SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GERMANY: EROTIC CONFLICT AND FOREIGNER INTEGRATION

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The Research Problem

In 2015, 1.1 million refugees and migrants entered Germany. Many citizens welcomed them in a large outpouring of support; others reacted negatively to this entrance. In the political field, all parties all felt compelled to take positions for or again "integration," in the process responding to and manipulating public mood. This article is a preliminary examination of some important themes in the Syrian refugee crisis as it unfolds in Germany. It grows out of a collaborative, ongoing ethnographic fieldwork project between John Borneman, an American, and Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi, a German. What follows is based on work conducted in Berlin in 2015 and 2016. Collaboration requires unorthodox identification of subjects and individual voices. From here on, throughout the paper we use either the first person plural, "we," or we identify ourselves by our first names—except for the very first section, in which Parvis reflects on difference as a location in Germany.

The project is more specifically concerned with the modification of projections in inter-subjective encounters between culturally-identified Germans and the refugees who entered Germany in 2015. Given our engagement through interpersonal encounters, we will consistently depict the emotional transference between us and our interlocutors, and our interlocutors with each other. This article focusses on one particular question in this research: the role of erotic conflict in the expectations and demands of "social integration" in Germany. How does either a *xenophilia* (a positive identification with the foreigner) or *xenophobia* (a negative identification with the foreign through fear) emerge and in and through everyday encounters? How do these forms of identification become moods, and under what conditions are the affects associated with these forms of thinking and feeling modified?

To be different is to be indecent

There is a particular sentence that my (Parvis') mother repeats whenever she ponders my maternal grandmother. The sentence goes: "*Anderssein ist unständig*" ("To be different is to be indecent"). A possible translation into Hindi might be: *Bhinnatā abhadra hai* (भिन्नता अभद्र है). Difference is perhaps the most important issue in the integration of refugees in Germany today. The sentence is a key to German history, as it informs as three generations of post-WWII Germans.

"*To be different is to be indecent*" does not fairly characterise how my mother thinks, nor does it adequately describe who she is. And yet, the phrase is locked strangely in her memory. She frequently recalls it, in an immediate and automatic way, as if it were the wisdom of a proverb. She speaks it without her having to think, as if it came directly out of a collective unconscious, i.e. without being consciously retrieved. Near the end of WW II my mother and my grandmother fled the Russians and resettled in what became West Germany. They were for a while refugees.

Yet, this sentence also expresses a generational conflict *between* mother and daughter; one which became a permanent schism after my mother married an Iranian immigrant who had entered Europe in the early 1960s. The consequences of that decision are still with her today, although her parents are long dead. For the generation of my grandparents, the current wave of refugees in Germany might be framed by this idea, "to be different is to be indecent."

The concept "generational conflict" is apposite here as one way to situate the varied reactions to the migrants and refugees—it is difficult to clearly separate the two—who entered Germany in fall 2015. This conflict between mother and daughter was more than a struggle over the choice of a particular husband. The struggle was much larger: to collectively organise two generations after World War II. My grandmother's generation is called the *Kriegsgeneration*, the generation that made and lived through war; my mother's generation is that of *Kriegskinder*, the children of that war who themselves inherited the guilt of their parents and later the responsibility for that war.[1]

Because *Anderssein ist unständig* often precedes whatever else my mother has to say about my grandmother, it has affected *my* memory also. The memory of my grandmother is like an interface to another Germany that my generation, that of her grandchildren, has never lived but nonetheless remembers.

In the September days of 2015, as millions of refugees and migrants were fleeing to Europe and Germany, several selfies of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in intimate contact with refugees were widely disseminated on social media. Some Germans recognised themselves in such photos, as refugees or children of refugees following the war. Others simply saw Merkel with a foreigner. For my mother and me, the identification with refugees suggests a continuing rebellion against my grandmother's generation, against all the implications of the expression *Anderssein ist unanständig*, "to be different is to be indecent."

Germany and Three Crises

Three events in the last couple of years have produced crises, upending many assumptions Germans have held about themselves, about their relation to one another, as well as their place within Europe and the European Union (EU). The first major crisis for Germany since the opening of the Wall in 1989 and national reunification was the Greek debt or Euro crisis that followed the world economic crisis of 2008. The German economy did well, despite the Great Recession experienced elsewhere, especially in Greece and Spain. Precisely because of Germany's punitive austerity policies toward others, they were accused of being uncaring, cold, deeply hypocritical, and even fascist. This event was followed by a second: the 2015 flow of refugees into Europe. Merkel is often accused of having facilitated it by temporarily waving border requirements. The third event was the recent and sudden 2016 Brexit decision by the United Kingdom, against Germany's pleas and interests, which has cast further doubts about the future of a unified Europe—reversing perhaps the major achievement of Parvis's grandparent's generation.[3]

The ruling Christian-Democratic government has stumbled, hesitated, and lost much credibility in its inability to lead during these three crises. Unable to successfully resolve the ongoing Greek debt issue, and having lost its important British partner within the E.U. through the Brexit vote, Germany needs a victory within Europe. A friend of John's who works in the Office of the Chancellor told him that one view is that Merkel will seek this victory in the current refugee problem. This refugee crisis cannot be totally severed from the Greek debt and Brexit crises. In this article, however, we will address *only* the relation of Germans to refugees, which we are analysing as a veritable experiment in German social integration.

Erotic Conflict and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

One important element, but no means the only one, in the integration of refugees and migrants is what we call *erotic conflict.* By erotic we do not merely mean the sexual as opposed to the nonsexual but we speak in a more mythological register, of *Eros* versus *Thanatos*, life versus death. The erotic is the close-up, the tactile, the passionate, the living versus the distant, the cold, the dead. Eros is of course conflictual, whether involving love or hate, whether in the imagination or in actual experience. Erotic conflict is the explicit and implicit dynamics at work when desires cross group boundaries, threaten intimacy taboos, or make explicit sexual and erotic rivalries, even or especially if the desires are active largely as unconscious phantasies.

In multicultural, cosmopolitan Berlin, and to a large extent throughout Germany, refugees and migrants encounter erotic conflict not just in face-to-face interactions but also in daydreams, nightly dreams, and recalled experiences; in swimming pools, administrative offices, public transportation, restaurants, and grocery stores; in greetings and departures; in music and comedic performances; in the search for apartments and language learning; and on the streets.

