today, some consider philosophy to be a superfluous task, valuable only to those with their "head in the clouds" and time to kill. This view may be partially attributable to the growing interest that contemporary philosophers have with producing ideas intended only for their fellow academics. "...modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for modern specialists."⁴ But it is a crisis which so many thinkers have exploded so many times in the history of philosophy. When philosophy was considered to be a way of life, when one of the main tasks of philosophy was to mould the soul towards goodness from any wrongdoing and evil, philosophy for stoic philosophers was a way to order our life, guide our moral standards, show us what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, and focus on the being good (virtue ethics) rather than discussing what one should do at a particular time and in a situation. "There are indeed mistakes made, through the fault of our advisors, who teach us how to debate and not how to live. There are also mistakes made by students, who come to their teachers to develop, not their souls, but their wits. Thus, philosophy, the study of wisdom, has become philology, the study of words."⁵ These words sound true at the current time when the philosophy of ethics has strongly lost its sight due to the domination of some philosophies such as logical positivism, analytical philosophy, and linguistic trend, etc. The question which strongly demands the attention of the wise people of the world has somehow lost its strength of vowing the intellectual.⁶

In contrast, to present way of philosophizing, the philosophy of antiquity was concerned not with just mere speculation of a word through permutation and combination, but with the attainment of the wisdom of life for the sake of instigating a transformation of self as well as the society and the world. "Modern philosophers are "artists of reason", says Hadot while ancient philosophers were "artists of life".⁷ Philosophy, as it is practised today, is abstract, theoretical, and detached from life, just one academic subject among others. Greek and the Roman philosophical world was something quite different in all sort of conception related to philosophy and its nature, argues the French philosopher, Pierre

Hadot. Philosophy was a normative inquiry and a way of life. Not merely a subject of study and parroting, philosophy was considered an art of living, a practice aimed at overcoming life suffering and shaping it also, and remaking the self according to an ideal of wisdom, knowledge and understating: "Such is the lesson of ancient philosophy: says Hadot in his book philosophy as a way of life an invitation to each human being to transform himself. Philosophy is a conversion, a transformation of one's way of being and living, and a quest for wisdom."⁸

One thing more, philosophy is not just only the reflective activity on the situation of human experience and knowledge or their cognition but it concerns fulfilling and flourishing human life. Philosophical traditions of antiquity accept knowledge or wisdom not only formal reasoning, information, induction, deduction, calculation, computation, etc. but as virtue also and hence philosophy is not confined to formal/logical reasoning only but it is valued and hence practised also. It belongs to the tradition of wisdom that comprises knowledge and cultivation (*Achara and vichara*) — individual and social. Seers, sages, scholars from the antiquity preached what they practised and practised what they thought. They presented a proper harmony between their thought and action, the highest virtue a man can consist of himself. Taking the human aspirations and utility of philosophy in satisfying them in view, talk about the utility of philosophy can relevantly be initiated. "Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand a theory as to the nature of the world and on the other, an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much-confused thinking."⁹

The philosophy of antiquity has never been welcomed as a dry exercise. The seers preach what they live. Thoughts must be disinterested and independent from different allegiances of mind: otherwise, they may misguide the thinking. The openness of thoughts and thinking useful for uncovering wisdom within must dawn in a self-conscious activity. Since discriminating knowledge of what to do is good and what is harmful and hence to be avoided is determined by philosophical reflection, escaping the light of philosophy, not only individual but social, political and ethical life also cannot run properly. "We should exercise ourselves with realities, not with dialectical speculations, like a man who has devoured some textbook on harmonics but has never put his knowledge into practice. Likewise, we must not be like those who can astonish their onlookers by their skill in syllogistic argumentation, but who, when it comes to their own lives, contradict their teachings."¹⁰

