

# Political Engineering and Governance in Jammu and Kashmir: A Study of the Era of Prime Minister Shamsudin (October 1963 and February 1964)

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## Background

The Indo-China war in 1962 weakened India's position. The reverses on the battlefield had negative implications on the domestic front for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>1</sup> Since the Indian National Congress was ruling at the centre and in the states, the whole bearing of the military reverses fell on its shoulders.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the government in New Delhi was forced to review its policies of managing the internal political dynamics of the nation, which included manoeuvring of the internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir.

Meanwhile, India came closer to the Western powers to strengthen its defence against China.<sup>3</sup> However, India's proximity to the West alienated its neighbouring country – Pakistan, forcing the Western powers to rethink and work towards retaining the confidence of Pakistan and they pressed for an agreeable solution to the Kashmir dispute to satisfy the concerns of Pakistan. Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru's biographer writes, "Reliant on US and UK for military support, India could not decline to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan".<sup>4</sup> Consequently, six rounds of talks were held between 1962 and 1963, between India and Pakistan. However, the talks failed to yield anything substantial, and eventually caused further alienation and deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan.<sup>5</sup>

Under these circumstances, as later developments revealed, Prime Minister Nehru had to choose one of two options available to him on Kashmir – a) to slacken position on the Kashmir dispute and assent to the directives of Pakistan; and b) to integrate Kashmir more into the Union of India and tighten control over the region. Nehru worked on the second option, and aggressively intervened in the internal politics of Kashmir. This time,

he did not adopt a coup d'état as during the removal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 but ousted Bakshi through a gimmick in the name of Kamraj Plan.<sup>6</sup> Bakshi was removed by the Kamraj Plan<sup>7</sup> after he refused to yield to New Delhi's agenda of complete integration of the state into the union of India and resisted changing the nomenclature of Prime Minister to Chief Minister and *Sadr-e-Riyasat* to Governor and resisted the merger of the National Conference into the Indian National Congress.<sup>8</sup> Bakshi, however, managed to remain the President of the National Conference and succeeded in having his shadow, Shamsudin, made Prime Minister. He also retained the Prime Minister's house and in effect continued to rule, thereby failing the Nehru's Kamraj Plan.<sup>9</sup>

In this context, this work is a first attempt to document the three key developments of the era: a) The succession of Shamsudin to the position of Prime Minister in Jammu and Kashmir; 2) the governance model of Prime Minister Shamsudin; and 3) the politics behind reducing the Kashmir Government to size by removing the Prime Minister.

## Kamraj Plan: Nehru's Political Engineering in Kashmir

Soon after the Indo-China war, Nehru visited the state of Jammu and Kashmir in June-July 1963 and held talks with diverse sections of society, especially the legislators and indicated a move for change in leadership.<sup>10</sup> Sanaullah Butt, the editor of a local daily, quotes SN Fotedar, the chairman of the State Legislature, "It looks that the Government headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has completed its days because Nehru is adamant about seeing the change in the leadership for getting Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah released so that a fresh dialogue could be started with him."<sup>11</sup>

Only ten days after Nehru's visit, Bakshi was called to Delhi and informed about the Kamraj plan.<sup>12</sup> The plan, as

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described by B. N Mullik, the Indian Intelligence Chief, needed “the senior leaders, instead of sticking to office, go into the country and work for people’s enthusiasm, whilst younger men take the charge of the reins of government.”<sup>13</sup> Bakshi, who was not a Congressman though, too resigned under this plan. Was Bakshi’s resignation, a decision of his own, a plot of Nehru that Bakshi failed to recognize, or a mark of respect for the wishes of Nehru, remains contentious?<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times* report suggests that Bakshi’s resignation was part of an India-wide governmental reorganization by Nehru to strengthen India’s ruling Congress party.<sup>15</sup> D Morison and ASB Olver write that Nehru compelled Bakshi to surrender the post of Prime Minister.<sup>16</sup> Aijaz Ashraf calls his ouster embarrassing and a Machiavellian tactic of Delhi to swallow Kashmir by cutting its government in size.<sup>17</sup> Bakshi tendered his resignation before *Sadr-i-Riyasat* on October 4, 1963, and vacated the chair, only to be occupied by his self-made dummy — Shamsudin, someone who Ramachandra Guha, an Indian historian, describes as a puppet of his predecessor, Bakshi.<sup>18</sup>