We often pass a Turkish kebab stand (*Yilmak Gemüse Kebab*) near our apartment on Potsdamer Strasse, which shows and advertises a vegetarian kebab. It is located right next to a typical Berlin erotic store. All Berliners meet with indifference, at least publicly, this juxtaposition of food and sex, Turkish food and German sex. The image is conflictual but does not result in any open conflict, as it might elsewhere. Already, the Turkish kebab stand is transformed in the German context to one offering vegetarian alongside meat kebabs, perhaps offering one or the other to the same customers who had just visited the erotic—the "*nonveg*"—store.

We are returning here to a topic that John (Borneman 1986) initially pursued in 1986 in the analysis of an event, the *Marielito Boatlift*, in which a sudden wave of Cuban refugees entered the United States. He was interested then in how a political event— the *Marielito Boatlift*—became defined as a sexual threat, a form of national penetration. In 1980, 125,000 Cubans entered the United States on this boat lift, where they were automatically classified as political refugees. In an act of spite or generosity, depending on perspective, Fidel Castro emptied his prisons. Thus 10,000 had criminal records, and a large number of them had been imprisoned for homosexuality, which at the time was also illegal in the U.S.

The entry of political refugees into the United States, who were simultaneously understood to be homosexual and Communist, led to a pronounced expression of anxiety. The fears of male-to-male penetration, a homosexual act, and of Communism, were combined in the unconscious of many Americans into one single fantasy of national penetration. The two forms of danger concern two forms of otherness: one sexual, the other ideological, which in fantasy merge into one threatening figure. Today's world refugee crisis—estimated at 65 million refugees—presents similar sexual and ideological challenges for many receiving countries. These challenges are usually framed as legal and political, while the unconscious dimensions of reception, including erotic receptivity, is usually itself ignored, repressed, or often simply avoided. The experience of reception always has an essential erotic component, which is admittedly more difficult to frame but, we would argue, much more important for long term group formation, as it addresses directly the thorny issue of "social integration" (*Integration*).

It is important to keep in mind that we are writing today about a Syrian refugee crisis which has become a German "refugee *problem*."[4] The crisis is unfolding in Germany only as a *problem*, but it remains a severe crisis in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. In our ethnographic fieldwork, we are concentrating on the relation of culturally-identified Germans to Syrian refugees. Their encounters unfold in the context of a world refugee crisis that includes migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, for example, who are in fierce competition with each other over refugee status in Germany. Numbers alone would frame the German story as relatively insignificant. In 2015, 2.137 million people migrated to Germany, while 998,000 Germans departed, leaving a net immigration of 1.139 million for a country of 82.2 million. Of the immigrants, 45% came from other countries in the European Union, 13% from European countries not in the E.U., 30% from Asia, 5% from Africa; 298,000 of the 441,899 migrants who applied for asylum are from Syria, 30% between the ages of 18 and 25 (BAMF 2016). The significance of the refugees and migrants is not in their numbers, however, but in the questions they pose about who the Germans are and what their obligations to others should be. Compare these German numbers to those in Syria since the start of the 2011 Revolution: over half of the pre-war population of 22 million is displaced, a quarter or more forced to flee the country, nearly 500,000 killed, 2 million wounded. For Syria, the crisis is dominated by death and disintegration; for Germany, it is primarily about the forms of life in a society (*Gesellschaft*) and its terms of inclusion or exclusion.

It is highly significant to Germans that for others their country has come to symbolise life, vitality, and a future, whereas death dominated the post-war master narratives of Germans stemming from their actions in the Holocaust and World War II. In the refrain from Romanian-born German-language poet Paul Celan's poem "Death Fugue" (1945), "*Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland*" ("Death is a master from Germany"). Today, this master narrative of death is open to a radical transformation.

One coincidence of the refugee crisis for John is that his two field sites of the last 35 years—Germany and Syria—have become intimately conjoined. After some twenty years of work in Germany, he began research in Syria in 1999. His research at the time asked how the authority of dynastic rule was related to family relations organised through patriarchy. When fathers can no longer guarantee the futures of their sons, what happens to the father's authority?[6]

The young men and women in the 2011 Arab Spring called into question the authority of Arab regimes that were propped up by a spoils system dependent on *asabiyya*—an Ibn Khaldoun concept variously translated as "clan-ism" or "group feeling"—in which political obedience and acquiescence were rewarded materially across sectarian divisions.[7] The Syrian revolution, which came late to this series of uprisings, has been the most violent, the most destabilising and the most disintegrating of all the Arab uprisings. By Fall 2015, Germany became a favored destination for those displaced.

Erotic Conflict

What is erotic conflict? How does one study this ethnographically? Part of our project involves refining the method called "participant observation" through an exploration of the concepts "projective identification" and "*Stimmung*." *Stimmung* we translate as atmosphere or volatile collective mood, vibe, atmosphere (approximations in Hindi might be सामूहिक मूड or मनोदशा—in Gujarati: or   . Also   or   — all for *mood* and *collective mood*). The question of sexuality and sexual exchange in cross-cultural interaction has been widely and productively covered in literature and film (in Germany, Rainer Werner Fassbinder's films are exemplary), but in anthropology and sociology most often it is dissolved into mere cultural norms (such as questions of marital exchange patterns or systems) or brought under the rubric of violence (individual and group clashes). In any event, the erotic is de-emphasised. Erotic conflict can be either a source of aliveness, surprise, or unexpected joy; or, alternately, it can result in violence or even death, as in

"honor killings."

The recent strangling of the media starlet Qandeel Baloch in Pakistan by her brother is one such example. Honour in most of these cases should not be equated with a status or cultural norm but understood as a verbal placeholder for a libidinally invested relationship. The conflict about authority between brother and sister was exacerbated by Qandeel's access to new media, especially Facebook. Despite the wishes of her family, Qandeel was able to stage and disseminate erotic self-representations, including an erotic exchange with a respectable Muslim cleric. The sensuality of Qandeel's erotic displays was the issue. That she earned enough through them to support her entire family was apparently irrelevant.

Another example of erotic conflict is revealed in the media coverage following the Godhra altercations on the railway station platform in Gujarat in February 2002, which inaugurated, accompanied, and even facilitated the Gujarat pogrom. Vernacular Gujarati newspapers, such as *Gujarat Samachar* and *Sandesh*, reported abductions, rapes, and bodily mutilations of Hindu girls by Muslim attackers at the railway station at the time—acts which were later denied to have occurred in police reports. These were imagined stories, added to the incidents of provocation on the railway platform. These imaginations, however, had a momentous effect in the minds of city residents in Ahmedabad during the subsequent days of anti-Muslim violence. The idea of abduction for the mere sake of sexual and perverse pleasure was powerful as it combined the spectre of an originary violence, partition (in which a large number of women were known to have been abducted), with more recent fears, rivalries, and prejudices about Muslim male sexuality and Hindu women's vulnerability (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012).

