

# Marx and Ambedkar: Reflections on the Dialectics of Indian Emancipation

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## CASTE AND THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION

If Lenin had said that without understanding Hegel it was impossible to understand Marx in the context of the international proletariat revolution,<sup>1</sup> then one can say in the Indian context that without understanding caste, it is impossible to understand India. The understanding of the dynamics of caste is the clue to the understanding of Indian history, its dominant ideology: Hinduism, and the mode of production in India with special reference to the Asiatic mode of production that Marx highlighted not only in his 1850s essays on India, but also in the *Grundrisse*, *Capital*, and *The Ethnological Notebooks*. According to Marx the caste based:

idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they had restrained the human mind within the smallest compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget that the barbarian egotism which, concentrating on some miserable piece of land, ... communities were contaminated by caste and slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances, that they transformed a selfdeveloping social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, ...<sup>2</sup>

How does one understand such a

reading? Should one say, following Edward Said that Marx the great humanist fell prey to the practice of Eurocentric hegemony, just as Eurocentrism had devoured Hegel and Goethe?<sup>3</sup> Or is Marx's reading an accurate reading of the structures in dominance of Indian society, and these structures are not to be confused with a reading of an 'Indian feudalism', but have to be located in the Asiatic mode of production, the stand that Marx (but not the Marxists) held, and that caste is the deciding factor of this Asiatic mode? That caste is the basis of Indian society is a fact examined by thinkers as diverse as Hibert Risley, John Nesfield, Emile Senart, Max Weber, Louis Dumont, DD Kosambi, EMS Namboodripad, MN Srinivas and Sharad Patil. That the social process of caste, and all its terrible superstitions and ramifications expressed through the dialectics of *varna-jati* is both the basis and an evil of Indian society, was not only recognized by Marx but also the talwars of the anti-caste movement—Jyotirao Phule and Babasaheb Ambedkar. The anti-caste revolution remained the leitmotiv of their radical politics.

For Phule and Ambedkar, the rebellion against the caste system is of central importance. With them, one has a radical re-reading of Indian history, a radicalism that would put them in direct opposition to the Orientalist and Brahmanical phantasmagorical account of India. How

both Phule's and Ambedkar's understanding of Hinduism is radically different from the romantic versions of Vivekananda, Sister Nivedita, Gandhi, Ananda Coomaraswamy and Aurobindo is evident in the fact that the former were to tear it down from its roots—caste had to crumble, along with it the superstitious spiritual superstructure created by the Brahmins. The 'notion' that the Brahmanical elites had constructed not only from the middle and late nineteenth century but since time immemorial, would be dissolved in its fragments. 'Hindu' history would fall under this subaltern deconstruction, a blow that Brahmanical Hinduism would never recover from. It is in this critique of caste oppression and the radical reading of Indian history that revolutionary Marxism enters the scene of the Indian revolution. Revolutionary Marxism is bent on understanding the process of caste in India and the radical subaltern account of Indian history.

In Phule's account of Indian history, the Brahmins who had paraded the *Sudras*, *ati-Sudras* and *Mlechas* (i.e., the lower castes and the Muslims) as the demonized 'other' are themselves deconstructed as the hostile other—the proto-Brahmanical 'other' that came from Iran and destroyed the 'authentic' Indian civilization.<sup>4</sup> Brahmanical history would cease to have the firm and solid foundation that it aspired for. It would be exposed as being neither nationalist

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nor people-oriented. On the contrary, Phule would reveal the imperialist and inherently tyrannical nature of Brahmanism. The thesis that Phule would create would be the foundation of the anti-Brahmanical movement. It is from this basis that the contemporary subaltern anti-Brahmin movement in India emerged. Ambedkar arrived on the scene of Indian history with this Phulean legacy. Though Ambedkar did not fully endorse Phule's historical critique, especially on the 'Aryan' question and the origins of the problem of the subjugation of the subaltern classes in India, differing in the historical analysis of the critique of Brahmanism<sup>5</sup>, both critiques went on to form an epistemico-political alliance in the subversion of Hinduism and the caste question.

In the tenth mandala of the *Rg Veda*, the master text of Hinduism, the myth of creation is depicted where the Brahmins are depicted as emerging from the mouth of god-cum-primeval 'man'—Prajapati ('The Lord of Beings') later to become Brahma, who existed before the creation of the universe—the Rajanya (the later Kshatriyas) from the hands, the Vaishyas from the thighs and the Sudras from the legs.<sup>6</sup> The *varna* system is first depicted in this text. It becomes a sort of an ideological signifying apparatus to justify later caste stratification and the social-politics of purity, pollution and exclusion. The first question that emerges is: what is *varna* and what is its etymological meaning and how would philology classify the term '*varna*'?<sup>7</sup> The second question relates to the process of *jati* and the historical linguistic analysis of this term. The third question relates the processes of *varna-jati* with the Marxist idea of class struggles with special analysis of the Asiatic mode of production. For the clue to the analysis of caste stratification, a comparative study between the *Rg Veda* and the *Avesta* is necessary in order to find the nature of the tribal and class conflicts, as also to find why the Iranians did not produce caste but the Indians

did. This implies a comparative study in the ideological apparatuses of the Indians and the Iranians.

What one needs is a scientific analysis on the relation between caste in India and class formations, and the location of caste in concrete historical economic modes of production. What seems to be hitherto missing is the disjuncture between the analysis of caste and the Asiatic mode of production. Whilst the question of the Asiatic mode that emerged in the twentieth century was restricted to the question of the hydraulic system and the oriental state, the question of caste seemed to be missing from this framework of analysis. The debate on the Asiatic mode was severely 'restricted' if not curtailed by the Stalinist state capitalist bureaucrats—MN Kokin (1906–39) being one victim, presumably killed in Stalin's infamous purge, and secondly not sufficiently touched upon by non-Soviet scholars. Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism: A Study of Total Power* and later Krader's analysis, turned out to be defective. What has largely happened is the tendency for a moralistic reading of Marx's Asiatic mode of production, claiming that Marx's usage of 'Oriental despotism' was extremely uncharitable towards non-European societies. This moralistic reading would not only devour the ex-leftist turned renegade Wittfogel, but also Edward Said and the Indian Marxists who championed the term 'Indian feudalism'. Marx was not interested in the mere morality of nations and civilizations, but in an accurate study of the modes of production. There is a fallacy in claiming that Marx was a European fellow traveller of Hegel and Co., a view championed by Said's Foucaultian reading of the West's encounter with the East. Said should have waited for Foucault's 'What the Iranians are Dreaming About?' where Foucault praises the politics of Ayatollah Khomeini, the butcher of democracy and the communists, as 'political spiritualism'.<sup>8</sup>