Some thinkers proclaim that the techniques, method and predilections of analytic thinking are not only

unhistorical but anti-historical, and primarily against textual commentary. Analytic philosophy might not be uninformed, but it usually tries to seek a very high degree of consistency, clarity and precision of formulation and argument, and it often seeks to be informed by, compliment with natural science. This thing needs to be taken into account, but despite having this strength analytic philosophy might have some pros and cons which need to be addressed for the service and spirit of philosophy like there must be some philosophical material which it will analyse. History of philosophy, metaphysics, and descriptive ethics is that material which deserves to be mean (philosophical material) to be analysed. We should take a history of philosophy including all its disciplines into account according to which we are "edified" by learning of the "great philosophical arguments", and which can be explored and analysed further for the development of philosophy.

Philosophical reflections aim at conceptual clarification, interpretation and lastly wisdom, it indicates the question of risk against philosophy does not hold merit. It is only by taking human aspirations that philosophy fulfils in view that the question of future of philosophy is warrantable. So we need to be emphasised over the applied and normative nature of philosophy which ought to be its bonafide nature since it helps humanity to live not just forced to survive reluctantly. Human is rational as well as social being so harmony and flourishing ought to be its primary requirement. At last, we would quote Cicero, "*unless the soul is cured, which cannot be done without philosophy, there will be no end to our miseries.*"¹¹ Thus, we can imagine and wonder about the importance of applied and normative nature of philosophy.

Respecting Metaphysics and Saving Philosophy

It is a very common notion among modern philosophers that analytical thinking rejects the metaphysics and ethics, to some extent it sounds true but it's not the full picture. It has become conformity among modern thinkers not to even pay attention to the metaphysical queries by considering them 'non-sensical' which somehow leaves a lacuna in analytical philosophization. Analytical thinking and methodology deal with the question, concepts and fundamentals, so if we accept these tasks on the behalf of analytical enterprise then what will be the approach of analytical thinkers regarding metaphysics and ethics. Immanuel Kant used to consider metaphysics as "a bottomless abyss" and "a dark ocean without a shore" while William James considered it "nothing but an unusually obstinate way to think clearly."¹² If we will look at the history of the discipline, examine its subject matter, and search for the optimistic approach in the 20th

century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's influential views on metaphysics, our conception will not be as much nihilistic as much we have adopted.¹³

Ludwig Wittgenstein, as everyone knows, was also quite sceptical about the ability to solve the subject matter of metaphysical puzzles or answer metaphysical questions. As he peened down: "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. . . (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful)."¹⁴ What did Wittgenstein, who it should be noted is by no means the clearest of philosophers, mean when he said that most philosophical propositions and questions are not false, but rather non-sensical?¹⁵ "His point simply follows this: Philosophical propositions are not false, they do not misstate facts which could be correctly stated, for they do not state or misstate any facts at all – they merely look like propositions but are in reality, not propositions in the strict sense. The attempt to say something (in the sense of stating propositions) about what transcends the world (the inexpressible) results in nonsense."¹⁶ In other words, Wittgenstein did not believe that the questions posted by metaphysicians, ethicist and aestheticist would be answerable with the use of language. Instead of the problems of metaphysics, ethicist and aestheticist, according to Wittgenstein, "transcend" the world, or as he put it, "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time." Alternatively, "There are, indeed, inexpressible things. They show themselves. They are what are mystical".¹⁷

However, it should be noted that even though Wittgenstein did not believe that most of the problems of metaphysics and axiology could be answered, yet he was also not completely against the disciplines. He was influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer who gave a well-elaborated and extensive metaphysical system. Wittgenstein himself reveals the legacy of metaphysics and in appreciation of metaphysics, he wrote: "Don't think I despise metaphysics or ridicule it. On the contrary, I regard the great metaphysical writings of the past as among the noblest productions of the human mind."¹⁸ The indispensability of metaphysics is due to its primary objective of explaining the nature of reality. Metaphysics forms the foundation upon which all scientific ideas are resolved and their validity as well as distinct elements established. The fact that all scientific endeavours are aimed at explaining a particular phenomenon, metaphysics comes into play by evoking the inquisitive nature of research with the "what is?" question. It, therefore, forms the core driving force for

