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The Politics of Asiatic Despotism:
Tyranny, Despotism and Asiatic Despotism in Ancient Greece

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I

The most enduring legacy of the Greek period to the Western understanding of the non-Western world is the notion of Asiatic despotism. It would not be an exaggeration to say that since classical antiquity the Western understanding of the non-Western world, with minor aberrations, has entirely been coloured by this single notion. One would also be entirely justified in saying that the notion of Asiatic despotism from the very beginning has had definite pejorative and ideological connotations attached to it.[1] In fact the use of the term 'politics' itself contained a bias. Politics, a derivative from *polis,* was closely related to its activities. But the word *politicus,* as used by Aristotle, by the thirteenth century acquired a meaning totally alien to its original intended meaning.[2] All political experience that did not conform to the *polis* model was seen as alien, and thus discredited.

Further, there is a tendency among scholars to explain away the emergence of the notion of Asiatic despotism during the Greek period to the Greek sense of cultural superiority, especially heightened during the fourth and fifth centuries. This belief has led to the linking of the development of the notion of Asiatic despotism to the division of the world by the Greeks into polarities of Greeks and barbarians.[3] It is only after the third century B.C. that one encounters the systematic development of a body of thought which can be termed universalist. The best example of this was Alexander's interpretation of the term *Homonoia,* which meant unity or concord, as also the absence of faction fights.[4]

The Greeks shaped the notion of Asiatic despotism into one comprising of vastly sophisticated variables and explanatory tools. So comprehensive was the notion that it was limited not merely to a description of certain non-Greek ways of governance: the notion was indicative of a totality, an entire world-view. It alluded to a total way of life that was said to have inherent deficiencies. The despotic nature of

governance of non-Greek polities was seen as a visible malignancy, hiding under it deep-rooted maladies. In so far as the countries of Western Europe have claimed to be heir to the classical tradition, the inheritance of the notion of Asiatic despotism (in the modern form of Oriental despotism) from the classical period has been total and almost uncritical.

A number of questions emerge from the above observations. One could begin by asking whether models of non-Greek ways of governance were genuinely despotic? If they were so, what standard was applied to determine their despotic nature? Moreover, was enough known of non-Greek models of ruling for such a conclusion to be reached? Further, if Asiatic countries were not despotic, what factors led to the development of such a comprehensive notion? Can the development of this notion merely be seen as a result of recognition of basic differences between Greek and non-Greek ways of life? If these differences were rather to be seen as different sets of social and political priorities, why did they take on such a virulent ideological colour?

In attempting to answer some of the questions raised above, it would be instructive to, first, consider the history of ideas which gave rise to the notion of Asiatic despotism. Secondly, it would be valuable to consider whether Greek history illuminates the reasons for the development of this concept, and the explanatory tools that supported it.

II

Reference to Asiatic forms of governance and Asiatic rulers as despotic (especially Persian rulers) in the works of Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) cannot be seen as isolated utterances devoid of any significance beyond the stated one. In fact, a discussion of despotism is integral to their philosophy. It is part of a larger enterprise of thinking about politics, which was for Plato and Aristotle a prime concern for the moral philosopher. Plato's works are suggestive at various levels. In works such as *Republic, Gorgias,* and *The Laws* he is concerned with justice and injustice, the nature and characteristics of the ideally just state, various existing forms of government and constitutions and their imperfections. At the same time works like *Republic* and *The Laws* are works of metaphysics, containing Plato's exposition of the metaphysical theory of Forms or archetypal Ideas (In Plato the metaphysical reinforces the political arguments in a major way, as shall be seen subsequently). Aristotle in

his *Politics* elaborates his vision of the nature and functions of the state, types of constitutions and the study of both superior and inferior forms of government, the nature of citizenship and so on.

What is extremely striking is that not only were Plato and Aristotle able to show a way of systematic thinking about Greek politics, but also put forth a very influential vocabulary of politics that remains a constant reference point till this day. One finds in their work a detailed evaluation of ideas such as democracy, kingship, oligarchy, despotism, tyranny, constitution, citizenship, slavery and justice among others.

Their thought, however, contains a paradox. It has already been noted that any discussion of despotism and tyranny is integral to the overall philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. After all, both had to contend with and explain the Age of Tyrants. This becomes imperative in the light of the fact that Greece was plagued by social and political anarchy for hundreds of years (except for the Age of Pericles, and the period of the Athenian Empire which saw some experiments in democracy). The rule of the day was monarchy, politely known as kingship, and when it showed lawless and violently irregular character, it was known as tyranny. Despotism and tyranny can thus be considered as essential constituents of what one might call Greek self-understanding. If this is true, why did Plato and Aristotle create the bias in distancing Greek political thought and political experience from despotism and tyranny by stereotyping Persians and all other Asiatics as essentially despotic? It would be worthwhile considering the nature of the Greek tyrant, and the features of the Age of Tyrants.

Greek history illustrates a long and rich tradition of thought and actual experiments with the institution of monarchy. Early Greek civilization was marked by the rule of an oligarchy. Homeric Greece in fact had, to use Henry Sidgwick's phrase, 'a decidedly more monarchical aspect'.[5] Certain features of early Greek monarchies need to be spelt out. The king ruled with the help of the richest and the strongest, who helped to constitute the armed forces of the clan. The king himself was no god, but traced his lineage to a heavenly descended family.[6] Though he did not 'own' his subjects, power was exercised as a factor of the king being strong, ready-witted, intelligent and better armed.

As one moves away from the Homeric period, Sparta (from 8th to 6th B.C.) provided an illustration of a social organization geared solely for the purpose of increasing the military might of the country. This demanded absolute subordination of the individual to the state, and

conversion of the entire population (except slaves) into a standing army. It would suffice to say that between 800 B.C. and 600 B.C., in Sparta as well as in Athens and Attica, constitution or democracy were not a feature of the prevailing trends in politics.

What characterizes the period between 800-600 B.C. is its unique place in Greek history as an age of revolution and tyranny. Any study of Asiatic despotism would be inadequate without a discussion of the Age of Tyrants.

