

The First World War and the All-India War Memorial: Commemoration, Memorialization and the Creation of the Public Sphere

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Introduction

According to most 'public sphere' scholars, groups and individuals constitute the public or get transformed into political agents once they go into the public sphere.¹ For Jürgen Habermas, it is the rational nature of the public discussion which makes possible the "transformation of socially situated persons into public individuals."² The public sphere refers to a common space, which, in theory, is open to everyone: the local sweet store, the roadside betel shop, an exhibition hall, a coffee house, a *maidan*, as well as the representational and discursive space of the television, radio, journals, magazines, newspapers and even the internet. Anybody can participate in the public sphere with opinions on the public good, which can be partially or wholly realized. A collective opinion about the public good is developed in a deliberate and positive way by means of rational debate and discussion in the public sphere. Participants take part in the process of reaching a collective solution of an issue and, perhaps, come to an agreement on it. The activity itself is public. The most important reason for the existence of the public sphere is to influence the state policies. The public sphere exists outside the State's institutions, yet it is concerned primarily with what takes place within it. Public opinions generated in the public sphere is intended to feed back into the ideas and activities of voluntary organizations and then onto the State.³

In 1991, the *Journal of South Asian Studies* published a special edition on "Aspects of the 'Public' in Colonial South Asia," which marked a turning point in the discussion on the public sphere. This was the earliest attempt to apply

the public sphere concept to South Asia in a methodical manner.⁴ The writers of this collection criticized the work of Jürgen Habermas,⁵ and highlighted his Eurocentric bias. Several articles highlighted that parades, the performance of ceremonies, as well as various religious activities might convey public good, lead to the creation of a public opinion and provide indigenous venues of dissent in addition to rational discussion. Sandria B. Freitag proposed that the word "public sphere" be replaced with "public arenas" to represent, more accurately, the local and performed nature of the public sphere in South Asia. Other papers in the 1991 issue looked at how the British colonial administrative policies, such as the division of cities into "British" and "native" towns, the building of civil and military townships, the policing of parade routes and the allotment of areas to specific groups, influenced the conception and the usage of public sphere in South Asian cities long after Indian subcontinent was partitioned.

However, a majority of these discursive explanations on the development and production of the public sphere are mainly "autotelic,"⁶ and makes a sharp separation of the public sphere and the state while explaining the mechanisms or processes of "the transformation of 'I' into 'we'."⁷ Indeed, according to Jürgen Habermas, the division of the state and the public sphere is the most distinguishing trait of the public sphere. Habermas admits, "the political public sphere [exists] when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state." But then he contends, "although state activity is so to speak the executor, it is not a part of [the public sphere]."⁸ It is this extra-Governmental character of the public sphere that gives the "public opinion" it produces an aura of validity, autonomy and independence.

This paper focuses on the key significance of the colonial state's discourses and practices in the formation

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of the public sphere in India. It particularly examines the creation of the public sphere through an analysis of the commemoration ceremony inaugurating the All-India War Memorial (now known as *India Gate*) in 1931 to honour the native soldiers of the British Indian Army who had lost their lives in World War I (1914-1918). The paper argues that the commemoration established images of the colonial state and of the native soldiers which were essential to the theatrical displays and visual exercises that formed the public. The role of optics, or the centrality of images and tangible activities, in the formation of publicness would therefore be highlighted in the production of the public sphere. The people come to recognize themselves as members of the public when they view the state, or are taught to view it in a specific way: as self-aware viewers of a theatrical presentation about and of themselves.

