

Engaging with the Problems of Life Exploring the Notion of 'Deep' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Thoughts

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Introduction

Can philosophy provide answers to the question of life? Ludwig Wittgenstein is convinced that academic philosophy is not the answer to the questions of life and its problems. At least that is the impression one gets from reading works by him and on him. For holding such a view against academic or traditional philosophy, he was labelled by some as “debunker” of philosophy.¹ A similar view on Wittgenstein was expressed by Richard Rorty. After characterizing various views on the future of philosophy, he raised this question with Wittgenstein's pessimist view at the back of his mind, “Does that mean philosophy will have come to an end – that philosophers will have worked hard themselves out of a job?”² What is Wittgenstein's idea of philosophy anyway? Is Wittgenstein's engagement with life's problems outside the purview of philosophy? What did he say about life and its problems? A significant portion of this paper is directed, explicitly or tacitly, towards these questions. While reflecting on issues related to the problems of life, Wittgenstein frequently uses the metaphorical ideas of 'deep' and 'shallow'. However, despite the repeated use of this pair of words by Wittgenstein, neither he nor anyone is known to have made serious attempt to explain what these words mean. Therefore, attempt is being made in this paper to understand what these two terms could possibly mean for Wittgenstein. Following this, I try to show how this pair of words is related to his understanding of life and its problems. Towards the end, I suggest that understanding these terms may enable us to both understand and appreciate better why

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Wittgenstein philosophized the way he did. Though I borrowed insights from literatures other than philosophy, I depended heavily on two books for the present analysis, namely, Wittgenstein's *Culture and Values*³ and Rush Rhees' *Personal Recollections*.⁴

The Deep and the Shallow

M. O'C. Drury, a friend of Wittgenstein, made an insightful observation, “There are two words which are frequently used by Wittgenstein: 'deep' and 'shallow'.”⁵ He goes on to provide a classification of some philosophers by Wittgenstein:

Berkley and Kant – *deep*
Schopenhauer – *shallow*
Ayer – *incredibly shallow*

Three statements of Wittgenstein given below provide us with a good entry points into his framework of thinking. In what follows, attempt is being made to locate these statements into appropriate contexts. I then try to weave together a possible interpretation around them in order to make sense of the pair of words in question – deep and shallow. Wittgenstein states that (in different contexts):

- i. His thoughts are 100% Jewish⁶
- ii. There is no tragedy in Jewish culture⁷
- iii. There is no tragedy for a truly religious person⁸

To begin our analysis of this pair of words – deep and shallow, I treat them primarily as figures of speech or metaphorical expressions. Though the two words may have independent meanings, I treat them as a kind of binary opposites. Accordingly, I attempt to make sense of the former mainly and derivatively treat the latter as its opposite without any explanation or analysis.

The *deep* is not what is directly provided to the eyes or the senses. It is not factual or empirical in nature. It is not a part of the world of observables. Wittgenstein writes, "What is eternal and important is often hidden from a man by an impenetrable veil. He knows: there is something under there, but he cannot *see* it. The veil reflects the daylight"⁹. On a similar note, Putnam remarks, "What concerned Wittgenstein was something that he saw as lying *deep* (mine) in our lives with language"¹⁰. Wittgenstein assumes that there is an unbridgeable divide between what is penetrable by reason (logic) and what is not. This is in addition to the divide between the two worlds of observable and unobservable. There are unobservable aspects of the world or reality which appeal to our reason or are accessible by reason. Thus, the term "see" can be taken to mean an intellectual eye or a logical eye. The line is imperatively drawn and going by this interpretation, the deep is what is impossible to grasp either by the senses or by reason. As such, it is important to note that the core of what constitutes the deep and the core of what constitutes the subject matter of our reason are substantially different though the line of division cannot be clearly drawn. It is relative to what is on my right and what is on my left, or what is in front of me and what lies behind me, at any given point of time. The cognitive subject or the self, stands at the middle and constitute the borderline of the two.¹¹

Rhees in one context makes a half-hearted attempt to understand the term "deep" when Wittgenstein expressed his desire to go to Russia claiming that his reasons were deep and good. He intuitively feels that the term used by Wittgenstein in this context probably has something to do with reflection of his [Wittgenstein] life and philosophy¹². One can pick up some clue here and ask: "What is his idea of life?" "What is his idea of philosophy?" For tackling these questions, let us turn to Wittgenstein himself though we will have to do it in a round-about manner. He confesses that his thoughts are hundred percent *Hebraic*¹³; and that 'being a *Jewish* is a way of thinking or a tendency of spirit; being a Jew is a much deeper riddle ... [therefore we need to] analyse [it] in as great a depth as possible'.¹⁴

On Being a Jew¹⁵

The immediate task before us then is this: "How do Jewish people think?" "What is their tendency of spirit like?" These are big and subjective questions and the constraints of writing this paper may not allow us to adequately address them. However, at the risk of misrepresentation, I will limit my discussion mainly to the three statements of Wittgenstein listed above to engage with these questions. The key words are "Jewish" and "tragedy". I will not take

up these two concepts one by one, but rather side by side. The context of discussion will make it clear.