The Age of Tyrants was marked by the appearance of tyrants or judges (*aesymnetae*) in certain specific areas of Greece.[7] These areas comprised the most progressive cities, which flourished as important commercial centres. They were ruled by an old oligarchy (politely called aristocracy, or rule of the best) of birth and landed possessions. Since these were centres of considerable commercial affluence, the growth of a middle class was a natural consequence. Growth of new wealth outside the closed group of a few families heralded the use of a new aristocracy of commerce and industry, demanding among other things full citizenship.

A large mass of population, however, had a very low standard of living. Small cultivators were oppressed by men of wealth. These cultivators had no political rights; common rights on land were frequently violated. There were no written laws, and a general mistrust of unwritten laws prevailed. The ruling oligarchy did nothing to improve their lot. Any demand to bring about reforms was met by stout opposition from the old aristocracy.

The common people had the force of numbers on their side, but lacked an organization that could articulate their common grievances and interests. The tyrant arose mostly as a result of *a coup d'etat*; they, indeed, were creatures of circumstance. The tyrant found support among the lower classes, as well as the middle class.

Once the tyrant acquired power, his repressive methods were directed primarily towards the rich. Condemnation of tyrants came largely from articulate and traditionally aristocratic parts of the populace.[8] Aristotle describes the rise of the tyrant as a transition from demagogue to *tyrannus*.

The tyrant favoured commerce and industry. In order to do so, tyrants often went to war to acquire trade routes and markets (Cypselidae of Corinth secured an important trade route towards the West). They built public works and brought water to the towns (like the building by the Pisistratids of the Olympian Zeus at Athens), built magnificent temples, and were patrons of art and literature. They also honoured people by instituting festivals and games, and strove to

provide employment to the labouring classes to whom they owed their power. Under a tyrant, people were relatively free, but knew that the use of their freedom was at the discretion of the tyrant.[9]

An example of a tyrant is Pisistratus, who seized power in Athens from Solon (who was a lawgiver and reconciler) in 561-560 B.C. Except for a brief period in exile, he ruled till 528 B.C., when he bequeathed his power to his sons who ruled for 18 years. His rule was stable and peaceful, a rare achievement in the turbulent history of Greece during that period. What is much more significant about Pisistratus is the fact that he did not weaken or destroy any of the democratic conventions and institutions Solon had laid: his power was a mere superstructure on the top of Solon's constitution.[10] He left Athens as a stable and prosperous power.

This brief treatment of the features of the Age of Tyrants raises a few important questions. First, if tyranny was so intrinsic to the Greek experience, why were Plato and Aristotle so critical and dismissive about it? The tyrants did not deserve the contempt they were held in, and this distorted picture of their rule can be attributed to later Greek historians. Secondly, it is evident that the tyrants were progressive and provided for stable rule. Why then do we not find a single theoretical defence of *Tyrannus* in Greece? Finally, the rule of tyrants in Greece did not cease after 600 B.C. One discerns a second phase of *tyrannis.* This was a result of faction fighting and bad government, which weakened the attachment to experiments in constitutional government. This phase begins soon after 400 B.C., and unlike the earlier period of the rule of tyrants did not come about as a result of a demagogue staging a successful *coup d'etat.* This was, rather, a result of the development of the mercenary system. In other words, one cannot see the existence of tyranny and despotic rule in ancient Greece as an aberration. Why, then, did Plato and Aristotle project the Persians and Asiatics as essentially despotic?

A detailed analysis of the political ideas of Plato and Aristotle might help in answering some of the questions raised above.

Plato begins his examination of despotism[11] by asking the question: 'How does despotism arise?' He is in no doubt as to what the answer to the question is. Despotism, according to him, arises out of democracy. Just as an oligarchy is ruined for its excessive craving for money-making, democracy comes to grief for its excessive quest for liberty. It is when the impulse for liberty becomes devoid of any checks and controls, then it turns into despotism.

Plato goes on to explain the process by which the transition from democracy to despotism takes place. The excess of liberty in

democracy is accompanied by a corresponding quest for equality. This leads to steady obfuscation of all distinctions and differentiations. Plato calls this 'the infection of anarchy'.[12] It leads to a situation where the distinction between rulers and ruled disappears – indeed, rulers behave like subjects, and subjects refuse to see the authority of any master. This infection of anarchy is not limited to the ruling classes or the citizens, but permeates the family and the slaves. All this vitiates the very nature of a proper state. The consequence of this surfeit of liberty tends to make citizens resent any form of authority. To them, any form of force applied is 'intolerable tyranny'; there is among such citizens an utter disregard for all forms of law.

Plato takes the example of bees to illustrate the rise of a despot. There are in every state a set of idle spendthrifts. The bolder ones among these show the way to less bold, but suppliant elements. These idlers create disorder, and the spirit of democracy provides a very fertile ground for them to flourish. A good polity, suggests Plato, must contain or eliminate these idlers: it is they who organize and throw up leaders. The sole aim of these elements is to deprive the rich of their money. The idlers or drones extract wealth in the name of the people – these 'people' are the most powerful class in a democracy if properly organised. These comprise the peasantry. They are poor, and have no particular interest in politics.

The drones, Plato further continues, plunder the rich: indeed, the rich are branded as the victimizers. They are charged for plotting against the people – they are termed reactionary oligarchs. The people put forward a leader who champions the interests of the people. He is nursed to heights of great glory by the people. This, according to Plato, is the mainspring of despotism.

Plato next poses the question as to how the champion of the people turns into a despot? Once the leader comes to control the mob, he turns his rule into a mixture of populism, arbitrariness, and complete lawlessness. On the one hand, he promises to cancel debts and redistribute wealth; on the other hand, he unleashes a reign of terror against his enemies, sending them into exile or even death. In course of time he graduates from being the protector of the people to their absolute master. He is 'transformed from a human being into a wolf'.[13]

A despot essentially is populist. But behind the facade of populism lurks a tendency to possess absolute power. Plato sees a number of distinctive features which characterise the rule of despot. He, most importantly, is perpetually in need of enemies: it is this factor which makes him wanted by the people by posing as their protector. He

invents new enemies – he goes to war with invented enemies. Wars serve two important functions for the despot. He succeeds in eliminating his internal enemies in the name of their being threat to the preservation of the city. The high cost of war impoverishes people, who are then capable of mere survival. This prevents people from plotting against him.