When Marx talked of the idyllic non-

changing system in India he was referring to the caste system<sup>9</sup>—a system that, according to Ambedkar, is devoid of rationality—a system according to Marx where there are 'self-sufficient communities that constantly reproduce themselves in the same form, and when accidentally destroyed, spring up again on the spot and with the same name—this simplicity supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeableness of Asiatic societies, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty. The structure of the economic elements of society remains untouched by the storm-clouds of the political sky'.<sup>10</sup> It is on this site that the critique of the Asiatic mode and Hinduism appear—Marx and Ambedkar now form a concrete alliance. This critique claims that there are multiple monadic Robinson Crusoes based on small property and patriarchal family labour where not only is rational cultivation but also the material and spiritual production of wealth is dwarfed; and that social life is fascinated with the totems and taboos of purity and the fetish of endogamy and social exclusion. In this *varna-jati* dominated mode of production there is no possibility of the instrumental rationality of capitalism, leave alone the critical reason of communism. Yet Marx's analysis should not be confused with Hegel's schematization of civilizations, where the Indians are rated along with the Chinese and the Persians, below European civilization.<sup>11</sup> Hegel was Eurocentric, Marx was a humanist and an internationalist: his motto being 'nothing human is alien to me' (*Nihil humani a me alienum puto*).<sup>12</sup> Marx never condemns people and civilizations, he studies modes of production.

It is to this question of caste that scientific attention must now turn, for it is the decoding of the caste-class question that will understand Indian history as well as define the question of the Indian revolution. Whilst the communists in India have taken the lead in being the vanguard of class struggles and protests against caste oppression, violence against



women and minorities, the caste question per se seems to be eluding their radical politics, so as not able to fracture the hegemony of the ruling classes in India. Unless this dialectic of caste and class is not exposed, even the bourgeois democratic revolution is not possible, leave alone the socialist revolution. The question of caste is the most degenerate structure regressing the democratic process. It is from this site that one can understand the dominant mode of production along with the understanding how: (1) patriarchy in India arises, (2) as also the repression and retardation of an authentic capitalism in India (for capitalism needs free labour as its prerequisite in contrast to the caste based hereditary unfree labour), and (3) the emergence of the neo-fascists Hindutva RSS as well as the Islaimist Tablig-e-Jamaat and the Jamaat-e-Islami. That caste is a living reality and does not die with the growth of capitalism has to be understood. The biggest threat caste poses today is Hindutva fascism of the Sangh Parivar. It ought to be understood that fascism is far more complex a phenomena than what the Comintern under Stalin's reactionary leadership and Dmitriov understood in the late 1920s and the 1930s. The classical definition of fascism coined at the thirteenth 'Enlarged Executive of the Communist International (ECCI) Plenum on Fascism, the War Danger, and the Tasks of the Communist Parties' went thus: 'Fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital.' Whilst it is most certainly decaying finance capital that had turned violent, and which propelled the First Imperialist War and the formation of the anti-communist fascists in Italy, Germany and Spain. What was missing from analysis was the study of the remnants of the German gens (as Marx reminded Engels in 1868 with a quotation from Caesar: 'The Germans always settled as kinship groups and not as individuals').<sup>13</sup> This survival of the

rural Germanic gens did play an extremely counter-revolutionary role in Germany. The same is happening in contemporary India—the caste system is being propelled along with the geopolitics of imperialism to create a fascist political system in India. The ruling political elites, i.e., the Congress, as Ambedkar prophetic summarized in 1940s, will not go for a social reform, but will give the process of social reform to the rank reactionary and fascist Hindu Mahasabha.<sup>14</sup> That the Brahmin 'democrat' is in no state to be progressive and no state to change the morbid caste system should be recognized, probably because the Brahmin is stuck up in the age-old fetish of the eternal recurrence. Hindu philosophy has no idea of progress; unlike their Indo-Iranian counterparts—the Zoroastrians for whom the idea of progress (*Spenta*) is central to their world-view.<sup>15</sup> Caste is the social structure whose superstructure is the ideology of anti-progress and the eternal recurrence. The real study of the caste system has to take place, for caste has not disappeared with capitalism but co-exists with it.

Why is this so? For one, the growth of capitalism is not according to an ideal type logic where some type of neat class system in 'pure form' develops, a purity that is free from caste structures or other disturbing elements. When Marx talks of 'pure form' and understanding social processes that occur in 'most typical form and most free from disturbing influence', he is implying a methodology that is able to pry into the 'cell-form' of society.<sup>16</sup> This pure form exists in reality at the level of the cell-form. The cellular pure form is always combined with the *chaotic form*. The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete is the movement from the cellular pure form to the chaotic bodily form.

Raising the question of social formations and modes of production has necessarily to be analysed at the empirical level that is free from all ideological disturbances. Most certainly one cannot

impose the model of the transformation of feudalism to capitalism of Western Europe onto India. One cannot have what Marx called a 'ready made system of logic' that can be randomly applied anywhere.<sup>17</sup> To raise the question thus of class and caste in India, has thus to transcend any a priori metaphysical assumptions. Unfortunately the communist movement had not only the intrusion of upper caste leaders but even the stalwart of the early communist movement was a revisionist, SA Dange, who applied a Platonic methodology in the analysis of India making evident the Brahmanical bias of an alleged leftist, who glorified Vedic society by claiming that the abominable sacrifice, the *Yagna*, is actually a mode of production<sup>18</sup>—to be precise, a primitive communist mode and thus possibly to be celebrated. Secondly, the dependence on mechanical materialism in contrast to the dialectical materialism of Marx necessitated the domination of the teleological view of history: the idea that history is governed by iron laws independent of human will, where all history is said to follow a predetermined course—from primitive communism to slavery, feudalism, capitalism culminating with some inexorable force in communism. That Marx refused to abide by such metaphysical mechanics is evident not only in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, but also in the *Ethnological Notebooks* and his correspondence with the Russian Narodniki revolutionaries:

'... the capitalist economic system emerged from the womb of the feudal economic system.... In that history 'all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments, when great masses of men are forcibly torn from their means of production and of subsistence, suddenly hurled on the labour market. But the basis of this whole development is the expropriation of the peasants, England is so far the only country where this has been carried through completely...but all the countries of Western Europe are going through the same development'.<sup>19</sup>



What, asks Marx would the analysis of 'this historical sketch' have on non-West European countries? It means firstly to transform the peasants into proletarians and then being caught in 'the whirlpool of the capitalist economy'.<sup>20</sup> But Marx warns that it is not possible to transform the historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into 'an historico-philosophic theory of the general path of development prescribed by fate to all nations, ... (One should not use) as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical'.<sup>21</sup>

So how would Marxism be able to free itself, from the metaphysical supra-historical cocoon that it quite often finds itself especially in relation to the understanding of India and the caste question? How does one understand the inner dialectics of caste and class so as to shake the very foundations of the political economy of injustice in India?