As noted above, Wittgenstein observes that the Jews have no concept of tragedy. To quote him, "tragedy is something un-Jewish".¹⁶ In the same context, he illuminates this point by using a metaphor – a tragedy occurs when a tree breaks instead of bending. The idea is to hold on, to carry on as much load and pressure as possible without giving up. To break down is to end up in tragedy.¹⁷ If we look at the Jewish history and biblical narratives, they had suffered much misery and pain as a nation; they were defeated in wars; they were exiled and enslaved; they were oppressed in their own homeland and also dispersed from their homeland. Only in 1948, since the fall of their last kingdom (that is, Hasmonean Dynasty¹⁸) after about 2000 years, Israel got back a portion of their homeland or nation-state. However, despite their long struggle and unimaginable suffering for identity and homeland, they did not give up hope, their *Messianic* or *Zionist* hope, throughout their history. It is interesting to note that the term "Israel" is a name given to Jacob (the grandson of the Patriarch Abraham) by God which in Hebrew means "wrestle with God."¹⁹ In the story, Jacob got this name after he struggled with God to get his blessings. If the name captures their national imagination in any significant sense, then the name "Israel" is synonymous with the idea of struggle and overcoming it without giving up.

In keeping with their *Zionist* hope, the Israelites held on to their theological beliefs. Their mainstream theological beliefs are inseparable from their historical narratives, and also their stories of defeat, shame and humiliation. They believed that those hard times were God's judgment upon them for their sins. They were convinced that the same God who punished them with great sufferings would also in due time bring about their deliverance. Judgment is a means of healing the people or purging the people from their sins. And so they refused to be broken; while being oppressed and victimized, they refused to develop a defeated and victimized mind-set. They did not allow themselves to despair. One of their prophets writes in the Bible, "This is what, the LORD, the God of Israel, says: 'Like the good figs, I regard as good the exiles from Judah, whom I sent away from this place to the land of the Babylonians.'" (Jeremiah 24:5); the same prophet continues to prophesy in another chapter, "'For I know the plans I have for you,'" declares the Lord, "plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future.'" (Jeremiah 29:11). The prophet was writing in the context of Israel's captivity and exile in Babylon during the 6th century BCE. "This 'way of thinking' or 'tendency of spirit' is what drove them to hold on to life even against all odds. Every event in history was part of

a greater narrative and part of a divine purpose. As such, there is no tragedy for them because their history begins and ends with their belief in a Sovereign God who is in control of the history of humankind. Read this way, it is clearly evident that being a Jew is almost inseparable from the idea of being religious.

On Being Religious

Religion is a way of life, a way of life that connects or binds one with the others including reality itself. Every religion teaches us to transcend our individual egos and to see ourselves in a web of life system, to connect us with something bigger and more powerful than ourselves (to keep us humble), and also to connect us with something smaller or weaker than ourselves (to practice compassion). The basic principle that underlies all religions is the moral obligation on the part of the self (individual or group) towards others (humans or nature). Perhaps, drawing insights from this aspect of religion, Wittgenstein wants to say that the values and meanings of things and life are knitted together into the whole, not in isolation or in parts, and certainly not self-centered or self-seeking. For instance, in the Jewish worldview, there is nothing that is outside the purview of religion. As such, a truly religious person is able to connect with everything through the very power or principle that is holding together everything. Every shade of light and darkness in life is but a part of the larger picture. Such a worldview would deny the possibility of tragedy because such a person will see the whole picture and not the constituent parts. It is probably for this reason that he makes a generalized remarks, "*For a truly religious person, nothing is tragic*".²⁰