It is imperative for a despot, observes Plato, to eliminate all possible challenges to his absolute power. For the sake of this, he needs to get rid of all his friends and enemies. Anyone courageous or intelligent or rich is purged from the city. In order to ensure his survival, a despot raises a bodyguard. This is done by recruiting mercenaries, and by freeing slaves who then are enrolled as his bodyguard. It is these bodyguard who are his most faithful followers. The despot is at this stage capable of violence against the people who had created him. His only friends are his bodyguard – 'this band of new-made citizens' as Plato derisively calls them: it is for Plato 'the tyranny of slaves'.[14] Plato is of the view that the only way to make onself immune to injury is to make friends with the despot.[15] This also entails sharing his standards, along with a readiness to obey his authority in an absolute sense.

The personal character of a despot is detailed by Plato. A despot is likened by Plato to be in a dreamlike state. He is a captive of unnecessary pleasures and desires. The gentler parts of his soul and reason are dormant, and he is plagued by appetites. Such a man possesses the sort of frenzy and madness that is devoid of reason and makes him ideal for being an absolute ruler. In order to satisfy his appetites, a despotic man is capable of going to any extent – he can kill his parents, rob, and abandon tradition. The despot is a parricide: he enslaves his 'fatherland' in a similar fashion as he orders his parents. He sees no limits. His rule is one of 'lawless disrule'.

A despot, Plato feels, fails three tests of well-being. He fails to provide freedom, wealth, and security from fear. A city is most miserable under a despot. It is the happiest under a king, a true king being one who is also king over himself.[16]

Elsewhere, Plato posits the notion of two mother constitutions.[17] These constitutions he identifies as monarchy and democracy. He feels that any political system if it were to enjoy freedom and friendship along with good judgement must combine the elements of both the mother constitutions. In the course of discussing the two mother constitutions, Plato takes Persian monarchy and Athenian democracy as examples. He brands the Persian monarchy as authoritarian in the highest degree, and Athens as representing an

extreme of liberty. It is for the Persians he reserves his most severe indictment.

The Persians, Plato states, had managed a judicious blend of liberty and subjection under Cyrus. However, after Cyrus Persian degeneration began to set in. This was because of the loss of partiarchal education to Cyrus's sons, who were educated by women and eunuchs. This was, to Plato, the beginning of Persian misrule. The Persians turned authoritarian and deprived people of their liberty. Corruption increased and the rulers ruled only for the fulfilment of their personal interests. These rulers ruled by terror: they were capable of an aggressive policy against friendly nations and did not hesitate in ruining their cities. This they did for small profit. They were universally hated. In spite of the numerical strength of their army, they inspired no loyalty and confidence. It is no great achievement to possess authority over people, Plato observes, if rulers are not men of goodwill. Goodwill can be generated only by making the citizens as good as possible.[18]

The Persians according to Plato had failed to create goodwill. Their rule was marked by greed and the quest for self-preservation. What went as a description of the authoritarian rule of the Persians was also true of all Asiatics. Plato is clear about what fate they will meet:

> So when the dead reach the judgement-seat, in the case of Asiatics the judgment seat of Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus summons them before him and inspects each man's soul, without knowing to whom it belongs. Often, when it is the king of Persia or some other monarch or potentate that he has to deal with, he finds that there is no soundness in the soul whatever; it is a mass of weals and scars imprinted on it by the various acts of perjury and wrongdoing of which the man has been guilty: it is twisted and warped by lies and vanity and quite out of the straight because truth has had no part in its development. Power, luxury, pride, and debauchery have left it so full of disproportion and ugliness that when he has inspected it Rhadamanthus despatches it in ignominy straight to prison, where on its arrival it will undergo the appropriate treatment.[19]

The Persians and the Asiatics were, then, devoid of soundness of the soul. It was a soul infected with lies and wrongdoing. The governing principles of all Persian and Asiatic rule were power, luxury, pride and debauchery. Plato's characterization of Asiatic rule in this manner was influential not only during his own time, but

would haunt the vocabulary of politics in the West for a long time in one form or the other, almost to the present day.

At this point a number of observations are in order. First, it is true that many Greek city-states had seen remarkable experiments in democracy. The Age of Pericles stands out as an outstanding example of such an attempt at a democratic constitution. During this period Athens was a democracy internally, but was also an empire. It can be said without any exaggeration that it is a slight misnomer to speak of 'democracy' during the 4th and 5th centuries. Democracy in one city-state differed from democracy in another. Athens itself was a moderate version of democracy. Indeed, many historians blame its democratic experiment to be the reason for her fall and failure in its struggle against Sparta.[20]

Plato's childhood and youth were spent under the shadow of the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. His attitude towards democracy in this context is understandable. Also understandable is his attitude towards monarchy. Plato himself came up with a version of the kingly statesman as an alternative to both monarchical extremism and democratic anarchy. In order to understand Plato's preference for kingship, one has only to look at the history of monarchy in ancient Greece from Homeric times to the period when the large empires found monarchy to be the only bearable form of government. The existence and relative popularity of monarchy in ancient Greece was historically evident. What makes the study of monarchy much more rewarding is the fact that the Greeks had a considerable tradition of thought about kingship.

Views about kingship were expressed by Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) Xenophon (428-354 B.C.), and most importantly by Pythagorean philosophers such as Diotogenes and Archetas of Tarentum. An important notion that emerges from these writings is that of the king as *soter* or saviour. This image of the king is echoed in Plato's description of the king as a shepherd tending his flock. The notion of *soter* is infused with another notion, *euergetes* or benefactor. In order to be saviour and benefactor, a king had to be capable of inspiring dread, swift in punishing the wicked, coupled with experience and skill in ruling.[21] It is worth noting that Xenophon attributes Plato's description of the king as a shepherd to Persian traditions. Aristotle, too, borrows the Persian image of the king as 'king-bee'.[22]

Another image of the king to emerge during this period is that of the king as 'living law' (*nomos empsychos, lex animata*). Living law was a notion that marked its difference from written laws. Such laws as

enshrined in a constitution can be disobeyed or at least disregarded. Further, they may be inadequate in dealing with changing circumstances. The king as animate law can make an exception to the existing laws. In order to be animate law, the king had to have divine and sacred mentality. He imitated the way God ruled the universe. He was not only judge, but also priest, who mediated with God. It is this divine side of the king that prevented him from turning into a tyrant. He had to be a lawful ruler. He was to rule for the benefit of his subjects and act as the human exponent of the natural law inherent in the perfect cosmic order.[23] This notion of divine kingship was not restricted to Greek notions of kingship alone, but the pharaohs too were restricted from arbitrary rule because of their divine status.[24] This notion was encapsulated in the Persian image of the king as 'hedged by a luminous solar divinity'. It would suffice to say that the existence of democratic institutions of the *polis* with kingly protection was not uncommon in ancient Egypt and Persia as it was common in ancient Greece.