The idea of a supra-human history had started creeping into the works of Plekhevov and Karl Kautsky, which was reified into an onto-theological doctrine by Stalin and made fashionable by Althusser's 'theoretical anti-humanism'. That this positivism is estranged reasoning is evident from the early Marx's reading of history and the human essence (*das menschlichen Wesen*). Marx says that the human is the *essence* and *basis* of all activities and situations: 'History does nothing, it "possesses no immense wealth", it "wages no battles". It is the *human*, real, living humanity who does all that, who possess all that; "history" is not, as it were, a person apart, using humanity as a means to achieve *its own* aims; history is *nothing but* human activity pursuing its aims.'<sup>22</sup>

When Marx had said that the economic base determines an ideological superstructure, he meant that the term determination (*Bestimmung*) connects and binds the sites the levels of the economic base and the ideological superstructure. Determination is not determinism. Determination on the contrary is related

to the idea of formation (*Gestaltung*). It thus, relates itself to the living aspect of social formations. What a revisionist interpretation of Marxism did (especially during the Second International and the later Soviet metaphysicians) was to fragment the base-superstructure, thus opening the path of a reductionist and teleological misinterpretation of Marxism. Economism was born in the proletariat movement. The Mensheviks, the social democrats and the Stalinists are the exemplary economists and teleologists. Social democracy today is caught in the binary of economic reductionism and political idealism. They cannot pose the caste problem. Why is this so? From whence does economism emerge? Poulantzas said that economism is an effect of the abandonment of mass struggle and internationalism.<sup>23</sup> One has to transcend this fossilized and mechanical methodology in order to pose the question of class and caste in a scientific manner. Economism neither reveals the mechanism of class nor caste. Economism is vulgar economics whilst Marxism is a critique of political economy. The *Aufhebung* of economism thus becomes an imperative. Just as the international mechanical social democrats split the base from the superstructure, in India, we are faced with the splitting of the questions of caste from class struggle. This has been the tragedy of the Indian revolution.

In contrast to economism, we move into the subterranean regions of history with special reference to the debate of the modes of production in India and the questions of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* that first Marx and then German sociologists had raised at the end of the nineteenth century. That India even in the twenty-first century, is a bewildering combination of communities, is a fact. Caste is not a mere pre-capitalist remnant, but a living organic socio-economic structure. These socio-economic structures are also realized as 'communities'. That these 'communities' are compatible with

modern class formations is also a fact. How these numerous communities are related to the historical conjecture of class struggles, remains to be seen. For this one has to go into the site of the great revolution in the sciences that Marx had performed. For the first time in history, 'the great moving power' (to borrow Engels' phrase) of history was seen in the dialectical clashes between the sites of forces of production, relations of production and the ideological superstructure. It is these ever-mobile clashing sites, which form the motor force of history. In these clashes, the economic, political, scientific and ideological sites, both condense and displace creating the seismic shifts that cause the changes in historical modes of production. In the 1859 preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx highlights the mechanisms of history.

Now it is in this unsurpassable terrain of history that the *question of history* itself emerges. The argument to be held is that Marx foresaw multi-linear histories, incorporating distinct Asiatic modes of production. History is not a single teleological process emerging from a primitive communism that marches into slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism; but world histories emerge from multiple 'primitive communist' sites leading to Greco-Roman slavery on the one hand, and on distinct Germanic mode, African, American and the Indic and Slavic Asiatic modes, on the other. It is from this Asiatic mode that caste as a hereditary, occupational, hierarchical and endogamous group formation emerged. It is in this Asiatic mode where caste plays the handmaiden to Indian history. The point is to understand the pre-Rg Vedic Indus civilization, what mode of production existed with the Rg Vedic people, the development of Indian society, and what the statement of *varna* fragmentation suggests in the *pursu sukta* of the *Rg Veda*. Irfan Habib suggests the 'original statement for the four *varnas*, is more a description of social classes than



of castes: the *rajanyas*, aristocracy, the *brahmanas*, priests, the *vis*, people at large (mainly peasants), and the *sudras*, springing from the *dasyas*, servile communities. There is no hint in Vedic times of either a hereditary division of labour or any form of endogamy. The *varnas* thus initially presaged very little of the caste system that was to grow later.<sup>24</sup> The first question that emerges: when do these classes metamorphosise into castes? And what is the relation of *varna* to the hierarchical caste system? How would both *varna* and caste be extinguished? There are two important issues emerging: the historical analysis, that of the Asiatic mode of production and caste (along with the question: is India really capitalist, will it ever be); and the role of caste in twenty first century India.

With regards the question of capitalism and caste, it should be emphasized that caste implies the restriction of the individual and the free movement of labour, whilst capitalism necessarily is based on 'free' labour. India where the capitalist market thrust on it by colonialism, has a complex social formation bound to the caste based proprietorship Asiatic *Gemeinschaft*. There will not be a fully developed capitalism with a capital/wage labour antagonism, but as Marx suggest proprietors or 'members of a community, who at the same time work. The aim of this work is not the *creation of value*—although they may do surplus labour in order to obtain *alien*, ie., surplus products in exchange—rather, its aim is sustenance of the individual proprietor and of his family, as well as his total community. The positing of the individual as a *worker*, in this nakedness, is itself the work of *history*.<sup>25</sup> This brings into mind Rosa Luxemburg's argument that the capitalist centre necessarily needs non-capitalist peripheries in order to realize the former's surplus value:

Capital accumulation as the historical process develops in an environment of various pre-capitalist formations, in constant political

struggle and reciprocal economic relations. How can one capture this process in a bloodless theoretical fiction, which declares this whole context, the struggle and the relations, to be non-existent?.... Capital accumulation can take place in so far as customers can be found beyond capitalists and workers, in which case sales in non-capitalist strata and countries are the pre-condition for accumulation.<sup>26</sup>

Trotsky likewise had remarked that, 'the most primitive economic forms are combined with the last word in capitalist technique and culture.'<sup>27</sup> Uneven development of capitalism and unequal exchange (albeit in combined form) now necessitate the existence of caste and the pre-capitalist sectors of the global economy. Caste then is not only a pre-capitalist remnant but also an active agent in the global accumulation of capital. Secondly, the violent imperialist nature of capital accumulation brings in the political compradors like right wing organizations that are active in recreating primordial identities (whether Hindutva, Tablig or the neo-conservative born-again Christians). In this case the anti-caste democratic revolution will have an entirely different perspective, involving direct struggle against not only the local ruling classes but also imperialism as well.