Erotic encounters between culturally identified Germans and Middle Eastern migrants have been present at least since the importation of guest workers from Turkey in the 1960s.[8] These have resulted in productive as well as violent conflicts. We wish less to emphasise cultural background—Syrian or German—as a coherent set of understandings than to be alert to how cultural difference is experienced in interactions over time. We ask how difference is unconsciously "actualised" in interactions through projective identifications. We wish to explore how projections are stabilised or modified in interactions. We will elaborate these terms shortly.

An Encounter

How do we proceed? The ethnographer is told of experiences,

or him or herself experiences or observes moments of arrest where "projective identifications" are at play. What happens when projective identifications arise in encounters between Germans and refugees? Two young Syrian men, who we will call Marwan and Alaa, one Kurd the other Sunni, arrived in Germany last summer and fall, respectively. They spent four days in early August with us in Berlin. We took them to places that might reveal to *us* how *they* see and experience Germany and Germans. We bicycled everywhere: to the Free University, since Alaa wants to study at a German university; to the governmental district of Berlin and the office of the Chancellory, since they both fondly refer to Germany's head of state as "*Haji Merkel*;" to the old site of Nazi power, *Wilhelmstrasse* which is presently known for the museum *Topography of Terror,* in order to connect their own history of persecution and torture by Bashar Al Assad in Syria to German Nazi history. We also took them to Vietnamese, Iranian, and Indian restaurants, to a new Damascus restaurant in the cosmopolitan district of *Neukölln* and to the Turkish neighborhood of *Kreuzberg*. We pointed to streets named after victims of Nazi terror, or named in honor of resistance fighters, showed them the bronze plaques that mark Berlin's streets (called *Stolpersteine*) of Jews who were deported to concentration camps to be killed, and we told them of the tough and ongoing struggles to rewrite Germany history. John had met Marwan and Alaa initially when they were still children, 13 years ago in Aleppo before the current war, and he met them again twice shortly during exile in Istanbul. Both are pious Muslims, and want to wait for sex until they are in a marriage. Neither has had any sex. Marwan is engaged but has met his future wife only once.

The following is a description of one erotic conflict to which we were both present. But these young men themselves also tell us of their encounters without our prompting them. For example, Marwan is tempted by German girls but is also provisionally engaged to a young Kurdish woman living in Germany. And since April, Alaa, who is considered very attractive, with large innocent eyes and long eyelashes, has been pursued by two German girls. One he met on the street. They text-message daily. Another girl who he met a few weeks ago is also very interested in him, but since Alaa said that he wanted to pursue his studies first before getting involved with someone, she has kept a certain distance. They still communicate daily, though. He describes both girls as beautiful and very nice. Alaa was the subject of a video made and published by the German weekly journal *Der Spiegel*, and has since received many messages on his Facebook page. They are nearly all positive, he said, and at one point he was surprised

to receive two messages from gay men. One said that he imagined Syrians and Muslims as incorrigibly violent, but he acknowledged to be moved by Alaa's story of flight.

Parvis complemented Alaa for being able to alleviate the fear Germans have of Muslims. On our visit to the Free University, we took them both to the student-run villa, and we by accident happened into the room of the Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual student activist groups. The walls were filled with men and women kissing, and posters advertising events involving alternative sexualities. Marwan said, in Arabic, "This is *išmiāzāz*." Alaa worked on translating this into German and English, playing with the word *ru'ab* (terror, fear, horror), although Marwan probably meant something closer to the meaning of *išmiāzāz*, disgust or revulsion. In any event, it was more than Marwan at that moment wanted to think.

We introduced them to two German friends, who John has known since the early 1980s. We will call them Jan and Georg, and switch here to the ethnographic present:

> Jan seeks above all to ascertain Alaa and Marwan's interest in Germany and what investments they have made in learning German. Throughout our conversation, Jan corrects their use of definite articles and verbs endings in past perfect, and in response to criticism of the other Germans present, he says he is doing so because it was important they learn proper German. He then assesses Marwan's German as better than Alaa's; Georg contradicts him. After an hour of discussion, Jan amends his assessment and complements Alaa, "Your German is very good." Alaa thanks him.
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> Jan's initial assessment had more to do with impatience than prejudice and his ability to understand Alaa's accented speech. Jan asks about education and career goals. Alaa talks about how German administrative officials seem to have lost his Syrian passport, and how his attempt to matriculate in civil engineering at four different German universities was rejected out of hand because he had not yet taken the DSH German language proficiency exam for technical reasons. It was offered too late to him to take it and include the exam results.
>
> Suddenly, as if this had long been on his mind, Georg switches the topic to cultural difference as cause for the putative failure of *Integration* ("social integration"). He objects that in Germany he has no access to Turkish or Muslim girls, while men from those communities would have access to German women. "Why is that?" He asks pointedly. The girl's brothers would want to kill him if he even respectfully—he repeats the word "respectfully" several times—approached them. The two young Syrians are initially silent, but they seem to agree with the statement by Georg. John intervenes several times to repeat Georg's question using alternative phrasing and then asks Marwan and Amar if they have any tips for Georg since he does not know the protocol with Muslim women.

Georg is not alone among German men entertaining the question of unequal access to women. German men pose this question without necessarily even wanting to date Arab or Turkish Muslim women or ever having attempted it. Jan teases Georg, impatiently, that all he wants to do is to get into bed with these women, and he is frustrated because he is not attractive enough for them.

   After a long silence, Alaa hesitatingly formulates a response. He says that there are indeed controls on marriage and dating within Syria, also. Men cannot date the women of each other's communities (he means sectarian groups like Shia, Sunni, Druse, Christians, Alawites). Parvis mentions caste dynamics in India. Marwan, Jan, and John remain silent.

Projective Identification

The term "projective identification" is useful to refine what goes on during the transference of emotions between people in an interaction. Coined initially by the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (1946), it has since become an important tool and method in understanding what happens in the psychoanalytic session. The views people hold of each other obviously involve projection of stereotypes. But these projections are constantly reshaped in personal encounters in which inner images—identifications—invoke unconscious phantasies that are either stabilised or modified.

   Whereas a projection places the phantasy *onto* another person or thing, a projective identification places the phantasy *into* the other or thing. To project something into the other produces a feeling that compels the receiver to respond. We are being "enlisted," writes the analyst Thomas Ogden, "in an interpersonal actualisation of a segment of the [other's] internal object world" (Ogden 69). The person who projects seeks a vessel to contain and act out—to actualise—a particular fantasy (Borneman 2012).