Secondly, it seems that Plato's diatribe against the Persians seems to arise from a far too common attitude that the Greeks exhibited against foreigners and enemies. The Persian Wars (548 B.C.) led to the conquering of the Anatolian Greeks by the Persians. However, the Persians, in spite of the conquest, made little change in the life of the cities. They demanded a certain amount of revenue, as also requests to provide soldiers and ships to help in the wars with Babylon and Egypt.[25] They supported tyrants at times. The destruction of Ionia and the burning of Miletus was more due to local causes; the southern and northern Anatolian Greeks overrated their own power and underrated the strength of the Persians.[26] The perception of the Persians was not helped by the razing to the ground of Athens by Xerexes's army in 480 BC. At the time of the end of the Peloponnesian War, in the face of much weakened Athens and Sparta, the Persians remained wealthy and powerful. In fact, the Greek cities of Asia Minor welcomed Persian rule (386 B.C.) since the Persians restored freedom to all Greek communities. When the whole of Greece was facing social and political anarchy during the middle of fourth century Persia was still a mighty empire.

III

Having seen this far Plato's description of despotism – its causes, characteristics, and consequences, a number of questions must be asked. One, did Plato have a theory of despotism integral to his

overall philosophy? If he did, does his theory of despotism support his ordinary claim of the despotic character of Asiatic regimes and the slavish character of Asiatic people? Finally, does he provide a political solution for despotism?

All our problems, Plato believes, stem from the fact that we recognise 'a world of mortality and perpetual change' to be representative of reality.[27] Consequently, we are bereft of an insight into a world that is unchanging and immortal. To Plato, a more lucid perception of reality cannot ever be merely human. It had to be more than human, the product of a 'godlike wisdom'. The bodily envelope of man is merely appearance. Most men have an excessive attachment to their bodies. This also gives rise to a misguided identification with the body, and its separateness with other bodies. This, according to Plato, is a serious barrier to a clearer cognisance of reality. In turn he proposes a soul-based theory of personal identity.[28]

If human bodies are merely appearance, then the real man is within this envelope of flesh and bones. This is the rational element within the human soul. Throughout the *Republic,* Plato is at pains to stress the supreme importance of this precious, but precarious element. He establishes at the outset that, 'it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul'.[29] To him justice – true justice – is a matter of the inward self. A just man ensures that each element of his soul is in its proper place and role. The maintenance of a natural hierarchy of the soul is imperative. The most serious threat to the ruling principle – in this case reason – are appetities. They form the greatest part of the human soul and are by nature 'insatiably covetous'.[30] In most men reason is the weakest part of the soul and appetites the strongest. 'Is it not simply when the highest thing in a man's nature is naturally so weak that it cannot control the animal parts but can only learn how to pamper them?'[31]

Appetites render a man incapable of governing his own life, keeping adequate control over his rational plans and preventing *akrasia.* Freedom from appetites is like gaining liberty from the rule of many mad masters.

If men identify with their bodies, then distinction of what is 'mine' and what is not 'mine' is inevitable. Further they are at most times driven by appetites. It is only the philosophers who establish control over their appetitive parts, and establish the supremacy of reason. If the drive of appetites can render rational control futile in an individual they are a positive hindrance to the unity of the city. To bring this unity about, men must cease to plan their own lives. Plato

feels that the traditional notion of a city comprising of self-aware and independent individuals, men as choosers of their activities, is a false one. This is so because the separateness so established is based not on a recognition of the unreality of appearances, but on an affirmation of this-wordly plurality.[32] Thus for living truly good and happy lives, plurality must give way to unity. A genuine unity would be based on the recognition of the need to rectify the lack of reason in most men.

Most political arrangements, Plato feels, fail to secure the desirable good of rational order. Democracy fosters unbridled freedom converting its citizens into slaves of their appetites. The inner state of a tyrant is that of the most wretched slave. He sees no law or custom and is the very personification of arbitrariness. Appetites run rampant in his soul, enslaving the rational part of his soul. In all other political systems, at least a small part of the appetites is constrained by obeying laws and rules. A tyrant sees no authority, save that of his appetites: he is to Plato the most authentic slave.

What then, according to Plato, is the solution that will make good the lack of reason in most men and bring about real unity based on the good life of rational control?

> Then, if we say that people of this sort ought to be subject to the highest type of man, we intend that the subject should be governed, not, as Thrasymachus thought, to his own detriment, but on the same principle as his superior, who is himself governed by the divine element within him. It is better for everyone, we believe, to be subject to a power of godlike wisdom residing within himself, or, failing that, imposed from without, in order that all of us, being under one guidance, may be so far as possible equal and united.[33]

The solution is a well ordered city. It is a solution where 'the desires of the inferior multitude will be controlled by the desires and wisdom of the superior few'.[34] The good life will be specified by the philosphers. In the ideal city non-philosophers will have no political role to play. The lack of reason is rectified by an external imparting of it by philosophers: rulers have no direct access to parts of the human soul where appetites predominate, and hence the only solution is to interfere in a man's rational life and plan.[35]

If such a rational order is imposed from without, what is the status of the citizen in Plato's ideal city? Once the basis for imparting this external reason is established, the citizen becomes a slave to this reason. He cannot do anything according to his volition. Everything from the idea of the good life to the way it is to be lived is dictated by

philosophers. He merely obeys laws and commands. The best alternative for most men is to identify themselves with the rational best in the city. All laws and other institutions of government will be the concern of the rulers alone. Indeed, Plato's ideal city not only precludes any measure of autonomous citizen participation, it totally obliterates the distinction between the public and private spheres, Everything in the city is geared towards making sure that the ideal city would be able to achieve the radical unity Plato envisages for it; education and communism are indispensable tools facilitating unity.

