Power, Interest and Ideas : Twentieth Century International Relations*

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The end of the cold war led to intense rethinking on the nature of international politics, foreign policy and diplomacy. The cold war had ended in the wake of unprecedented and largely unanticipated policy reversals in the former Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Why did these changes come about? What really happened? And, more importantly, are there any lessons to be learnt for diplomacy aiming at outcomes in conflict-resolution for establishment of peace? An international change of this magnitude cannot be understood in terms of a mindset which treats ideas as rooted entirely in power and interest. The end of the cold war was an ideas-driven change.[1] It was a case when new ideas confronted and won against power and interest associated with the cold war. *Perestroika, glasnost* and *new thinking* have already become code words for these ideas, at least in the vocabulary of conflict-resolution and peace-building activists.[2] How does the twentieth century look through the prism of such a development? Does it look like a century of lost opportunities, of wasted and misguided efforts?[3] It all depends on what one looks for in the record of the last hundred years.

THE DARKER SIDE

Wars, Armed Conflicts and Use of Force

A darker side is there. The first half of the century witnessed two

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world wars, while the second half witnessed an all-consuming cold war. There were lesser wars and conflicts also as a function of colonial, fascist, totalitarian, fundamentalist and other forms of dictatorships and authoritarian rule, holding out a constant threat to peace and freedom. In this context, the conflicts which glaringly stand out are : first, an array of regional wars; and second, numerous instances of use of force leading to massive violation of human rights—the Stalinist purges, the Holocaust during the inter-war period, the communal carnage in India and Pakistan following the partition, the atrocities on the people of Vietnam, the barbarity in Nigeria and the former East Pakistan, mass killings in Cambodia, dehumanising violence in Sri Lanka, the Rwanda massacre, and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. Add to this the misery and exploitation of the poor, the 'underclass', a growing number of migrants and refugees, and tell-tale signs of trade in humans.

The question is : what is the source of this dark shadow on the century? The finger inevitably points to the processes leading to centralization of political power and hegemonization of minority groups through the cultural symbols of the majority community. These processes have been integral to state-building in Europe, ever since the sixteenth century. In Great Britain, for example, the English in southwest of England rose to dominance in relation to other regions like Scotland, Ireland and Wales, and King's English became the national language. The situation was no different in Spain, France, Germany and the former Soviet Union. In the United States also the North had imposed unity on the South. The consequent developments had cast dark shadows on the political record of the previous centuries. State-building attempts on these lines in post-colonial societies have cast similar shadows on the twentieth century. The shadows are inevitably darker in multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic states. At the end of World War I, the international community had sought a way out through the break-up of such states by using the ideological instrumentality of Wilsonianism. At the end of the cold war, there is a return to the use of this instrumentality which is posing serious dilemmas before the leadership of such states.

The New Diplomacy

The cold war debates were about ideological differences on how society and economy should be organized, and the kind of domestic

politics and international relations which should go with such an organization, or on how can the desired forms of political organization and international relations be introduced in states where these were differently organized. This gave classical notions of power politics a new dimension—that of informal access into, and domestic transformation of, the target state. The need was to orchestrate international strategies with action in the domestic politics and society of such a state. The purpose was to generate favourable political synergy by magnifying internal insecurities and linking them with external threats including the threat of war. For example, early in the century, after the October Revolution, the West pursued the strategy of encirclement of Russia, together with complementary diplomatic moves to impact its domestic policy process—a strategy latched on the hope that the 'two - level games' would eventually create a situation when the Russian masses would themselves reject the socialist establishment.

During the inter-war years, another so - called 'pariah state' was Germany—defeated, isolated, and the people there smarting under punitive reparations. Hence the Russo-German rapprochement at Rapallo in 1922 had intensified French sense of insecurity and gave its diplomacy a bad flavour, until Britain threw its weight in favour of conciliation at Locarno in 1925, which cleared the way for ending the international isolation of Germany and Russia (known as Soviet Union since 1934). But the Locarno spirit was short lived. Feelings of disappointment and frustration at the outbreak of World War II, and the course of events during the war, led to the revival of the earlier approach to diplomacy: that of international isolation and containment, combined with pursuit of milieu goals aimed at strategizing domestic change and transformation.

