

Revisiting Globalization: Mapping Past and Present Trends

BABYRANI YUMNAM AND WASUDHA BHATT

What difference does it make to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless, whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?

-Mahatma Gandhi

Introduction

Or for that matter, as some argue, even under the garb of 'globalization'? Globalization has been the buzzword since the 1990s, and is indeed a distinguishing trend of these times. The new global order has come to be interpreted widely as a 'network society' grounded in new communications and information technology or marking a global fragmentation through a much contested 'clash of civilizations' and even heralding the emergence of 'empire' as producing fresh forms of sovereignty, economy, culture, and political struggle.¹ Evidently, the interplay of the 'global' and the 'local' on the international economic landscape, the social mobility it fosters, the blurring of physical boundaries and the subsequent impressions on the political processes has led to the evolution of a most passionately contested subject. More significantly, the present day world order is marked by calls for equality of opportunity as a way of life, disseminating fuller economic growth, and promoting greater social cohesion across the socio-political divide. As a result, globalization attains critical significance as a cohesive force of social change today. The idea and practice of development is one of the most debated processes of worldwide economic, political and cultural integration.

I. The Globalization of Human Development and the new empirical philosophy

During the ephemeral phase ensuing World War II, when the course of decolonization began, development became the buzzword of not only the scholarship in the West and financial aid agencies but also of the Third World governments who would try to annul the legacy of

underdevelopment that colonialism had enforced. As a majority of the newly independent countries were considered to be underdeveloped according to the development indicators of the time, the post colonial world has ever since, used development as an inevitable, perhaps natural mantra of future progress. So much so that not only did it encompass the hopes of the peoples of newly emerging countries but it also became a goal for the establishment of a society based on egalitarian values for which people aspired and struggled.

However, development brought about processes and events that contradicted the expectations of people of these societies. Critics forwarded the argument that expansion of capitalist accumulation in the underdeveloped/developing world led to amputation of resources from the bulk [of the social order] to benefit the marginal elite in the developed world. In this sense, development came to be criticized as augmenting poverty and underdevelopment through ideas and policies that generated the surplus value for maintaining the relative prosperity of the developed nations while keeping two-thirds of the world population in relative poverty. At the macro-global level too, development as a doctrine and as a state policy essentially came to be seen as harnessing natural resources, and tapping human labor for generation of wealth in the highly developed countries with the aid of technocratic instruments of power.

Development, nevertheless, got its complete political meaning immediately after the Second World War as the process of decolonization began and its antonym, 'underdevelopment' acquired prevalence with President Truman's 1949 Inaugural Address. Truman noted a state of 'underdevelopment' in the postcolonial societies because they did not possess certain features

Babyrani Yumnam is Research Associate at CSDS, Delhi
Wasudha Bhatt teaches Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin

characteristic of the Western societies such as 'scientific advancements and industrial progress' and proposed the Point Four Program based on 'concepts of democratic fair dealing' to help the underdeveloped societies overcome their lack. Since then, development has been constructed as a trope or lack, an inadequacy on the part of institutional mechanisms in the poorer countries.

In the subsequent years, development became a buzzword, both at the academic and policy levels; policy makers sketched varied blueprints to be packaged to various 'underdeveloped' areas.² It is in this backdrop that development policies and planning first took shape, and have continued to be shaped and reshaped in consonance with East-West/North-South tensions and the changing organization of the global political economy.³ But for two-thirds of the people on earth, this positive meaning of the word 'development'—profoundly rooted after two centuries of its social construction—remained a reminder of what they are not and a goal to be achieved. It was a reminder of the absence of human well being, unintentional and deliberate in some parts, for a specific pocket of the world.⁴

More so, the economic development of poor countries as a subject of inquiry acquired prominence only a half-century ago. Classical economists were concerned to identify the social processes that created prosperity, but it was the emergence of independent nations in Asia and Africa, which provoked economic development into becoming a specialized field. In order to discover ways to improve upon contemporary development processes, economists explored the impact of economic decisions on human well being not only in the present and near future, but in the distant future too. Unfortunately, they also became attached to the idea: that an increase in gross national product [GNP] is the key to economic development and poverty elimination.⁵