World War I and the Memorial in New Delhi: All-India War Memorial

One of the most distinctive features of the British imperial policy in India was its prominent and sustainable relationship with the military. Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, wrote in 1832, "our Eastern empire... has been acquired, and must be maintained, by the sword."⁹ Following the Revolt of 1857, a myth that the Indians were divided between 'non-martial' and 'martial' castes was developed.¹⁰ Soldiers hailing from South India, Central India, Bihar and Awadh, who had initially assisted the British to colonize India, but had afterwards participated in the Revolt, were deemed 'non-martial'. They were no longer taken in the army on a large scale. Pathans, Gurkhas and Punjabis, on the other hand, who had helped to put down the Revolt, were proclaimed 'martial'. They were enlisted in huge numbers.¹¹ The Punjab region contributed almost half of the Indian men in the British Indian Army at the beginning of World War I, and this percentage grew over the next two years.¹²

During the First World War, India – a colony of Great Britain – was used as a reservoir of manpower and material resources. The British used the Indian Army as an imperial fire brigade. A complete corps was dispatched from British India to fight the German Army on the French border. Other units were sent to Egypt and German East Africa. The war in Mesopotamia was fought by the British Indian Army from the start to the finish. With a total of 8,77,068 soldiers and 5,63,369 non-fighting men, India was the biggest contributor of human resources among the countries within the British Empire. Furthermore, in 1914, the British Indian Army had 2,39,561 soldiers serving in different roles.¹³ In addition, an Indian Labour

Corps consisting of around 48,000 manual workers, who were recruited primarily from India's north-eastern regions, were deployed in 1917.¹⁴ In all, British India sent 1.5 million soldiers and non-combatants.¹⁵ The conflict claimed the lives of 1,21,598 Indians, with 53,486 being killed, 64,350 being wounded, and 3,762 being reported incarcerated or missing.¹⁶

After the First World War, the British Government built memorials across India to pay respect to the Indian soldiers who had died. The majority of these memorials are modest in size and simple in design.¹⁷ The All-India War Memorial in Delhi, on the other hand, is a massive edifice and a significant public symbol. The history of the monument is inseparably bound up with the construction of New Delhi. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe, focused on the building of New Delhi to communicate an "unflinching determination to maintain British rule in India,"¹⁸ and to search for strategies against the anti-colonial movement, which also involved assassinations and bombings.¹⁹ In December 1911, the then Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, resolved to relocate the British imperial capital to New Delhi from Calcutta with the approval of the British Cabinet and the India Office.²⁰ At a massive durbar held at Delhi, King George V, who during that time had been touring British India, said that his royal wish was that the capital city be transferred to Delhi. It was the colonial era's most grandiose and extravagant construction undertakings. In 1911, the construction of the new government facility began. Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker were chosen by Lord Hardinge to design and construct the new imperial city.²¹

In 1916, which was a year marked by horrendous rates of death during the First World War, the Government of India chose to incorporate a huge memorial of war in the principal seat of the Government area. The purpose of the memorial was to publicly recognize the efforts and bravery of military men from India. The Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) was involved in the design and making of the memorial. In 1915, the IWGC was granted a Royal Charter to build memorials and headstones for the fallen soldiers. The All-India War Memorial was designed by Lutyens, who worked on an IWGC Special Sub-Committee with Reginald Blomfield and Herbert Baker that developed Britain's wartime memorial style.²² The Special Sub-Committee's architects, together with the British Museum Director, Frederic Kenyon, persuaded the IWGC that absolute simplicity and uniformity of design were necessary for graves as well as for military monuments. The number of casualties in the war was simply too high, and the deceased were all too ethnically, socially and religiously diverse to allow for any multiple designing perspective. *The Times* explained: "It was felt

that what was done for one should be done for all, and that all, whatever their military rank, or position in civil life, should have equal treatment so far as their graves were concerned."²³ Uniformity therefore symbolized, on the one hand, the universal sacrifice of every imperial subject. On the other hand, uniformity resulted in a generality of style, the abstractness of which prevented unique cultural interpretations connected to a single racial or religious community. However, Lutyens was a staunch supporter of the established colonial system even while displaying a deep open mind to commemorating the dead soldiers who came from diverse religious origins. For Lutyens, the memorial monument symbolized "duty, discipline, unity, fraternity, loyalty, service, and sacrifice... encouraging continued partnership in the established order, and celebrating the ideal and fact of British rule over India."²⁴ Therefore, Lutyens' monument was firmly rooted in British paternalism.

