

Impact of Prince Khurram's Revolt on the Mughal Campaigns in the Deccan (1617-26)

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I

After the battle of Khirki (1616), the Mughals under Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan's leadership somewhat retrieved their military position, but with no territorial gains. Malik Ambar, the Nizam Shahi commander, could not be fully crushed. Immediately after the battle, he withdrew to Daulatabad and started reorganising his army from there. He also resumed raids into the Mughal territories which were in the nature of guerrilla warfare. On getting to know that the situation in the Deccan was not progressing satisfactorily, Jehangir was first inclined to march to Deccan personally, but on further thought, he decided to send Prince Khurram who had recently distinguished himself in the campaigns against Mewar replacing Prince Parvez as the ceremonial commander in the Deccan, while retaining Khan-i Khannan as the *sipahsalar*, i.e., the officer wielding real powers.¹ Before his departure to the Deccan, Khurram's *mansab* was raised to an unprecedented twenty thousand *zat* and ten thousand *sawar*, besides some other favours.² Khurram left Ajmer for the Deccan on October 6, 1616. He was accompanied by such leading *amirs* as Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung, Raja Suraj Singh, Dayant Khan besides Mutamad Khan, who was appointed *Bakhshi* of the army.³ Simultaneously, Jehangir also moved his camp from Ajmer to Mandu in order to boost the morale of the Mughal soldiers in the Deccan.⁴

Thomas Roe—who by this time, had arrived at Ajmer—has stated that the appointment of Prince Khurram to the Deccan command was opposed by the commanders posted there, particularly by Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan Lodi. He even suggests that these nobles had refused to serve under Khurram.⁵ But this seems

to be an exaggeration on the part of Thomas Roe. No other contemporary writer has mentioned the disagreement of the Mughal commanders in the Deccan with Khurram's appointment. Moreover, Thomas Roe has also suggested that the differences between Khurram and Khan-i Khanan grew because the former earlier wanted Khan-i Khanan to be recalled from the Deccan as he 'was a practiser with the Deccan, from whom he received pension.'⁶ This testimony of Thomas Roe is not corroborated by other records. On the other hand, it is known that after achieving victory over Malik Ambar in 1617, Prince Khurram recommended Khan-i Khanan for appointment as *subedar* of the Deccan.⁷ It seems that Thomas Roe was actually reproducing the rumours circulating at the court, reflecting the hostility of certain sections for Khurram.

II

On his arrival in the Deccan, Khurram was welcomed by Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan at the bank of Naramada. He arrived at Burhanpur in March 1617. From there he promptly opened negotiations with the rulers of the Deccan states, in which, contacts with Bijapur were given greater importance. By neutralising the ruler of Bijapur, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, Khurram was actually anxious to isolate Malik Ambar. He sent his reliable men—Afzal Khan and Raja Bikramajit—to Adil Shah offering Mughals' friendship and protection in return for acknowledging Mughal overlordship, promise of regular *peshkash* and above all, for pressurising Malik Ambar to return the territories he had captured from the Mughals.⁸ Ibrahim Adil Shah II, on his part, is reported to have welcomed the Mughal envoys by coming out upto seven *kos* to receive the farman and *nishan* of the Prince they were carrying, and indicated his acceptance of the demands put forward by Khurram. One might infer that the arrival of Khurram with such a large force at Burhanpur, and the presence of the Mughal Emperor at Mandu, so close to Burhanpur, appear to have unnerved Ibrahim Adil Shah II as well as the Golconda ruler, Muhammad Qutb Shah. They, apparently, felt that in the given situation, their interests would be better served if they made a settlement with the Mughals by accepting Khurram's demands. The Mughal envoys returned from Bijapur with costly gifts alongwith a message from Ibrahim Adil Shah II amounting to an acknowledgement of the Mughal 'suzerainty' and promising the return of the territories taken away by Malik Ambar.⁹

Around the same time, a Golconda envoy also arrived at the Mughal court near Mandu. He was accompanied by Husain Beg Tabrezi, the envoy of the Safawid ruler, Shah Abbas I. The Golconda envoy also brought with him precious gifts.¹⁰

Subsequently, under the pressure of Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur, Malik Ambar had to surrender to the Mughals the fort of Ahmadnagar and the territory around Balaghat, which he had captured from them earlier.¹¹ So far as Malik Ambar was concerned, this was not the end of his fight. He cleverly retained the fort of Daulatabad and the area around it in the hope of reviving his struggle at an opportune time.

