

- latter advocated a conciliatory stance towards them.
10. The terms 'Nation' and 'fragments' have been used in the sense in which Chatterjee has used them. See Chatterjee, Partha (1994), *The Nation and its Fragments*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
 11. It is probably for his continuous anti-Aryan stance that he does not find a place among the *Saptris* (seven stages) the mythological great bear.
 12. In sharp contrast to this Brihaspati, the preceptor of the Aryans, was a person of such weak morals that he seduced Mamta, the wife of his brother, Uchathaya, though she protested and pointed out that it was violation of *Dharma* (moral code).
 13. There is a *Puranic* legend that when Vali was performing the *sankalp* (the ritual of giving) by pouring water on Viṣṇu's palm, Śukra assumed a minute form and entered the spout of the pot to prevent water from flowing out. Viṣṇu could see through Śukra's game and pricked the spout with a straw of grass in which process Śukra lost one of his eyes.
 14. The inheritance of Yayati's kingdom by his youngest son, Puru, and disinheritance of all his four elder sons was justified on the plea of their being disobedient. It is a different matter though, that later on Puru apportioned a share of his kingdom to all of them.
 15. *Rgveda*, I, 36.18, 47.7, 54.6, 174.9; IV, 30.17; V, 31.8; VI, 20.12, 45.1; VII, 19.8; VIII, 1.31, 4.7, 7.18, 9.14, 45.27; IX, 61.2; and X, 49.8, 62.10. See particularly I, 108.8 and VII, 10.5.
 16. In recent times this view has been articulated by Michel Foucault in his celebrated work, *Power/knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-82* (ed.) Collin Gordon (New York, Pantheon, 1980).
 17. The great sage Vishvamitra was a liberal and pleaded for the acceptance of some of the non-Aryan cultural practices.

Defending Pure Experience

CHANDANA CHAKRAVARTY

This paper is a critical exposition and clarification of William James' concept of pure experience and a statement of the relation of that concept to the larger one of radical empiricism. We will begin by following James' terminology and tactics closely and will only gradually work James into a more modern framework.

James upholds the thesis that 'there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed . . .'¹ In itself, this primal stuff, that is, pure experience, is not intrinsically subjective or objective. Pure experience is neither mind nor matter, but is the ultimate ground of both the mental and the physical world. It is devoid of any intrinsic

duality of knower and known, consciousness and content, thought and thing. Experience does not come to us as neatly marked 'physical' and 'mental'. Traditional philosophy has operated with an either/or division in an exclusive sense, namely, that any reality is either physical or mental. James, however, found questions like whether this instant field is physical or mental to be misleading ones insofar as they presuppose an either/or division.

James argues that if the present experience of the reader or the writer be stopped short, it will be found on observation to be innocent of the 'interior' or 'outer' quality. Thought-stuff and thing-stuff are here indistinguishably the same. The

'paper seen' and 'seeing the paper' are only two names for one indivisible fact, which properly named, is the 'datum', 'phenomenon' or 'pure experience'.

In his article on 'The Thing and its Relation', James has referred to pure experience as 'another name for feeling or sensation.'² This 'pure sensation' is not experienced initially as either part of the mental or physical world. All the processes of identification and discrimination come only later in life. In his *Seminary* of 1895-96, James resorted to the metaphor of 'fields', hoping thereby to make more concrete his concept of neutral phenomena. Unfortunately, he did not develop his metaphor adequately, and John McDermott laments this fact:

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This is a real loss, for it should not be overlooked that in contemporary thought, 'field' is a highly valuable metaphor in all the major disciplines, precisely because of its ability to convey process. . . .³

In his article on 'The Notion of Consciousness', James offered the following arguments to prove the non-existence of a clear-cut distinction between subject and object, between thought and thing in experience.

1. ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTION

James argues that in the perception, say of the walls of a room there are no intrinsic differences of 'interior' and 'exterior', 'inner' and 'outer', 'my sensation of the wall' and 'the wall', and so on, that one is aware of. According to him, in the common sense point of view we cannot distinguish between what is sensible reality and sensation itself. In our direct sensations of the wall of this room 'the content of the physical is none other than the psychical. Subject and object are confused, as it were.'⁴

Not only in outer perception but also in dreams, reveries and imagination, James argues that the physical and psychical realities are homogeneous and identical. If we dream of a particular thing, a golden mountain, for example, the mountain does not have any extra-mental existence but within the dream it appears as physical.