It appears that, at times, Wittgenstein treats the notion of 'being religious', including his *Jewishness*, as a metaphorical tool to express his thoughts. It is a *way of life* with a point of view. So for him, to be religious is not necessarily to believe in some particular God or to have a collective religious identity.²¹ It may simply mean having an eye to see things beyond their surfaces; it is to see coherent connection of things at the deeper level which otherwise appear to be unconnected or even conflicting at the surface level; it is also to have a viewpoint with a sense of direction or purpose from where we see everything that happens in life as essential as opposed to seeing some as essential and some others as accidental. Accordingly, he holds that if one truly understands one's life, one should not take one's unheroic *nature* as an unfortunate irregularity but as an essential quality.²² In other words, there is no selective acceptance or rejection of certain aspects of life.²³ A philosophical view that engages with *questions of life* in such a manner as to construct or offer a

point of view as sketched above may be termed as 'deep'. As such, the idea of deep in the context of Wittgenstein's philosophical reflection is inseparable with the idea of life and seeks to provide one with a viewpoint to *see* life. Putnam believes, and I think correctly, that the Jewish philosophers (including Wittgenstein) he examines in his book²⁴ are against *theorizing* (his) about God, or religion for that matter, in their philosophical works on the one hand, and on the other, they all seem to agree with Philo of Alexandria, a philosopher of first century AD, that philosophy is a *way of life*, "a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant; and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual's life".²⁵

Deep Thinking and Shallow Thinking

The foregoing discussions strongly suggest that what is deep is also whole. Religion which generally encompasses the whole of life is in that sense deep. Wittgenstein is convinced that many things that matter most in life are neither supported nor sustained by good reasons, compelling evidence or sound argument.²⁶ For this reason, he probably thinks that the modernists are the most deceived people.²⁷ Modern logic is primarily the language of description, description of the structure of reality or world. As such, this structure is *seeable*. The ultimate truth which logic arrives at is dependent on its atomic parts. In contrast, religion is not atomistic. Its basic beliefs and values are not self-evident as in the case of logic. They are independent of and beyond the realm of rational or logical inquiry. Its concern is not fact or empirical truth. In this sense, religious beliefs are not ultimately dependent on logical argument. Logical reasoning can neither justify nor nullify religion because their basic principles and domains are different. Moreover, since reason as understood by modern logicians and scientists deal essentially with descriptive aspect of life and the world, it is inadequate to represent or explain the non-descriptive functions of language and thought; it cannot be used to prove or justify the whole of life. To do that, it would run into some obvious logical difficulties.

Going a step further, Wittgenstein thinks that logic cannot teach us much about reasoning itself.²⁸ In other word, reasoning for him is more than formal logic. It is as much about why we reason or ought to reason as it is about how we ought to reason. In this broad sense, reasoning has to include reflection. However, reflection is not a standard logical reasoning in that it need not be about derivation of a conclusion from a set of given premises. Rather it is more about seeing the plausible

connection of ideas and things in relation to life, things that happened or yet to happen, taking into consideration our natural inclinations and personal desires or fears as well. It is like running a thread through a set of pearls of different shapes and sizes to get a necklace. It goes round and round in a kind hermeneutic circle. It is creative reasoning that involves interpretive skills. This kind of reasoning or philosophizing may be termed as "Deep Reasoning." It is primarily philosophizing. It is reasoning with basic values and concepts. As such it is neither logic, nor philosophical logic nor philosophy of logic. Deep reasoning is more about reasoning from a point of view than reasoning to arrive at a point of view though it is futile keep them apart. The process may involve removing ambiguities and even accommodating or enduring vagueness and tension without anxiety. In deep reasoning, one has to find purpose or value or meaning in this thread of reasoning as a whole in contrast to truth which a standard logical reasoning seeks to establish at the end; it is to see the necklace, a work of art, as a whole and probably get aesthetic experience too.

Against this background, we may try to make sense of Wittgenstein's 'deep and good' reason to go to Russia and subsequent observation of Rhees that this 'deep and good' reason has something to do with 'reflection of his life and philosophy.' Summing up the above points, we can see that formal logic which is about relation of descriptive sentences is incapable of representing or solving life's questions and problems. Standard reasoning in logic and science by its very nature is mainly concerned with objects which are given to us either through our senses or through our intellect. They are 'seeable' and that is why reasoning in logic and science may be understood as shallow. In contrast, ethics and aesthetics, including religion, are concerned with subjects whose problems arise not by encountering life at the empirical realm but by the interpretation of it. At the end, one can experience beauty, and probably, that is why he says that ethics is better understood as aesthetics. As such, it takes deep reasoning to *see* the problems of life and also to make them *disappear* in life. Wittgenstein's exemplary incidences which will be discussed in the immediately following section are indicative of this kind of reasoning or philosophizing.