Thus, clothed in the garb of ethics, development policies attempted to serve as the *raison d'être* for pursuing the modernization path as an attempt to address issues such as elimination of poverty, growth, unemployment, illiteracy and inequality. As a result the promises with which ordinary people of these countries associated development remained largely unfulfilled. With gradual attenuation of well being, problems such as poverty and illiteracy and the powerlessness of the people who lived in such countries became only the external signs of this underlying condition of 'under-development', thereby raising pertinent questions about the ethical implications of development.⁶

The next challenge that confronted social scientists was the need for a new kind of 'empirical philosophy' which, though informed by scientific inquiry, was yet firmly

rooted in social reality. Social scientists thereby needed to:

- Identify and clarify academic concepts of development employed in social science; Consider how poor people themselves perceive development and 'good' life; and
- Confront abstract concepts of development with the views of ordinary people.

Consequently, 'globalization of human development' marking the new world order emerged as the new 'empirical philosophy'.

II Globalization: Expansion of Development

Delving deeper, the development discourse can be seen as a policy apparatus which was posed as a remedy to the age-old problems of poverty, growth and governance. It sought to minimize or reduce the gap between the rich and the poor countries. The gap has always been explained in terms of differences – differences in terms of income, resources, trade, quality of life or standards of living.⁷ Starting with the liberalization years in the 1990s, measures like economic growth, industrialization, access to market resources and services came to be proposed to enable the participation of liberal, democratic nations in the processes of neo-liberal capitalism and globalization. This global economic system has been a subject of much debate and criticism. The Classical Marxists call it the global capitalist system, where the most powerful classes in the most powerful states exercise power. It is also argued to be hegemonic, with US having economic, political and cultural ideological supremacy.⁸ Besides early dependency theorists like used terms like 'superpower', 'metropolis-satellite' to describe the system.⁹ Wallerstein described the world system through the triad concepts of 'centre, semi-periphery, and periphery states.'¹⁰ In essence, these theories evolved to analyze and critique the world order as divided into the developed world thriving on the developing world's resources.

Post Cold War, a 'new world order' characterized by a neo-liberal mode of economic development emerged. Throughout the 1990s, it became an ideal path towards achieving the kind of progress that Western nations achieved and which developing nations sought to emulate. The ideological context of globalization provided the means to achieve similar high rates of growth and development. Globalization, or the increasing integration of economies and societies across the world, is characteristic of innovations in telecommunications, increased interdependence amongst states, and a growing

private sector. It advocated greater trade liberalization and reduced state intervention in the economy. In other words, it is theorized as a product of technological revolution and the global restructuring of capitalism which includes economic, technological, political and cultural features.

The relation between globalization and development is anything but straightforward. It has been hotly debated over the years, across all academic disciplines. Essentially, the underlying theme of both development and globalization is one: the unified vision of eliminating poverty. It is with this vision that the development discourse emerged as a policy framework to minimize or reduce the gap between the rich and the poor countries. Elimination of poverty through economic development came to be proposed as the key ideal construct. The post-War recovery experience in Europe generalized the Western experience that development of the Third World can be achieved through capital.¹¹ It provided enough impetus to propose economically deterministic principles of development as the chosen way to prosperity. The positive appeals of progress, growth and development acquired a legitimate status of organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement. The Modernization Theory coupled with the idea of neo-evolutionism sought to predict the path of development the developing nations were to follow. The work of economists like Rostow's 'take-off stage' of growth and Rosentstein-Rodan's 'big-push theory' provided theoretical support to these claims.¹²

However, critics of globalization have a different story to tell. They have argued that disparities between the developed and developing countries have increased, with the poor being exploited to further enrich the rich. Increased level of globalization is argued to have contributed to uneven distribution of benefits. Citing UNDP's Human Development Report 2001, Stephen McCloskey said that the distortion in income between the richest and the poorest countries grew from 34 to 1 in 1970 to 70 to 1 in 1997.¹³ In assessing progress towards the eradication of poverty in the ten years following the collapse of the eastern bloc, the UN Human Development Report 2000 found that by the late 1990s, the fifth of the world's people living in the highest income countries controlled 86 percent of the global GDP, the bottom fifth controlled just one percent.¹⁴

For those who support it, globalization has accounted for successful improvements in the development scenario of some countries. A 2001 World Bank Report recounts the reduced poverty rates in countries like China, India, Vietnam and Uganda where favourable policies have attributed to these improvements.¹⁵ In 2000, the British

Government's DFID (Department for International Development) published a White paper, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor*, which argued that 'globalization created unprecedented new opportunities for sustainable development and poverty reduction.'