### Rise of Shamsudin in Kashmir Politics

With the fall of Bakshi, a protracted power struggle began in the state. Nehru’s choice for the new premier was Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq - the senior most leader after Bakshi in the National Conference.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Bakshi, as Mullik records, favoured this succession but feared that Sadiq may use his office later to undermine him in the state. Mullik states that Bakshi’s fear was amplified with the assertion of Sadiq who sought absolute freedom to choose his ministers.<sup>20</sup> Sadiq’s ambition of keeping Bakshi supporters at bay, despite knowing that the majority of his supporting legislators were Bakshi’s cherry-picked men in the 1962 rigged assembly election, was politically non-viable. The 1962 elections in the state were engineered by Bakshi in his favour to such a length that even Prime Minister Nehru had written to Bakshi that, “it would strengthen your position more if you had lost few seats to the bonafide opponents.”<sup>21</sup> Mullik writes about an agreement between Karan Singh, Sadiq, Mir Qasim, DP Dhār, Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad and Bakshi Abdul Rashid wherein Sadiq’s premiership was supported by a cabinet comprising of nine ministries: four to be Sadiq’s men and five from Bakshi’s side. However, this arrangement failed to sustain and eventually, Shamsudin was chosen for the post of Prime Ministership in October 1963. Mullik claims to have enquired from Bakshi about the failed agreement and came to know that the party men favoured free vote as happened in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in the post-Kamraj Plan scenario as against giving Sadiq an open chance.<sup>22</sup> Mullik’s statements on

the purported agreement appear an exaggeration when seen in the light of the facts as expressed in the minutes of the party’s meetings after the acceptance of Bakshi’s resignation, which inform that Bakshi was unwilling to vacate the seat of Prime Ministership the Jammu and Kashmir, leave alone his willingness to support Sadiq’s claim to the chair. In the public statement, Bakshi, however, maintained that the legislators were free to choose their leader who could manage the state in a good manner.<sup>23</sup> Politically, Sadiq was a misfit for the rule, as he was not adequately connected with the party cadre, to the extent that he knew only fewer members of the legislature party, the working committee or the General Counsel.<sup>24</sup> Mullik writes about Bakshi Rashid as another probable choice for premiership and argues that if voting by the legislators was done, Rashid would have been the Prime Minister of the state. However, Rashid had weak administrative skills, was unacceptable for his Bakshi lineage and was not liked by Delhi.<sup>25</sup> Under these circumstances, Bakshi wanted DN Mahajan as the new Prime Minister and his swearing-in also came up for discussion.<sup>26</sup> However, the nomination and election of Shamsudin as the Prime Minister came as a result of some eleventh-hour afterthought. Commenting on the election of Shamsudin, Shamim Ahmad Shamim, a Kashmiri Parliamentarian, legislator and a journalist of repute, satirically commented that the election of Shamsudin was so unexpected that when his name was announced for the post, he cried loudly.<sup>27</sup> Describing the new premier, Shamim writes, “Like Mary Antony, Shamsudin was a petty individual, chosen for a historic role”.<sup>28</sup>

### Prime Minister Shamsudin and his Governance Agenda

Shamsudin was born in the Anantnag district of South Kashmir in 1922 AD. He graduated in law from Aligarh Muslim University and was a colleague of Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Karra and many others who played a momentous role in the history of the freedom struggle in the region. Before his rise to the position of Prime Minister of the state, he worked as a ‘Petition Writer’ (*Arz-i-Navees*) in a local court.<sup>29</sup> After the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, he joined Bakshi and in 1957, when Sadiq, Mir Qasim, DP Dhar and others separated from the Bakshi led National Conference and promulgated a new party named ‘Democratic National Conference,’ Bakshi inducted Shamsudin into his cabinet as a minister and gave him the Revenue Ministry. He had little individual significance and was Bakshi’s protégé.