But the Soviet Union was now much stronger than Russia in the aftermath of World War I. Despite the devastation and heavy causalities suffered during the war, the morale of the Red Army was high, and, as the people there had a measure of social security, socialism was catching the imagination of poor and deprived sections all over the world as a more potent ideology of social progress. The Soviet Union was therefore much stronger and was able to match the Western strategies with its own. The result was that both policy and diplomacy became subservient to US-USSR competitive search for security against each other. Gradual extension of the competition to third world societies and politics

shifted the focus of diplomacy away from US-USSR bilateral relations, to the regions, which, as a consequence emerged as hotbeds of internal and inter-state conflicts, often with the support of the great powers or their proxies, a support which was overt or covert, or both. This gave diplomacy a new colour. Diplomacy was no longer an inter-state process, excluded and isolated from domestic political process and the impact of the media and public opinion. Diplomats stepped out of the chancellery into the seminar room and the auditorium, and networked with political leaders, legislators, journalists and the media people, vice-chancellors, teachers and students. They defined issues and politely suggested frameworks for their analysis. This helped them in creating space for pursuit of policy objectives of their respective governments. The idea was to snap the link between legitimacy, territoriality and sovereignty. Diplomacy was found to be more effective than military might in securing this strategic outcome. Through diplomacy it was possible to organize effort for drawing on historical and cultural resources of the target society to make a strategic impact on such popular understandings of the political process which were at the root of political legitimacy. This served as a favourable context from mounting challenges to the exercise of authority on a number of issues. The dissatisfied groups often insisted on a solution to their problems within an institutional framework conceptualized in terms of partial sovereignty, levels of sovereignty or multiple sovereignties within the state. They also claimed legitimacy for support coming to them from outside international borders, thus paving the way for bottom-up transnationalism for realizing political goals.

Such intrusive diplomacy grew in sophistication and started going beyond mobilisation of popular pressure on policy issues. At the level of inter-state relations, it took coercive forms of conditionalities and sanctions and sometimes went even further to take forms of armed action such as intervention, sponsored terrorism and limited war.

An impact of this new diplomacy (an euphemism for not-so-honourable activities, at times) was not always wholesome for state and nation-building processes in most third world societies, leading in different measures to non-governance and governmental non-performance. It increasingly became difficult to locate responsibility and enforce accountability, as special interests with cross-border links emerged, and brokered influence with political leaders, state elite and international centres of power and influence.

THE BRIGHTER SIDE

Freedom and Human Rights

The last hundred years have seen a considerable expansion in the domain of freedom and human rights. Looking back to the year 1900, one finds that large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America were under the colonial rule of a few European powers such as Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The metropolitan powers were experiencing industrial growth, creating imperatives for new sources of labour and raw materials, which, together with personal ambitions of kings and queens, national pride and character, patriotism and historical animosities, drove them into relations of conflict and co-operation over territory, colonies and profits. The content of international relations was thus limited to inter-imperial relations.

It was at that time, when nobody had ever thought of it, that Mahatma Gandhi, then in South Africa, sought to globalise the cause of freedom by awakening the world to the moral need for legal equality of rights for members belonging to different races. In 1915, he returned to India and threw himself into India's struggle for independence. His impact was felt in increasing problematization of the relationship between the inevitability of progress (often described as 'white man's burden' or as Prometheus unbound) and national self-esteem underlined by political independence, sovereign statehood and equality. Henceforth, this became an article of faith with the nationalists engaged in anti-colonial struggles. They sought state power as a means of transferring control of political office and economic resources from foreigners to the new nation. The end of the colonial rule and racial domination was seen as an end in itself and also a means for realising larger freedom through socio-economic emancipation. The latter was seen as falling within domestic jurisdiction and circumscribed by sovereignty. Hence Gandhi and leaders of the national movement in India, especially Jawaharlal Nehru gave the concept of the state a new, positive role, while the contemporary states of Europe were caught in bitter relationships of conflict and war, characterized, in most cases, by militarization of their economies and societies. The third world incarnation of the state idea was therefore not imagined as a clone of the then European states. [4]

The possibility of a self-conscious pursuit of a democratic

developmental trajectory, together with many other general and contextual factors, gave a boost to the decolonization process after World War II. Beginning with India in 1947, the wave of freedom, rolling back colonial rule, swept across vast areas of the third world. Gandhi and Nehru were soon joined by a galaxy of the most illustrious leaders from Asia, Africa and Latin America, who became icons of anti-colonial struggles and national liberation. Nelson Mandela, as a leader of such distinction, had his struggle crowned with success when in 1993 he was elected as President of South Africa. The leit-motif of freedom through independent statehood thus spanned a hundred years and more. The result was a worldwide expansion of the international society. Such globalisation of the states system brought the state to the centre stage of politics, diplomacy and international relations.

One may ask: is it possible to skip the European stage in state development ? The answer is contingent on evaluation of international mediation of strategies to this end. This calls for some elaboration.