As an agent of development by means of growth and investment, Western countries advocated developing countries to integrate into a global market of commodities and services. The recognition of a singular world system, with a global market was believed to help integrate peripheral economies belonging to limited areas of prosperity into a global economy. This fuelled further criticism that globalization exacerbates global poverty levels in developing countries and dictates their terms of engagement with the global economy. The most direct argument posited is that - through a global capital economy, there emerges a 'governing network' by which control over some nations is easily legitimated. This debate ensued more so in the wake of the institutionalized intervention by international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Established in 1944, these Bretton Woods institutions were charged with the endorsement of international trade and liberalization policies. These institutions disbursed loans and technical assistance to aid countries in various developmental activities of the developing nations. But the failure of Third World countries to match the developed nations' expectations in the 1950s and 1960s generated serious interest among scholars, policymakers, government officials in both the worlds, offsetting more criticism than appraisal. And these institutions came to be seen as the enforcing agencies through which nation states are 'shown' the path to rapid economic development.

The following section examines this critical argument focusing on governance of the world system through the ideology of development.

III Governing Development

The history of development and underdevelopment inevitably takes us to that 'era of development' which heralded the institutionalization of the 'development project'. There emerged categories powerful enough to engage experts to recommend policies adapted to the changing needs of the increasingly globalized world. Hence, development can be seen as a perceptual field structured by a set of relations that produced objectives, goals to be perceived; strategies to be adopted, problems to be registered and forms of intervention. As a space of thought and action, it came to command a legitimate position of authority.

The most visible form in which this authority came to be manifested was in the form of foreign aid – be it grants, loans or humanitarian aid. The concepts of growth and advancement along with the emergence of international organizations and lending institutions established a system of relations and created a space where authority concerned the role of development experts, from whom certain criteria of knowledge were required. Objects to be dealt with were numerous, such as poverty, insufficient technology and capital, rapid population growth, inadequate public services etc. The experts came to command authority of knowledge over the entire cultural, economic and political geography of the Third World. The economists and policy experts came to command authority and occupy a space whereby they recommend development policies to be adopted or changed according to the changing needs of the increasingly globalized world. New directions of development thinking emerged with focus on reorientation of policies.

As the decades progressed, new problems came to be selectively incorporated such as the shift from basic needs approach towards development in the 1970s to adjustment lending in the 1980s and re-focusing on poverty alleviation programmes in the 1990s. Thus development came to acquire a discursive character when representations of reality were applied to specific Third World Cases in the years following the World War II and the Cold War years. This discursive character came to be reinforced and redefined by official documents on development such as the UNDP's *Human Development Reports* and the World Bank's *World Development Reports*. These documents adopted a structured operational approach that involve systematic and better coordinated implementation of integrated strategic frameworks for development. Aiming to outline the role of policy measures in meeting new challenges and introducing new approaches to achieving maximum development effectiveness, they acquired a mass appeal as techniques of development communication and information dissemination. Through these reports and assessments of performance by recipients, the mapping of the economic and social life of the countries into a political anatomy of the Third World was possible.¹⁶ Thus development as a space of thought and action gained ground. The role of the experts in defining this perceptual field is indispensable. Reusse's analysis of the interventionist paradigm in terms of the 'epistemic communities' spoke of the relationship between knowledge and power.¹⁷ Epistemic communities as professionals in the area of development aid facilitated an interventionist paradigm and influenced policy

coordination.

Further, Crewe and Harrison defined development intervention as involving a set of institutions, policies and practices with an identifiable history. In this sense, activities of organizations like the World Bank, IMF, UN, bilateral donors and NGOs can be described as 'development.'¹⁸ Through structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and conditionality lending, they sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to do away with poverty and misery. The perception of development continues to rest on an assumption of inadequacy on the part of the institutional recipients in poorer countries. Thus, development as a discourse has a historical formation articulated around the construct of a trope of lack or degeneracy that is perpetually reinvented with each shift in development policy.

