

- p. 386.
13. This kind of circularity is sometimes called rule-circularity. See Rescher, Nicholas, 1980, *Induction*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
 14. Also see DI, pp. 43-45.
 15. "Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for deciding What Hypotheses to Take seriously" in GR, pp. 153-172.
 16. Harman does mention simplicity of representation that is similar to what is called economy with respect to constitution in the Nyaya. He also distinguishes computational simplicity from semantic simplicity advocated by Elliott Sober in *Simplicity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. According to Sober, a hypothesis is simpler and preferable to another if less information is needed in the light of the former compared to the latter to answer questions that matter.
 17. Another important kind of undesirable consequence is due to conflict between what one asserts and the way one regularly behaves. For more discussion see DI, Chapter XI.
 18. Harman tries to show that computational simplicity is an indicator of verisimilitude. He, however, assumes in this process that there is no difference between believing something and believing that it is true. This assumption is questionable: believing something without believing that it is true seems to be quite possible. For example, a man of science may participate in religious rituals in the belief that this is needed for afterlife although he may have also reason to believe that science rejects life after death. At least the Nyaya claims that it is possible to hold on to a contradiction in spite of being aware of that it is a contradiction.
 19. "A Grue thought in a Bleen Shade: 'Grue' as a Disjunctive Predicate" in GR, pp. 173-192.
 20. D.H.H. Ingalls, a long time colleague of Goodman at the Harvard University, was trained in Nyaya philosophy by a traditional pandit. Goodman makes no reference to the Nyaya anywhere. Still

it is more than possible that Goodman and Ingalls had some philosophical conversations and that Goodman was influenced by Nyaya ideas in coining perverse predicates like the grue. Goodman holds: 'A hypothesis is *projectible* if and only if it is supported, unviolated, and unexhausted, and all such hypotheses that conflict with it are overridden.' (*Problems and Projects*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1972, p. 393) This is analogous to the Nyaya view that an induction (or a hypothesis: *kalpana*) is not reliable unless it is supported by subjunctive reasoning that shows that the denial leads to an undesirable consequence. As already said, the Nyaya doctrine of an undesirable consequence is highly developed. An undesirable consequence may be a contradiction or a belief-behavior conflict or conflict with something reliably accepted or acceptance of something uneconomical.

Global Order, Peace and the Nehruvian Discourse

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The contemporary global order understandably suggests a serious theoretical scrutiny. The collapse of the cold war and with it the dissolution of the balance-of-power shelter of convenience tends to simplify, at a surface level, the inner threads of international relations. But at a different strata of power structure and in its operation, is deciphered a coded and very complex strategic consideration which could not be visualized before. The entire spectrum of inter-strata

relationship seems to be re-scripted in the zephetic vocabulary such as *dependent capitalism, internet-hypodermis, technology over-arch, process-product patent quarantine, capital equilibrium* and so on. The urgency for some to trumpet their concern for the world order and to legitimize their authority for economic and cultural dispensation is conveniently tranquilized by them against the uneasy sensitivity to alterity. Consequently, in the event of any of their political, social and economic

doctrines being let-loose, peace is fractured.

The quest for the alternative to the dynamics of the exclusive unipolarity, is therefore, held to be the most serious enterprise in the contemporary world order. Collapse of the Soviet Russia and a great part of the communist ideology having been surrendered by China to the subversiveness of the consumerist economy, have weakened the moral sensoriousness for the taken-for-grantedness of capitalism. The

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realization of the civil liberties within the framework of liberty' as a superior social conduct, is increasingly deceived by the glitz of *per capita* income escalation trope and the entitlement, which it confers for excess and extraordinariness. All simple laws of sanity enacted by civilization over millennium appear to have suddenly burst, and they rain limbs of social anarchy and cultural priaprism. The enemy presumably is very strong; consequently world peace cannot be spared in this state of a major structural disorder.

Hence, what is proposed in the subsequent study is to try to exhume some of the remains of the Nehruvian peace discourse, as we consider them to be legitimate conceptual tools to qualify us for an essential paradigm shift. From the first Asian Relations Conference in 1947 (AP Padorai, 1954) to the 1961 (Leon, 1966) Belgrade Conference was a long and difficult terrain Nehru had navigated to materialize non-alignment as a creed for peace. However, the genesis of the seminal discourse may be traced to the doctrine of *Panch Shella*, a structured argument embedded in the authenticity of its conception and in the moral legitimacy of its requirement. It is not a valid decision that all of them have been consumed by the maggots of anti-history born of decomposed ideologies. The relics can be very fruitfully used even today by competent construction and with the required political will to confront the tyranny of power and pride.