Remembering the British Indian Army Soldiers: Unveiling Ceremony of 1931

After the 'stone laying' ceremony in 1921 by the Duke of Connaught, the construction of the memorial was fully completed in January 1931. On the brick surface were inscribed the names of sixty thousand native soldiers, who were killed fighting overseas during the First World War, along with 13,516 British Indian Army commanders who died in the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-42; 1878-80; 1919).²⁵ The memorial was unveiled on 12 February 1931,²⁶ when Lord Irwin, the then Viceroy, inaugurated the new capital of British India. The commemoration was intended to celebrate the British Raj's splendour. There was an enormous influx of visitors to Delhi for the commemoration ceremony. One of the leading hotel proprietors told the special correspondent of *The Times of India* that "the number of applicants for accommodation... has been enormous. It must have beaten all records. All the hotels are experiencing the same rush, and not only hotels but every bungalow is likely to have as many guests as it can accommodate."²⁷ Roads, which were usually open, were barred.²⁸ The British Government appointed a special officer of the Public Works Department (PWD) to make special arrangements which were necessary for the accommodation of the large gatherings of visitors.²⁹ The PWD erected temporary grandstands to give seating accommodation to 4,000 guests.³⁰ Present among them at the commemoration were military officers in full scarlet or *khaki* uniform.³¹ A large number of Royal Air Force (RAF) officers were also present.³² Civilian officers of the British Government were in their full blue and gold uniform. There was a large number of men frock-coated

and wearing black or grey top hats or white *topis*. There were very many ladies, English and Indian, attired in dresses and sarees of many bright colours. But a great proportion of the company was wearing the handsome coloured durbar and ceremonial attire of different parts of British India. Beyond the grandstand, in specially marked off spaces, there were gathered tens of thousands of other spectators from the city and from the villages around.³³ Besides these, the roofs of the two Secretariat buildings were made available to the throngs of visitors.³⁴

At a short distance from the memorial, on either hand, were large three-tier fountains. Between the memorial and its fountain on the left was drawn up a Guard-of-Honour of the York and Lancs Regiment. In the corresponding position, on the other flank of the memorial, was a Guard-of-Honour of the 1-9 Jat Regiment. Between the ends of the grandstand and these Guards-of-Honour were drawn up in two large bodies 526 officers and other ranks of the British Indian Army, who were representatives of every unit of that army. Every one of them wore a row of war medals upon his breast; many of them had grown grey beard in the service of His Majesty and of their motherland (Britain), and of the Commonwealth of which they were members. A carriage had been left between the massed representatives of the British Indian Army and the Guards-of-Honour. A succession of good-looking motor cars threaded inward through it from either hand. The Chief Commissioner and Lady Thompson were the first to come. Then followed a number of the ruling Princes, who were in the capital. Then came the representatives of the Dominions and their wives, accompanied by the Aides de Camp from the Viceroy's House. The members of the Executive Council of the Viceroy came next. They were followed by Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, the Governor of Punjab (1928-32). Then came Lord Hardinge. Soon thereafter, the Commander-in-Chief and Lady Chetwode arrived at the venue.³⁵

The whole processional way from the Viceroy's House to the memorial was kept clear of traffic. The route from the Viceregal Palace to the memorial was enlivened by decorations. There were white pylons, trophies and festoons of Union Flags. Then, inside the city gates, an avenue of wooden poles painted red, white and blue. The Viceregal procession came down the way from the Viceroy's House with Lord and Lady Irwin in its midst. As it set forth on its journey, the first of a salute of thirty-one guns fired in the Central Vista to mark the departure of the Viceroy and Lady Irwin.³⁶ Then came a fanfare from the trumpeters. The carriage was drawn by six horses ridden by postillions and was preceded and followed by the stalwart and beautifully mounted Viceregal Bodyguards.³⁷ The RAF meanwhile circled overhead and

at the right moment flew down the processional way at a low height so as to accompany the Viceregal procession or to signal its arrival near the memorial.³⁸ The RAF gave a pageant over the New Delhi racecourse. Every squadron of the RAF in British India had its personnel and machines in the air show. There were altogether eighty machines in the air, including the famous twin-engine "Hinaidi" bomber.³⁹