any scientific inquiry.¹⁹ Its importance doesn't limit to science only but extends further within the discipline of philosophy. Although it's quite controversial, since antiquity it has provided the foundation most of the discipline of philosophy and human inquires. History of philosophy tells us that it is the foundation and most basic branch of philosophy and philosophical disciplines and rejecting metaphysics radically is an impossible feat, which if it were possible will not only destroy what binds and keeps society together but will also imply the absence of other philosophical disciplines like ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, etc.

Another lacuna which we find in the analytical philosophy or positive philosophy is rejection of metaphysics and ethics and since the 1970s in the 20th century, there is a so-called naturalism movement inside the analytic thinking. The naturalist philosophers suspect the traditional disciplines of philosophy especially those which are most close to human life. The basic idea of naturalism is that philosophy is continuous with science. So, if there is no distinction between philosophy and science, we should refer to science if we want to get the truth in philosophy. This assumption has done so much damage to metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics by attracting the idea of radical realism and evolutionism, etc. if we simply ask if there is no division between science and philosophy, then what will be the difference between the work of science and philosophy. Then the modern allegation that philosophy is dead seems sound. And if we want to tackle such kind of allegations then only disciplines of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics, etc. can help us. We need to propose that reality consists of much more than what we perceive with the senses. Science knows this but its arrogance that only it is right seems quite dogmatic. "Science is a bit like the joke about the drunk who is looking under a lamp post for a key that he has lost on the other side of the street because that's where the light is. It has no other choice."²⁰ This analogy suggests that scientists and drunks have something in common: both seek the truth where the process of seeking is not challenging, rather than where truth is. Here metaphysics and philosophy help us, where the methodological humility lies, the very essence of these discipline lies in the fact that 'knowing is life, accepting is death', and this knowledge-seeking must be consistent and forever.

Sometime analytic trend seems a bit like the medieval scholastics because of their common focus on rigorous analysis. Both are large-scale represents delineated among many different practitioners who specialize in a particular area. Both are effectively subordinated to particular discipline; the scholastics subordinate to theology, the analytics to natural science. The latter one is

a little tenuous, though, since some analytic thinker used to repudiate scientism. The classical analytic philosophy of the 20th century was very much subordinated to science, though, as found in Quine's approach that only philosophy of science is philosophy enough. This approach seems quite radical and a threat to the future of philosophy which needs to be addressed by the thinkers.

For instance, moving from anthropocentrism to cosmo centrism has always been considered a good philosophical approach which analytical trend solely misses. As far as ethical, metaphysical and socio-political arguments are considered, contemporary thinking scenario including analytical approach adds further weightage with anthropological/biological evidence due to its inclination towards natural sciences, as seen in quine's dictum. Well, one more interesting dimension might go with a famous argument (with a hint of evolutionism) that "every cosmo centrism is (in a way) a refined form of (thereby leads to) anthropocentrism only". This sense can be traced in those trends whose arguments focus on or derived out from the influence of the natural sciences phenomena. The analytical trend is one of those trends; it unintentionally justified almost all wrong acts done by a human in the name anthropocentrism like environmental destruction. Thus, it somehow can be traced that how the scientism is a threat to ethics and morality.²¹

Rationality, ethics of justice, analysis, is good but it also has a limit and some lacuna which leaves us incomplete. For instance, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics of care which gives enough importance to emotions, instincts, curiosity, wonder, and suffering and other aspects of the universe need to be accepted in philosophization. And the crisis which we felt about how anthropocentric arguments are quite dominating in the present scenario is genuine to arise, and one of the main reasons behind this would be scientific castism with which so many analytical thinkers like to associate the philosophy. The way it treats to metaphysics, dogmatic faith in sensory experience, consider matter only the foundation of everything and surprisingly consider a matter to be pointless, aimless. How this dogma defines life from a matter which is pointless and meaningless? They are, thus, failing in one of the basic duties of philosophy, which is to keep one's assumptions under review and be willing to seriously question even the most basic of them. So the question and problem which analytical philosophy excludes to address are not so much useless and pointless.