After the surrender of Ahmednagar and Balaghat by Malik Ambar, in July 1617, on Khurram's recommendation, Jehangir appointed Khan-i Khanan as the *subedar* of Berar, Khandesh and Ahmednagar, which together constituted the Mughal territories in the Deccan. His son Shahnawaz Khan was deputed with twelve thousand *sawars* to control the territories around Balaghat.¹² It was, again, on Khurram's request that Ibrahim Adil Shah II was entitled *farzand* (son),¹³ which was clearly a gesture acknowledging the key role played by the Bijapuri ruler in persuading Malik Ambar to return the Mughal territories, Ibrahim Adil Shah II could, thus, also be used to keep a watch on Malik Ambar's aggressive activities. It would appear that this move paid-off from the Mughal point of view. Subsequently, a rift between the Bijapuri ruler and Malik Ambar appeared which prevented the latter from getting any help from Bijapur during his struggle with the Mughals which were renewed towards the end of 1617.

It was, apparently, at the time of this settlement (1617) that the important role of the Maratha *sardars* and their *bargi* soldiers in the Deccan was recognised by Jehangir by initiating a policy of recruiting them in the Mughal service. Some of the Maratha *sardars*, who accompanied Khurram in July 1617 to the imperial camp at Mandu, including Udaji Ram, Jadav Rai and Babaji Kantiya were rewarded with 'suitable' *mansabs* and *jagirs*.¹⁴ Jehangir specifically mentions the conferment of a *mansab* of 3000 *zat* and 1500 *sawar* on Udaji Ram.

It may, in nutshell, be stated that Khurram's success in the Deccan in 1617 gave the impression of the Mughal position there being secured considerably. Subsequently, the Emperor accompanied by Khurram returned to the North. But for a restless and ambitious person like Malik Ambar, the war was never over. He remained busy

throughout in reorganising his army and waited for an opportunity to hit back with renewed vigour.

Two years after the 1617 settlement, at a time when Emperor Jehangir was away to Kashmir, Prince Khurram (now entitled as Shah Jehan) was preoccupied in besieging Kangra, and dissensions among the Mughal officers in the Deccan had resurfaced, Malik Ambar resumed his attacks on the Mughal outposts. In these attacks he used the newly recruited Maratha *bargi* soldiers, on a large scale. Though in the initial two or three engagements, the Mughals were able to gain an upper hand but soon Malik Ambar's forces started harassing the Mughals from different sides. He succeeded in cutting-off their lines of communication as well as supply of provisions which forced the Mughals to withdraw from Balaghat. Hotly pursued by Malik Ambar, the Mughal forces, withdrawing from Balaghat, fell back to Balapur where Darab Khan, the younger son of Khan-i Khanan was encamped.¹⁶ At this point, the Mughal forces made a stand. Raja Bir Singh Deo Bundela succeeded in repelling a contingent of the Deccanis. During this action, Mansur, a Deccani officer of Abyssinian origin, was killed.¹⁷ But this setback did not deter Malik Ambar from continuing his constant guerrilla raids on the Mughals, entrenched at Balapur. This eventually forced Mughal forces led by Darab Khan to vacate Balapur. They retreated towards Burhanpur. In this manner Malik Ambar succeeded in taking back from the Mughals the whole of Balaghat as well as sizeable territories in Ahmednagar and Berar regions.¹⁸ Subsequently, by 1620 the only places still held by the Mughals were Burhanpur and the fort of Ahmednagar which were also being closely invested by the Deccanis.

Khan-i Khanan, who found himself in a difficult situation at Burhanpur, sent repeated appeals to the court for help against the Deccanis who were on the offensive.¹⁹ The Emperor sent to Khan-i Khanan twenty lakh rupees with some reinforcements but the situation did not improve. Malik Ambar even besieged Burhanpur. He also occupied areas in Berar and Khandesh from where his agents began collecting.²⁰ As Prince Shah Jehan, alongwith many leading officers, was busy in besieging Kangra, no significant assistance could be sent to help Khan-i Khanan in the Deccan. After Shah Jehan's success in reducing Kangra, Jehangir again sent him to the Deccan. But the Prince delayed his departure to the Deccan possibly owing to his anxiety that in his absence from the camp Nur Jehan might enter into an alliance with Khusrau, who, although a prisoner, had

again come to be treated mildly.²¹ He practically refused to march out until Khusrau's custody was transferred to him.²²