2. ARGUMENT FROM SIMILAR CONSTITUTIONS

The 'object' and its 'representations' are made of the same stuff, viz., sensations. So they are 'generically homogeneous.'⁵

3. ARGUMENT FROM THE CONTINUITY OF AN ABSENT OBJECT

Again there are no intrinsic differentia between and object seen and an object remembered or imagined that one is aware of. According to James,

If at this moment I think of my hat which a while ago I left in the cloak-room, where is the dualism, the discontinuity between the hat of my thoughts and the real hat? My mind is thinking of a truly absent hat. I reckon with it practically as with a reality. If it were present on this table, the hat would occasion a movement of my hand: I would pick it up. In the same way, this hat as a concept, this idea-hat, will presently determine the direction of my steps.⁶

In order to make his point clear here James draws our attention to Locke's ambiguous use of the term 'idea'. Sometimes Locke uses 'idea' to refer to our immediate objects of sensory awareness, i.e., sensible qualities, while at other times our ideas of sensible qualities are spoken of as ideas. James made it a point to show that there is no fundamental difference between what we perceive and the idea of it. In fact, the idea of the hat and the hat are the same 'primal stuff'.

4. ARGUMENT FROM THE 'USE OF ADJECTIVES'

James argues that his thesis gets further support from the linguistic expression of our thought. He refers to a whole group of adjectives which are 'neither exclusively objective nor subjective in nature' and can be used in various different contexts, e.g., 'sullen sky', 'frightful storm', 'arduous road'.⁷ James also finds Santayana describing beauty as

'pleasure objectified'. All these interpretations point to the fact of indissoluble community between subject and object.

5. ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE EXACT NATURE OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

James argues that the shifting place of secondary qualities in the history of philosophy shows that the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' is not given in the primitive experience itself. Size and shape, which are regarded by Descartes, Locke, and others as primary qualities have been reduced to 'subjective appearances' by Kantian thinkers. Thus the existence of controversy regarding the status of these qualities reveal that they do not come to us aboriginally stamped and labelled as mental or physical.

In his article on 'The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience', James writes that the existence of our affections 'so far from invalidating my general theses, these phenomena, when properly analyzed, afford it powerful support'.⁸ It has been argued by James' critics that the affectional side of our nature—viz., pleasures and pains, loves and fears and angers—are peculiarly and exclusively spiritual in nature. Thus, according to them, the existence of affectional fact is a great stumbling block for James' general theses of the 'neutrality' of all experience. James however remarks, that the popular notion of these experiences as purely subjective or inner facts is 'hasty and erroneous'. In the first place, he argues that the whole literature of the James-Lange Theory of Emotion has shown that emotions are

'simultaneously affections of the body'. Secondly, it is also noted that our affectional experiences and appreciative perceptions remain equivocal and ambiguous. The ambiguous nature of these experiences show that these experiences do not belong exclusively to one realm or another. We say 'agreeable heat' or 'agreeable sensation' indifferently. James poses the question: 'Beauty, for example, where does it reside? Is it in the statue, in the sonata, or in our mind'.⁹ James found that 'their ambiguity illustrates beautifully my central theses that subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification'.¹⁰

For James, then, there is no 'subjective' and 'objective' split in the ultimate datum of knowledge. Experiences as pure process-contents come unclassified into subjective or objective. In pre-reflective consciousness, experience comes directly and has no clear duality in it such as that traditionally described by the distinction between consciousness and content, thought and thing. 'Pure' in this context means experience which is as yet free from and predication. Thus it is a bare knowledge of existence of is-ness, without its characterizations. In other words, it is knowledge of a that, without any what. It is only in the retrospective phase of perception, i.e., in reflective consciousness, that the distinction between subjective and objective arises. Thus the distinction between thought and thing, idea and object, is not cognitively primitive. To begin with, our original field of awareness is 'neutral'. It is only with the retrospective phase of perception that the categorization of pure experience starts.¹¹

In holding that pure experience is a pre-reflective, pre-theoretic mode of awareness,¹² James is following Bergson, and departing from Peirce, in holding that experience is not fundamentally propositional. This also explains James' view that 'knowledge by acquaintance' is presupposed by descriptive or theoretical knowledge. As B Wilshire remarks,