Shamsudin got the majority vote in his party by earning 86 votes of the legislators out of 101 members<sup>30</sup> and took the oath of office and secrecy as Prime Minister

and assumed office on October 12, 1963, forenoon.<sup>31</sup> There was a public perception that Shamsudin was Bakshi's dummy, and it was expressed through handbills posted in Anantnag town in South Kashmir with the caption '*Aji Sunyay tou Sahih*' (Listen! Please). The handbill accused Bakshi of killing two birds with one stone.<sup>32</sup> This perception found its expression in a front-page cartoon published in *The Sunday Standard*, New Delhi, on October 13, 1963, captioned '*Majority Vote*,' wherein Shamsudin was shown dancing on the stage while Bakshi managed his cords from behind the scene.<sup>33</sup>

Shamsudin ruled as Prime Minister for merely 150 days but his tenure is remembered for certain steps aimed at addressing public grievances and attempting to restore a sense of accountability in the administration. He worked towards maintaining the availability of ration at Government depots and increased rations from 5 seers to 15 seers per head per month.<sup>34</sup> On October 28<sup>th</sup> 1963, he called upon the new Council of Ministers to declare their assets within a month to the president of the party, to maintain a check on corruption.<sup>35</sup> In effect, he prematurely superannuated ninety seven government officials for their corrupt practices.<sup>36</sup> The anti-corruption week was observed between 10<sup>th</sup> December 1963 and 16<sup>th</sup> December 1963 and seminars were organised to prevent corrupt practices in the state administration.<sup>37</sup> To address the policy of public relations, he would meet people in person, and the ministers could be approached without the barriers of secretaries and security men. The idea was that only with this practice would people would know what *Swaraj* is and what it is only then.<sup>38</sup> On November 27 1963, his government decided that deputy commissioners must hold public meetings at the tehsil headquarters of each district and receive complaints from the public. The officials were ordered to stay at the tehsil headquarters for a full day and dispose of cases on the spot. On November 30 1963, he cited the instances of poor peasants from faraway places like Kishtwar to highlight maladministration and indicated that the lack of functional grievance redressal mechanisms causes a lack of confidence among people.<sup>39</sup> He announced reforms of far-reaching administrative and social significance and called for the appointment of a Transport Advisory Board to address the transport route system. He also formed a Forest Advisory Committee to rationalize the exploration of states' forest wealth. He increased the retirement age of civil servants from 55 to 58 and announced a Contributory Health Scheme for the secretariat employees. The minimum wage for government employees was declared to be raised to Rs 100 a month. He ordered the creation of district employment boards and introduced a ballot system in Panchayat elections.<sup>40</sup>

### Theft of Holy Relic: Expression of a Popular Discontent

The rule of Shamsudin was short lived and many sections protested against his reign.<sup>41</sup> With his succession, efforts continued to rid Kashmir of Shamsudin and it was accomplished in a cloak and dagger fashion through the mysterious theft of the Holy Relic of Prophet Muhammad from the shrine of Hazratbal on December 27, 1963.<sup>42</sup> The crisis due to this theft generated enormous public indignation, to the extent that the central government and its agencies in the state felt Kashmir slipping out of its hands.<sup>43</sup> The protests that followed the theft of the Holy Relic brought to light, strong anti-government feeling in Kashmir.<sup>44</sup> The government completely lost control in the face of massive demonstrations, in which the great majority of the population of the state participated.<sup>45</sup> The political unrest and the mass protests earned international attention and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister requested the Security Council for an urgent meeting on the grave situation in Kashmir<sup>46</sup>.