At a slow trot, the Viceregal procession emerged between the Secretariats, across the great place below it and down the processional way between continuous lines of troops. The 5-14 Punjab Regiment lined the route part of the way from the Viceroy's House and, thereafter, it was lined by the Central India Horse, who sat still as statues upon their horses with their pennoned lances in their hands. Massed bands arched near the memorial on the western side of it played "God Save the King" (national anthem of Britain) as the Viceroy and Lady Irwin entered the space before it from the side. Lord and Lady Irwin were received by the Commander-in-Chief and the Senior Officer of the British Indian Army. The Viceroy then inspected the Guards-of-Honour and the Indian representatives. As he then returned to the dais, Sir Fabian Ware, Vice-President of the IWGC, rose and made a speech upon the purpose of the day's gathering and of the memorial. The Commander-in-Chief then stepped forward and invited the Viceroy to open the memorial. There followed a short speech by Lord Irwin. A vernacular translation of it was read by an Indian officer. Groups of loudspeakers were also arranged so that everyone could hear the speeches made.

The Viceroy then pressed an electric button and in a few seconds the smoke of the "Fire of Remembrance," which the button started, rose from the top of the memorial. "The Last Post" rang shrilly out from the midst of the memorial. There was a minute's silence and then from the same source rang out the "Reveille". The Viceroy then stepped forward, took a large wreath of flowers from an officer and carried it to the foot of the memorial where he laid it against the wall. The Commander-in-Chief, the Maharaja of Cutch on behalf of the Chamber of Princes, the deputies of the British Dominions, the Adjutant-General as a representative of the ex-Services Association of Burma and India, an English soldier, an English pilot and an Indian sepoy was "chosen by lot" from the representatives of the British Indian Army also stepped forward with wreaths and placed them at the foot of the memorial. The Viceregal Bodyguards, thereupon, rode in front of the dais. Lord and Lady Irwin entered their carriage and their procession passed through the memorial. The guns once again fired a Royal Salute as they took their departure. They were followed by the

representatives of the British Indian Army, who marched after it in column.⁴⁰

Imperial Commemoration and Colonial Memorialization: Creation of the Public

In colonial India, the commemoration of the fallen Indian soldiers took place at New Delhi by employing a variety of techniques. Every one of these different commemorative practices had one thing in common: they all presented themselves as "public events". The remembrance event was a gathering "of, for, and by the public", a phrase which was used synonymously with the word "people." Therefore, the public emerged at the commemoration as an imperial presentation. It was closely linked to the process of colonialism carried out by the collaboration of imperial-colonial state elites. The commemoration was centred around the defining presence of the colonial state. State authorities were in charge of official planning the memorial events. The pictures were visuals that represented some element or activity associated with the state – for example, the Union Jack, the armed forces, the civil officials of the British Government, the ruling Princes, the representatives of the Dominions and the Viceroy's Executive Council. Newspapers carrying the speeches of Fabian Ware and Lord Irwin extolled the colonial state's numerous accomplishments and addressed the people as benefactors of governmental action. Cinema and sound films were taken of the commemoration ceremony. It was developed and put on exhibition in the talkie theatres throughout India.⁴¹ The colonial state also remained visible outside of the physical and temporal limitations of the military procession with street illuminations and decorations, and the traffic jams that disturbed normal activities and disrupted regular travel patterns. Taking these many components together, viewing the state became the core action of the remembrance. As a result, the memorialization discourses and commemoration activities elicited a feeling of publicness that highlighted spectatoriality – the process of hearing and seeing the sounds and sights of the state in order to form the public. The spectator-public created in the framework of the remembrance was infused with effective political agency as well; portrayed as both a spectator and a participant. During this commemoration, the decisions taken by the people of India to participate in the military march-past or to buy particularly designed postage stamps⁴² were vital to the production and creation of the public. The public was not just a viewer of the state, but also a participator in the rites which celebrated the dominance of the 'hierarchical' imperial rule and colonial state.