After his misgivings were removed, Shah Jehan, at the head of a large army including one thousand *ahadis* and a train of heavy artillery, came to Burhanpur in early 1621. Shah Jehan's arrival compelled the Deccanis to lift the siege of Burhanpur. At a council held by Shah Jehan at Burhanpur, he was advised by Khan-i Khanan to adopt dilatory tactics. It was suggested by him to postpone the military operations for the recovery of Balaghat till the rainy season was over. This proposal supported by nobles like Abul Hasan, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung and Darab Khan was outrightly rejected by Shah Jehan.²³ He was in favour of attacking the Deccanis without giving them time to prepare themselves for facing the Mughal counter offensive. Shah Jehan divided his army into five contingents, two of which were commanded by the Prince himself, while the other three were put under Darab Khan, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung and Khwaja Abul Hasan respectively. These forces advanced towards Ahmednagar slowly, all the time keeping their alert eyes against the likely guerrilla attacks by the *bargi* soldiers of Malik Ambar. The Deccanis led by Yaqut Khan attacked Abul Hasan's contingent from the rear but were defeated. Hotly pursued by the Mughal troops, they fled towards Khirki (then capital of the Ahmednagar Kingdom), which was occupied by the Mughals without much fighting.²⁴ Malik Ambar had got the news of Mughal advance in time to vacate the fort of Khirki alongwith Burhan Nizam Shah III and his family.²⁵ On entering Khirki, the Mughals burnt down the whole of the town.²⁶

After occupying Khirki, the Mughal forces proceeded to help the garrison of Ahmednagar fort, which was still being besieged by the Deccani forces. When the Mughals reached Paithan, Malik Ambar, who had earlier withdrawn to Daulatabad, opened negotiations with Shah Jehan offering to surrender the territories, once held by the Mughals in the Deccan, and an additional fourteen *kos* wide strip adjoining the *sarkar* of Ahmednagar.²⁷ He also agreed to pay fifty lakh rupees as *peskhash* collected from the Deccani rulers (*duniyadaran-i dakan*), out of which eighteen lakhs were to be paid by the ruler of Bijapur, twelve lakhs by the ruler of Ahmednagar and twenty lakhs by the ruler of Golconda.²⁸ Shah Jehan, being anxious to return to the North as early as possible, promptly accepted Malik Ambar's proposal and concluded peace in May 1621. It seems that as a result of this peace, the Mughal position in the Deccan was at last greatly secured, but Shah Jehan's rebellion, which broke soon

after, disturbed everything that he had achieved in the Deccan during his last campaign.

In May, 1622, Shah Abbas I, the ruler of Iran, besieged Qandahar,²⁹ which was a bone of contention between the two, the Safawids and the Mughals, since long. Jehangir ordered large scale preparations for relieving the fort. An order was sent to Shah Jehan to come to the North as soon as possible and proceed immediately to Qandahar.³⁰ Shah Jehan, suspicious of the moves of his rivals at the court, decided to use this opportunity for dictating his terms. Though he did not openly refuse to march but put forward some conditions before proceeding to the rescue of Qandahar.

After sometime these anxieties of Shah Jehan induced him to take steps which amounted to rebellion. In 1622, he sent his men to occupy Dholpur, which was assigned in *jagir* to Prince Shahryar. Subsequently, taking advantage of the Emperor's absence, he also made an abortive attempt to capture Agra.³¹ Failing to occupy Agra, Shah Jehan, pursued by an army under Parvez and Mahabat Khan, retreated towards the Deccan. He crossed the river Tapti in September 1623. In Deccan, Shah Jehan ordered confining of Khan-i Khanan, who was suspected of secretly corresponding with Mahabat Khan. Many of Shah Jehan's supporters had also deserted him by this time.³²

Being driven to extremity, Shah Jehan, now appeared in the Deccan as a rebel beseeching the co-operation and support of the Deccani rulers. He sent his confidant Afzal Khan to Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II with presents seeking their assistance. Malik Ambar politely refused to help. He is reported to have told Afzal Khan that he was 'simply a follower of Adil Khan (*tabi* '-i Adil Khan), who was at present the head of all the Deccani powers (*umada-i duniyadaran dakan*), so, first he should go there and explain his desire'.³³ Malik Ambar's refusal to assist Shah Jehan at this juncture, may be explained with reference to his hostility towards the person of the rebel prince for being humbled by him twice in the past. Malik Ambar's attitude on this occasion could also be explained in terms of his not being ready to get embroiled in the affairs of a rebel prince, hotly pursued by a powerful Mughal army. Afzal Khan's reception at Bijapur was still more disappointing. Ibrahim Adil Shah II detained him outside the city for a long time. He had accepted the gifts sent by Shah Jehan but declined to help him.³⁴ As a last recourse, Shah Jehan went towards Golconda. Muhammad Qutb Shah assisted him by supplying cash and provisions, but did not allow him to stay inside his kingdom. Shah Jehan, thus, proceeded towards Orissa and Bengal.³⁵