In the fifth *Cartesian Meditation*, Husserl also arrived at a view of experience which is neither mental nor physical but neutral. As Husserl puts it, 'Phenomenology signifies indeed a fundamental refashioning of psychology too. Accordingly, by far the greater part of psychological research belongs in an apriori and pure intentional psychology. (Here the word 'pure' means: kept free from everything psychophysical'.) This sounds very Jamesian. But this is only an apparent similarity, for there is a point of fundamental importance on which James would not agree with Husserl. With James 'pure experience' signifies the 'primal stuff', the primordial data which has not yet bifurcated into mind and matter, subject and object. It is only our reflective consciousness which reads 'pure experience' as mental or physical. With Husserl, however, this neutrality of pure experience is not pre-reflective but post-reflective. It is after the *epoché* that we can dissociate ourselves from the 'natural attitude' and look at it from the standpoint of transcendental, purified consciousness and thus get to its eidetic structure or essence. Phenomenology as a purely eidetic science gives the reflective description of essences and essential structure of pure transcendental consciousness. B Wilshire aptly remarks:

It is the intent of James's theory of knowledge to do justice to, and to build upon, pre-theoretical experience. . . . James thinks it bootless and misleading to construct a theory of truth in ignorance of what the truth is true about—being or reality—and the initial grasp of this is the world experienced pre-theoretically.¹³

It must not be supposed that the concept of pure experience is a reified abstraction for James. He identifies pure experience with the instant field of experience. It is an invitation to return to a consideration of what actually happens in everyone's experience is a reified abstraction, 'never found in the concrete life which James claims to be describing . . . , a speculative venture on his part, which he cannot assimilate into the main body of his radical empiricism'.¹⁴ With James, pure experience is the immediately given which comes to us in the form of 'biography'. According to James, the concrete form of the immediately given, the perceptual flux, 'is the authentic stuff of each of our biographers'.¹⁵

These neutral phenomena do eventually become classified into mental or physical. But James found no ground to characterize as essential the difference between 'thing' and 'thought', 'object and subject'. They are simply two ways of referring to the same entity. James admits dualism only in the practical sense. All dichotomies and distinctions are to be understood as modes of classification or 'translocating' of experience which are instant field of experience is 'pure', 'mentality', or 'physicality', is our attribution to reality which is neutral to any of these. So, in Husserl's eyes James would still be in the 'natural attitude' of one who has not

'suspended' empirical associations by reflection.

James' view is basically a monistic position, i.e., the belief that ultimate reality is made up of one single substance. But James was careful to distinguish his position from the 'contemporary positivism and agnosticism' which are 'monism in name only'. In spite of their professed monism, they believe in one reality which presents itself under two aspects, these two aspects remaining as irreducible as the fundamental attributes of Spinoza's god. With James, on the other hand, these two aspects are ultimately reducible to pure experience. These two aspects do not have any philosophical significance but are practical or functional in nature. His aversion to contemporary monism becomes evident as he writes:

It is true that the positivism or agnosticism of our own day—which prides itself as coming under the physical sciences—freely assumes the name of monism. But it is a monism in name only. It posits an unknown reality, but then tells us that this reality always presents itself under two 'aspects', on the one side consciousness and on the other matter; and these two sides remain as irreducible as the fundamental attributes of Spinoza's God, extension and thought. Contemporary monism is, at bottom, pure Spinozism.¹⁶

James now attempts to show how it is possible on his view to explain satisfactorily the traditional paradox that 'what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind'. The perceived object—for example, a tree—is 'out there', yet it is also in some fashion 'in' the mind. James observes that the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus on is an attempt to solve the metaphysical riddle, viz., how an

identical thing can exist in two places, both in the external world and in the mind. James claims that his theory of pure experience can show one way out of this paradox. The paradox disappears if we realize that the object's being in two places is simply a matter of its entering simultaneously into two different processes or relations. For example, the same identical terms of pure experience might function subjectively or objectively depending on how they are related. James tried to explain the perceptual situation as an intersection of two processes by a metaphor. Just as the point at an intersection of two lines belongs to both lines and to neither exclusively, so these neutral elements may be reckoned as part of 'the stream of our internal thinking' or as part of 'the system of external realities', according to the way they are linked up elements of one or the other 'lines'. To illustrate this, James invites us to consider the case of sense perception. In the perception of a room, for instance, the 'percept' enters both into the biography of the perceiver and the history of the house. Because of the intersection of two series, the room figures in two contexts at the same time without ceasing to be the same room. For the percept of a room and physical room are one and the same bit of pure experience taken twice over, once in the context of a knower, once in the context of something known. Pure experience is thus devoid of any inner duality. The duality of mental idea and object can be explained with reference to the different relational context. James explains this point with another metaphor, a can or paint this time. He writes:

In a pot in a paint-shop, along with other paints, it serves in its entirety

as so much saleable matter. Spread on a canvas, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. Just so, I maintain, does a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of consciousness; while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content'. In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as thing. And, since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once.¹⁷

James' theory of pure experience applies not only to percepts but also to concepts. What is true of percepts is also true of concepts. Concepts and memories taken in their 'first intention' are also mere bits of pure experience, pure 'that's', unclassified experience, 'virtual somewhats', but unknown as this specific 'what' until it is 'taken'. Like percepts they are also neutral entities, which may turn into subjective or objective ones according to the context in which they occur.

We see by now that the concept of pure experience is not a simple concept. It embodies at least three independent claims which are often blurred together. The three claims which we will isolate and discuss separately are, as we shall see, compatible with the general scheme of radical empiricism. They do not violate the common spirit of radical empiricism, but they are not entailed by it either. We will now simply single out these three claims and show how they fit in the total context of radical empiricism.

1. THE METAPHYSICAL CLAIM:

The doctrine of the neutrality of the primal stuff implies that there is no fundamental distinction between mind and matter. The distinction between mind and matter is not an essential or philosophical distinction; rather it is a distinction of office or use. The mental does not differ from the physical in substance of kind. The distinction between matter and mind is to be excluded from the realm of the given. The apparent duality between mind and matter is due to different relational patterns. The traditional dualism of mind and matter receives a functional interpretation in the philosophy of pure experience.

2. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLAIM:

On the epistemological side, the doctrine of pure experience rejects the distinctions between act and object in a cognitive situation. In the perception of a piece of white paper, James finds that there is no distinction between 'seeing the paper' and the 'paper seen'. In other words, James rejects the view that consciousness is basically intentional in nature. With James, consciousness is not always conscious of something. This distinction between 'consciousness' and its 'content', 'awareness' and of 'which we are aware' is not present in pure experience.

3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD CLAIM:

James remarks that his doctrine has more affinity to 'natural realism' than to the subjective idealism and phenomenalism of Berkeley and Mill. By 'natural realism' James means 'belief in extra-mental realities'. He conceives of objects as

directly presented to consciousness and knowledge as a direct revelation of objects. Objects are in reality independent of us and of each other, essentially as they appear to be.

Let us see now how James' complex concept of pure experience fits into the total concept of his radical empiricism. The crucial point is that 'pure experience' is not simply subsumed under 'radical empiricism' but simply that it meets the general criteria and assumptions of the latter. The main doctrines of radical empiricism, i.e., the continuity of experience, the givenness of relations along with terms, and immediacy of apprehension, are all assumed in the philosophy of pure experience.

First, the appeal to experience and aversion to admitting any trans-experiential agency are common to both theories. James was on his guard not to accept any entity that does not belong to the domain of our experience. He eliminates all reference to the so-called entities of transcendent types from his doctrine of pure experience. Pure experience is not a mythical, mysterious, unknown *x*. True to his empirical philosophy, it is a datum of experience. Nothing is admitted as significant in pure experience which is not 'practically' verifiable. The rationalistic concepts of mind and matter have also received an empiricistic interpretation. Consciousness can no longer be regarded as a peculiar substance or entity. Thus everything in this area of his philosophy has to pass the acid test of experience. No trans-experiential connective support has been evoked to facilitate the cognitive situation. In other words, there is no traffic with the non-empirical world. Reference to any concept wholly devoid of practical consequences

nowhere occurs in his discussion of the concept of pure experience.