The theft of the Holy Relic was a political conspiracy by those who believed that without instigating the anti-government religious movement, they could not achieve their political objectives in Kashmir.<sup>47</sup> Accountability was demanded from Bakshi for the theft of the relic and the agitation was directed against Bakshi. Business interests of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his brother Rashid Bakshi were targeted.<sup>48</sup> Despite the Union Home Minister, Gulzarilal Nanda, making a statement in the Indian parliament that the suspected culprits had no connection with the National Conference or any other political party, public fury on ground was directed against Bakshi, and he was dubbed as an agent of New Delhi.<sup>49</sup> After the relic was found, Lal Bahadur Shastri's statements indicated an end to the Shamsudin era.<sup>50</sup> Right-wing Praja Parishad demanded the dismissal of the Shamsudin ministry and the imposition of the President's rule.<sup>51</sup> Sadiq called upon New Delhi that the people of the state would not be satisfied unless the Central Government acted immediately to improve the political and administrative setup in the state.<sup>52</sup> Moulana Masoodi, the secretary of the Relic Action Committee called for an administrative change.<sup>53</sup> New Delhi worked for the revitalization of the National Conference as part of the Congress.<sup>54</sup> Shastri was sent into the state to prepare the ground for the change of leadership. On February 20 1964, he disclosed the political angle of the visit to Kashmir in the Rajya Sabha and indicated a change in rule towards a regime that would satisfy the people of the state.<sup>55</sup> A report published in *The Statesman*, New Delhi, on his visit mentioned a thorough shake-up in the State administration.

[Shastri's visit aimed at the] reconstitution of the State Cabinet which ruled out Mr Shamsuddin's continuance as the Premier. At the same time, Shamsuddin's inclusion in the reconstituted Government is strongly favoured, not only is to underscore that there no reflection on him personally but also to ensure unity and cooperation among all sections of the National Conference. Since Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's return to the Government is unlikely to be popular with the people, to say the least, the choice for Premier narrows down to Mr G.M. Sadiq, although at one stage Mir Qasim's name was also mentioned.<sup>56</sup>

### Fall of Shamsudin and the Rise of Sadiq

Shamsuddin's Government was considered weak by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who pressured the National Conference to elect Sadiq as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>57</sup> It was not just the failing administration that prompted Nehru to alter the power structure in the state as similar situations arising in Calcutta, wherein hundreds died in Hindu-Muslim riots, led to no administrative reshuffle. The relic incident too was not sufficient for unsettling the fundamental constitutional and democratic processes, as put by Gulzari Lal Nanda, after he met with Bakshi. Wherein he said that it would be wrong to unsettle the constitutional and democratic processes that have been at work in Kashmir over the years, merely because of the relic incident. He argued that the state has a constitution of its own, a Legislative Assembly elected by the people and a Government established through democratic methods and that Sadiq and others who now have differences with the present Government, were a party to these processes.<sup>58</sup> The political opposition by Sadiq in the name of the opposing regime's corrupt practices had little strength as he was part and parcel of the administration until October 12, 1963<sup>59</sup>, and Bakshi countered his accusations on the same lines.<sup>60</sup> Some cite Pakistan's avowed intention to create trouble along with the cease-fire as a reason for Shamsuddin's removal,<sup>61</sup> however, it fails to hold water when seen in the context of the 72 bomb explosions that took place in the state between 1962 and 1963 when Bakshi was the ruler of the state and no drastic step were taken. Similarly, in Sadiq's era later, 'Operation Gibraltar' took the regime by surprise and yet no major changes in the administration were introduced. In this context, *The Statesman*, New Delhi, noted that there was a strange mystique in Delhi that nothing unsavoury about internal affairs was to be brought to light, lest Pakistan make unscrupulous use of the disclosures, and this made Delhi support Bakshi's authoritarianism, and destroy any worth-while opposition to him, under Sadiq, Mir Qasim and DP Dhar.<sup>62</sup> New Delhi's support to Bakshi, personally, and to the National Conference as a family, to hold control on Kashmir against the wishes of the people