Is Plato capable, in the end, of providing an antidote to despotism? First, Plato reduces the notion of despotism to a universal psychological category – a state of the human soul. Moreover, his solution has nothing to do with politics. He categorically rejects all common human activities, for they do not possess any intrinsic value. An important point that emerges from his notion of the ideal city is the fact that whenever appetites take supreme control over a soul, despotism was the result. The tyranny of appetites at its maximum produced tyrants. Inspite of branding Persians and Asiatics as particularly susceptible to despotic tendencies, despotism emerges as a universal category in his political philosophy. Lastly, inspite of the claim that the life of a philosopher was 729 times better than that of a tyrant (which to him was the worst life), one is left to wonder at his alternative to a city-state governed by philosophers as absolute rulers.

Aristotle sees tyranny to be a type of sole rule. He considers tyranny to be a deviant form of monarchical rule.[36] He uses the notions, 'tyranny' and 'despotism' almost identically, and at time even interchangeably. In Book III of *Politics*, he makes the relationship between monarchy, tyranny and despotism explicitly clear: 'Tyranny as has been said, is that form of monarchical rule which is despotically exercised over the political association called the state.'[37]

A king, then, rules according to law and over willing subjects. This is different from that rule which is exercised according to the decisions of the sole ruler. This form of rule is found in non-Greek kingships. This rule is that of a master over slave. It is for this reason that such non-Greek kingships can be called tyrannies. They, however, differ from tyranny proper in many ways. They are legally established and hereditary; the ruler keeps a royal bodyguard comprising of citizens, unlike a tyrant's bodyguard which is made up of foreign mercenaries.[38]

What then are the reasons for the existence of the second form of monarchical rule – the rule of master over slaves – among non-Greek kingships? These non-Greek tyrannies exist because barbarians were

'by natural character more slavish than the Greeks', and hence tolerated despotic rule without any resentment.[39] Among these non-Greeks, Asiatics were more slavish than the Europeans. Aristotle returns to this theme again in Book VII, Chap. 7. The argument of barbarians in general, and Asiatics in particular, being naturally slavish, and hence prone to despotic rule is again emphasised:

> The races that live in cold regions and those of Europe are full of courage and passion but somewhat lacking in skill and brain-power; for this reason, while remaining generally independent, they lack political cohesion and the ability to rule over others. On the other hand the Asiatic races have both brains and skill but are lacking in courage and will-power; so they have remained enslaved and subject.[40]

The stability, then, of non-Greek kingships is not solely due to their legality or hereditary character: they were stable because they were lacking in courage and will-power, and hence the subjects were naturally submissive.

Aristotle identifies another form of deviant rule which could be termed as the most extreme form of tyranny. It differs even from the despotic rule of barbarian kingdoms in its extremity. This rule is characterized by the fact that the sole ruler was not responsible to anyone. He ruled over equals and superiors alike; no natural distinctions and hierarchy was observed by this ruler. This rule was marked by an individual's pursuit of self-interest without being responsible to his subject's welfare in any way.[41] Free men do not willingly submit to such a rule.

What seems to distinguish non-Greek tyrannies from tyranny proper is their legality. Aristotle however points to the evidence that though tyranny might be pathological to Greeks, there were elected tyrants among 'Greeks of old' called *aesymnetes*.[42] There was one feature, however, of both despotism and tyranny that made both notions indistinguishable. They exemplify master and slave type of rule. The reasons Aristotle gives for the existence and characteristics of tyrannies are very much the same as that of Plato, both drawing upon concrete historical experience. Hence, a short summary of Aristotle's views on it will suffice.

A tyrant springs from a mob. He can also be thrown up by oligarchies. From oligarchies he derives, one, the notion that wealth is a desirable end to pursue – it is also essential for him in order to maintain his bodyguard and an ostentatious way of life.[43] Secondly, as in oligarchies, he mistrusts people and treats the lower classes badly.

He derives hostility towards the upper classes from the democratic tradition.

In order to preserve their rule and power, tyrants undertake what Aristotle terms as administrative measures. He cites the use of these measures by Greek as well as Persian and other foreign monarchies. These administrative measures can be encapsulated in the form of three principles: tyrannies disallow their subjects to possess independent views, they make them powerless, concentrating all power in the hands of a sole ruler, and lastly, sap the confidence of the people as to make them totally subservient to the despot/tyrant and his arbitrary will.

Consequently, the tyrant dispenses of all men with any intelligence. He has an intense dislike of intellectuals, for they pose a threat to his rule. Further, a tyrant has no use of public forums of any kind, such as clubs of social and cultural activities. These are dangerous for they breed independence and self-confidence in the participants. Education too is discouraged.

A tyrant survives on a network of spies. He makes public the secrets of people. Free speech is scarce; he effectively destroys any notion of privacy. This is done to generate a constant sense of obligation towards the tyrant (this is especially so in the case of Persians).[44] A web of constant intrigue and dissension among the people ensures his survival. To survive, people also must be kept perpetually poor and at work. This is done through taxes and making wars. In this he gives the examples of the pyramids of Egypt, the offerings made by the Cypselids, and the building of the temple of Zeus Olympius by the Peisistratidae.

There is one element, however, that is newly introduced by Aristotle in his discussion of tyranny. In order to ensure continuity and survival, a tyrant has to employ subtler means than mere brutal exercise of power. This takes the form of creation of a myth, and the role of propaganda. Tyrannies, therefore, have to be made to look more kingly. The tyrant must ensure that he does not appear to be a tyrant:

> Just as one way of setting a kingdom on the road to destruction is to make its rule more tyrannical, so conversely it protects a tyranny to make it more kingly, always preserving one thing – the power of the ruler, power enabling him to govern not only those who consent but also those who do not. For if he abandons that, he abandons his whole position as tyrant.[45]

Therefore, it is imperative to appear kingly, or the guardian of the

house. He must resemble a person who is disinterested, devoid of any thought of personal gain. He should be able to present a picture of perfect moderation. What matters in the end is appearing to be doing good and right.