It is from this terrain of the Asiatic mode and capital accumulation in the age of late imperialism that one proceeds into the overdetermined character of Marx's idea of mode of production in order to understand how Marxism is necessarily dialectical and anti-reductionist. Firstly, an economic mode of production combines a number of social formations. Secondly, the elements of the base and superstructure (family, religion and state) are also classified as modes of production, albeit *particular modes of production* which fall under the laws of private property and alienation.<sup>28</sup> Thirdly, the site of relations of production is also complex and multi-layered involving the following:

1. Historical forms of ownership of

means of production, the balance of forces and the conjuncture of class struggles.

2. Type of economy, natural or commodity, caste and class: value, exchange-value, money, capital accumulation and surplus value. Surplus value as 'unpaid labour' is the great idealized signifier of commodity production.
3. Alienation (*Entfremdung*), reification (*Verdinglichung*) and fetishism (*Fetishismus*), where alienation implies loss, dread and terror (reminding one of Freud's analysis of *Unheimlich* ('The Uncanny' or unhomeliness), reification is literally 'thingification' or the de-personification of humanity and the personified of the 'thing' (signifying the character of commodity production), and fetishism is the morbid attachment to the existing-nonexisting-estranged object.
4. 'Real individuals'<sup>29</sup>, and
5. The human essence (*das menschliche Wesen*).<sup>30</sup>

It is from this site that one can view the non-reductionist nature of historical materialism. Those who claim that Marxism has no space for caste and those who claim that Marx reduces everything to 'class' are absolutely mistaken. It is from this site of class-caste in the age of global capital accumulation that the critique of casteism can emerge. The annihilation of caste is not an act that emerges from the writings and enforcements of legal codes. Nor does the annihilation emerge from creating primordial identities and nativism that is to oppose an imaginary phantom of Brahmanism, but to actively engage-disengage real Brahmanism, the Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses in India (which are yet governed by the *pursa sukta* notion of exclusion and hegemony) and the concrete accumulation of capital. *Otherwise an inversion of Brahmanism will then be an inverted Brahmanism*. Why is one making such a statement? Because



there are possibilities of an illusory anti-Brahmanism (disjoint from history and estranged from the concrete mode of production) which functions within the *varna* framework, where an alleged 'subaltern' caste reclaims a 'lost' (or estranged, even 'castrated' in the psychoanalytic sense) *Kshatriya* status. In such a framework, the *varna* framework is retained, even in its estranged-castrated form. The point is to subvert the caste system, but then as Phule and Ambedkar had reminded us, one has to overthrow Hinduism itself; and as the revolutionary Marxist dialectic goes, one must annihilate capitalism and imperialism itself. The march towards the annihilation of caste has now become a long march.

#### ENTFREMDUNG, MORALITY AND PRE-MODERN DIFFERENCE

Marx's concept of *Entfremdung* (alienation) that he claimed to be the motor force of the onto-genesis of global class histories and which reaches its full blown form in the modern capitalist mode of production, nestles in a very strange way in Indian history, especially reflected in the ideological state apparatus of Hinduism. *Entfremdung* as estrangement and the terrible loss, signifies schizoïd splintering and manifests itself as the pre-modern *difference* of the *pursu sukta* and the caste laws of Manu. Hinduism for the Indian subalterns, is probably the only religion that is based on the onto-theology of inequality; it is the only system in world civilization that has a legal code of exclusion. Its morality is in fact immorality. Its dharma is *varnashrama dharma*, a morality that is based on caste distinctions. Its duty, as Hegel's and Ambedkar's reading goes, is based on the duty of the caste law: the purity of the caste and protection of it from the intermixture of castes and the production of inferior blood.

If one reads the 'morality' of the *Bhagvad Gita*—the master text of the Indian counter-revolution as Ambedkar

called it<sup>31</sup>—as 'duty for duty's sake', then it is in fact wrong. What it signifies is 'duty for the protection of the purity of the castes'. One can immediately contrast this caste based counter-revolutionary (im)morality with Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* where the idea of 'duty for duty's sake' emerges. For Kant, as opposed to Krishna, there is a distinct idea of humanity to be considered as an end-in-itself, thus postulating the idea of goodwill: to be good for the sake of goodness, as well as the concept of the kingdom of ends. For Hinduism, there is no idea whatsoever of an autonomous individual, thus no goodness as such, and absolute absence of humanity as an end-in-itself. What Marx called the morality of the tribe as herd animal, is found in the dharma of the caste law. Ambedkar said, 'Hindu society had its morals loosened to a dangerous point.'<sup>32</sup> *Difference* is the ontological fragmentation of society into castes. *Gesellschaft* becomes *Gemeinschaft*, morals means enforcing exclusion and meaningless rites. Consider Hegel on the morality of the *Bhagvad Gita*:

...in which the Indian Arjuna's mentality is attached to family-ties. To the moral understanding of the European the sense of this tie is the moral in itself so that the love for one's own family is as such the completion, and morality consists only in the fact that all sentiments connected with this tie, such as respect, obedience, friendship, etc. as well as actions and duties related to family-relationship, have that love as their foundation and as self-sufficient starting point. We see, however, that this is not this moral sentiment which in the hero causes the reluctance to lead his relatives to the slaughter. We would commit crimes, he says, if we would kill those robbers (Willkins: tyrants); not in the sense that killing them as relatives (the teachers always included) would be in itself the crime, but the crime would be a *consequence*, namely through extinction of the generations the *sacra gentilitia*, the duty-bound and religious performances of a family would be destroyed. When this happens, lack of godliness affects the whole tribe. ....In that way the noble

women-folk—of the tribe the men can first of all be killed, for they alone are engaged in the battle—will be defiled, from which results *varna-sankara*, the mixture of castes (*the spurious brood*) Yet the vanishing of caste distinctions leads to those who are guilty of the extinction of the tribes and the tribe itself to eternal ruin....for the ancestors drop down from the heavens because in the future they will be devoid of *cakes and water*, no more receiving their oblations, for their descendents have not preserved the purity of their tribe....If the dead do not receive such offerings then they are condemned to the fate of being reborn as impure beasts....