of Kashmir, was cited as a reason for failing democracy and administration in the state, by a Kashmiri Congress Parliamentarian AM Tariq in the Indian Lok Sabha.<sup>63</sup> While the support to the anti-people regime was an important factor, *The New York Times* cites the unpopularity of the Shamsudin government and the Kashmir debate in the Security Council as Nehru's reasons for this change in Kashmir.<sup>64</sup> The anti-India protests during the holy relic movement distinctly had a pro-Pakistani slant.<sup>65</sup> After the relic was found, India worked towards changing the local administrative arrangement. Pakistan reached out to the United Nations arguing that India was moving towards fuller integration of Jammu Kashmir into the Indian Union. However the Indian spokesman, Gulzari Lal Nanda, informed that no dramatic changes were in the making and it was only to strengthen the Kashmir administration. Finally, Nehru's choice, Sadiq rose to the seat of power on February 28, 1964.<sup>66</sup>

Even after the fall of Shamsudin, the question for the successor was unsettling. The name of Sadiq, proposed by Nehru, evoked a negative response, by the Jana Singh leader Prem Nath Dogra, who argued that mere changing of the heads in the state would not solve the political problems in the state.<sup>67</sup> Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Shamsudin were also not in favour of Sadiq. It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who succeeded in getting the support of different groups in his favour.<sup>68</sup> Finally, a four-member cabinet, headed by Sadiq was sworn in on February 28, 1964 amid public jubilation in Jammu, with favourable support from Action Committee leader Moulana Masoodi and Praja Parishad leadership.<sup>69</sup> Though the scene was quite different in Srinagar, wherein Sadiq had been welcomed with pro-Abdullah and Pro-plebiscite slogans and a small percentage of people were protesting against him.<sup>70</sup>

### Conclusion

In the times when the Indo-China war had unsettled India, internal democracy was in crisis in Kashmir and Western allies were advocating for dialogue between India and Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru intervened at two levels, 1) engaging with Pakistan in dialogue, and 2) political engineering in Jammu and Kashmir. The dialogue between India and Pakistan yielded nothing and intervention in Jammu and Kashmir only weakened the democratic credentials of the rule. Nehru focussed on integrating Kashmir and demanded that Bakshi give up. Bakshi was not keen on full integration and asserted that Article 370 would be abrogated on his dead body.<sup>71</sup> Nehru's Kamraj plan failed and institutionally sanctioned politics collapsed. Shamsudin, Bakshi's successor, seen as a client of Delhi in Kashmir, proved to be a protégé of the

client. Though Shamsudin tried to create his own identity through his administrative policies, he was however, always seen to be under the control of Bakshi. Thus, the removal of Bakshi and the installation of his subject was a political failure. The theft of the Holy Relic from the Hazratbal shrine led to mass protests in the region, with local and international implications. It made Pakistan reach out to the nations with a plea, calling for an end to Indian control in Kashmir. While Nehru was battling internal discontent in Kashmir and international attention on the global stage, he called for the removal of Kashmir's Prime Minister Shamsudin. He then installed Sadiq, a left-leaning politician and managed to get different political stakeholders on board. The beginning and end of the Shamsudin's era only exposed the crumbled democracy in Kashmir. BK Nehru, the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir from 1981 to 1984, rightly described the political exercises in Kashmir from 1953 to 1975 as farcical and authoritative.<sup>72</sup> Nehru was concerned about the presence of two hostile fronts, China and Pakistan, and wanted stability on one side of the border. On the one hand, he tried to manoeuvre the internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir and at the same time engaged with Pakistan. However, the expected results were far from achieved.