Recapitulating what has been said so far, it appears that Aristotle introduces a far greater number of typologies of regimes that may be termed as despotic or tyrannical. He differs from Plato in admitting a legal basis for certain tyrannical regimes. What, however, emerges as a common feature among all deviant regimes – the linchpin of Aristotle's notion of despotism – is that they signify the master-and-slave type of rule. Further, the crucial notion of the need for myth and propaganda for the preservation of tyrannical rule is introduced.

What, then, are the reasons for Aristotle's opposition to master-slave type of rule? It surely is not, as Koebner[46] seems to suggest, merely due to the abandonment of lawful traditions (on the face of it, the argument that one could have a ruler who rules on the basis of lawful traditions – constitutional monarchy – is hardly tenable if one were to follow Aristotle's prescription that a truly *political* relation can only be formed between equals). This is especially so as the evidence points towards the existence of non-Greek tyrannies that have legal and hereditary basis. What also seems to emerge is the ability of a tyrant to gain a quasi-legal legitimacy on the efficay of myth and propaganda.

Further, both Plato and Aristotle seem to be agreed that tyranny involves a master-slave type of rule. For Plato, tyranny is both a historical and psychological category. Tyranny of appetites led to a man's soul, and the best but precarious part of this soul-reason, being enslaved. The ruling principle and its concomitant natural hierarchy is reversed. The solution to end this slavery is the creation of an ideal city, where philosophers impose on the citizens 'tyranny of reason'. This form of tyranny was preferable because it was based on an element of intrinsic value, was unchanging, and stable. It removed divisions that come about as a result of our excessive attachment to the physical world and appearances of reality.

Does Aristotle agree with Plato's prognosis? Also, is Plato's solution of containing tyranny by unifying the city under the overlordship of an almost divine reason acceptable to Aristotle? What is Aristotle's own solution? And finally, is his bringing together all Asiatic governments under a universal category of 'despotism' justified? Does his solution throw any light on the compulsions that might have gone into the creation of, to use Melvin Richter's terms,[47] an adversary anthropology (based partly at least on a highly tenuous

use of climatic determinism)?

Aristotle does not share Plato's view that the world of appearances is false. To him the world as we see, perceive and describe is true. Consequently, the human creature is divisible into a more rational real self and bodily envelope which is part of the world of appearances. Though Aristotle places equal importance on all three parts of the soul, he warns of the disruption unchecked appetites may cause. Whereas Plato explicitly rejects common human activities on the argument that they do not possess intrinsic value, Aristotle feels that no superior knowledge is capable of assisting practical reason, since it was about contingent human problems and therefore indefinite.

Next, Aristotle rejects Plato's vision of the ideal city and the need for unity. A truly *political* community is not based on unity. The greater the unity of the *polis,* the lesser its character as *polis.*[48] Any form of enforced unity or stability destroys the essential character of the city as plurality. A city was a realm of shared social activity. Whatever the nature or aspect of an individual's life or activities – political, personal, or individual life – they are not above the life of the *polis.* All such activities were a part of the concerns of the community and its laws. That is what Aristotle meant by a man being a social/political animal. He was *polis* based and participated in the common life of the *polis.* The membership of *polis* is a necessary condition for the attainment of good life. Political institutions provide a basis for the moral education and teaching of ethical virtues. For achieving this end, political participation itself is not sufficient. Rather, it is the application of coercive authority that teaches the individual to love the right things.[49] This authority is embodied in laws and a civic scheme.

A very important aspect of the life of the *polis* is the nature of citizenship. Aristotle makes it clear that each citizen must have a share in the affairs of government. Plato had misconceived the nature of a truly political association, by making it analogous to a single man. A political association could only be formed on the basis of equality.[50] It is an association of peers and equals. The plural association of free and equal men constitutes the essence of political rule for Aristotle:

> For the state consists not merely of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a state out of men who are all alike... On the other hand for the making of a single state differences in kind among the members is essential... [I]t is the perfect balance between its different parts that keeps a city in being. This balance

between *different* parts is essential even among citizens who are free and equal; for they cannot all hold office simultaneously but must do so for a year at time...[51]

Thus people who are equals take turns to rule and in being ruled. The nature of citizenship was determined, however, by the nature of constitution in practice. A citizen has the right to participate actively in the political life of the *polis* and own property.

Political justice then is a relationship of equality. Citizens might differ in habits or personal choices, but are natural associates.[52] If this is so, there is absence of justice between son and father, and between master and slave. Political rule must not treat its citizens like slaves or children; a denial of their separate entities is a denial of their citizenship.

If justice requires a recognition of equality, and thus a rule of equals, then absolute rule seems to be the alternative suggested by Aristotle for men who are unequal. Kingship over natural freemen is necessarily a form of tyrannical rule. A slave does not make practical choices.[53] He belongs to someone else for whose benefit he exists. Aristotle recognises that there are people whose natural capacities are low and this prevents them from exercising choice or participating fully in the life of the *polis*. Their slavery to better men was the best course left open to them. A slave is justified as long as the end product of his services to a master comprises of virtuous and noble activities.[54] The relationship between a master and slave becomes despotic when there is a loss of dignity in such a relationship. It is the inevitable fate of the master-and-slave type of rule that it turns despotic in the end. This is because the roles of both the master and slave are necessary and useful. Thus any distinction between them is clearly obliterated. A citizen is one who can obey as well as command: between a master and slave this relation does not exist.[55]

CONCLUSION

This far we have seen a categorical rejection of despotism, both as a notion and a form of rule, by Plato and Aristotle. Their concern is to establish politics as the prime concern of the moral philosopher and to this end their version of what the ideal city should resemble is directed.