Now the functioning of these policies, institutions and practices draw attention to the forms of international organizations, the internationally shared norms, rules, and procedures governing development policies and shifts in policies over the decades. Viewed as a hierarchy of bodies whose practices converge around a set of rules, norms and principles, the development apparatus required conformity to a 'system of power' within a wider realm of international politics. Political perspective provided by Keohane and Nye are instrumental.¹⁹

Thus a shared ideology of a world economy transformed into an integrating force that sought to integrate national economies into a single world order, setting the parameters of development choices and process in the Third World recipients. This world order was characterized by ideas of neoliberal globalization. The SAPs and stabilization measures served as interventions to strengthen the international economic order dictated by economic incentives, private property and free markets.

World system analysts like Wallerstein and Dependency Theorists like Frank posited that capitalism, as a global system of exchange, did more harm than good.²⁰ Fouad Makki argued that world historical processes established U.S. as the global hegemonic power under which the world market came to be restructured.²¹ Market liberalism found expression in the establishment of supranational organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. The post-War U.S. supremacy came to be codified and expressed in an interlocking system of alliances such as the NATO, SEATO, OAS, CENTO, and the U.S.-Japan Security Pact. During the Cold War, Communist revolutionary triumphs in China, Korea, Vietnam and Cuba led the U.S. to identify its main strategic objective as containing communism and upholding of the integrity of the capitalist world market.

The new paradigm of neoliberal model of economic development institutionalized the dominance over and hence governance of the developing economies and their peoples. The advent of the ideology of globalization in the 1990s coincided with developments in electronics and information technology that accelerated the dynamics of time-space compression. This spatio-temporal transformation required a corresponding transformation in the state-market relations.²² The political ideal of neoliberalism is a world in which all states share a common normative commitment to a single global market unfettered by social and political obstacles. Private and transnational financial institutions also subscribe to this ideology.

Trade is another agency through which governance is argued to be extended. With focus on liberalization policies that sought to reduce state protectionism of domestic markets, the World Trade Organization is criticised as effectively controlling the policy agenda for global trade and economic development. Established on January 1, 1995, it is composed of 144 members, 80 per cent of which are developing countries. The decision-making process is often regulated by U.S., Japan, Canada and the European Union.²³ The World Trade Organization regulates agreements on agriculture, services (telecommunications and finance) and intellectual property rights. Negotiating and implementing the rules of global trade provides the WTO with enormous influence over the economic development of Third World countries. Influence is wielded by means of policies such as 'open economies' and 'free trade economics.' Developed countries espouse the benefits of such policies yet protect their own domestic economies. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture is designed to reduce subsidies to farmers and protect members' domestic markets from cheap food imports. However, the European Union (E.U.) and the U.S. government continue to subsidize farmers at an annual rate of \$360 million. The UN estimates that the cost of this protectionism to the Third World economies to be 'an export income of \$2 billion a day'.²⁴ Oxfam reports that U.S. cotton subsidies, through the price depressing effect, imposed a loss of 1 per cent of GDP to the economies of Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso. It also reports that U.S. subsidies for 25,000 American cotton growers are thrice the amount of foreign aid to Africa's 500 million people each year.²⁵ Agreements like the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and (TRIPS) Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights are particularly damaging to the economies of developing countries.²⁶

IV Governing the Global

The liberalist strategy of economic reforms has come to institutionalize development as an instrument for effective control of those who are considered as unable to govern themselves (here referring to those who are the peripheralized recipients). This concept of governance is applied to the ability of states to contain poverty and promote economic growth. Development intervention through policy measures is thus justified by the positive goal of poverty alleviation. As amply demonstrated by the regulatory mechanisms of the development apparatus, policies and practices allow different players to participate in different forms of government. For Foucault the emergence of the concept of population rationalized power in diverse forms of government and different forms of rule came to be associated with specific knowledge.²⁷ Thus, poverty as a specific problem concerning certain sections of the world population became an object for liberalism.