Thus, Shamsudin's era represents an era of undermined democracy, political engineering and unrest in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, despite the hard efforts by the Prime Minister of the state, on the developmental front. It also emerged that the politics of coercion despite the developmental model, had failed to convince Kashmiris and win their hearts and minds. To Nehru, the Holy relic agitation during Shamsuddin's era amply clarified that the political mentality of Kashmiris had not changed and the carrot and stick policy had not worked. Nehru told his Cabinet committee comprising of Gulzari Lal Nanda, TT Krishnamachari, Shastri and AK Sen that if sixteen years from accession, Kashmiris could rise against the Government like this, then there was something fundamentally wrong with the Kashmir policy. Shamsuddin's era thus led to yet another policy shift in Delhi and India decided to politically decimate Bakshi, release Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah from jail, and empower Sadiq to erode Article 370, to reduce Kashmir's autonomy. Nehru sent Sheikh Abdullah to Pakistan for talks with President Ayub Khan to discuss Kashmir. Kashmir continues to remain in a state of exception where Delhi's political engineering, governance crisis and unrest are routine.

## Notes

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4. Gopal, Sarvepalli, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, London, 1984, p. 256.
5. Butt, Sanaullah, *Kashmir in Flames; An Untold Story of Kashmir's Political Affairs*, Ali Mohammad & Sons, Srinagar, 1981, pp. 79-80.
6. Wani, Aijaz Ashraf, *What Happened to Governance in Kashmir*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 204
7. Under this plan, the Chief Ministers and the Central Ministers were asked to submit their resignations to Prime Minister Nehru, and those whose resignations were accepted were expected to leave active politics and work on the ground for strengthening the basis of the party
8. Wani, *What Happened to Governance in Kashmir*, p. 204
9. David Morison and A. S. B. Olver, 'Notes of the Month,' *The World Today*, Vol. 20, No. 11 (Nov., 1964), pp. 461-64.
10. Ishaq, Munshi Mohammad, *Nidayay-i-Haq*, (Political Diary, Urdu), Kashmir Book foundation, Srinagar, 2014, pp. 302-303.
11. Butt, *Kashmir in Flames*, p. 78.
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13. Mullik, B. N., *My Years with Nehru: Kashmir*, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, P. 107
14. 'Kamraj Plan in Action,' *The Sunday Statesman*, New Delhi, August 25, 1963, p. 1.
15. 'Ex-Prime Minister, Dissidents Backer, Is Jailed in Kashmir,' *The New York Times*, September 22, 1964, p. 4.
16. Morison and Olver, 'Notes of the Month,' pp. 461-64.
17. Wani, *What Happened to Governance in Kashmir*, p. 204
18. Ramachandra Guha, 'Opening a new Window in Kashmir,' *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), pp. 79-94
19. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 112. Also see. 'Delhi Favours G. M. Sadiq,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, August 27, 1963, p. 1.
20. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 112.
21. Akbar, M. J., *India: The Siege Within: Challenges to a Nation's Unity*, Roli Books, 2017, p. 258.
22. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 113-114.
23. 'Political surprises galore in Kashmir,' *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, October 27, 1963, p. 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. *Weekly Aayeen*, Srinagar, Vol. 5, Issue 1, August 2, 1964