Here, however, great importance is attached to the conversion of this tie into a superstitious context, into an immoral belief in the dependence of the soul's fate after death on the cake and water-libations of the relatives, that is to say of those who have remained true to the caste-distinction.

Meaning and value of Indian religiosity and the doctrine of duty related to it, can however only be understood from the caste law—this institution that has made and still makes morality and real cultivated civilization for ever impossible among the Indians.<sup>33</sup>

In contrast to this genealogy of birth and ranking by blood descent (something that fascinated not only Manu and the Brahmins but also Nietzsche and later the Nazis), Kant claimed that:

morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will. The principle of his will is therefore to perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a universal law, and consequently such that the will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its maxim....

Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; for only this is it possible to be a law-making member in a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity.<sup>34</sup>

We get an immediately contrast: the



morality of the secularized autonomous individual as an end and not as a means, and the tribal onto-theological dharma of the herd—to consider humanity never as an end but always as a means. It is at this juncture that one understands the dilemma of the dharma of the Asiatic mode of production and the dharma of the despot (thus Oriental despotism). If one has to argue for a secularized, modern nation, then one has to discard the caste system, the dharma of the despot and for that, as Ambedkar passionately argued *one has to abolish Hinduism itself!* But how is this subversion and annihilation possible? Cornelius Castoriadis has argued that reason, individuation, autonomy and democracy emerge from the settings of the Greek polis and despite the reactionary sabotaging of Heidegger's 'end of philosophy', it remains the central concern of the Greco-Western project.<sup>35</sup> It is this Greco-social structure that enabled the emergence of real, secularized philosophy, distinct from the mythology of the gods. Now it is not the case that other world systems did not produce *philosophy as philosophy*. That world revolutions are international, de-territorialized and not confined into any restricted space is well-known. The thesis of the emergence of real philosophy from Greece is of importance, but one cannot forget, as Samir Amin has argued, how the three international revolutions of the universal idea of humanity that broke out: the first starting with Zarathushtra, Buddha, the Hellenistic Greeks, Confucius, early Christianity and Islam; the second being the European Enlightenment; and the third being Marxism and the international communist movement.<sup>36</sup>

In the *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel had said that there is a sharp line of demarcation lying between the sites of the mythological and the philosophical.<sup>37</sup> To philosophize means to reason with a critical mind. Mythology is the stage of the 'mind' of world history, existing in the stage of infancy. Philosophy emerges only with

due maturity. For Hegel, the oriental world lies in the realm of the mythological, whilst the occident has the powers of philosophical reflection. Philosophy as such emerges with the Greeks. Whilst Hegel could be critiqued as an example of the Orientalist consciousness that began probably with Herodotus running up to Heidegger and Karl Popper, making an absurd claim that the 'East', as if it had no philosophy; the running battle between the mythological and the philosophical is real and does continue even in present times. For the Indian subalterns, the Brahmins are mythological, and there is no possibility of reason being drummed into their heads.

Marxism emphasizes on the scientific and the reasoning of critical philosophy, and locates the mythological as the 'return of the repressed'. It thus involves a humanist subversion of the same. The mythical is akin to Marx's reading of Hegel's philosophy as the 'estranged mind' (*entfremdete Geist*)—of the world thinking itself within its self-estrangement—i.e., comprehending itself abstractly.<sup>38</sup> The caste struggles in India are embodied in myths and counter-myths, each attempting to subvert the other, each attempting at hegemony. If the *pursu sukta* embodies a myth of proto-Brahmanical hegemony, there are parallel subaltern myths. It is in this parallel political economy of myth making that the subalterns are able to attempt to destabilize Brahmanical hegemony.

Consider Phule's counter-mythology: If the Brahmins were created from the mouth from where was the mother of the Brahmin created? Or are the Brahmins motherless? And what about the Europeans? If the Brahmins were created from the mouth, then the mouth becomes a womb for the Brahmins.<sup>39</sup> But then when the mouth turned into the Brahmanical womb menstruates then how did the Brahmanical mouth-womb absolve this pollution? <sup>40</sup> And if creation emanates from the bodily *differance* then each of these estranged parts are to be

affixed with vaginas in order that procreation to take place, and the period of menstruation for Brahma increases.<sup>41</sup>

It is well known that Savitri was Brahma's wife. Why, then, did he take upon himself the cumbrous responsibility of carrying the foetus in his mouth for nine months, and also of giving birth to it and bringing it up—subsequently? It appears very strange indeed! Three of his (four) mouths were free from this encumbrance. How then did the impotent Brahma like such childish game of make-believe?

If we call him impotent, then how did he seduce his own daughter—Saraswati (the goddess of wisdom)? That is why he was known as *Brahma the daughter-seducer!* Because of this vile deed he is not worshiped anywhere.

If Brahma, indeed had four mouths, then he ought to have had eight breasts, four navels, four urethras and four anuses.<sup>42</sup>

The libidinal economy reading of the *Unheimlich* of Brahmanism destabilizes it. The mythological games of the self-procreating estranged Brahmin are exposed. Hinduism is a game, but not a philosophical 'game for nothing' (to borrow Althusser's phrase from a different context).<sup>43</sup> It is a game for something and a nothing, a 'religion (that) is at once a religion of sensualist exuberance, and a religion of self-torturing asceticism; a religion of the Lingam, and of the Juggernaut; the religion of the Monk, and of the Bayadere.'<sup>44</sup>

So far, it is in this heterogeneity and contradictions that the Hindu system finds pride in. When an Indian calls himself a 'Hindu', it is this very spuriousness and vacuousness that is qualified. The term 'Hindu' itself emerges from the gaze of the 'outsider' (their 'brother Aryan', i.e., the Iranians) and metamorphosizes itself into something quite different from what the brother 'outsider' suggested, as well as what the Indian self demanded. So what is this genealogy of this estranged gaze? From whence did this emerge? It is well-known that the Persians probably first qualified the Indians as 'Hindus'; the



Zoroastrian *Vendidad* is probably the first text that qualifies the Indians as 'Hindus'.<sup>45</sup> Thus, it is in the Persian Parthian period that the term 'Hindu' emerged. Later Persio-Arabic writers continued this historical-geographical usage. But when the upper class-caste elites in the middle of the nineteenth century used this term, the contradictions inherent in it became apparent. The battle for hegemony and counter-hegemony also started whereby the Phule-Ambedkar politics formed a non-negotiable alliance against Hinduism. If caste has to go, so does Hinduism. There can be no Hinduism without caste, just as there could be no morality with Hinduism. Hinduism is slave morality and here the slaves are in a state of rebellion. The subaltern slaves are not enamoured by Nietzsche's master morality, rather Hegel's dialectic between master and slave fascinates them, because in this dialectic, it sees the Brahmin's macabre dance taking centre stage, but also understands that the rebellion is waiting in the wings. The slaves want unity, not *differance*. Civil war against this *Unheimlich differance* has begun. Only thing is that it appears not to be quite visible. To transform the not so visible into visible, is the task for history.