If our above analysis is correct or even somewhat close to being correct, then it is not surprising that he finds Ayer, one of the strongest proponents of logical positivism, "incredibly shallow".²⁹ Also in the same light, we can make sense of his remarks: "I may find scientific questionings interesting, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual* and *aesthetic* questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems; but not the other sort" [that is, conceptual and aesthetic].³⁰

Lessons from Wittgenstein's Engagement with Life's Problems

When his friend, Drury, expressed his difficulty in reading some violent passage in the Bible, Wittgenstein pointed out that that is not the way to read the Bible.³¹ The biblical passage is given below:

"As he [prophet Elisha] was walking along the road, some boys came out of the town and jeered at him, "Get out of here, baldy!" they said. "Get out of here, baldy!" He turned around, looked at them and called a curse on them in the name of the LORD. Then two bears came out of the woods and mauled forty-two boys." (2 Kings 2: 23-24).

In all probability, Wittgenstein is referring to the basic hermeneutic principle that passages in the Bible should not be read in isolation. Bible reading is not cherry picking. It has to be read in the light of the truth of the whole. And so he chides his friend, "You are quite out of your depth".³² His use of the term "depth" in this context somewhat confirms the above suggestion that depth comes from seeing the inter-connectedness of things and from the understanding of the whole.

The idea is to see life as a whole and embrace every incident of life as a part of the greater whole and not to understand them in isolation. This is necessary to appreciate the creativity of life. This artistic analogy is apt. In order to have aesthetic experience, we have to see the artwork as a whole. Removing or suppressing the negative parts of life will only make the storyline incomplete. The meaning and value of an artwork, especially narratives, is not the sum total of the function of its parts. Rather the meanings are defined in relation to how they occur in the light of the whole story.

Wittgenstein writes:

"The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear... a man who lives rightly won't experience the problem as sorrow, so for him it will not be a problem, but a joy rather; in other words for him it will be a bright halo round his life, not a dubious background".³³

In addition to the above, let me also add two more quotes to throw more light and also to strengthen the point he is making:

- i. "Problems in life like sorrow and pain can be solved at the level of the deep."³⁴
- ii. "I am not a religious man but [desire] to see every problem from a religious point of view."³⁵

It is obvious that Wittgenstein is not talking about physical or socio-economic-political problem. He is primarily concerned with personal problems like sorrow and pain. We may safely enlarge the list to include other

related problems like pride, hatred, greed, hypocrisy, jealousy, depression, etc. We noted above that both the notions of deep and religious can be treated as metaphors. We can also safely assume that at the metaphorical level, these two terms can be treated as synonyms (for the present purpose). With this at the back of our mind, if we look at the three quotes above, he seems to be suggesting that it is important to develop both religious and ethical viewpoints in order to deal with the problems of life. In other words, if one attains a religious point of view (on reaching certain degree of depth in thinking), and is convinced about the rightness of one's ethical life, then the way in which we look at our problems in life will undergo change. First, they are not something to be solved like removing cancerous cells through chemotherapy but something that disappear like a mirage from a right view point; second, in some cases, they may even become the cause of our joy. From the religious point of view, problems now look like dark shades in a painting. It is essential for the beauty of an artwork.

Though Wittgenstein used the notion of religion or religious, metaphorically to make a philosophical point, it may be pointed out that he is not interested to secularize the idea of religion.³⁶ Though he generally says that he is not a religious man (probably in the sense that he is not a practicing believer of any religion), he desires to acknowledge God at times for the good that happens in his life. He confessed to Rhees, a friend, for instance:

"God's help brought him into more settled water, into better relation with people and to greater seriousness...I am cowardly beyond measure. If I do not correct this, I shall again drift entirely into those waters through which I was drifting then."³⁷

Settled water means, for Wittgenstein, deep water in the sea as opposed to surface water which is never settled, but tossed to and fro by the sea waves. There is calm at the depth of the sea. However, our attention may be drawn towards his expression, "I am cowardly beyond measure." What could this possibly mean? Rhees again tries to interpret this for us. He suggests that the term "cowardly" may mean self-dissembling or self-deception. And self-deception can be closely understood with contempt for intellectual pride or vanity. Earlier we have mentioned an instance of deception – that the modernists are the most deceived people. The foremost thing about modernity or modernism is rationality, the foundation of which is logic and the epitome of which is science. "Reason" was taken as the definition of humankind and because of our possession of it, we were elevated above Nature. The elevated position of humankind by virtue of possessing "Reason" tends to make us proud and arrogant. It is interesting to note here that he makes a reference to his early career in philosophy; probably he

was referring to his "Tractatus" period, which he later finds it to be shallow and incapable of solving problems of life.