   A Green Party poster from the September election addressed directly one widely-held German position on the relation of religion to erotic conflict: *Dein Gott? Dein Sex? Dein Ding!* (Your God? Your Sex? Your thing!). It warns that the other should not be expected to contain your phantasies of God and of sexuality. Religion and sexuality, in other words, are your own and none of my business. In this, the Greens seek to circumvent projective identifications that attempt to make it my concern what another person thinks of his or her god or his or her sexuality. And therefore, I neither have to contain these projections nor respond to them.

   In the encounter just described, Georg sought to actualize his conscious fantasy of unavailable sex by projecting into Alaa and

Marwan his unconscious phantasies about the reasons for this
unavailability. His use of the word "respectfully" was an attempt to
take the edge off his fantasies. Only when he is confronted with
two young, energetic, attractive Syrian men, does he articulate his
general fear of approaching Muslim women. While veiled Muslim
women in Berlin may indeed be unavailable to him, what is strange
about his statement is that he thinks the reason they are unavailable
has largely to do with them being veiled. This leads him to articulate
arguments about culture and religion that repeat a widely held
assumption, namely that integration fails to the degree that Muslim
women are pious and veil. This assessment is one he does not make
about pious Catholic or Protestant women, whose (un)availability he
seems to easily adjust to.

The attentive silence of Alaa and Marwan suggests they felt
not just a projection onto them but that some emotion had
been deposited into them, which they were asked to contain and
compelled to respond to. Georg was making them responsible for
the unavailability of Muslim women to him. We hope to follow
these kinds of interactions over time to understand how and when
projections are modified or stabilised. Because personal encounters
demand this active participation with the other in real time, such
encounters do not always follow a cultural script. In other words,
we are arguing against using the distinction that the anthropologist
Marshall Sahlins (1985) makes between culture as a given order of
categories and the acting out of these categories in real life. Attention
to projective identifications allows for a more interactive, temporally
nuanced and processual understanding of projections, and more
attention to the unconscious transference of emotions. The question
for us becomes not one of the performance of projections following
a cultural script, but the interpersonal actualisation of projections in
emotional exchanges, where projections are open to modification.

Stimmung

The likelihood of individual modification of projections in
interpersonal cultural encounters is highly contingent upon context,
one element of which is public mood (सामूहिक मूड). Hence we attend
to *Stimmungswechsel* or *Stimmungswandel*, changes or transformations
in volatile public moods (Heidegger 1996; Thiele 1997). Most
important for *Stimmung* are those events—retroactively constructed
happenings—that, to use today's lingo, go viral.

We will mention four events that have gone viral in Germany, with

major effects on public mood. The first, in mid-July, 2015, was a chance emotional encounter on German television between Chancellor Angela Merkel and a teenage Palestinian refugee, Reem Sahwil, who feared deportation, producing an ambivalent *Stimmung*, public mood.[9] A second event, on September 2, 2015, the dissemination of photos of the three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdi's drowned, face-down body on a Turkish beach, galvanised an empathic identification with the plight of refugees and people began talking of a *Willkommenskultur* (welcoming culture).[10] A third event, in November, 2015, the Islamic State's attacks in Paris, led to anxious questioning of the feel-good welcoming mood in Germany. A fourth event, which we will analyse here, was the New Year's Eve, 2015/16, sexual attack on German women predominantly in the Cologne Bahnhof. This event mobilised widespread xenophobic sentiment—fear of the foreign or strange. Roughly 1000 men, largely of Arab or North African origin, congregated in the main plaza outside the Cologne train station. Groups of them spontaneously broke off to corner, sexually assault, and rob German women in the plaza. Although there was a police presence, the police were unprepared and unable to intervene effectively. Months later, many election posters made implicit references to the event. The ruling Christian Democrats, for example, displayed on one poster a group of young, stereotypically German-looking women having fun, and used the slogan *Sicher feiern* (Party Safely) to suggest they would create the conditions making this possible. This poster met little resonance in the election, as Merkel's policies were held responsible for the anxiety about safety. This past summer there were two violent rampages of youths with migration backgrounds in *Ansbach* and *Würzburg* in *Bayern*, that is, Bavaria. The youth from Ansbach had been born in Germany; the other, who committed multiple and brutal axe murders on a train in *Würzburg*, was an adolescent asylum seeker from Afghanistan. The adolescent asylum seeker had had a fight with his girlfriend and had been rejected for asylum. One can assume his attack was a reaction to these rejections. Such events work to stabilize *Stimmungswechsel,* change in collective mood. The increase in attacks against asylum seekers, primarily against asylum homes all over Germany, are also an expression of a new xenophobic mood.[11]

In sum, within the last year, there have been three radical shifts in public mood, in *Stimmung*: from indifference to ambivalence, from ambivalence to empathic identification or xenophilia, and from xenophilia to xenophobia. The volatility of public moods is especially important in democracies with electoral campaigns. Shifts

from indifference to a welcoming culture to one of rejection, fear, and hate must be periodically ritually legitimated. Elections provide the ritual occasion for politicians to mobilise moods to obtain votes. The electronic and print media play a crucial role in crystallizing and orienting these moods.

<div align="center">Stimmung and the Cologne Sexual Attack</div>

The sexual attack and robbery of Germany women on New Year's Eve, 2016, in the plaza at Cologne's main train station, resulted in complaints against 183 men, 108 of whom came from Morocco and Algeria; 120 of the complaints were related to sexual assault.[12] It was one of several such uncoordinated attacks in German cities on that eve. To date, there have been four convictions in Cologne, only two of which resulted in prison sentences. Although many of the German victims identified themselves within a week, and within several months thousands claimed to have been victimised, it took considerable time to identify the suspects. This temporal delay created a public mood of frustration and suspicion that officials intended to protect the immigrants from German anger. Eventually the police identified 31 suspects, among who were Germans, a Serb, an American, and 18 asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa – but no Syrians. The welcoming mood of Fall, 2015, was immediately complicated by a divisive and threatening specter that has since only grown larger.

Harassment and assault of German women by foreign men is a symptom of an erotic conflict that is not limited to the particular group of men who have engaged in attacks but is present in most of the interactions young migrants have.[13] This is true not only in Germany but throughout the northern European countries that have had considerable Arab migration over the last fifty years. The issue of Arab-Muslim male sexuality produced a bitter debate in France, for example, around the award-winning Algerian novelist Kamel Daoud's argument that "the sexual misery of the Arab-Muslim world" is what is responsible for the Cologne attack (Daoud 2016).