28. Ibid.
29. 'Kashmir Party Chooses New Chief,' *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, October 11, 1963.
30. Government of Jammu and Kashmir, *The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette*, Vol. 75, No. 27-b, 4<sup>th</sup> October 1963.
31. Government of Jammu and Kashmir, *The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette*, Vol. 76, No. 28-a, 12<sup>th</sup> October 1963. It is to be said that Shamsudin's Cabinet had the strength of Six Ministers, and included D.N. Mahajan, Harbans Singh, Kaushak Bakula, Manohar Singh, Gayasud-Din (communist) and Ayub Khan. Those holding the portfolios of the Ministers of state included Chajju Ram, Amar Nath Sharma, Kanwar Sagar Singh and Mir Ghulam, Mohammad. See. *The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette*, Vol. 76, No. 28-C, 12 October 1963, Part 1-A.
32. Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, *Fortnightly Confidential Diary Ending 15-10- 1963 of District Anantnag*. File Number IS-207-A/63. Srinagar State Archives.
33. *The Sunday Standard*, New Delhi, October 13, 1963, p. 1.
34. Shamsudin, during his first visit to his home town Anantnag as the Prime Minister of the state, on 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 1963 assured people that his government would do everything to eradicate poverty, social evil and unemployment from the state. He assured the people of the availability of the ration at the Government deposes and also the maintenance of price level. He in fact announced the increase of fuel rations from 5 seers to 15 seers per head per month from the government stores. See, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, *Fortnightly Confidential Diary of Anantnag District Ending 31-10-1963*, File Number IS-214-A/63, State Archives Srinagar.
35. 'Kashmir drive against graft,' *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, October 28, 1963, p. 7.
36. These State officials were later reinstated following the acceptance of a writ petition by the State High Court on April 17, 1964, during Sadiq's Premiership. See. '100 Kashmir officials to be reinstated,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, April 18, 1964.
37. In Poonch region the anti-corruption week was inaugurated on 10<sup>th</sup> December 1963 by Kanwar Sagar Singh, Minister of State for Local Self Government. Similar ceremonies were held by him at Rajauri, Nowshera and Sunderbani on 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> December 1963. On 11<sup>th</sup> December 1963, a symposium on the anti-corruption drive was held at College Ground, Poonch. In the Valley of Kashmir such meetings were reported from Baramulla, Kulgam, Shopian and Anantnag, where during the Anti-corruption week celebrations, employees pledged to remain honest in their services to the state. Harbans Singh Azad, Minister of Education, in this regard administered the oath to about 2000 employees in the presence of 3000 audiences at Kuthua in Jammu. In another oath ceremony held at Basohli in Jammu, 700 employees took oath in the presence of thousands of people. The government took firm action against all officers with cases of corruption against them. The Kashmir Government issued notices to Divisional Engineer and 24 officials asking them to show cause why their services should not be suspended. Aga Syed Altaf, custodian of Evacuee Properties, Jammu was suspended after having been charge-sheeted by Kashmir anti-corruption Commission. The charge against the custodian was that he had employed a school student named Mohammad Anwar as his peon against the standing orders of the Government and thus obtained pecuniary advantage without consideration for the boy. The attendance of the boy in the school as well as in the office was shown simultaneously. See details in, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, *Fortnightly Confidential Diary of Poonch District for the Period ending 15<sup>th</sup> December, 1963*. File Number IS-251/A/63. Srinagar State Archives, p. 2. Also see, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, *Fortnightly Confidential Diary Ending First Fortnight of December, 1963 of District Baramulla*. File Number IS-251/A/63. Srinagar State Archives, p. 2. Also see, 'Notices served on Kashmir officials,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 14, 1964. Also see, 'Jammu official suspended,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 17, 1964.
38. 'Bakshi Plan for Public relations by Govt's,' *The Indian Express*, New Delhi,, October 23, 1963, p. 10
39. Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, File number IS-237-A/63. Srinagar State Archives.
40. 'Social Benefits for Kashmiri's; Shamsudin announced far-reaching reforms,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 26, 1964.
41. Praja Parishad in Jammu gave protest call against the appointment of Shamas-ud-Din as Prime Minister of the state. A call for general strike was given by this organisation on 11<sup>th</sup> of November, 1963 in Jammu region and the slogans of "Shamas Sarkar ko Tod Dou" (Do away with the Shams din's government) were raised. Similarly, in Kashmir, "National Congress" under the leadership of Mohammad Shafi Qureshi, too protested by distributing a booklet titled "Bakshi Sahib ki Lagayee Hui Aag ko hum Bhujayen Gay" (we shall extinguish the fire, set by Bakshi Sahib). See, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department Records, Internal Security Section, *Fortnightly Reports For The First Fortnight Of November, 1963*. File Number IS-221/A/63. Srinagar State Archives.
42. Gauba, K. L., *Passive voices: A penetrating study of Muslims in India*, Sterling Publishers, 1973, p. 214.
43. Wani, Aijaz Ashraf, *What happened to Governance in Kashmir?* Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 207.
44. 'Leftist Is Elected to Leadership of Kashmir; Sadiq Is Assembling Cabinet with Nehru Support; Former Regime Considered Weak by New Delhi,' *The New York Times*, February 29, 1964, p. 2.
45. Morison and Olver, 'Notes of the Month,' pp. 461-64.
46. A South Asian view: a collection of speeches and excerpts from important addresses delivered in the United States, by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, during the years 1963-1964, *Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan*, Washington, 1964, p 57-77.