#### MYTHS AND COUNTER-MYTHS

If Brahmanical hegemony is veiled in a myth, so too are the counter-myths of the subaltern castes. The Mahars, the lowest ranked of the castes even in the hierarchy of the 'untouchables' have a myth of creation which depicts their 'fall'. Unlike the Biblical myth, which states the fall of entire humanity, the Mahar myth recounts the fall of the Mahars. Like the Biblical myth, it has the taboo of eating forbidden food at its epicentre. There were four cow born brothers, according to this myth, who were asked by the mother how they would treat her after she died. The first three said that they would worship her; the fourth said that he would bear her inside his

stomach, just as she had borne her children. This fourth child of the cow becomes the exemplaric sinner and the ancestor of the carrion eating Mahars, for it is he who puts the dead cow in his stomach.<sup>46</sup>

But if there was the myth of the fall there was also the myth of the Mahars as the vanquished tribes, subjugated by the Brahmins. Mahar leaders had used other forms of folklore to stimulate caste pride in the fellow Mahars: that the Mahars are the original inhabitants of Maharashtra destroyed and enslaved by the invading Aryans. Kisan Fagoji Bansode, an early Mahar leader, mobilized the Mahars on this issue and in 1890 Gopal Baba Walangkar, a retired Mahar soldier, drew a petition under the banner of *Anarya Doshparikarakham* ('The Non-Aryan Group for the Removal of Wrongs'), demanding re-admission of the untouchables in army.<sup>47</sup> Eleanor Zelliott claims that the early claim of a noble pre-Aryan status is passed over for a Kshatriya status.<sup>48</sup> Ambedkar would late in life (1948) in *The Untouchables* bring the thesis that the Mahars were former Buddhists who were defeated by the deceiving Brahmins in the fourth century AD.<sup>49</sup> The heroic image entered the Mahar consciousness. Later, the Mahars had a heroic leader in Ambedkar and by 1956 (the year of his death), a new ideological discourse, Buddhism.

By independence the subaltern classes had a new identity, not the unclean untouchables, nor the sinning-guilt ridden 'fallen' carrion eating cow child, or the innocent Harijan, Gandhi's children of God. The break that Ambedkar made instilled the subalterns with a different subject position itself. It is the understanding of this new subject position that is of great importance.

Lenin had said that capitalism and imperialism signify multiple subject positions, each non-reducible, and that the rights of oppressed nations (and minorities) for self-determination is of central concern for the world communist movement. The central concern is

democracy—the rights of all people for self-determination, not only labour or the proletariat, but *all* people. It is this idea of 'all people', which has to be understood, the idea that Marx had summed up in his statement—the human essence (*das menschliche Wesen*).

#### DAS MENSCHLICHEN WESEN

Just as caste and the Asiatic mode of production are under-theorized in Marxism, so too is the philosophy of Marx's humanist *das menschliche Wesen*. It was left to Althusser, the guru of structuralism in France, who castigated this radical idea in *For Marx* as an ideological remnant of a bourgeois fiction invented possibly by Ludwig Feuerbach.<sup>50</sup> What was needed, so Althusser suggested, is an 'epistemological break' whereby a 'scientific Marx' would appear from a young and heady humanist Marx.<sup>51</sup> One must openly speak of a 'theoretical anti-humanism'.<sup>52</sup>

What seems at one point is a French philosophical justification of a Slavic Stalinist misunderstanding and murder of Marx. But this misunderstanding will create the earlier philosophies and ideologies that not only Marx, but also Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach had transcended. One has to go through the secularist and humanist revolution of the European Enlightenment. The idea of society, society *as such*, arises with this definite idea of the human, the human *as such*. Yet one must point out that Marx's humanism is not to be confused with the pre-Marxist usage whether in Rousseau, Voltaire, the French materialists and Utopian socialists. Marx's *das menschliche Wesen* relates itself to the historical origins and mechanisms of *Entfremdung*, private property and commodity production. It thus stands in direct opposition to reification (*Verdinglichung*) or the becoming of the human into a *thing*. For Marx, modern capitalism has reified humanity into a commodity, the grandmaster of this *thingification* game. The human has



become a *Ding an Sich*. What now concerns us is how this reified thingification functions in pre-capitalist societies, especially with caste and patriarchal stratification—how humanity not only bows down before Hanuman the monkey, but believes in the legal code of poring molten lead in the ears of human beings and cutting out their tongues when humanity comes in front of the Holy Vedas, and burning widows alive. Hinduism for the Indian subalterns is practical anti-humanism. Anti-humanism in India follows in the brutal fascist form of extermination of people. It is also carried out in innocent 'aesthetic' form. Coomarswamy, the guru of Indian spiritualism glorified sati as the 'proof of the perfect unity of body and soul...of devotion beyond the grave', that celebrates the ideal of wifhood and seeking 'eternal heaven'.<sup>53</sup>

If this is not despotism, then what is it? But Marx does not contrast Oriental despotism with a heroic and rational West, but with a devouring colonialism. Marx contrasts Asiatic despotism thus with European despotism.<sup>54</sup> Both function within the domain of the estranged human essence. Now this idea of the estranged human essence remains a pivotal philosophic germ in Marx's critique of all class societies. History, i.e., history as such, or histories of class societies, are governed by the dialectic of the estranged human essence and the struggle to appropriate this human essence. So we have the alienated human essence and the transcendence (*Aufhebung*) of this estrangement that defines the humanist parameters of Marx's dialectical and historical materialism. This dialectic of estrangement is directly woven within the historical materialism of the forces of production, relations of production and the ideological superstructure dialectic.

That the estrangement of the human essence is directly related with both, class exploitation and caste dehumanization, is obvious. What the European Enlight-

enment and the French revolution did was to uproot feudalism and its ideologies from its roots and instead put 'man' at its epicentre of discourse. What now applies to world history (and not local histories) are the *Rights of 'Man'*, not the morbid rights-rites of purity, pollution and the creation of a terrible fascist superman. For the Brahmin, like Nietzsche and the fascists, man has to be overcome; for Marx and Ambedkar humanity has to be recalled and embraced. The early Mahar leader Walangkar had said that what matters are the 'proper rights of humanity'—humanity is *manuski* in Marathi.<sup>55</sup> What India has done is to forget 'man'. Caste is the *forgetfulness of 'man'*. If Phule understood this, Ambedkar had to live through this caste dehumanization—living as if the entire ages of caste history of his dehumanized people.