In the early years of its inception, especially in the sixties, the goal of development oriented itself towards improvement of populations through the benchmarks of certain social and economic characteristics. The development strategies of the seventies focusing on poverty and sponsoring anti-poverty programmes became strategies for intervention, changing from lending for infrastructure support to economic growth to 'biopolitics'.²⁸ Hence strategies like basic needs, public services and poverty provided valid reasons for the target and object of government. Grants and loans became essential to the structure of governance by international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. The debt crisis of the eighties demanded a greater commitment to a liberal order from the subjects of the development project. As a new site of authority, the geographical site of Washington came to acquire a 'Panopticon view' of the global economic space.²⁹

Thus development policies linked to policy reforms under structural adjustment loans came to work as instruments of governance. The principle of conditionality became a governing technology used to coerce developing countries to integrate themselves in a global space disciplined by the market. The national governments are 'depoliticized' in this process, economic reforms required the market forces to control the state.³⁰ Thus policies become instruments for the changing patterns of Western and international governance. And the goal of development became an instrument for enforcing economic reforms. The nineties witnessed a change in the governance pattern. Calling for countries to 'own' the development process, governments were

expected to engage in a policy dialogue, which included the civil society, NGOs and the poor themselves. The late nineties saw the emergence of a new governing mentality: bilateral aid and grants to reward those who conform. This mentality can be seen in the Millennium Challenge Account, which seeks to bring about policies of 'just rule' and 'economic freedom'.³¹ The Millennium Challenge Account was characterised by greater conditionalities, which developing nations must satisfy in order to be eligible for development assistance. It was seen as a fresh attempt by the U.S. to control and govern the world economic and political space from its hegemonic position in Washington. The global order, especially the Third World, came to be represented by a division of countries on the basis of reform-conducive good governments. Countries where economic reforms can promote market qualities conducive to development such as China and India were on one side. Those on the other side are beyond reform; these were the failed states, 'hopeless cases' like Chad, Haiti or Angola where use of force has been recommended.³² And liberalization was to play the role of managing and differentiating these groups by selecting good governments. For instance, according to the MCA, development assistance will be directed to nations satisfying the criteria of: (a) good governance, including rooting out corruption and adherence to the rule of law, (b) investment in health and education and (c) economic freedom or policies that are conducive to open market mechanisms. Thus a representation of the global world order along the lines of civilization came to be constituted. This paradigm, Samuel Huntington argued, is a 'clash of civilizations' with 'hate dynamics' emerging, thereby fuelling a security concern in international relations.³³ In this new cartography of power, underdevelopment became dangerous and harmful. With increasing globalization, fluidity and mobility of populations across transnational borders surged. So also increased the problems associated with it such as 'weapons, drugs, disease, hate and envy.' USAID collated this phenomenon with U.S. security concerns.³⁴

Post September 11 2001, U.S. assumed the responsibility to control terror, defend 'civilized society' and stop 'wrongdoing' by employing military force. Examples of such intervention could be seen in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq. The goal of development was thus geared to contain the problems posed by mobility of populations and development aid budget acquired a tendency to turn into a 'tool of war diplomacy' thus calling for a 'new imperialism'.³⁵ Paul Krugman called this strategy the 'Martial Plan' in cynical mimicry of the Marshall Plan.³⁶

Thus, development policy has been and still is a

powerful instrument of governing and controlling populations. As a type of power, it was argued to aim to persuade rather than inform.³⁷ This ability to exercise authority was enabled by the concurrent indices of economic, commercial and political supremacy. This power arose from its intervention in the affairs of those who suffer from the stigma of being poor in the name of freedom from poverty. From targets of intervention, the poor have transformed into an obstacle to economic reforms and globalization. It was this dangerousness of poverty that has legitimized the function of development as something 'objective, neutral and legal'.³⁸ This function was deemed extremely successful in masking the political nature of development policies. Modern power necessitates the cloaking of the political with neutrality; development is thus a very effective form of modern power.

The development project still continues to rest on an assumption of inadequacy on the part of the poorer countries. There are structural inequalities and power imbalances that shape this assumption. Amidst global currents of business and politics, powerful institutions and the policies they make affect millions of lives on this planet. And the structure and workings of market fundamentalism are not going to be easily abandoned.

V Mapping the World Economy

The relation between international development and global governance is a complex phenomenon mired in the political, social and economic currents of the world. Development and globalization have become contested ideologies and discourses. Economic globalization as a transformative process has been more used as a theoretical scapegoat to explain every cause and outcome in the global economy. The most popular argument against it is the idea of governance – governing identified spaces in the global economy. Linked to this concept of exercising power and control are concepts like 'imperialism, internationalism, globalism etc. Rather like the Gramscian notion of 'hegemony', governance or governmentality has become a core concept within a wide range of studies of power, order, subjectivity and resistance. It is with its primary concern with power and its various configurations that governmentality became primarily important to social science research, particularly development studies. In the context of a changing world, the proliferation of discourse concerning globalization, global governance, liberalism and neo-liberalism required the extension of studies beyond the local and national systems of rule. At a time when ideas of neo-liberalization and globalization came to be wedded to the need for international development, global

governance studies came to be more significant to social science research.