At the time of the outbreak of Shah Jehan's rebellion (1623-26), Ahmednagar and Bijapur were having disputes over the possession of the fertile tract of Sholapur.³⁶ When Parvez and Mahabat Khan arrived in the Deccan for suppressing Shah Jehan's rebellion, both Ahmednagar and Bijapur tried to seek their assistance against each other. In 1624, Malik Ambar sent his confidant, Ali Sher, to Mahabat Khan offering to wait upon him personally and also to send his eldest son for the Mughal service.³⁷ Likewise, Ibrahim Adil Shah II offered to send a force of five thousand *sawars* under Mulla Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughals.³⁸ This move was aimed at getting Mahabat Khan's help against Malik Ambar. Being an astute politician, Mahabat Khan did not respond immediately to these overtures of Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II. He kept both of them in suspense until Shah Jehan left the Deccan, as it was feared that if Mahabat Khan would favour one of the parties, the other would certainly have gone to assist the rebel prince. In this manner Mahabat Khan succeeded in keeping Shah Jehan isolated and eventually in compelling him to leave the Deccan. Once Shah Jehan had left the Deccan, Parvez and Mahabat Khan decided to support Ibrahim Adil Shah II in his dispute with Malik Ambar. Jehangir approved this decision by issuing a *farman* in Adil Shah's favour.³⁹ Mahabat Khan's decision to support Ibrahim Adil Shah was obviously designed to use him in suppressing Malik Ambar, who was perceived as the immediate and most formidable adversary of the Mughals in the Deccan.

In compliance with the terms of the above alliance, Ibrahim Adil Shah II sent a force of five thousand *sawars* under Mulla Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughal army against Malik Ambar. Mahabat Khan now despatched a force into the Balaghat territory,⁴⁰ for protecting the Mughal military outposts there. The Mughal-Adil Shahi alliance and the movement of their forces worried Malik Ambar greatly. He vacated Khirki, the temporary Nizam Shahi capital, removing the family of Nizam Shah and his own establishment as well to the fort of Daulatabad. He himself marched towards the fort of Kandahar,⁴¹ on the frontier of Golconda.⁴² Malik Ambar's declared aim in marching towards the frontier of Golconda at this juncture was to realize the arrears of *peshkash* for the last two years from Muhammad Qutb Shah.⁴³ But in reality, he appears to have moved closer to the Golconda frontier in the hope of securing Muhammad Qutb Shah's protection in case of his being overtaken by the Mughal-Adil Shahi forces pursuing him.

In 1624, from the frontier of Golconda, Malik Ambar marched rapidly towards the city of Bidar where he defeated in a surprise attack, the Bijapuri contingent garrisoning the fort. From there he marched rapidly to Bijapur devastating and plundering the territory on the way. Ibrahim Adil Shah II shut himself up in the fort of Bijapur and wrote to the Mughals to send Mulla Muhammad Lari, who was then quartered at Burhanpur. In addition to this force, a Mughal force consisting of the contingents of leading nobles like Lashkar Khan, Khanjar Khan, Jadav Rai, Udaji Ram, etc. also set out from Burhanpur to rescue Ibrahim Adil Shah II.⁴⁴ The advance of this army alarmed Malik Ambar. He wrote to the Mughal authorities at Burhanpur that the Deccani powers should be left to settle their disputes among themselves and that the Mughals should not interfere in their mutual relations.⁴⁵ But the Mughal officers paid no heed to his protestations. They continued their march towards Bijapur which compelled Malik Ambar to raise the siege and withdraw into the Ahmednagar territory. The combined armies of the Mughals and Adil Shahi kept on pursuing the retreating Nizam Shahi army under Malik Ambar.