Second, the commitment to the doctrine of continuity of radical empiricism is also manifested in James' discussion of 'pure experience'. Continuity, for James, does not stand for a logical connector but is an object of our direct experience. The general doctrine of continuity has been reflected in the knowledge situation, as pictured by the pure experience doctrine. The idea of continuity helped James to avoid 'an artificial conception of the knower and known'. From early days to recent times, philosophers, James says, have generally treated the knower and known as discontinuous entities. Thus various philosophers tried to fill this gap between mind and object by inventing various sorts of intermediaries, viz., 'representation', 'image', 'content'. In James, knowing is to be understood as continuous process that does not require any 'salutatory act' on the part of the knower. AJ Ayer clearly notes that James' 'principal aim (here) is to eliminate what he calls the 'epistemological gulf' which might be thought to exist between states of cognition and their objects by showing that the processes in which knowledge consists 'entirely fall inside the continuities of experience'.¹⁸ The idea of continuity has been exemplified in James' idea of co-conscious transition—where it allows the subject to be aware of the subjective phase of life. As James remarks, 'If we cling to pure experience, it is in part experience of activity . . . a kind of experienced transition, a part of the content. . . .'¹⁹

Like radical empiricism, another significant factor in the philosophy of pure experience is its emphasis on

the reality of relation. 'Without them', J Smith writes, 'experience remains a bare that not 'taken' at all but left merely as an undifferentiated whole of feeling. 'Taking' means relating an item of pure experience to its associates and describing it in terms of 'whats' or contents . . .'²⁰

NOTES

1. McDermott, J. J. (ed.) (1969), *The Writings of William James*, New York: Random House, p. 170.
2. *Ibid.*, p.215.
3. *Ibid.*, p. xxxix (McDermott's Introduction)

4. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p.188.
8. *Ibid.*, p.127.
9. Bernstein, R. J. (ed.) (1971), *Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe*, New York: Dutton and Co. Inc., p. 113.
10. McDermott, J. J., op.cit., p. 272.
11. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. xxxix (McDermott's Introduction)
12. Husserl, E. (1960) *Cartesian Meditations*, tr., D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 144.
13. Wilshire, B. (ed.) (1971), *William James: The Essential Writings*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, p. xix (Wilshire's Introduction).

14. Wild, J. (1869), *The Radical Empiricism of William James*, New York: Doubleday and Company, p. 368.
15. James, William (1924), *Some Problems of Philosophy*, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 151.
16. McDermott, J. J., op.cit., pp. 184-185.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
18. Ayer, A. J. (1968), *The Origins of Pragmatism*, California: Freeman, Cooper and Company, p. 282.
19. Perry, R.B. (1936), *The Thought and Character of William James*, 2 vols, Boston: Little Brown and Company, p. 384.
20. Smith, J. "Radical Empiricism," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 65 (1964-65), 211.

Khandesh and its Neighbours: Political Relations down to 1526 AD

M. SIRAJ ANWAR

I

In 1398-99 AD, Taimur's invasion had totally shattered the Tughlaq empire. The collapse of the Tughlaq empire gave an opportunity to the provincial governors of Malwa, Gujarat and Khandesh to assert their independence. Among the Tughlaq governors, second to assert independence was Malik Nasir Faruqi, the son of Malik Raja Ahmad Faruqi, who declared himself an independent ruler in 1400 AD.¹ His realm at this time apparently comprised the territories of Thalner² and Karond, his original *iqta*, as well as other parts of Khandesh that he might have succeeded in bringing

under his control by 1399 AD. It seems that by this time Malik Nasir Faruqi's position *vis-à-vis* Asa Ahir (the local chief of the territory around Asirgarh) was already that of a superior chief. According to Ferishta, Asa Ahir had submitted to Nasir's father Malik Raja.³ The territories of Thalner and Karond as *iqta* were conferred on Malik Raja by Firoz Tughlaq in 1370-71 AD.⁴

Regarding the early life and career of Malik Raja Ahmad Faruqi, the founder of the Faruqi dynasty of Khandesh, various stories are recorded by the historians. According to Ferishta, Malik Raja's ancestors were in the service of the *Sultans* of Delhi since Alauddin

Khalji's time. His father's name is given as Khan-i-Jahan Faruqi. One might guess that this person could have been the descendant of one of the nobles of Khalji or Tughlaq period, enjoying the title Khan-i-Jahan.⁵ One such person was Malik Maqbul, who was entitled Khan-i-Jahan by Muhammad bin Tughlaq at the time of his appointment as the *Wazir* of Gujarat in 1324-25 AD.⁶ After the death of Khan-i-Jahan his son Malik Raja Ahmad, for sometime, could not find a suitable means of livelihood, and eventually he entered Firoz Tughlaq's central army as a private horseman. After sometime he became a *Ghulam-i-Khas* of the *Sultan* and began to accompany him on his hunting expeditions.⁷

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