Tackling Some Challenges and Threats of Ethics

Generally, ethics, as it is explored in the Western philosophical tradition from Gracio-Roman to modern times, may be divided into three branches: descriptive

ethics, normative ethics; and meta-ethics. As we classify, the job of the first is to give an objective ground of the moral prescriptions, norms, and values of an individual and community or group and to show how action-guiding precepts and principles are applied in specific contexts. Normative ethics proposes general rules and principles governing how we ought to act and how one ought not to act and tries to define the character and shape of the 'good life' and 'well-being', or the way of life. It also aims to offer philosophical justification, clarification, and validation for norms it seeks to establish. And at last but not the least, meta-ethics finds its task as providing fundamental and conceptual clarification by analysing the meaning of moral concepts and characterizing the philosophical relations in moral arguments. It philosophically (critically) examines the logic of ethical enterprise and validation, and considers the overall question of the vindication of competing for ethical systems.

Our modern thinking scenario is that we care much more about our rights than about our 'good' and responsibility. We are much more hesitant to talk about our goodness: it seems moralistic or elitist. Similarly, we are nervous talking about duties and responsibility because of that a greater amount of our ethical energy or moral senesce goes to protecting claims and rights against each other which includes securing the state of our soul as purely private, purely our own business and whatever is left we put in metaethics. "A system of philosophy is generally tested by its ethical doctrine. Though criticism of life, philosophy is judged by its capacity to improve life" these words were penned by Sarvapali Radhakrishnan regarding the ethics of Vedanta, where he tried to explore and interpret the ethics of the Vedanta. I think we also need to adopt this approach if we are concerned about humanity, and should check every philosophy or system on this parameter. Otherwise, there is more chance that the thing which should be the instrument of human life improvement may become the philology or just the permutation combination of words.²²

Some argue that morality is basically 'individualistic' which is quite problematic. The problem lies in the fact that it will direct morality towards relativism or subjectivism which so many thinkers find a threat to ethics. Now thinkers are searching for the ontological aspect of morality, researching the objective nature of it. So the universalizability standard which is one of the main aims of the ethicist, moral realist and philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Simon Blackburn, Emmanuel Levinas (who establish the ethics as first philosophy and criticized the individualistic conception of morality, because it may justify the brutal act of past century like Hitler's barbarism, Stalin's cruelty etc.), John Rawl's conception of justice, etc. falls apart. Obviously, individual choice,

dignity and freedom is the foundation of any moral principle but a sense of justice ought to govern those choices otherwise crude relativism is waiting for us, so many brutal instances can be traced in the history which is easy to justify based on subjectivism and relativism. We have all learned to become cautious about the physical world. We have a sense that we depend upon it, that it is fragile, and that we have the power to destroy it. Perhaps, fewer of us are sensitive to what we may call the moral or ethical sense or sense of being good. This is the sense of ideas about how to live and die well without harming others first (negative sense of morality) and how can we contribute something in the world and the lives (positive sense of morality).

Typical empiricists like John Locke believed in only two kinds of knowledge: matters of fact/empirical truths and relation of ideas/analytic truths. David Hume sharpened this analytic-synthetic distinction: "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Unfortunately, moral statements fall in neither of the above two categories. It simply means 'grass is green' and 'murder is wrong', which are two different categories of propositions. First one is the empirically verifiable and second one is devoid of truth value, neither true nor false but still can be considered as a moral fact. How? It is not a fact in a scientific term which can be verified or experimented but factual in a sense that we can't experiment on any wrong act then know whether something is wrong or not.