Hence the development debate gave rise to the study of enduring 'regimes' of institutionalized international cooperation.³⁹ Manifest in the policies and international institutions that provide directions for development action, anti-globalization and anti-development, the understanding of the development debate needed an understanding of the conditions of socio-economic interdependence amongst states. Hence policies such as privatization, trade liberalization, marketization; economic phenomena such as the rise of international economic institutions (IMF, WTO etc); and ideological shifts such as the valorization of the market over the state needed analysis as processes of fundamental restructuring of the world political economy. One particular popular response to the question of global order is that of new imperialism/empire.⁴⁰ Various interpreted as US imperialism or a wider empire predicated on certain globalise norms and values, it revolves around the features of 'expansiveness, hierarchization, forms of governance linked capitalism and distinctive crises'.⁴¹

The emphasis on global markets and the new prominence of international institutions can also be seen as a response to the problem of governing citizens, to address the question of poverty while at the same time perpetuating a relationship in which the poor are objects of intervention.⁴² Rather than compartmentalizing the debate between supporting or negating the effects and causes, the study of the processes of globalization and governance can provide an open space for dialogue between various disciplinary research agendas. It would not be wrong to contend that the critique labelled against the development has come in the wake of territorialisation of the Third World. Neo-liberal globalization as a new development discourse however should not tempt us to pessimistically view that the target-countries are passive victims of the exercise of developed nations' economic power. It operates on a logic of counter-discourse and resistance too. Escobar accounts for such 'sites of resistance' as questioning the 'epistemology of the market in the name of alternatives deriving from within and beyond the market system'.⁴³ They entail the negation of the universalization of capitalist modernity – at least in its neo-liberal form.

VI. Conclusion: New challenges of the present day globalization

So far, the global system had been dominated by players such that of US, Europe and Japan especially during the 1980-2000 wave of globalization. The present day twenty-

first century globalization has thrown up challenges of unprecedented scale and magnitude not only to these economies but also for social scientists. Characteristic of the new wave of global integration are changing relations of trade, diffused financial concentration and multi-polar centres of production and consumption. In a marked change from the past trends, the current era of globalization is witnessing the rise of the South, growing faster than the North. Erstwhile underdeveloped and developing nations in Asia, Latin America and even South Africa are competing for global market shares.

During the period of 1980-2000, US-led WTO, NAFTA and APEC dominated negotiations for trade relations and pacts. Rise of regional and inter-regional trade relations have come to question the old core-periphery relations. For example ASEAN+3 is being hailed as having the potential to emerge as the world's largest trade bloc thereby sidelining the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).⁴⁴ The Asian market would no longer be dependent on the American market. Newly industrializing economies (NIEs) such as that of China, India and Brazil are indicative of a shift in power relations in the global economy. Twenty-first century globalization has also pointed out another significant development - the vulnerability of neo-liberalism. The recent economic crisis originating in the U.S. created ripple effects in crumbling world markets but showed the resilience of mixed economies such as that of China and India.

Most importantly, the institutional architecture of global governance i.e., the IMF, World Bank and WTO has been weakened by the failure of structural adjustments policies, falling short of achieving goals to reduce poverty such as the Millennium Development Goals. Meanwhile, G20, G77 and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are acquiring increasing significance in influencing policy-decisions. Consequently, the idea of a 'hegemon' is losing its position; giving rise to a new multi-polar global system. New networks of interdependence through international markets, technological interventions and movement of populations across physical boundaries serve to reinforce this new trend of globalization.