It is not always true that to configurate an inventory of the sickness of the contemporary world would contribute to the strength of our argument. So, we have chosen to explore only two trends, out of too many, to be able to qualify Nehru's

relevance to the debate.

(a) It is being observed by any perceptive viewer of the contemporary economic order that *capital* has moulted into a state of hesitancy, a state in which it appears to be unsure of its erstwhile role in the realms of economic transformation. So also is the complexity in the network of production-function and production-relations in the operation of capitalism. It is not so much the resurgence of the *lesses faire* argument that might have intrigued the processuality of the capitalist enterprise as the disappearance of a confident finality to which the operation could be conducted. Its pathology suggests that capitalism is overtaken by a preemptive crisis against which capitalism is neither institutionally nor emotionally fortified.

The challenge to which capitalism has been thrown open is the confrontationality of technology; a new technological order seems to have imposed itself not only on the means of production but also on the very argument on which it was founded. Technology has subverted capital from the legitimacy of its autonomy, which it has carefully crafted since the late eighteenth century. A stage has reached when technology seeks to precede capital and to decree an imposition of subservience to address needs of technology. Consequently, the freedom which capital used to appropriate for its operation is foreclosed. The post-modern technology has materialized with an over-arching conceptuality by arrogantly smoothening the roughness of its cultural specificities. A patented *verbatim* of the western technology is the only fate to which technology anywhere today can

legitimately aspire. Much of the territory that was once held by capital has been conquered by technology and to consolidate the gains technology asks capital to first depend on it for further guidance and to shed its prejudice for national fixedness to be amorphous enough to flow into any crucible.

The other aspect of the crisis of capitalism is the fragmentarity into which capitalism is gradually withholding itself under the influence of the political discord amongst the capitalist countries themselves. *Euro* is the product of a serious fiscal crisis no doubt, but it is also the consequence of a concerted effort from a section of the membership of the capitalist consortium from being overwhelmed by the other. The collapse of the cold war has suddenly untied their bondedness and in an atmosphere of unmitigated scramble for market, they have led their capitalism to deeper crisis. The European Economic Community symptomatizes the fissure in the proclaimed monolithicism of capitalism; it suggests the structural disunity in the G-8 group of nations in spite of their conspiratorial unity to retain their share of the global trade.

(b) The other important point on which I intend to concentrate at the present juncture of my argument is the politics of the trade. It was certainly there since the mercantilist argument had entailed it. But it was never so much the means of survival as it has today come out to be. The potentiality to survive for long as an economic power and the degree of hegemony one can exercise on the international community is fit now into the computation feeder in terms of share of the global trade. So, the trade configuration of the G-8

nations such as 25% for USA, 13% for Germany, 11% for both England and France, 8% for Japan and 6% for Canada, Italy and Australia (WTO Report 2001) are the litanies of the contemporary global muse. It is indeed a piece of frightful information that 86% of the global trade is held in firm grip by only eight nations of the world representing only 5.6% of the world population. But what upsets the even tenor of our thought even more severely than the other one is the quarrel amongst them for territorial gains in the third world.

The whole range of arguments that originated from the Uruguay Round of talks and the subsequent developments in the US Super 200 and in the GATT have been encapsulated by a destabilizing patent policy, intellectual property policy and the guillotine released on the agricultural subsidy in the newly entrapped victims. The 'most favoured nation' noose is being tightened on those who appear to be too urgently disposed to surrender their will to redefine the 'poverty line' despite the stronger and contrary arguments of their ecology. Consequently, a regime of fabricated trade data being released periodically has sought to befuddle the crucial issues of the third world economic regeneration. The purported claim of India's 100 billion and China's 200 billion foreign exchange reserve till date does not seem to be clever enough to hide the incongruity between the figures and the performance of these two nations in the international trade. With 0.9% share for India and 1.20% for China such massive accumulation of foreign exchange as they claim cannot be explained. Besides, what is the quantum of debt service every

year? It is 10% of India's GDP; I don't know what is the position with China. It is presumable that the figures of foreign capital annually transferred to these countries are being thoughtfully used to bolster the figure of foreign exchange reserve to deceive us by undertoning the national liability. Debt servicing is one aspect of our collective burden, the other aspect is the painful conversion of our economy from a production sector to a market for the western commodities.