The formation of the public is a pedagogic effort aimed

at promoting a particular viewpoint. Furthermore, the creation of the public sphere necessitates not only the manufacturing of new “public” discourses and images, but also the making of new state discourses and images. In the creation and production of the imperial public sphere, the colonial state played a constructive role and had a significant presence. However, scholars such as Geoff Eley,⁴³ Mary Ryan⁴⁴ and Joan Landes⁴⁵ argue that Jürgen Habermas’s approach romanticizes the liberal public sphere. They contend that, notwithstanding the language of openness and transparency, the official public sphere was built on, and in many ways was defined by, a variety of fundamental restrictions. In this context, Sudipta Kaviraj argues that the principles of “openness” to everyone and equality of “access” did not form a part of the public repertoire in colonial India.⁴⁶ Although the concept of public duty, obligation, and action was rich, it did not correspond to the notion of the equality of access for all persons regardless of their social status.⁴⁷ Rather, the British colonial administration created new types of urban public spheres. It established the concept of the open and universal public sphere inside racially divided colonial urban structures, which deliberately prevented the participation of the common people. Only a small number of individuals were regarded members of the imperial public, for example, the British administrators and, to an extent, the comprador class of aristocratic Indians.⁴⁸

At the commemoration event, the paternalistic imperial worldview remained unchanged. The commemoration was full of imperial spectacle of ‘power hegemony’ through colonial state. Royal salutes for the Governor-General, military processions, official appraisals, flag-decorated roads and elaborately organized sitting areas for the officially invited visitors and British dignitaries were all part of the festivities, despite the fact that the memorial was intended to honour the British Indian Army soldiers who gave their lives in the First World War. The Indian people were reminded of their colonial position at the commemoration. The layout for the seating was confined to two distinct blocks: one block was for senior British military and civil officers and the other block was for eminent visitors (a small number of princes of the Indian Princely States or their successors and the rulers of Afghanistan, Persia, Japan and Nepal). The great bulk of the people of India who were interested in seeing the commemoration were restricted to the rooftops of the North and South Blocks. The forum between the Blocks and the parade route were both cordoned off by a large police presence. Lord Irwin praised the contributions of the Indian soldiers during the war thus, “We are here to recall the four unforgettable years during which nations

and peoples and races... became one in a common impulse of loyalty to the throne and one in the defence unto death of the rights they had won under the protection of that sovereign.”⁴⁹ To David A. Johnson, “Irwin’s speech was a pointed statement directed at the Indian independence movement.”⁵⁰ Underlining the enormous size of the British Empire, Irwin pointed to Britain’s unification power. He also emphasized the precarious nature of the Indians’ rights and advantages obtained during British rule. Irwin cautioned that without Britain’s continuing assistance, direction, and imperial patronage, India’s progress toward independence might be quickly squandered.