To one disenchanted with Eurocentric notions of development and progress, these current trends could indicate a positive development that tilt the axis of a new world order. The current reality is thus of phenomenal changes in the capitalist world-economy – 'an age of transition' with no certain outcome.⁴⁵ However, the unmistakable ideas of economic determinism still underlie the analysis and explanation of the twenty-first century globalization. Economic indicators of trade, capital and markets still continue to imbue our

observations and arguments. But the very problem which shaped development policies for an equal world – inequality – continues to remain elusive till today. In fact, global inequality has acquired new forms today. It has reduced the gap between advanced economies and NIEs but increased within the NIEs. Problems like unemployment, poverty and homelessness which were characteristic of the poor countries are also being reported from countries like U.S., U.K., Australia and Japan. Knowledge economies and technological advancements have produced vast skill differentials within NIEs that are further aggravated by free market forces, multinational and new global businesses brought about by fast integrating economies. As a result, policies aiming at fast growth have also produced a declining agricultural economy, rural displacement and urban poverty in countries like China and India which are far more marked today.

Thus the present globalization trends mark an unprecedented scale and magnitude of structural shifts in the world. The understanding of these shifts requires the recognition and acceptance of multiple regional centres, multiple modernities that transcend the Eurocentric model of unilinear growth. Social science, particularly Sociology, faces the indomitable task of observing, comparing and looking for theoretically discernable patterns of social change. The perplexities of a comprehensive theorization will depend upon how the economic phenomena affect the social and cultural lives of billions across the world.

NOTES

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24. Data is sourced from Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, UK.
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26. GATS, ratified in 1994, is designed to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations in the area of service delivery that are considered to be barriers of trade. Services prone to privatization under this agreement include education, health, water supply, sanitation etc. TRIPS seek to patent 'intellectual property' that includes medicines and agricultural seeds that are mostly indigenous to the developing countries. This agreement will affect food and commodity production and induce decreasing access of people to life saving medicines in the developing countries. The World Development Movement website (www.wdm.org.uk) provides useful information on matters related to global trade and investment issues.
27. Michel Foucault, "The Birth of Biopolitics." In P. Rabinow ed., *Michel Foucault. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential*

- Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Vol.1. Translated by Robert Hurley et al. (New York: New Press. 1997), pp. 73-79.*
28. Ibid: p 79. Biopolitics is the way in which political power administers life by disciplining the biological body and regulates populations on the basis of biological processes like reproduction, birth, death etc. the entire series of interventions and regulatory controls subjugate bodies and control populations through 'bio-power.'
 29. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*. Translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977). Used by Foucault in the context of discipline used in prisons, this term refers to the systems of surveillance that are not always visible but there is a general awareness of its existence. It is neither an institution, nor an apparatus but a form of power that elicits compliance and discipline thus denoting an increase in the power of those who dominate.
 30. Cristina Rojas, "Governing through the Social: Representations of Poverty and Global Governmentality". In Larner and Warner eds. *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces* (London: Routledge, 2004), p 104.
 31. Geoffrey Gilbert, *World Poverty: A Reference Handbook* (USA: ABC-CLIO Inc, 2004), p. 99.
 32. Samuel Huntington, 1996, p. 266.
 33. C. Rojas, 2004, pp. 109-110.
 34. USAID, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest*, 2002, p 1. It is argued that just as tools, ideas and resources for progress can quickly move from industrial to developing countries, many forms of risk stability can travel in the opposite direction. (For further details see <http://www.usaid.gov/fani/overview/index.htm>).
 35. C. Rojas, 2004, p. 111.
 36. Paul Krugman, "The Martial Plan," *New York Times Online*, 2003. Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/21/opinion/21KRUG.html>.
 37. Raymond Apthorpe, "Writing Development Policy and Policy Language. Plain or Clear: On Language and Power." In Cris Shore and Susan Wright eds. *Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 43.
 38. Cris Shore and Susan Wright eds. *Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 8.
 39. Larner and Warner eds. *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces* (London: Routledge, 2004), p 8.
 40. Martin Coward, "The Imperial character of the contemporary world order." *Theory and Event*, 2005, 8(1).
 41. Martin Coward, "The Globalization of Enclosure: Interrogating the geopolitics of Empire." *Third World Quarterly*, 2005, 26(6), p. 857.
 42. Ibid: p. 9.
 43. Arturo Escobar, "Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalization Social Movements." *Third World Quarterly*, 2004, 25 (1), p. 221.
 44. ASEAN+3 include the countries of China, Japan and Korea in addition to the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
 45. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World-System*. Fernand Braudel Centre, 1999. Accessed at <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwtrajws.html>.