There are many contributing factors internal to Arab societies, such as favouritism given to male children, that should be part of any explanation for these assaults. The dangers in pointing to internal cultural variables are well known: one generalises at the group level what is in fact the behavior of only some individuals. Nonetheless, cultural variables cannot be entirely ignored when they are in fact often used as the very basis for Islamophobic claims.

We seek to situate them, and examined how they are actualised, in the contingency and temporality of the encounter rather than as enactments of a particular cultural heritage.

Erotic conflict arises from a desire that is awakened in an encounter. Acting with indifference to this desire can inflame a conflict, though it is more likely to be inflamed by active rejection or receptivity. Think of erotic conflict as an element in a dynamic exchange: desires are projected into the other who is compelled to react: first to contain them and then to mirror them back in a modified form. Interactions call forth the inner images that Germans and refugees have of each other; such images form a reservoir of unconscious phantasy that can be invested in future interactions. Public events such as those in Cologne present a stage for acting out—actualising—these unconscious phantasies.

Most of the men who attacked and robbed German women in front of the train station would likely not have done so in their home countries, where social controls on the acting-out of sexual acts in public are much greater. It is not irrelevant that all of these men came to Germany unaccompanied by their families.

To be sure, the regulation of erotic conflict in the entire MENA (Middle East-North Africa) region contrasts with its regulation in Germany, a country that prides itself on sexual openness, transparency, and gender equality, and where sex is advertised as readily available, including commercially. But the advertised availability of sex is subject to intricate and ambiguous disciplinary protocols that must be learned. Germans have already internalised these, although they may also violate them. Even on learning the sexual protocols, however, foreign men are usually frustrated when trying to follow them. Hence when foreigners act out their desires in what they consider a German or European idiom, they often perceive themselves, and Germans perceive them, as imposters— acting as someone else, hiding their own true selves. If foreigners do not follow the protocols, they ultimately experience themselves as undisciplined, which is, ironically, the initial projection many have about Germans, who in friendship and love appear not to be overly concerned with separation of the sexes and regulation of sexual behavior. This suspected lack of discipline also confirms the German stereotype about the sexuality of foreigners. Moreover, the precarious legal and social status of the new migrants puts them in an extremely dependent and vulnerable position, which in turn can produce unconscious aggression.

The assaults in Cologne were a product of these aggressions that

then were actualised in this specific encounter. In other circumstances we assume most of these men could demonstrate a capacity for empathy to identify with the feelings of others, including German women. In the German New Year's eve celebration, however, this particular group of men at the train station showed no empathy. In fact, they wished to harm women, and to do so by eroticising their aggression (Stoller 1975: 26). Such aggression transforms individual traumas of dependence and emasculation into triumphs, a classic example of what is called *narcissistic perversion.*

The French psychoanalyst Paul-Claude Recamier (2014: 119) has theoretically developed this concept, which might help us point to the particular psychic conditions predisposing men to take pleasure in asserting themselves at someone else's expense. What kind of conditions predisposes some foreign men to treat German women as if they were prey? Most generally, to transform women into prey involves a refusal to symbolize them. In other words, the preys are not women like one's own sisters or cousins. Rather, women are reduced in phantasy to an abstraction, to something like a number that stands for anything or nothing. The desire awakened in the encounter confronts not a real woman but an abstraction. This reduction of fantasy is a personal defense against desire, here against the attractiveness of exactly these women. That attractiveness arouses and reinforces a feeling of dependence. In other words, the confrontation with an attractiveness that is unavailable arouses feelings of dependence, impotence and incapacity. These feelings, in turn, provoke an "overmastering need for self-sufficiency," which, in the case of migrants or refugees, divorced from sources of their own self-worth and self-sufficiency increases the sense of powerlessness (120). Whoever arouses this feeling risks becoming an object for a violent projective identification and possible aggression.

While the frequency of sexual attacks by migrants is no greater than that of culturally-identified Germans, the image Germans have of them risks being collapsed into a general category of the foreigner who poses a sexual threat and disrespects German values. The ubiquitous publicity of these events through social media intensifies for Germans fear of being preyed upon by all strangers, activating a latent xenophobia.[14] These fears are most active and effectively mobilised at the unconscious level. Consciously, most Germans do not think of themselves as xenophobic. Most do not consciously fear foreigners, nor do they think they hate them. Yet, since the Cologne assaults, many Germans in political discourse and in response to opinion polls talk about an anxiety of the foreign

(*Fremdenangst*). The production of this fear is in part a product of media games invested not in the modification of projections but in the articulation, exploitation, and solidification of prejudices.

Unconscious German fears of the foreign are often hidden under a veneer of disinterest. They are often communicated by avoidance, and by subtle, unspoken expressions of impatience and disdain. What we have observed is that an increasing number of Germans communicate to foreigners a diffuse paranoia, which can easily turn into a xenophobic projection and signal to all foreigners that they are considered essentially and forever outside the social. The danger is that the new immigrants feel compelled to contain and react, in turn, to this paranoid feeling. They might do so by giving in to their own bottled up aggressions, thus affirming one argument that circulates among Germans today: that non-European, but especially, Arab or Muslim migrants are incapable of integration into German society.

The *Volk* and its *Gemütlichkeit* (comfortable ambience)

The initial frame for the refugee crisis was expressed in the incredibly well-televised private and public welcome extended to refugees. "Welcome" posters in German and English can still be found in Berlin, a year after the initial wave of refugees had arrived and taken in. What Germans dubbed *Willkommenskultur* ("a welcoming culture") was both a decisive break with the colonial, racist, and annihilationist practices and ideology of the Nazi period, and a repetition of the *Begrüssung* (greeting, welcoming) that was played out between East and West Germans after the opening of the inner-German wall on November 9, 1989. It also invoked unconscious memories of the violent and "un-masterable" past of their own history of the Nazi and the postwar period, including of being among the 12 million expellees from the Eastern territories.