Now, there are various opinions on the nature of moral propositions. A.J. Ayer calls them emotive expressions, few see them as command and for few its approval or disapproval of moral acts. Meanwhile, G.E. More comes into the picture with *Principia Ethica* and argues that the philosopher's job is to explain moral terms. That's all. Whether we take David Hume seriously or not, that's a different issue. But, analytic philosophy is highly influenced by David Hume. Modal logic (including philosophy of language) and cognitive science (including neuroscience) are major areas of interest for analytic philosophers. It needs to be examined as advocated by Alexander Macintyre in his classic book *After Virtue* and Elizabeth Anscombe in her famous paper "Modern Moral Philosophy for the Betterment of Moral Philosophy". G.E.M Anscombe in his famous paper "Modern Moral Philosophy" gave thesis that "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate

philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty — moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say — and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it."

If anyone says one moral statement is same as any other moral statement (moral relativism) then that person is like who is trying to become a grammar expert of a language which he doesn't even know, so it seems quite non-philosophical. Even though some argue that every moral assertion is the same as that of any other but instead of relativism, they preferred term contextualism by using the old wine and new bottle method. Their spirit matches as when a critic asks Heraclitus that if everything is in flux, so does it mean your statement also holds the same principle. Remember what Heraclitus responded. The response (possibly given by one of the followers of Heraclitus, but it's certainly assured that Heraclitus would have agreed on that) would be: "Everything is Flux" is a linguistic statement denoting ontological entities/phenomenon (not metaphysical, to be noted here). Now flux pertains every entity which thereby remains in constant flux, but not a linguistic statement on which the principle of change cannot ever be imposed. In this case, no contextualist is ever denying a minimum reductionist moral principle of a) universality b) necessity and c) objectivity. They are simply asserting that the manifestations might vary as per context (if-then).

This is quite problematic to the objectivity of morality and moral philosophy. Man doesn't seem to be instinctively or essentially morally courageous, and because moral acts take plenty of courage and 'strength of will' so due to this fact one may use the 'if-then' method or contextual approach as a permanent excuse to run away from moral responsibilities. Then an analytical thinker will come up with a well-known question 'but then every scientific/factual statement is technically an if-then statement. Isn't?' It is a real problem where emotive moralists misunderstood moral issues with comparing scientific facts and statements. Objective moral standards is not a fact in the scientific term which can be verified or experimented but factual in a sense that we can't experiment on any wrong act then know whether something is wrong or not. Another objection which a contextualist may have would be that to speak of "plenty of moral courage" and 'weakness of will to be moral agent' sounds too much of self-obsession, maybe a typical trait of the unfinished project of anthropocentrism. Obviously, it is unfinished task of humans to be moral

saint which constantly has to explored, moral perfection is not something that is reached from one point to another, instead it's a process towards which we can proceed and progress. But here both end and mean must be consistent, contradiction free.

It is not easy to convince moral relativist, because there are so many instances which are not actually in the moral domain but to prove their claim relativist forcefully insist them to be moral acts. To prove the theoretical aspect of if-then: 1. If we are practising Hinduism, then we cover our head on our way to temple/gurudwara. 2. If we are a Semite/Christian, we make sure to uncover our head while visiting king/senior/church. At both levels, there is an underlying objective principle of "respecting the respectable", but we can't follow the same behaviour universally, lest it becomes a sort of blasphemy. So if we are in India, then a specific code of conduct, otherwise different. After all, we chose a drowning man over a drowning cat, but in a different scenario, save a drowning cat over a drowning table. It is true when it is advocated what we do? What we ought to do? But when it comes to what we ought not to do (negative aspect of morality) then somehow if and then failed. If I say raping a child is wrong, and then it's wrong, no if will work here. A very valid point but then negative reinforcement sometimes works more efficiently. Relativist insists that rape, in any case, shouldn't be used in case of ethics, but the case of perversion. Any ethical discussion is meant for a regular society (if not ideal). But then what about slavery, sexism and so on. These activities then should also be used in act of perversion, but they don't do this, they just give some historical excuses like slavery and sexism had their connotations, anthologies and contexts which have changed and keep on changing overages. But they forget that these excuses don't convert wrong into right, wrong will be wrong.