For Wittgenstein, tackling this problem – self-deception or cowardice – is of immense importance. He believes that one should first understand oneself before one ventures into the business of writing anything. He states,

1. How can I be good philosopher when I can't manage to be a good man?³⁸
2. "If you are unwilling to know what you are, your writing is a form of deceit... If anyone is unwilling to descend into himself, because this is too painful, he will remain superficial in his writing."³⁹

Knowing oneself is significantly important because he agrees with Socratic view that humans are partly reasonable and partly a monster.⁴⁰ Wittgenstein takes this notion very seriously and hardly treats it as a metaphorical concept to explain our human nature. He writes thus, "People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect, as *ill* (his). Any man who is half-way decent will think of himself extremely imperfect, but a religious man thinks himself *wretched* (his)."⁴¹ For him, the struggle within to be a good man or to overcome his guilt conscience is real.⁴² The notion of wretchedness is a psychological problem that is anti-thetical to the ideas of self-esteem and pride. It is a feeling of being miserable and shameful. Unless one confronts this monstrous self within and overcomes it, or wrestles with it continuously, one will be drifting in the superficial or dubious life. It takes courage to confront this other self. He writes, "Without some courage, one cannot write a sensible remark about oneself."⁴³ Probably, he was rarely prepared to face this 'demon' in him and that is why he says that he is "cowardly beyond measure". Probably, he did not find any help from philosophical discourses, with exception to Kierkegaard and probably Kant, to face this demon. Probably, he is convinced that only religious message of love and forgiveness can go deep enough to tame the monster within (him) and that is the reason why he says that he cannot help but "to see every problem from a religious point of view."

Coming to an important question if philosophy, in the sense of academic philosophy, is capable of solving our life's problems, I tend to believe that Wittgenstein's answer is in the negative. To one of his pupils – John King – who told him that his interest in philosophy was triggered by theological questions of pain, suffering and evil, Wittgenstein told him that he will never get from philosophy the answers he was seeking (King 1981: 87). And recollecting the lessons he learned from Wittgenstein, King writes:

“What I learned from him was some faint understanding that philosophy would not answer my questions...And I learned something of the ethical and the mystical, things which I find difficult to express and of which indeed according to his philosophy, “one cannot speak.”⁴⁴

One may agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy as we generally understand in the academia will not provide solutions to the problems of life. In fact, one may even argue that to do that is not the aim of philosophy. However, one may still ask, “What was Wittgenstein doing when he ruled out the possibility of solving life’s problem through philosophy?” “Was he then speaking as a philosopher or as a religious person?” There is no direct answer to either of these questions. However, if we read his thoughts from the foregoing discussions, then he seems to philosophize rather than being religious; he was looking at or for a religious point of view in philosophy without becoming a religious person. He was a mystic philosopher traversing in the borders of philosophy and religion where neither rationality nor mysticism takes precedence but where one can experience both the depth and shallowness of life. Unfortunately, such a vantage point (at the border) will not allow one to philosophize in a logically coherent manner as the modern philosophers did to construct their philosophical systems.

Conclusion

The present attempt to understand the notion of “deep” is primarily exploratory in nature. It is an attempt to make sense of Wittgenstein’s philosophical outlook towards life and its problems. However, this is also certainly in part to make a suggestion on how to philosophize about life. As such, the present work is meta-philosophical in its orientation though one may get a feeling that this work is an echo of continental philosophy. With the impotence of normative and descriptive philosophies to engage with life and with the pragmatic philosophy on the rise to engage with the questions of life and its problems, but which at the same time and in a manner of speaking militates against the age-old spirit of philosophizing, it may be not be a waste of time to consider Wittgenstein’s philosophical engagements with life and its problems. I quote Putnam to conclude my reflection:

“The pursuit of clarity that Wittgenstein’s work was meant to exemplify needs to go on *whenever* (his) we engage in serious reflection. If this idea is grasped, we will see that far from being a way of bringing an end to philosophy, it represents a way of to bring philosophical reflection to areas in which we often fail to see anything philosophical at all.”⁴⁵