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48. 'Riots in Kashmir Called Political; Regime Is Viewed as Target of Moslem Violence,' *The New York Times*, January 24, 1964, p. 2.
49. 'Kashmir wants full integration,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 13, 1964.
50. 'Maulvi's Identify Relic,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 4, 1964, p.1.
51. 'Parishad Leaders meet President,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 25, 1964.
52. 'Bakshi comments on Sadiq's statement,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 25, 1964.
53. 'Radical Changes likely in Kashmir Ministry,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 21, 1964, p. 1.
54. These suggestions were discussed by *Sadr-i-Riyasat* Karan Singh with President and Prime Minister of India at the Prime Ministers House in New Delhi and also with Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda. In this regard Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Mir Qasim, and D.P. Dhar also had consultations with Central leadership. See 'Steps to Tone up Kashmir Administration,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 19, 1964. p.1.
55. 'Shastri to Visit Jammu today,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 20, 1964, p.1.
56. 'Shamsudin may be replaced, Shastri continues talks on Ministerial Changes,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 21, 1964, p. 1.
57. 'Ex-Prime Minister, Dissidents' Backer, Is Jailed in Kashmir,' *The New York Times*, September 22, 1964, p. 4.
58. 'No Political Changes in Kashmir envisaged,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 20, 1964. P. 1.
59. Sheikh Abdullah just after his release criticising the Sadiq Ministry made the same comment at his Udhampur rally when he said that 'they were the chips of the same block.' See 'Indian Army's role in Kashmir; Abdullah relates it to Self-determination,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, April 12, 1964.
60. 'Bakshi Comments on Sadiq's Statement,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 24, 1964.
61. 'Radical Changes likely in Kashmir Ministry,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 21, 1964, p. 1.
62. 'Need for Drastic reforms in Kashmir,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 9, 1964.
63. 'Kashmir wants full integration,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 13, 1964.
64. 'Leftist Is Elected to Leadership of Kashmir; Sadiq Is Assembling Cabinet with Nehru Support; Former Regime Considered Weak by New Delhi,' *The New York Times*, February 29, 1964, p. 2.
65. 'Anger Over Theft Lingers In Kashmir,' *The New York Times*, February 5, 1964, p. 11.
66. 'Riots In Kashmir Called Political; Regime Is Viewed as Target of Moslem Violence,' *The New York Times*, January 24, 1964
67. 'Jana Sangh Chief's Comment,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 24, 1964.
68. 'Bakshi support to Sadiq reported,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 27, 1964. Also see. 'Kashmir Party Leadership; Bakshi to Propose Sadiq's Name,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 28, 1964.
69. 'Wide support for Sadiq Cabinet,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, February 29, 1964.
70. When Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq arrived in Srinagar from Jammu, for the first time, as the Prime Minister of the State, Sadiq drove in an open Jeep from the airport to Gagribal, his residence in the city, through a Nine mile long route, tastefully decorated with arches and bunting. At four or five places people shouted Pro-Abdullah and Pro-plebiscite slogans. Six people were arrested. According to police, one of them tried to pull down arches set up to welcome Sadiq. See, Qasim, Mir, *Dastan-i-Hayat*, Idarah Adbiyat, 1985, p. 266. Also see, 'Warm welcome for Sadiq in Srinagar,' *The Statesman*, New Delhi, April 5, 1964.
71. Puri, Balraj, *Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation*. Sterling Publishers, 1981 p. 153-4.
72. Nehru, Braj Kumar, *Nice Guys Finish Second*, Viking Books, 1997, New Delhi, p. 614-15.