This initial frame was a radical revision of Germany's traditional view of itself as a country of emigration and not immigration. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, large numbers of Germans emigrated, especially for the Americas. Empirically, however, Germany is now the most desired land of immigration in Europe, and has arguably become multi-, instead of mono-cultural, or as an older idiom has it, "*völkisch*".[15] What does being "multicultural" mean for a country that considers itself *ein Volk*, one distinct people in a world divided into units of many kinds of people (*Völker*)? Especially, since it was none other than Angela Merkel herself, who in 2010 prematurely

announced that *Multikulti* ("multiculturalism"), which had been a goal for decades by parts of the left and the Green Party, had "absolutely failed" ("*Der Ansatz für Multikulti ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert!*").[16]

The appeal to "*Volk*" rings strong in the German-speaking ear. "*Wir sind das Volk!*" ("We are the people") was the rallying cry used in the peaceful revolution of 1989. That revolution demanded democratisation of the Communist political system, and an opening of the borders, ultimately turning into calls for unification of a divided people—*Wir sind ein Volk*! ("We are one people") (Borneman 1992). The phrase can, and is, used both as a populist slogan claiming socio-cultural exclusivity, and as a democratic claim about the people's sovereignty within a state. The *Reichstag*, the famous 1894 building of the German Parliament, which had fallen into some obscurity during the Cold War, was restored and became the house of the newly united Germany in 1999. A central part of its renovation, led by the British architect Norman Foster, was to top it with a large glass dome to signify openness and transparency. The inscription above its entrance was unchanged. It reads *dem deutsche Volk* (for the German people), and allows for both interpretations, of *one* people and *the* people).[17]

Like all aggregate populations organised on the basis of modern nationhood, Germans necessarily conceive of themselves as belonging to a bounded territory, in addition to sharing distinctive cultural practices and forms. As to distinctive cultural practices, what we might call a specific German ontology, one of the most peculiar and positively valorised feelings is that of *Gemütlichkeit,* which we translate as "comfortable ambience." The concept is considered a quality essential to the German way of being, in fact, so peculiarly German that it is often left untranslated in English sentences. *Gemütlich* denotes cozy, homely, relaxed; not driven or fidgety or nervous.

Near our apartment in the Schöneberg district of Berlin, there is a bar/restaurant called "23 hours of *Gemütlichkeit* with Rena." One is invited to dine and drink with Rena, the owner, in a *Stimmung* marked by *Gemütlichkeit*. The concept is closely related to the quality of *Geselligkeit*, which means "conviviality," "sociality" or "companionability," even "camaraderie". This relation suggests a quality of horizontality. *Gemütlich* would exclude the stark vertical social relationships marked by formal comportment, social distance, and the expression of hierarchy.

Since the late 19th century, *Gemütlichkeit* describes a residential

space in which kinship or the intimacy of friendship allows one to dispense with ritualised forms of interaction. It can also denote a public space in which people gather without any concern for class distinctions, such as in local neighborhood bars and eateries (called *Kiezkneipen* or *Kiezrestaurants* in Berlin). But can one be *gemütlich* with a foreigner or stranger, with someone who does not drink alcohol or refuses to eat pork, who does not share so-called foundational values ("*grundlegende Werte*")? With one whose life-ways are difficult to comprehend and with whom communication is complicated? Communication that risks constant misunderstanding might make us uncomfortable. The sociability that is deemed *gemütlich* and *gesellig* minimally places additional demands on foreigners to demonstrate their ability to integrate, engage in specifically German social behavior, in interactions. Germans, in turn, must usually embrace that which at least initially lies outside their comfort zone to construct a sociality with foreigners that might resemble the feeling of *Gemütlichkeit.*

One of the most common initial frames to think these new immigrants has been to compare them to the infamous *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) invited to work in post-war Germany in the 1960s and 70s. This older public discourse would frame the new immigrants as mere foreign guest workers, a way to pay German pensions as the population ages.[18] But nobody today defends the guest worker programmes, which provided no planned paths for "integration" and thus created a large internal population of Turkish-identified residents.

Turks are often disparaged as resisting integration by living in a "parallel society" (*Parallelgesellschaft*). Academically in Germany, this label is used to describe how ethno-religious groups separate themselves spatially and socially to minimise cultural contact with other Germans. Often it refers to the primary use of a language other than German, endogamous organisation (Turkish or Kurdish men marry others from the villages of their parents), or diaspora networks reliant on Turkish rather than German resources. What is ignored is that there are many interconnections and interdependencies of these groups with the majority culture, especially in the service sector. The idea of parallel societies ignores the remarkable fact that the ubiquitous, *gemütliche* small beer stands outside Turkish liquor stores which serve German customers in the late afternoons and evenings are often run by non-alcohol drinking owners for alcohol-consuming Germans. Many forms of successful integration remain invisible to a prejudiced eye. Making explicit what integration in German society

might mean undermines both conservative and progressive visions of the future. More conservative assumptions include orienting mostly Muslim migrants to a *Leitkultur* (a leading, dominant culture) with Christian roots and traditions, or assimilating them into the tradition of a *Volksgeist* [spirit of the people, i.e. metaphysical] with its claims to a unity in a spirit that informs language, thought, and culture. More progressive assumptions include integrating migrants into the Enlightenment tradition (the *Aufklärung*), to emancipation movements and European secular achievements that carry with them a particular history of shame and responsibility, especially toward the Jews. To abandon either vision is to loosen one's connections to the past and to forego expectations of fullness as a *Volk*, a people.

In the current *Stimmung*, the claim of the more nationalistically-inclined on the political Right to a more restrictive view of culture has the stronger emotional appeal. According to this view, represented in the political sphere by rapidly ascendant political parties such as the AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*), the new migrants, especially but not exclusively when they are Muslims, are inassimilable outsiders whose entry must be stopped. The AfD has been in existence only four years, but has already garnered more than 20% of the vote and gained representation in 10 of the 16 state parliaments. These recent successes have largely been accomplished by turning an anti-establishment, anti-EU party into an anti-immigrant one. One of their more prominent posters in the September elections, playing directly to the anxieties, created around the new migrants, declared *Asylchaos stoppen! Grenzen sichern!* (Stop the asylum chaos! Secure the borders!). Muslims, above all, threaten the experience of German *Gemütlichkeit*. This anxiety about the new migrants is augmented by a fear of loss not only of the feeling of the people being one but also by the fear of loss of some very contemporary identifications, such as the benefits of the social welfare state and with a sense of oneself as European. These are identifications that the refugees threaten to take away! Those who react to these losses by giving destructive wishes free reign are behind the daily attacks on refugee homes and persons. On the other hand, to overcome or negate one's unconscious destructive wishes and fears generates the incredible generosity that refugees in Germany have experienced, when they have experienced it.[19]

Containment and Germany as a Holding Environment

The sociopolitical goal of integration places specific demands on

long term residents of Germany. They are asked to create a holding environment for new migrants at the same time as many citizens find their own social welfare benefits shrinking in a precarious post-Cold War national community. A "holding environment" is a concept the analyst Donald Winnicott developed to describe "good enough" mothering. A good enough mother provides sufficient emotional space for the child to feel secure to grow and eventually to care for itself and for others (Borneman 2001). To the migrants who arrived last year, Germany promises such a space, quite different from the environments from which most refugees fled. To a large degree, however, only some Syrian refugees among the migrants experience most of the elements that would make Germany a holding environment.