The official colonial public, nevertheless, was not the *only* public. Conversely, a number of rival counter-publics were created almost simultaneously with the colonial public. The leaders of the Indian National Congress had written to the British authorities six months before the commemoration in a letter thus, “we notice no symptoms of conversion of the English official world view that it is India’s men and women who must decide what is best for India.”⁵¹ The commemoration provided no cause for these nationalists to modify their beliefs. Ultimately, the celebration reaffirmed Britain’s paternalism in India, emphasising the link between changes to the constitution and imperial intervention in India’s national life. While covering the memorial ceremony, a nationalist newspaper reported, “India knows New Delhi. India understands New Delhi. [However,] India is not in it.”⁵² “The function was deliberately designed to show the Whiteman’s superiority,” wrote *The Tribune*, “and to emphasize the fact that India could do well to remain within the British Empire and not to talk of independence.”⁵³ In Britain, too, this disparity between the Indians and British was noticeable. *The Times* stated, as it described the opening ceremony, “it would be idle to pretend that the ceremony had any popular support. The attendance was confined entirely to those admitted by invitation. All the approaches were plastered with armed police, and little encouragement was given to anyone who desired to offer a demonstration, friendly or otherwise.”⁵⁴ The British Government desired to celebrate the British Empire by camouflaging the ‘horrors of the war’ and attempted to enforce its ‘war victory’ memories on the Indians in order to reaffirm “India’s loyalty to the British Empire.” Nothing was said about the sorrows of the Indians, their feelings, or their memories. The memorial was therefore built to awe the people of India with imperial Britain’s intimidating strength and splendour.

According to scholars like Thomas Lacquer,⁵⁵ Robert Pogue Harrison,⁵⁶ Richard Bradley,⁵⁷ Sarah Tarlow,⁵⁸ Jay Winter,⁵⁹ and David Arnold,⁶⁰ among others, cemeteries and memorials have long been seen as significant

places for the people to remember and grieve. They are physical manifestations of changing cultural landscapes; expressions of shifting views regarding death; and areas for humanization in which the people create their present life and envisage their future. The importance that these places play in building national regeneration or national identity around the world was emphasised by other scholars like George Mosse,⁶¹ John Gillis,⁶² and Partha Chatterjee.⁶³ Rebecca Brown has demonstrated that the British monuments in colonial India were meant to symbolize the legitimacy along with lastingness of British authority and the common sacrifice for the Empire of all those who died in defending it.⁶⁴ In recent times, Ann Laura Stoler has claimed that these relics of the Empire still plague the post-colonial society as devastation that perpetuated a policy of violence and fear in the colonial world.⁶⁵ David A. Johnson argues that the All-India War Memorial drew a distinction between “loyal” subjects – the Indian soldiers who died while serving and defending the British Empire during the First World War – and “disloyal” subjects – the Indian nationalists involved in the anti-colonial agitation against British rule in India.⁶⁶ This would create problems in post-colonial India while commemorating the fallen Indian soldiers. For the post-colonial Indian public memory, the war memorial did not form a part of Indian collective memory, its loss and its grief. The soldiers of World War I, who had fought under the banner of the Empire, were perceived as perpetuators of colonial rule. The war was basically an imperialist war for the partition of world’s resources and for the distribution and re-distribution of colonies and spheres of interest. Lord Brentford, Home Minister in the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, had stated in 1928: “We conquered India by the sword, and by the sword we shall hold it.... I am not such a hypocrite as to say that we hold India for the Indians. We hold it as the finest outlet for British goods in general, and for Lancashire goods in particular.”⁶⁷

Conclusion

According to Jürgen Habermas, antecedent processes of “individuation” (the moulding of human agency and awareness) are necessary for people to participate in the exercise of rational-critical conversation that produces the public. Habermas says these processes happen largely in the family’s “private” sphere. Critics argue that this ignores Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the internalised habits that influence social and political behaviours, or “habitus,” which is informed by both private or “inner,” and instinctive “senses of the game,” as well as official and public institutions’ socially constructed restrictions and commands.⁶⁸ In the public sphere, political

institutions, practices, conventions and events, according to Bourdieu, play a critical role in the construction and reproduction of agency and subjectivity. The attribute of “extra-ordinariness” – the self-appointment of the Remembrance Day as a “day unlike any other” – allowed the self-awareness that was necessary for creating the public.