Ambedkar was right when he exclaimed that 'man' is not an economic being—that 'man' does not live by bread alone.<sup>56</sup> The idea of labour as the 'essence of humanity' (*Wesen des Menschen*)<sup>57</sup> that Marx drew in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, is not to be confused with purely economic labour. Marx instead had the concept of the ontology of labour, which Georg Lukács was later to work on:

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phänomenologie* and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence (*Aufhebung*) of this alienation; that he thus grasps the *essence of labour* (*Wesen der Arbeit*) and comprehends objective man—true, because real man—as the outcome of man's *own labour*. The *real, active* orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being), is only possible if he really brings out his *species-powers*—something which in turn is only possible through the co-operative action of mankind, only as the

result of history—and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin with is only possible in the form of estrangement (*Form der Entfremdung*).<sup>58</sup>

It is important to draw on the Buddhist notion of *Dukha* in Marx's analysis of alienation, reification and fetishism. According to Ambedkar, sorrow emerges from class conflicts.<sup>59</sup> Probably the relation between *Dukha* and Marx's *Entfremdung* has not been studied sufficiently. *Entfremdung* as alienation is not the 'fall', but the entry into the terrible and unhomely class-caste stratified *Unheimlich* world. Alienation, reification and fetishism are the notions whereby both caste and class can be both decoded in theory and transcended in praxis. For Marx, the transcendence (*Aufhebung*) of *Entfremdung* is of fundamental importance—the strategies of the transcendence of private property, class and caste histories, patriarchy and the construction of communism is bound intrinsically to the transcendence of this *Entfremdung*. For Ambedkar, the transcendence of the sociology of *Dukha* is of vital importance. Phule's deconstruction of the devouring estranged Brahmin and Ambedkar's social reformation follows from this deeply philosophical notion of transcendence of *Entfremdung-Dukha*. Otherwise an inversion of Brahmanism would be an inverted-Brahmanism; and an inversion of *Entfremdung-Dukha* would imply an inverted estrangement. One does not want the return of the repressed; it has to be transcended once and for all.

Class and caste are not two 'things' whereby comparative analysis and formal alliances can be made on the principle of the 'either/or' formula. Rather they are to be understood as social processes; and like capital have to be read as a social relation<sup>60</sup>—and not as the damned thing, but how the social relation is expressed through things.

In contrast to the damnation of humanity as *thinghood*, Marx's notions of



species-being and the human essence stand as the philosophical keys to the theory and praxis of communism. Both the species-being and the human essence signify classlessness. Marx's critique of all class societies is predicated on the philosophical reasoning of these two ideas. When one says: reason with the human essence, one is talking of an internationalist perspective of Marxism (a point that the communist parties in India forgot after Stalin's reactionary 'socialism in one country'—which should have been 'capitalist restoration in Russia' and the later dismantling of the Communist International under pressure from the Western imperialists). The human essence bent towards classlessness is necessarily an internationalism. Presently, all progressive forces in Asia need to articulate an Asian Soviets, directed against the imperialists and the local reactionaries. The iron cage of the casteist *Gemeinschaft* that Ambedkar had so vehemently criticized,<sup>61</sup> is better subverted in this framework. Ambedkar's criticism of Marxism was a critique of the fatalistic and reductionist pseudo-Marxism that he had to face. Stalinism and other forms of counter-revolutionary politics like the Brahmin hegemonists collapse when the internationalist-humanist dialectic enters on the scene of a *thinking history*.

One has to make a paradigm shift from the nation-state, with all its reactionary anomalies like class, caste, patriarchy, etc., in order to find an authentic solution to humanity's problems. To look beyond the nation state, capitalism and Brahmanism is a challenge to the Indian revolution. But then neither the nation state, nor capitalism or the Brahmins will allow this. In this case: *What is to be Done?*

## NOTES

1. 'It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic.

Consequently half a century later none of the Marxists have understood Marx!' V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 38, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 180.

2. Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India" in Marx, Engels, *The First War of Independence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978, p. 18.
3. Edward Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London: Penguin, 1995.
4. Jyotirao Phule, *Slavery*, (tr.) P. G. Patil, Bombay: The Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1991, pp. XXIX-XXXI, 4, 5, 40.
5. Babasaheb Ambedkar, *Who were the Shudras? How they came to be the Fourth Varna in the Indo-Aryan Society*, Bombay: Thacker & Co., Ltd, 1946.
6. *Sacred Writings. Hinduism. Rg Veda*, (tr.) Ralf T. F. Griffith, New York: Quality Paperback Books, 1992, p. 603:

'The Brahman was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rajanya made.  
His thighs became the Vaishya, from his feet the Sudra was produced.'

It is in this hymn of the primeval man that the hegemony of the Brahmin is constructed. A. L. Basham says that the order of nature in Hinduism is not dependent on the gods, but on the Brahmins who by 'magic of the sacrifice' maintain nature. The Brahmins are more powerful than any god or earthly king and by using the magical ritual could turn the sacrifice against his patrons and destroy them. *The Wonder that was India. A Survey of the History and Culture of the Indian Sub-Continent before the Coming of the Muslims*, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2001, p. 241.

7. Ambedkar held contrary to Kosambi's "Marxism and Ancient Indian Culture", in *History and Society: Problems of Interpretation*, Bombay: University of Bombay, 1989, p. 77; Nripendra Kumar Dutt's *Origins and Growth of Caste in India*, vol. I, London: Kegan Paul, 1931, p. 21 and later Romila Thapar's *A History of India*, vol. I, New Delhi: Penguin, 1996, p. 38, that *varna* is not 'colour' and proceeded to borrow from 'my friend Dastur Bode(s)' interpretation of the *Avesta* to imply an idealist usage of the same (thus making *varna* equivalent to religion and ethics) in *Who were the Shudras?* Why did Ambedkar do so? A probable reason is that he did not want the caste question to be confused with the race one, both which he had experienced first hand, the former in