Since it is also the work of an ethicist or moral philosopher to speculate about what is right and what is wrong then I think every wrong act should be included in ethics; thus, wrong must be considered wrong and right must be right, irrespective of all condition, especially when it comes to the danger of morality. Thus, since ethics and morality are the true guide of humans which helps us to choose good and well-being, and prevent us to do anything wrong, then it can be concluded that ethics is the most lively part of philosophy. To conclude, "The question "what is good?" is certainly the most important question you can ask...," says Richard Taylor in his famous book *Good and Evil*. For it comes to this: each of us has or might have one life to live, and that life can be, as it commonly is, wasted in the pursuit of specious goals, things that turn out worthless the moment they are possessed, or it can be made a deliberate and thoughtful

art, wherein what was sought and, let us hope, in some measure gained, was something all the while worth striving for. Or we can put it this way: there will come a day for each of us to die, and on that day, if we have failed, we shall have failed irrevocably."²³

Notes

1. Hadot, Pierre, and Arnold I. Davidson. *Philosophy as A Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 110n15, attributed to Epicurus. 1995
2. J. Flaherty, trans. *Socratic Memorabilia*. Baltimore, 1967, p. 147.
3. Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
4. Hadot, Pierre, and Arnold I. Davidson. *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 110n15, attributed to Epicurus, 1995, p. 275
5. Lucius Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, letter-49
6. The idea that ethics should pay special attention to definitions was greatly encouraged by Moore, who in his *Principia Ethical* (1903) advanced a set of views about goodness: it was a non-natural, simple quality that could not be defined (see, Williams, Bernard *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, , Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 126)
7. Ibid.
8. Hadot, Pierre, and Davidson, Arnold I. *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 110n15, attributed to Epicurus. 1995, p. 275
9. Russell, Bertrand. *History of Western Philosophy*, 1961.
10. Ibid, p. 267
11. Cicero, Marcus Tullius, and King, J. E. *Tusculan Disputations*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966, III. p. 13.
12. Goodman, Russell B. Wittgenstein and William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
13. Nihilistic in a sense that as may now be self-evident metaphysics and it's subject matter inquire with some very abstract questions, queries which many thinkers, metaphysicians amongst them, accepts may not even be answerable and soluble. FH Bradley quotes humorously: "*Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct. . .*"
14. Fann, K.T. *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy*, University of California Press, 1969, p. 23.
15. Ibid, p. 27
16. Ibid, 28
17. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1921, extracts edited by D. Cole 1999, <https://www.d.umn.edu/~dcole/phillang/TractatusExerpts1999.htm>
18. Sherry, Patrick. *Religion: Truth and Language Games*, Springer, 17-Jun-1977, p. 46
19. Ochulor, Apebende, & Metuonu, *The Necessity of Metaphysics*, 2011
20. Chomsky, Noam. letter to auother, 14 June 1993.
21. See, Simon Blackburn's famous book *Being Good: A Very Short Introduction to Ethics*, in which he has argued how evolutionism is a threat to ethics along with some other six threats.
22. Empty is the word of that philosopher by whom no affliction of men is cured. For as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not treat the diseases of the body, so with philosophy, if it does not drive out the affliction of the soul. Epicurus fr. 54 Bailey=LS 25C & Just don't go on discussing what sort of person a good person ought to be; be one. Marcus Aurelius, 10.16". See, R.W. Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy*, Routledge, 07 August 2014, p. 1.
23. Taylor, Richard, *Good and Evil (Great Minds)* , Prometheus; revised edition (November1) 1999, p. 173.