An emphasis on the imperial commemoration shifts attention away from the spatialized concept of the public sphere and, instead, points out that publicness is practiced and performed. In fact, Jürgen Habermas’s explanation revolves upon the concept of the public as an activity. The presence of salons and coffee houses in Europe in the seventeenth century, according to Habermas, did not establish the bourgeois public sphere, but rather the practices and debates that occurred in them. In this sense, the remembrance ceremony was a manifestation of publicness, temporal counterparts of Habermas’s public sphere. In addition, a study of the remembrance emphasized the dynamic interactions which generate public opinion between state and non-state players. Such events are sometimes dismissed as instances of the state’s publicity which convert the people to mindless consumers of magnificent visuals. These instances of state-serving representational publicity appear to be devoid of the basic element of rational discussion which is at the heart of the public sphere and, in fact, strongly discourages it. The colonial state, however, would not have had viewers for its commemoration ceremony without the participation and presence of a public, as well as media coverage of the ceremony. Public ceremonies like remembrances were in the same way as much of the people as they were of the state. In order to perform the commemoration ceremony, the colonial state required the participation of the people. In sum, the colonial state used its political institutional framework as well as its socio-cultural activities to shape and produce the imperial public sphere.

Notes

1. See Harold Mah, ‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians’, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 153-82.
2. *Ibid.* p. 181.
3. Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld (eds.) *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 14-17.
4. ‘Aspect of the ‘Public’ in Colonial South Asia’, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 14, Issue 1 (1991), pp. 1-153.
5. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, (translated by Thomas Burger), Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989, pp. 74, 76.

6. Michael Warner, 'Publics and Counterpublics', *Public Culture*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2002), p. 49-90.
7. Jane Mansbridge, 'Feminism and Democracy', *The American Prospect*, No. 1 (1990), p. 127.
8. Geoff Eley, 'Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century', in Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley and Sherry Ortner (eds.), *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 296.
9. Quoted by Jon Wilson, *India Conquered: Britain's Raj and the Chaos of Empire*, London, Simon and Schuster, 2016, p. 163.
10. See David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940*, London, Macmillan, 1994.
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17. A news article appearing in *The Times of India*, 'Fading With Time: 1st World War Memorial Lies Forgotten' refers to the small monument erected in memory of sacrifices of soldiers during 1914-1918 with inscription 'Lest We Forget' in Hyderabad, *The Times of India*, 13 December 2017.
18. Robert Grant Irving, *Indian Summer: Lutyens, Baker and Imperial Delhi*, New Haven, Yale Press, 1981, p. 27.
19. David A. Johnson, 'New Delhi's All-India War Memorial (India Gate): Death, Monumentality and the Lasting Legacy of Empire in India', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2018), p. 347.
20. Robert Eric Frykenberg, 'The Coronation Durbar of 1911: Some Implications', in Robert Eric Frykenberg, (ed.), *Delhi through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture, and Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 369-390.
21. David A. Johnson, *New Delhi: The Last Imperial City*, London, Palgrave, 2015.
22. Winter, *Sites of Memory*, p. 23; David Crellin, "Some Corner of a Foreign Field': Lutyens, Empire and the Sites of Remembrance", in Andrew Hopkins and Gavin Stamp, (eds.), *Lutyens Abroad: The Work of Sir Edwin Lutyens outside the British Isles*, Rome, British School at Rome, 2002, p. 101; Irving, *Indian Summer*, p. 258; Colin Amery, (ed.), *Lutyens: The Work of the English Architect Sir Edwin Lutyens, 1869-1944*, London, Arts Council of Great Britain, 1981, pp. 179-81; Tim Skelton, and Gerald Gliddon, *Lutyens and the Great War*, London, Frances Lincoln, 2008.
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29. *ToI*, 9 January 1931.
30. *ToI*, 5 February 1931.
31. *ToI*, 13 February 1931.
32. *ToI*, 5 February 1931.
33. *ToI*, 13 February 1931.
34. *ToI*, 5 February 1931.
35. *ToI*, 13 February 1931.
36. *ToI*, 10 February 1931.
37. *ToI*, 11 February 1931.
38. *ToI*, 10 February 1931.
39. *ToI*, 5 February 1931.
40. *ToI*, 13 February 1931.
41. *ToI*, 11 February 1931.
42. *ToI*, 9 January 1931.
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