Therefore, a new term to negotiate international relationship has gradually replaced all other terms of relationship. The relationship has been reduced into a 5P system i.e., product, price, profit, place and patent. And all dimensions by which we are welded with each other by the management are therefore conducted by a patented TQM (total quality management) smile. Under the circumstances there can be nothing more in the contemporary economic politics that can be read than a golden handshake for all-indigenous industrial ventures, intellectual enterprises and endeavour for agricultural self-sufficiency. So, all of us who cannot hold our head 'high' and where our 'knowledge' is not without any fear, feel more severely threatened than ever in the arena of national peace and in inter-state relations.

II

Acceptance of the given conditions of our existence in spite of the contradictions detailed out may be a very pragmatic response to the diabolics of the crisis. But where is it very insouciant is in its indifference to the critical inadequacy of the conditions of 'peace'. I don't think

it is needed that I perform an autopsy on the anatomy of peace to be knowing what it is like. What is more urgent is to argue for a paradigm shift. Understandably, like an uneasy question it will be said where is that paradigm? My humble answer is it is the Nehruvian paradigm. That it has not been exhausted is the *a posteriori* decision on which I seek to found my arguments. I have doubts if the whole of it the arguments tendered in all the non-aligned summits held from Belgrade to Pretoria are equally relevant to unipolarity as they were relevant to bipolarity. So, in my search for some stable conceptual determinants, I am called back to the *Panch Sheela* (F.A. Report, 1954) of Pandit Nehru.

It was indeed at a difficult moment of his negotiation with Asian politics, after the Asian Relations Conference and the Bandung Conference, that he wisely inserted the following five codes of international conduct in the India-China Trade Pact of 1954. Some very simple truths, which conduct human life everywhere to avoid sorrow, have been thoughtfully elevated to the status of inter-state conduct.

- (a) recognition of territorial jurisdiction of states
- (b) non-interference in internal affairs
- (c) peaceful solution of all international disputes
- (d) non-participation in defence pacts
- (e) accord of economic and technical assistance without strings

An interpretative construction of the item (d) together with all other clauses, they are too good to address the present predicament. Two

questions certainly may arise; first, what is the shape of the model that could be possibly built out of the premises classified above, and secondly, what would be the instrumental agency by which the model could be operationalized?

The first question necessitates constructive interpretation of clauses (d) and (e) as they are integral to our argument. Non-participation in any defence pacts, as they used to threaten both regional and international peace in the cold-war days, presumably does not bear any relevance to the post-cold-war situation. But the fact that 13.5 to 14 trillion or so dollars are being spent annually to manufacture weapons to kill man and to maintain global armed forces by slicing 10 to 25 per cent of the annual GDP of a nation, cannot be easily ignored. Forty to forty-five per cent of the global population remaining under the starvation level and the nations not spending even 10 per cent of the GDP on agriculture is an appalling insult inflicted on humanity. There is no just explanation for why do we do so except to flaunt panicky spasms of threat perception from near and distant neighbours. We seem to have been so much used to the conditions of 'war' that the vocabulary which would suggest 'peace', 'solace', 'benignity' are systematically weeded out to declare 'war against poverty', 'war against disease', 'war against destitution' and to build up 'arsenal of medicine', 'brigade of nurses' and an 'infantry of health-service workers'. Understandably, the contemporary society may be considering it very sane conduct, not to declare any 'war against war'. So, the question that often bothers me is: 'Is this society sane?' By clause (d) of his *Panch Sheela*, Jawaharlal Nehru

was perhaps in a state of insanity contemplating to outcaste war. In that strain of insanity we can legitimately argue that if the powerful has the right to be wrong then why can't we, the powerless, exercise our civil rights to be wrong to utter a *war cry against war*.

The second point which may be held to be integral to my argument is the clause (e) of Nehru's five doctrines. Nehru certainly could have preempted in his time what the western technology would be doing in future. He might not be knowing the likely tyranny of technology but could visualize very well the economic subservience that technological dependence would impose on the third world victims. The technological and economic aid on mutual basis' is a very practical proposition whose implication could be easily seen in the deplorable proportional imbalance of the third world trade with the first world and among themselves. The bulk of the G-8 countries' trade is accounted by their market in the third world and whatever future expansion programme do they plan is targeted towards the third world. It is their competition that has caused segmentation in the third world market and their market policies have identified selected target markets widening the gap between consumer capability and satisfaction. Even the members of the G-8 are confronting the consequence of their own achievements in the definition of classes and class behaviour. In an election study in Great Britain, it is observed that with income escalation there was a certain percentage of decline in Tory votes purely on grounds of consumer dissatisfaction. It is about time that a vigorous effort may be undertaken by the third