Plato's solution is an ideal city which will bring the greatest unity. This unity is directed by the philosopher-statesman, who alone is capable of transcending the smoke-screen of appearance and

perceiving the real world of archetypal ideas. Politics is reduced to obeying the rules and laws set by the philosopher-rulers: it was a matter of being educated and initiated in a way of life prescribed by them. Plato invents the 'noble' lie to bring about the greater cohesion the ideal city requires. Men were made up of various metals, following a Phoenixian fable, and God himself had put gold in the souls of those who were capable of ruling.[56] It would suffice to say that Plato's solution reduces drastically the scope of political activity, at least as it was understood in the conventional Greek sense of being a factor of the membership of the *polis.*

Aristotle, it seems, is able to see the flaws inherent in reducing the plurality of the *polis* in the name of greater social cohesion. He advocates a notion of politics which has the notion of citizenship at the very core. Though he is reluctant to reduce the members of the *polis* into categories based on a natural hierarchy, he deprives certain sections of the society – slaves and manual labourers – of recognition as citizens. Aristotle justifies this on the grounds that for achieving political excellence leisure is required. Thus depriving a handful of men of civic education was justified for the larger goal of prosperity and survival of most citizens, and the *polis* way of life.

Is Aristotle able to free himself from the lure of the life of contemplation by suggesting a bold alternative based on the notion of citizen participation? Aristotle makes it clear that all citizens have a claim to political office. This does not however mean that active participation or holding of political office is necessary for the attainment of good life. What is crucial is the *claim* to any such office. The good state, Aristotle feels, requires virtuous men as its rulers. These men, unlike Plato, do not have a natural basis for claim to rule. Rather, political power should go to those who have achieved the good life, since that is the purpose of the *polis.* In fact, suggests Aristotle, if a man of extraordinary capabilities were to come about, the citizens will not hesitate to accept him as an absolute ruler. This was, of course, possible only in the best state.

In the best state, the life of the state is geared towards the promotion of leisured activity. Leisured activity itself was the public philosophy, involving an intellectual culture in the broad sense. In any other city, save the ideal state, a good citizen becomes a good man by participating in political activity. It is a part of his moral education.

However, in the best regime the good citizen is the same person as the good and virtuous man. Therefore, in such a state politics is a distraction from pursuing the good life, which is a life of leisure. Therefore if a king of considerable virtue were to be found, the

citizens would leave the business of ruling to him willingly. The best regime reorients its activities in such a way that it makes politics an encumbrance.[57]

The only solution to tyranny, war, and strife was forgoing unleisured activities, such as politics and war. An education which strives at moderation may be able to contain tyranny. But in the final analysis it was only the intrinsically superior pleasures of philosophy and leisured activities that can satisfy or exorcise the craving for tyrannical rule.

At this point it is obvious that though their view of politics and what constitutes the good life may be radically different, both Plato and Aristotle seem to have come full circle regarding the importance of the life of contemplation. It is obvious that both were driven to their respective conclusions about the worth of political activity from a background of wars, internal strife, loss of citizenship and of political freedom. Thus a flight from politics is not very surprising.

This leads to the question as to whether there was, during the Greek period, a complete and uncomplicated endorsement of politics and political activities.

In Book I 336 B and 347E - 354C of the *Republic*, Thrasymachus makes a startling claim. Justice to him was the interest of the stronger.[58] In all three types of identifiable constitutions, namely aristocratic rule, democracy, and despotism, rules and laws were always in the interest of the ruling party. Stronger men rule because of their stronger force. He further states that the most consummate form of injustice rewards wrongdoing. Injustice, hence, was virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus's views on ruling, justice, virtue and wisdom can be seen as a rejection of a view of politics where ruling is seen as specialized knowledge. It also can be seen as a rejection of the view that if our lives were to be reoriented towards the contemplative life, politics would lose its meaning.

Thrasymachus, first, rejects the conventional notion of justice. Even if one were to assume that the central feature of any just system was altruism of one sort or the other, there was always a self-regarding aspect to it. Rulers in the name of justice make laws, design political institutions, and conventions in order to suit their interests.

If rulers ruled for the attainment of their selfish ends, then political obligation was based, not on virtue, but on the ruler's ability to secure this by means of political craftsmanship. It is his political knowledge that makes him infallible, not one form or the other of moral superiority. Thrasymachus objects to the classification of

regimes as tyranny, democracy, or oligarchy. All regimes are based on the central principle of securing the self-interest of its rulers. Politics, then, was the realm of competition. It is an arena where all have the liberty to try out one's respective strength. This is usually done in terms of quantity (*demos*), quality (aristocracy), or uniqueness (tyranny).[59] Equality of opportunity was pitted against the inequality of ability and will.

Political reality points towards the fruitlessness of the conventional meaning of justice. This is because the traditional notions of justice have always rejected self-interest. It is because of this inability to face a central fact of all politics, feels Thrasymachus, that injustice regardless has always triumphed over justice.

The conflict, seen from Thrasymachus's point of view, is between the ideology of justice and the practice and actual existence of injustice. Every regime, therefore, is unjust. It, however, needs an ideology to justify it. Politics institutionalizes, but does not always formalize injustice.[60]

Does Thrasymachus's notion of politics illuminate our understanding of tyranny and despotism in any way? Thrasymachus feels that every form of government needs an ideology to justify itself. It is only tyranny that lacks an ideology: its sole justification is the tyrant or despot's ability to secure his self-interest. It is merely the purest form of the rule of the stronger. It gives legitimacy to injustice publicly; while other regimes need a cloak of ideology to make injustice legitimate. A despot formalizes 'the most consummate form of injustice'.[61]

NOTES

1. There are differences among scholars regarding the ideological implications of the Greek view of the non-Greek world. Patricia Springborg, who has written on Oriental despotism, is of the view that though certain ideological biases could be detected in the works of classical writers, the theory of Asiatic/Oriental despotism can otherwise be extracted only on a very selective reading. Springborg is of the opinion that classical works reflect accurately the realities of ancient societies.

   Melvin Richter, on the other hand, argues that it was a result of the works of classical writers that 'despotism became the first concept used by Europeans in an adversary anthropology that grouped together all Asian governments under the same pejorative category'. See, Patricia Springborg, 'The Contractual State: Reflections on Orientalism and Despotism', *History of Political Thought*, Vol VIII, Issue 3, Winter 1987, p. 402; Melvin Richter, 'Despotism', in David Miller (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, p. 120.