To create a holding environment even for Syrian migrants is no small feat. Above all, migrant dependency produces aggressive feelings that are often turned against their German hosts, even against those who resist a xenophobic *Stimmung* (mood) and seek to welcome and integrate refugees. Germans are asked to contain the often violent projective identifications of migrants and mirror them back in a harmless, modified form. German officials, teachers, employees at asylum shelters, staff at refugee homes also have to reckon with the heightened aggression between different migrant groups that sometimes seek to harm one another. A modification in mirroring works only if what Germans accrue in self-esteem outweighs both the demands of containment and their fears of being taken advantage of.

One of the major attractions of Germany as a holding environment over other European countries has been its current economic, social, and political stability. What makes this stability a valued experience in Germany is legal security or certainty, *Rechtssicherheit.* This principle of legal certainty within the rule of law is premised on the concepts of compliance and predictability. Migrant compliance with the law is difficult until they obtain knowledge of the laws and then agree to comply, even when their personal interests may differ from the states' imperatives. In the current situation, compliance is often impossible, however, as the laws regulating migrant residence, work, and asylum status keep changing. These constant changes undermine the principle of predictability in law. At the moment, these ambiguities in the law benefit mostly the private contractors who make huge profits in providing lodging and meals for the new migrants while earning government subsidies.

Most migrants experience a contradiction between the official

welcoming culture and administrative obstacles and delays. Most continue to fear deportation even after they have been granted a provisional legal status of three years allowing them to reside and work in Germany. If integration and access to education or work is extremely slow or proves impossible, many young male migrants are likely turn to criminal activities to support themselves and to avoid deportation. Everybody knows this and talks about it. On the other hand, if the new migrants succeed in education or employment, Germans who feel left behind economically and socially will resent them for this. This is especially true for those still residing in the former East Germany, or those in administrative positions with added work demands due to the new migration. Similar contradictions structure the field of sexuality and eroticism: if the refugees become successfully integrated, i.e. culturally assimilated enough, they risk becoming real competition for Germans as attractive erotic alternatives. Again, resentment will be the outcome among those who feel they are left behind.

Also contained within the concept legal security itself is an ambiguity: While the law may invoke associations with the father and the state, with male domains of the father and the executive, security invokes the maternal order. We were confronted with this ambiguity in a poster held up by a man in a demonstration in Leipzig that read *Mutti zerstört Vater's Land* (Mommy destroys Father's Land). Merkel is of course the mommy who destroys. *Vater's Land* is an unusual locution. The two words are nearly always combined into a compound noun, *Vaterland*, to designate the land of one's roots or allegiance (fatherland). It has been deployed ideologically to designate why one fights wars, to defend the *Vaterland* against other people, political enemies. *Vater's Land* appeals to an even older, pre-national use, *väterliches Grundstück* (paternal property), which emphasized aspects of patrimony, possession, and inheritance in land.

Until recently, "*Mutti*" (mommy) has been a common everyday address Germans have used for Merkel, who as Chancellor brings together in one person the maternal and paternal. It is the mother, who first, as Melanie Klein analyzed, "not only stilled the pangs of hunger, but also satisfied our emotional needs and relieved anxiety" (1937: 337). Chancellor Merkel is pulled in both directions, of father and mother, as she must encompass both registers: executor of the law and creator of a holding environment that provides for security and basic needs. How the feeling of legal security develops out of encounters is key to the creation of a new sense of solidarity

and sociality. Ultimately, the feeling of security does not grow out of rights alone, but out of feeling that one is being cared for and free from arbitrary arrest, torture, social rejection, and deportation.

Conclusion

To return again to our starting point, the refugee flow results largely from the disintegration of imperial political systems in the Middle East and the inability of the authoritarian systems that replaced them to generate stable legal orders and good enough holding environments. Once the migrants land in Europe, however, their presence produces a crisis less political in its origin than personal and intimate, with challenging erotic expectations in emotional exchanges. These exchanges may provoke culturally identified Germans to turn away from democratic openness to an authoritarian defense of a posited *Volk* community raising the specter of the *völkisch* Germany of Parvis' grandparent's generation. As for Syrians, while their attachment to democracy may be weak, especially given the frustrating experience of lost revolution and lost country, their new experiences of "group feeling" through interactions with Germans may lead to modifications which will occur especially through intimate dynamics in the romantic and erotic domain.

Experiences in cross-cultural encounters involving erotic conflict, such as in the Cologne attack, either intensify or modify public moods. As such, they are indexical of the direction of change, of whether Germany continues to strive to be an open and caring society acting in the name of humanitarian feeling or takes a hard turn to the right.

Notes

1. My (Parvis's) mother is a *Kriegskind,* a war child, born unwanted in 1940 in the midst of one of the most devastating wars the world has ever seen. It was her generation that, as they grew up in post-war Germany, developed a broken relationship with their parent's generation, the *Kriegsgeneration.* I am, in turn, a *Mauerkind,* a child who grew up enclosed by the Berlin Wall, one of the consequences of WWII. The relation of generations was pregnant with suspicion and the question, where were *you* in all of this? It concerns the role of parents, the question whether they were active participants in what was now called an *Unrechtsregime* (a regime of injustice) or just silently playing along with racist policies, persecution, catastrophic nationalism, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. In post-war Germany, since the Nazi regime had been defeated and since many of its crimes became openly articulated, a position of passive bystander in the years 1933-1945 was not considered something innocent. My mother's generation, in turn, is blessed with the "grace of late birth" ("*die Gnade*

der späten Geburt") as we say in German. Being only a child by the end of the WWII, she was too young to be held accountable for the various crimes of Nazi rule.