Being hotly pursued by the Mughals and Adil Shahi troops, Malik Ambar finally took a decision to take a stand against the allied army. He positioned his army at Bhatodi,⁴⁶ about ten miles south of Ahmednagar. Here the rival armies fought a well contested battle (1625) in which Malik Ambar inflicted a crushing defeat on the allies. He, thus, was able to save the Nizam Shahi Kingdom from extinction on this occasion. During the contest Mulla Muhammad Lari, the Adil Shahi commander, was killed, while many other Mughal and Adil Shahi officers were either captured or fled from the field.⁴⁸

This was the last major battle which Malik Ambar fought against the Mughals. By this time, he had achieved considerable success and had managed to regain most of the Nizam Shahi territory from the Mughals, except the fort of Ahmednagar and adjoining area, including a stretch upto the Mughal posts in Jalnapur.

After the Battle of Bhatodi (1625), Malik Ambar started a counter offensive against the retreating Mughal and Adil Shahi armies. He laid siege to the fort of Ahmednagar which was defended energetically by the Mughal *qiledar*, Khanjar Khan.⁴⁹ Leaving some of his officers to continue the siege, Malik Ambar himself proceeded towards Balaghat region where he succeeded in capturing most of the territory. Thereafter, he once again moved towards Bijapur and wrested the coveted territory of Sholapur from Bijapur (June 1625).⁵⁰

He, then, sent Yaqut Khan for investing Burhanpur. By now Malik Ambar had succeeded in recapturing most of the territories which earlier belonged to the Ahmednagar Kingdom thus, making himself the master of the entire Nizam Shahi Kingdom excluding the fort of Ahmednagar.

While Malik Ambar was busy in his above operations against the Mughals, Shah Jehan, pursued by Parvez and Mahabat Khan, arrived in the Deccan (1625). Although, by this time Shah Jehan was a spent force, even then Malik Ambar welcomed him,⁵¹ deciding to help him against the pursuing forces, apparently, with an aim to use his troops in the ongoing operations against the Mughals in the Deccan. Shah Jehan readily agreed to help Malik Ambar's officer, Yaqut Khan, in besieging Burhanpur.⁵² But, on the arrival of Parvez and Mahabat Khan near Burhanpur, Shah Jehan and Yaqut Khan were forced to raise the siege. They withdrew towards Ahmednagar.⁵³

Some time afterwards, being ill and tired. Shah Jehan sent a petition to the Emperor apologising for his 'crimes committed in the past (*jara' im mazi*)'.⁵⁴ It seems that by this time, he had realized that he could not hope to regain his lost ground even with the help of Malik Ambar. Shah Jehan's real aim was to strengthen his position at the court for ensuring his accession in the eventuality of Jehangir's death in which Malik Ambar's support could not be of much use. Moreover, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who was in alliance with Jehangir, was not expected even to give him asylum. Nor his earlier experience made him hopeful of securing help from the ruler of Golconda. It was under these circumstances that he, despite friendly attitude of Malik Ambar towards him decided to submit to Jehangir at this juncture.

By the time of Shah Jehan's submission (1626), Malik Ambar had succeeded in recovering most of the Nizam Shahi territory. He, therefore, thought it prudent to stop hostilities against the Mughals. Soon after this he died (May 14, 1626).⁵⁵

III

Although Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan had somewhat succeeded in retrieving the Mughal position in the Deccan by 1616, the gains made however, were not very significant. Later, Prince Shah Jehan, did succeed in isolating Malik Ambar from Ibrahim Adil Shah II and creating a rift between them. Shah Jehan's major success was the settlement with Malik Ambar in 1617. Another important dateline of Shah Jehan's success in the Deccan was the settlement with Malik

Ambar in 1621. In spite of these settlements, Malik Ambar was never subdued fully. He was soon able to revive his resistance with the help of Maratha *bargi* soldiers. The outbreak of Shah Jehan's rebellion presented Malik Ambar with an opportunity of regaining territories from the Mughals. The victory in the Battle of Bhatodi (1625) was in itself a great achievement of Malik Ambar. By 1625, Malik Ambar, thus, was able to recover most of the Nizam Shahi territories from the Mughals and Adil Shahis. These successes of Malik Ambar delayed the extinction of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom for the next ten years.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jehangir, *Tuzuki-i Jehangiri*, (ed.) Saiyid Ahmad Khan, 1864, Ghazipur and Aligarh, p. 161; Khwaja Kamgar Husaini, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, (ed.) Azra Alavi, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 225-26.
2. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 166-77; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 225-27.
3. *Ibid.*
4. cf. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 227. See also, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 166.
5. "All the cappatayens as Chan Ghana, Mahobet Chan, Chan John refuse to stay if this tyrant (i.e. Prince Khurram) come to command". See, William Foster (ed.) *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-19* (new and revised edition), Jalandhar, 1993, p. 171.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-43.
7. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 194.
8. See, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 182; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 229-30.
9. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 182; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 235-36.
10. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 184.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 188. See also, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 242-43.
12. See, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 194; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 247; See also Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, (ed.) Kabiruddin Ahmad and Ghulam Qazi, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1860-74, vol. I, pp. 291-92.
13. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 191-92; p. 244.
14. See, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 194-95; 197.
15. For the biographies of the Maratha Sardars, namely, Kheloji Bhonsle, Maloji, Udaji Ram and Jadav Rai, see Farid Bhakkari, *Zakhirat-ul Khawanin*, (ed.) Saiyid Moin-ul Haqq, Karachi, Pakistan Historical Society, 1941, vol. III, pp. 132-33; 139-41.
16. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 305; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 305.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 321-22.
19. In one of the letters sent to the court, Khan-i Khanan is reported to have written that if timely help were not sent, he would commit *jouhar* after