Notes

1. Hillary Putnam, *Jewish philosophy as a guide to life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 10f
2. Richard Rorty, “Introduction: Metaphysical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy” in *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method*, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1967), pp. 33-34.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, ed. G.H von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman and translated by Peter Winch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
4. Rush Rhees, “Postscript” in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollection*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 190-231.
5. M.O’C. Drury, “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein” *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 91-111.
6. F. R. Leavis, “Memories of Wittgenstein” in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 63-82.
7. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, p.1.
8. M.O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, p. 122.
9. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, p. 80.
10. Putnam, *Jewish philosophy as a guide to life*, p. 11.
11. I pick this notion of ‘borderline’ from G.H. von Wright who maintains that Wittgenstein was influenced by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, who worked on the border land of philosophy, religion and poetry Rhees’s *Personal Recollections*. However, this suggestion should not be taken seriously. In some contexts, Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the water as deep and shallow is preferred in some contexts. However, the water metaphor fails to draw a line of division while the notions of left and right of a person clearly demarcates a line of division though it is relative to any given context.
12. Rhees, “Postscript”, p. 220.
13. John King, “Recollections of Wittgenstein in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 75.
14. Rhees, “Postscript”, p. 196.
15. Albert Levi contends that Wittgenstein held on to some faith and that his faith was thoroughly Judaic, invoking the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; see, Albert Levi, “The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein’s Ethics,” *Telos* 38 (1979): 63-76.
16. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, p. 1.
17. Broadly speaking, tragedy is of two type, viz., ordinary and literary. Though there is a possibility to read Wittgenstein’s use of tragedy in the literary sense, I prefer to read him in the ordinary sense for the simple reason that he uses this expression in the context of his engagement with life and life’s problem.
18. The last of their self-rule was during the Hasmonean Dynasty which roughly covers the period from 140BCE to 63 BCE.

19. Then the man said, "Your name will no longer be Jacob, but Israel, because you have struggled with God and humans and have overcome." (New International Bible, Genesis 32: 28). The phrase "struggle with God" can also be translated as "wrestle with God." All the references to the Bible are from the New International Bible version.
20. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein," p.122.
21. This particular point can be contentious. There are arguments to support both the views that Wittgenstein is religious in the ordinary sense and also that he is non-religious. We will come to this point later.
22. Rhees, "Postscript", p. 209.
23. Ibid, p. 201.
24. Putnam, *Jewish philosophy as a guide to life*.
25. Ibid; Putnam acknowledged that he got this quotation from Pierre Hadot's *Philosophy as a way of Life* (edited by Arnold Davidson), Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
26. Bob Plant, "Wittgenstein, Religious "Passion," and Fundamentalism," *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 41, (2013): 280-309,71.
27. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein", p. 122.
28. Ibid, p. 115.
29. Drury, "Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein," p. 95.
30. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 79.
31. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein" 1981.
32. Ibid, p. 183.
33. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, p. 27.
34. Ibid, p. 79.
35. Drury, "Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein", p. 94.
36. Dallas McGuinness informs that von Wright is of the view that Wittgenstein was not religious and to such an opinion, Wittgenstein's sister Gretl objected to it saying that "He was a Christian in my reckoning"; see his "Wittgenstein: On Seeing Problems from a Religious Point of View", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 28 (1990): 105-117, p. 43. We also learned from various sources that Wittgenstein prays and wants to be prayed for. Not only that his faith in Christianity was deeply influenced by the reading of Tolstoy's "The Gospel in Brief" (Dallas McGuinness 1990); also see, Drury's *Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein* (p. 101), and John King: "Recollections of Wittgenstein(p. 87). In the meantime, Levis too opines that Wittgenstein held on to some faith and that his faith was not some form of metaphysical speculation or argument for the existence of God but was instead quite thoroughly Judaic, invoking the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Levi, "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics" 1979).
37. Rhees, "Postscript", p. 192.
38. Brian McGuinness, *Wittgenstein: A Life*, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1988), p. 227.
39. Rhees, "Postscript", p. 195.
40. Ibid, p. 194.
41. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Values*, p. 145; The idea of "wretched self" is a Pauline notion in the Bible which is found respectively in Romans 7:19 and 21-24: "For I do not do the good I want to do, but the evil id do not want to do – this I Keep on doing" ... "So I find this law at work: Although I want to do good, evil is right there with me. For in my inner being I delight in God's law; but I see another law at work in me, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within me. *What a wretched man I am* (mine)! Who will rescue me from this body that is subject to death?"
42. McGuinness, *Wittgenstein: A Life*.
43. Putnam, *Jewish philosophy as a guide to life*, p. 9.
44. King, p. 90.
45. Putnam, *Jewish philosophy as a Guide to Life*, p. 11.