world countries to have had their economic consortiums at first on regional basis and then involving all the regional consortiums into a global third-world network to practically own a good part of their national markets. The term 'consumer satisfaction' is of a very uncertain and ubiquitous meaning; it is largely a product of the marketing mechanics. Given the liberty to operate in an unrestrained manner, the marketing strategy will seek to influence all sectors of rational life, including the electoral politics of the third world countries for their products. 'Mutual economic aid' interpreted in terms of concessional tariff on reciprocal basis through a policy of regional cooperation would certainly contribute to capacity building to address the basic requirements for economic growth. It is true that SAFTA is on a rough sea just as LAFTA and OAU because of some intransigent bi-lateral (Nye, 1971) issues, but in the long run many of the irresolute economic questions seem to originate from the overall economic policies of nations, their priorities and their incapacity to contain the pressure groups. Nevertheless, none of the issues classified can justifiably disqualify the importance of regional economic cooperation as a safe shelter against the destabilization of the global economy.

The prospect for the transfer of technology has been never free from some very intricate why and how questions. There are two ways to look at it; transfer of technology borrowed and indigenized being one and transfer of technology indigenously developed as the other. It has been very sadly realized that technologies borrowed from the west are either

secondary or tertiary in terms of their generation and therefore indigenization involving a lot of capital investment might not assist in technology equalization. So, an urgency to develop technology was felt by Nehru, which induced him to plan the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Indian Institutes of Technology. Borrowing however remained the main prop of our technological existence in as much as it has been the main prop in all the third world countries. So, the scheme for transfer of technology was defeated on this ground. Because the simple but very effective argument that is advanced is if technology has to be borrowed why not doing it from the land of its origin. The question of alternative technology was not seriously considered then, nor is it done now, though its importance is belatedly but feebly recognized. To illustrate how important alternative technology could be is to refer with all humility to our own research finding in Indian silk industry from the 16th century till its assassination by the EI Company in the early 19th century. By exploring all possible archival sources we come to a decision that India used to produce four thousand tons of silk in hardly two-three centres controlling 50 per cent of the global silk market (Guha, 2004). We produce roughly nine thousand tons of silk now with ten times more centres having erupted all over the country with the argument that nothing more could be done unless more investment is made and bi-voltine silk worms are imported. We have to frustratingly fling on their face the data that *bombis* for univoltine, bi-voltine and

multi-voltine silk were indigenously secured. At the given level of expansion of sericulture Indian should have produced fifty thousand tons of silk on the basis of its own time-tested technology.

Therefore, it can be easily established that with a focused and determined policy decision to boost indigenous technological experiences of the third world nations, a rich technology-bank can be configured to fall back upon. Transfer of technology in that case would not be too wild a proposition as it appeared to be when it was proposed. We need to clarify our position at the first instance that we have to propose the paradigmatic 'other' of the absurd competitive market model of the day. And secondly, we have to boldly opt for our definition of *poverty level*, *development-index* and *distributive justice* opposed to the panacea ruling the roost in the contemporary economic thought. Nehru could not have drawn his argument to its logical conclusion. But he had certainly sculpted a dream which could be very close to its reality.

III

By an act of retrieval from the uncertainty into which the non-aligned movement has landed itself after the dissipation of the cold-war regimentation, it can realize the magnitude of the new task it should set out to do. It qualifies with its majority membership in the General Assembly of the UNO and of its global reaches for some of the important elements of an institution. The task necessitates that beyond the empty rituals of the summits and the

raucousness of the officials and some establishment intellectuals each layer of our resolution may be made and carefully deposited by those who are quietly professional and are urgently motivated for the task. Nehru's ideas have furnished the broad guideline, which could be detailed out by a number of hard taskmasters secured from each member country of the NAM for all practical purposes. To achieve the target, the governments necessarily have to shed some of their prejudices about 'we' and 'they' and those who could be entrusted should shed the arrogance of any ideological obscurantism to be able to sort out the working plan. We are at a crossroad of history; it is urgently necessary for the third world to realize now that dancing to others' tune, however smart that body-language could be, is not the appropriate answer to the question bothering us. The question is not to rote a contrivance to share information or some instruments of comfort, it is very fundamental in its anxiety for the ultimate destiny of the third world.

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