India the later as a student in the USA. Ambedkar was also against the race inspired view of early Indian history inspired by the orientalist. In fact, Ambedkar blamed the Brahmins for accepting this racist view because they believe in 'the two nation theory' (*Ibid.*, p. 76) and their own imagined 'superiority', where they—the Brahmins, the representatives of the Aryan race rule over the rest of the Hindus—the alleged non-Aryans (*Ibid.*). Max Weber in *The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*, Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1958, was also against the explanation of the caste system from the race theory—from 'race psychology', the 'blood', or the 'Indian soul' (p. 124). More information can be obtained from the early *Avesta* or the *Gathas* of Zarathushtra which has most uncharitable views on the Rg Vedic people whom Zarathushtra found to be liars and violent, that were destroying the incipient agricultural and pastoral economies, both as Gherardo Gnoli in *Zoroaster's Time and Homeland. A Study on the Origins of Mazdaism and Related Problems*, Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1980, p. 186, claims to exist at the times of the *Gathas*. Gnoli suggests that the struggle was between the *ratheshta*/Kshatriyas and the *vastryo-fsuyan*/Vaisyas (*Ibid.*). How the Indians produced this strange and perplexing caste system is of great importance. The Iranians also had a three tier class system; the *athraavan*, *ratheshtar* and *vastryo-fsuyant*, and Iranian tradition attributed this tripartite division to Yima, though there is no evidence of a caste system evolving from this.

8. Michel Foucault, "What the Iranians are Dreaming About?" in Janet Afaray and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. Gender and the Seductions of Islam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
9. Irfan Habib claims that Marx's idea of the element of the 'unchanging' in the Asiatic mode was *unjust*, and that Marx's idea of the village community was 'highly idealized'. See Irfan Habib, *Essays in Indian History. Towards a Marxist Perception*, New Delhi: Tulika, 1997, pp. 35, 234.
10. Karl Marx, *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. I, (tr.) Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983, pp. 338-339.
11. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction*, (tr.) H. B. Nisbet from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 200-202.
12. Karl Marx, "Confession", in Eric Fromm,



- Marx's Conception of Man*, New York: Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., 1967, p. 257.
13. Karl Marx, "To Engels in Manchester, London, March 25, 1868", in *Marx. Engels. Selected Correspondence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, pp. 188-190.
  14. Babsaheb Ambedkar, *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables*, Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1945.
  15. Actually the conflict between the progressive force (*Spenta Mainyu*) and the regressive force (*Angra Mainyu*) is the leitmotiv of Zarathushtra, the struggle that inevitably culminates in absolute goodness—the restoration, or renovation (*Frasho-Kereti*).
  16. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, Part I, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 40; *Capital*, vol. I, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983, p. 19.
  17. Karl Marx, "To Fredrick Engels in Manchester, Feb, 1, 1858", in *Marx. Engels. Selected Correspondence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 95.
  18. S.A. Dange, *India from Primitive Communism to Slavery*, Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1949.
  19. Karl Marx, "To the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, London, Nov., 1877", in *Marx. Engels. Selected Correspondence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 293.
  20. *Ibid.*
  21. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.
  22. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980, p. 116.
  23. Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship. The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*, (tr.) Judith White, London: Verso, 1979, pp. 18-19.
  24. Irfan Habib, *Essays in Indian History. Towards a Marxist Perception*, p. 165.
  25. *Ibid.*, pp. 471-472.
  26. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951; Rosa Luxemburg and Nicolai Bukharin *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital*, (tr.) Rudolf Wichmann, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972, pp. 61-62, 77.
  27. Leon Trotsky, "The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International", in *The Founding Conference of the Fourth International*, New York, 1939, p. 40.
  28. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984, p. 91.
  29. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 36-37.
  30. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.
  31. Babsaheb Ambedkar, *Buddhist Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India*, Delhi: B. R. Publishing House, 1996, p. 155-182.
  32. Babasaheb Ambedkar, *Ranade, Gandhi and Jinnah*, Bombay: Thacker & Co., Ltd, 1943, p. 30.
  33. G. W. F. Hegel, *On the Episode of the Mahabharata known by the Name Bhagvad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt*, (ed.) and (tr.) Herbert Herring, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995, p. 51.
  34. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, (tr.) H. J. Patton, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966, pp. 96-97.
  35. Cornelius Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics and Autonomy*, (ed.) David Ames Curtis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
  36. Samir Amin, *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. The Management of Contemporary Society*, Delhi: Madhyam, 1997, pp. 80-90.
  37. G. W. F. Hegel, *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, (tr.) T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 17-19, 159.
  38. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982, p. 129; Karl Marx, 'Nationalökonomie und Philosophie (1844)', in *Karl Marx. Die Frühschriften*, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1964, p. 253.
  39. Jyotirao Phule, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
  40. *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.
  41. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
  42. *Ibid.*
  43. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, (tr.) Ben Brewster, London: Allen lane, 1975, p. 55.
  44. Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India", p. 13.
  45. B. T. Anklesaria, (ed.), *Pahlavi Vendidad*, Mumbai: The K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, 2002 depicts the land of the 'Hindus' thus: *The Fifteenth of-lands and places, I created the best, I Who (am) Ohrmazd, was that which was the Hapt-Hindukan;— [Its being Hapt-Hindukan is that it has seven chiefs. Why do I say this, that is seven rivers? For, That is evident in the Avesta: (Av.) 'From the Eastern river towards the Western river.' There is one who thus says: 'Every clime has One']— Thereupon, 'Gana-Minuy', full of death, counter-created, In opposition to it, (the) abnormal mensuration,—(it is very oppressive), and (the) abnormal heat,—(it is more then patman).*
  46. See Eleanor Zelliot, *From Untouchable to Dalit. Essays on the Ambedkar Movement*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2005, p. 54.
  47. *Ibid.*, p. 57
  48. *Ibid.*
  49. *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 72.
  50. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, London: Allen lane, 1969, pp. 51-86, 222-223, 227-231, 236-237.
  51. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 28, 32-34, 32 n., 37-39, 47, 168, 185, 192 n., 244, 249, 257.
  52. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
  53. See Ambedkar's criticism of Coomarswamy in "Castes in India" in *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. Writings and Speeches*, vol. I, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1989, p. 13.
  54. Karl Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 14
  55. Eleanor Zelliot, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
  56. B. R. Ambedkar, 'Buddha or Karl Marx', in *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1987, pp. 461-462.
  57. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 132; Karl Marx, 'Nationalökonomie und Philosophie (1844)', in *Karl Marx. Die Frühschriften*, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1964, p. 269.
  58. *Ibid.*
  59. B. R. Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-445.
  60. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, pp. 814-815.
  61. B. R. Ambedkar, "Untouchables and the Children of India", in *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. Writings and Speeches*, vol. 5, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1989, p. 62.

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