2. Nicolai Rubinstein, 'The history of the word *politicus* in early-modern Europe', in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 41-46.
3. John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, 'The Greeks and the West', in R. Iyer (ed.), *The Glass Curtain Between Asia and Europe,* London: Oxford University Press, 1965, 1965, p. 72; M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World,* Vol. 1: *The Orient and Greece,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926, p. 333; Denys Hay, *Europe,* Edinburgh University Press, 1968, pp. 2-4.
4. W.W. Tarn, 'Alexander The Great And The Unity of Mankind', *Proceedings of the British Academy,* 1933, pp. 123-166; Henry M. De Mauriac, 'Alexander The Great and the Politics of "Homonoia"', *Journal of History of Ideas,* Vol. X, No. 1, 1949, pp. 104-14.
5. Henry Sidgwick. *The Development of European Polity,* London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., p. 34.
6. M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World, Vol. 1. The Orient & Greece,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926, pp. 184-88.
7. Henry Sidgwick, *The Development of European Polity,* pp. 86- 97; M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World,* Vol. 1, pp. 216-28; Martin P. Nilsson, *The Age of the Early Greek Tyrants,* Belfast: Mayne, Boyd & Sons Ltd., 1936.
8. Henry Sidgwick, *The Development of European Polity,* p. 96.
9. Martin P. Nilsson, *The Age of the Early Greek Tyrants,* pp. 22-23.
10 M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World,* pp. 218-24.
11. Plato, *Republic,* Book VIII 562A -IX 576, p. 281-313.
12. Ibid., p. 282.
13. Ibid., p. 285.
14. Ibid., p. 288-89.
15. Plato, *Gorgias,* p. 121.
16. *Republic,* Book IX, p. 121.
17. Plato, *The Laws,* Book III.
18. *Gorgias,* pp. 126-27.
19. Ibid., p. 145.
20. Rostovtzeff, pp. 314-15, p. 318; Paul Cartledge, 'Paid up Participants', review in *TLS,* December 19, p. 1430.
21. John Procope, 'Greek and Roman Political Theory', in J.H. Burns (ed), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Thought c. 350-c. 1450.* Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 26; Patricia Springborg, 'The Contractual State: Orientalism and Despotism', *History of Political Thought,* Vol. VIII, Issue 3, Winter 1987, pp. 401-6; A.D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World,* Clarendon Press, 1972, Vol II, PP. 720-35.
22. Springborg, p. 404.
23. Burns, p. 27.
24. Erik Hornung, *Conception of God In Ancient Egypt. The One and the Many,* London, 1983; Springborg, 'The Primacy of the Political: Rahe and the Myth of the *Polis', Political Studies,* Vol. XXXVIII, 1990.
25. Greece under Demosthenes decided that freedom of Greece was identifiable with the city-state. It had a right to settle its affairs, domestic or foreign, without any interference. They saw monarchy as an especial foe of this arrangement.
26. Rostovtzeff, pp. 251-54.
27. *Republic,* IX, p. 305.

28. Martha Carven Nussbaum, 'Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's critcism of Plato', in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, University of California Press, 1980, pp. 410-11.
29. *Republic*, Book IV, p. 137.
30. Ibid., p. 137
31. Ibid., Book IX, p. 311.
32. Nussbaum, 'Separateness, and Political Unity', pp. 396-97.
33. *Republic*, Book IX, p. 311.
34. Ibid., Book IV, p. 122.
35. Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, Cambridge University Press, 1989 edition, p. 142.
36. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Chap. 14, Chap. 17.
37 R. Koebner, 'Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 3-4, pp. 275-77; *Politics*, Book III, Chap. 8.
38. *Politics*, Book III, Chap. 14.
39. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 14.
40. Ibid., Book VII, Chap. 7.
41. Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10.
42. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 14.
43. Ibid., Book V, Chap. 11.
44. Ibid., Book V, Chap. 11.
45. Ibid., Book V, Chap. 11.
46. Koebner, p. 277.
47. Melvin Richter, 'Despotism', p. 210.
48. *Politics*, Book II.
49. Richard Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', in *Political Theory*, Vol. 18, No. 2, May 1990, p. 205.
50. *Politics*, Book II, Chap. 2.
51. Ibid., Book II, Chap. 2.
52. Ibid., Book III. Chap. 9.
53. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 6 & 14.
54. Ibid., Book VII, Chap. 3.
55. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 4.
56. Daniel A. Dombrowski, '*Republic* 414B-C: noble LIES, NOBLE lies, or NOBLE 'lies'?, in *The Classical Bulletin*, Vol. 58, November 1981, pp. 4-6.
57. P.A. Vander Waerdt, 'Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime', *Phronesis*, Vol. XXX/3, 1985, pp. 249-73.
58. *Republic*, Book I.
59. Samuel Harlap, 'Thrasymachus's Justice', *Political Theory*, Vol. 7, No. 3, August, 1979, pp. 347-70; see especially p. 365.
60. Ibid., pp. 364-66.
61. *Republic*, Book I, 343.

28. Martha [illegible] Nussbaum, [illegible] [illegible]
Cambridge [illegible]
29. [illegible] Politics, Book IV, p. 167.
30. Ibid., p. 172.
31. Ibid., [illegible] p. 314.
32. [illegible]
33. [illegible] Book IX, p. 311.
34. [illegible] Book IV, p. 123.
35. [illegible]
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36. Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chap. 11 [illegible]
37. [illegible]
[illegible]
Book III, Chap. [illegible]
38. Politics, Book III, Chap. 14.
39. Ibid., Book III, Chap. [illegible]
40. Ibid., Book VII, Chap. 7.
41. Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10.
42. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 14.
43. Ibid., Book V, Chap. [illegible]
44. Ibid., Book V, Chap. 11.
45. Ibid., Book V, Chap. [illegible]
46. [illegible] p. 327.
47. [illegible]
48. Politics, Book III.
49. Richard [illegible] and the Nature of Politics [illegible]
[illegible] 1988, p. 203.
50. Politics, Book II, Chap. 8.
51. Ibid., Book II, Chap. 7.
52. Ibid., Book III, Chap. 9.
53. Ibid., Book III, Chap. [illegible]
54. Ibid., Book VII, Chap. [illegible]
55. [illegible] Book III, Chap. [illegible]
56. [illegible]
[illegible]
57. [illegible]
58. [illegible]
59. Samuel [illegible]
[illegible]