- sacrificing his men. cf. Mirza Muhammad Amin Qazvini, *Badshahnama*, British Museum MS, Or. 173, Rieu, i/258 b, f. 88.
20. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 32-22; See also, Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, f-88.
 21. For an assessment of Shah Jahan's attitude on this issue, see Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, Allahabad, (rpt.), 1973, p. 305, B.P. Saksena, *History of Shah Jahan of Dihli*, Allahabad, (rpt.), 1976, p. 26. See also Nurul Hasan, (1958) "The Theory of Nur Jehan Junta - A Critical Examination", *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1958, pp. 324-35.
 22. Mirza Kamgar Husaini, however, says that Khusrau was given in the safe custody of Shah Jahan since the personnel guarding Khusrau were negligent in performing their duties, cf. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 321-22. Qazvini gives a detailed account of the handing over of Khusrau to Shah Jahan. See, *Badshahnama*, ff. 88-89.
 23. Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff. 93-94.
 24. *Ibid.*, f. 94.
 25. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 330-31; See also, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 332.
 26. Jehangir himself writes in his memoirs that "the generals of the victorious army, with their revenge seeking soldiers (*sipah kina khwah*), halted three days in the town of Khirki and destroyed the city which had taken twenty years to build". cf. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 330-31; See also *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 332.
 27. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 330-31.
 28. *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 334.
 29. Qandahar (31° N, 65° E), was an important and strategic fort to the west of Lahore, bordering with the Safawid Empire. See Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, New Delhi, (reprint), 1986, sheet - 2 A-B.
 30. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 343; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 346-47; Qazvini's *Badshahnama*, ff. 103-04.
 31. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 353; Mu'tamad Khan, *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, (ed.) Abdul Hai and Ahmad Ali, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1865, p. 200.
 32. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 369; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 377-78; See also biography of Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan in Samsamuddaula Shahnawaz Khan, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, (ed.) Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1890, vol. I, p. 706. For the desertion from Shah Jahan's camp, see *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp. 239; 248-49.
 33. cf. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 378.
 34. *Ibid.*
 35. *Ibid.*
 36. Sholapur (17° N, 75° E). In the beginning, Sholapur was included in the Nizam Shahi Kingdom but it was captured by Bijapur in 1510-11. Since then a dispute over this region started.
 37. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 381; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 389-90.
 38. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 385-86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 397-98.
 39. See, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 377.

40. Balaghat region (20°+B, 75°- 78°E) was spread into Ahmednagar, Khandesh and Berar. See, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet 14 -A.
41. Kandahar (18°N, 77°E) was an important fort in the *sarkar* Nander situated to the south-east of the Ahmednagar kingdom bordering with Golconda. See *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet 14-A.
42. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, pp. 385-86; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 397-98.
43. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 391.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 391-92. See also *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp. 234-36.
45. *Ibid.*, See also, *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, p. 412.
46. Bhatodi (19°N, 74°E). The name of this place has been spelt either as 'Bhaturi' or 'Bhatvadi' by the modern writers. But Irfan Habib has given this name as Bhatodi. See, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Sheet 14-A, p. 56.
47. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 392.
48. *Ibid.* See also, *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp. 236-37. Also, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, Vol. I, pp. 347-49.
49. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 392.
50. *Ibid.* Also, *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, pp. 237-38.
51. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 394; *Ma'asir-i Jahangiri*, pp. 417-18
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 397.
55. *Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri*, p. 271.