2. Only a unified Europe can collectively tackle a refugee problem of this magnitude, decide on measures in order to help end the civil war in Syria, offer another political center of gravity, one that could effectively rival the United States or Russia and generally develop an alternative voice. Germany is not only one of the largest countries in Europe. It also has the continent's most powerful economy and is its most populated country (only Turkey draws close in population numbers, but Turkey is not formally part of Europe). Germany's dominance in many European affairs must be understood as the backdrop to many implicit inner-European resentments and conflicts. On the international stage, Germany is too small a country to be relevant as world power, unlike say India or Russia. And yet Germany is too dominant in Europe to remain a passive player following the lead of either France or Britain. Cold War structures, including the division of Germany into two separate and opposed states, as well as vigorous European integration of reunified Germany after 1990, were intended to constrain and limit Germany's authority by binding it to a unified Europe once and for all. These parameters have now largely become unhinged and even irrelevant to the resolution of the three current crises mentioned. And yet, they demand a decisive and consequential response by Germany.

3. The German government of Angela Merkel calls the wave of refugees a problem, "*Flüchtlingsproblem,"* while those opposed to Merkel, including from within her own party, insist it is a crisis, "*Flüchtlingskrise."*

4. My (John's) argument is that the sectarian and political affiliation on which Syrian President Asad based his rule demanded of local patriarchs an abdication of much of their power, creating a certain distance, from if not disrespect, among many sons of their father's powerlessness. The "fathers" had been rendered ineffective leaving the sons to fend for themselves (Borneman 2007).

5. Most anthropologists of the Middle East were, and still are, uninterested or at least skeptical of this link, focusing instead on colonial histories, transnational media, and the status and location of women. I (John) framed my research proposals at the time around the transformation of the concept of 'asabiyya," variously translated as "clan-ism" or "group feeling." Initially developed by the 14th century Arab historian and polymath, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), asabiyya was later taken up by the eminent historian Albert Hourani, who offered this concise definition: "[A] corporate spirit oriented towards obtaining and keeping power." This concept of "corporate spirit" enabled me to think through the relation of the state to kinship (an argument also recently revisited by Malise Ruthven. How to Understand ISIS, NYRB, June 23, 2016).

6. Perhaps the first scholarly exploration of such erotic conflict and violence in Germany is that published in 1983 by the German anthropologist Werner Schiffauer, of 13 Turkish youth and one adult who in 1978 had raped an 18-year-old German girl. Schiffauer, who had worked as a social worker with four of the young men and hence knew them quite well, interprets the rape as a product of misunderstandings stemming from cultural differences—Turkish/German and village/city.

7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8L2J47dFbc.

8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk1HEf9Ksge.

9. "BKA-Chef warnt vor neuer Qualität der Gewalt gegen Flüchtlinge," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 May, 2016. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kriminalitaet-bka-chef-warnt-vor-neuer-qualitaet-der-gewalt-gegen-fluechtlinge-1.2994370.

10. http://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/2016-06/koeln-silvester-lehren-polizei-gewalt.

11. The spectre of Islam—and assumptions of essential differences between Muslim and Christian conceptions of sexuality—in these erotic conflicts is difficult to ignore, even though Islam is publicly addressed only by the more rightwing elements of the German public and political party spectrum. German lawmakers unanimously approved legislation in 2016 that would make it easier to prosecute suspects of sexual violence and that defines rape as the violation of a women's will under the principle of "no means no." After the vote in Parliament, neinheisstnein, (no means no) topped the list of Twitter trends in Germany, with many people welcoming the law as a significant improvement. This change is defended as a part of the right of sexual self-determination, a concept that has been expanded around the rights of prostitutes to determine how they use their bodies, to same-sex sexuality, married women's rights vis-à-vis their husbands, and children's rights to be free from sexual advances by adults (see Borneman, Cruel Attachments, 2015).

12. There is a great deal of self-criticism by the press on its reporting about the refugee crisis. See, for example, Susanne Glass on ARD TV (https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/zapp-105.html).

13. After all, Germany is located right at the center of continental Europe and has thus since millennia been affected by large migration movements from within and without.

14. Spiegel Online, Samstag, 16.10.2010; http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html, accessed September 16, 2016.

15. What was used against the GDR (East German) state is now used against the refugees and the united German state.

16. Memories of events of unification provide resonant associations for comparisons to the present. What framing of refugees is done by the concept "Willkommenskultur" was for East Germans who came West from the building of the Wall through 1989 framed by the concept "Begrüssungsgeld" (100 deutsche mark given to East Germans in their first entrance into West Germany before after 1989). East Germans ultimately paid for the generosity of West Germany/West Berlin to those in the East by giving up their country of origin (GDR) in return for participation in an enlarged (West German) Federal Republic. But for the current refugees, one dominant expectation is that they will preserve their cultural origins and at the same time "integrate" into the German cultural landscape. Also, Angela Merkel's sudden explicit decision (she had little actual choice) to waive the border controls and admit all the refugees making their way up through Greece was mirrored in 1989 by a decision at the border that was accidental, not coming from the head of state. In November, 1989, Günter Schabowski's error in reading an administrative decree opening the Wall, admitting GDR citizens into West Germany without visas, also legalized a flood of internal migrants. In that case, Helmut Kohl marshaled West German business and government to help integrate the former GDR and its people, which was then made easier by the corporate opportunities available in the East, the property to be privatized, and the academic and political jobs

awaiting a tier of West Germans who were blocked by over-qualifications in the West German system. The Solidaritätsbeitrag (a form of solidarity tax) that Westerners pay to the East still exists today, though in reduced amount, 15 years after unification, as does the resentment of many of those in the East for poorer pay and lack of or equal employment opportunities.

17. Solidarity with the new migrants and refugees is often tied to feelings of the need to make reparation for past guilt. The unstable dynamics of counter-transference in demands to repair can easily turn into its inverse: a demand for compensation. Take, for example, the reaction of the German speed skater, Claudia Pechstein, winner of five Olympic medals, to the rejection of her legal appeal for compensation for damages suffered because of what she claimed was an unjust suspension by the IOC from competition. She claimed, "Every refugee who enters Germany and is registered enjoys legal protection. But not we athletes." ("*Jeder Flüchtling, der in Deutschland einreist und registriert wird, genießt Rechtsschutz. Aber wir Sportler.*") The court had found her complaint inadmissible as she had been suspended because of doping. In a pointed response to Pechstein, the German-Turkish journalist Mely Kiyak (2016) commented, "There is no court in this world that is responsible for the rights of refugees. They have no lobby, no speaker, they do not have a million member associations backing them but only ailing homelands. What is there to be envious of the refugees?" (*Es gibt kein Gericht dieser Welt, das sich zuständig fühlt für die Rechte von Flüchtlingen. Sie haben keine Lobby, keine Sprecher, sie haben keinen Millionenverbände im Rücken, sondern nur marode Heimatstaaten. Was neidet sie den Flüchtlingen?*). See Becker (2016).

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