State development in Europe was led by religious conflicts. The reformers like Lutherians, Presbyterians and Calvinists (called the Protestants) were on one side, while the Catholic Church was on the other. The European monarchs took side in the conflict as they sought to advance the faith they respectively professed. This resulted in internecine wars beginning in 1618 known as the 'Thirty Years War'. The war ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, which divided Europe along religious lines into sovereign states characterised by universally accepted and inviolable international boundaries. Thus, territoriality and sovereignty were a historically contingent solutions to bloody and devastating religious conflicts. And the dualistic nature of sovereignty described in terms of the sharp dichotomy of inside-outside was a counsel of peace among the hitherto warring communities.

Post-colonial states could not consolidate this essential stage in state development, even though the initial historical conditions, in the case of several of these states including those in South Asia, were, at least in certain respects, similar to those in Europe prior to Westphalia—the conditions characterized by religious or ethnic animosities and conflicts, used as a political means for advancing the favoured religious or ethnic group. From the very beginning of independent statehood, there were cases of external interference, generally of religious, ethnic or of ideological kind, which

only demonstrated the weakness and vulnerability of the political centres of authority in post-colonial societies engaged in state-building activity. These societies did not have inviolable international boundaries, as was the case in Europe after Westphalia. The present menace of sponsored and cross-border terrorism could be seen in this light.

The result was that the post-colonial state was not able to evolve a consensus on the way to imagine and represent the territorial authority. Neither it could comprehensively define the principles of territorial control and political loyalty, nor it could effectively mediate the relationship of its citizens with the outside. This did not bode well for peace, development and freedom in the wake of the decolonization process. When state development turned out to be a non-starter or suffered a set back, 'narrowly defined domestic and transnational social forces' surfaced to work havoc. 'State power got interlinked with social forces external to it. . . . The idiom of social discourse became anti-statist and the state struggled to shape the society while the social forces struggled to shape the state.'[5]

The predicament of the post-colonial state was compounded by exogenous pressures on it in favour of such public policies and institutional arrangements which were then considered of universal validity but were not always most suited to its specific conditions. Such pressure imposed heavy costs on the infant states, even before they could seriously start implementing the normative agenda immanent in the decolonization process. This agenda was, in most cases, non-racial, secular forward-looking and internationalist. The pressures originated and snowballed under the impact of the cold war. Because of ideological differences, there was no great power consensus on global norms. Each super power defined the domestic politics and foreign relations of the new states in terms of its ideological approach and followed a corresponding constructivist strategy. The resultant competitive East-West constructivism in relation to third world states fragmented their underlying societies and led to political system ineffectiveness and undermined governance. The political scene was characterized by competitive diplomatic networking and social mobilisation for simultaneous achievement of goals which in European history were linearly ordered. The consequent distortions in state-society relations narrowed the range of policy choices open to a third world state. It was now difficult to have a policy environment visualized by Nehru when he said : 'We have to do our thinking, profiting by the example

of others, but essentially trying to find a path for ourselves suited to our conditions.'[6] The effect was to undermine the legitimacy of the political system which eventually problematized the relationship between state survival and democracy, and between modernization and social justice. The emerging tension between these valued goals of politics intersected with the zones of contention both within and between states and led to internal conflicts, international wars and violation of human rights.[7]

International action to mediate the development of the post-colonial state was felt necessary right from the very beginning. Consciousness of this need came soon after World War I when the ravages of the European notions of the absolutist state were all too evident for every one to see. World War II took the consciousness a step further. In the thick of the war, the Allies had come out with the Atlantic Charter promising a peace which would afford assurance that all men in all the lands might live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

A linkage was thus clearly underlined between the path of state development and international protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The emerging opinion was that no government could hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate human rights. Shaping state-building processes now required the great powers to pursue milieu goals by focusing on matters which were formally regarded as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states. A new legitimacy was thus accorded to informal access into the domestic politics of other states through civil rights and other popular movements for social and economic emancipation. These movements were bolstered by transnational networks, and emerged as part of the global issue-area dynamics. This trend continues to this day. Since the end of the cold war, it has transited from the limited purpose of regulating state development and policy in favour of capitalism or socialism, to marshalling of empirical evidence to highlight the incompatibility of state structures and their functioning with the normative preferences of the people. The impact of it was to underline the negative aspect of the state, as also the desirability of its vanishing role and jurisdiction. The now prevalent neoliberal framework of development has given a further push to this line of thinking. Thus, at the close of the century, the leadership in the third world is faced by a paradox emerging at the centrestage of politics: while in the West, the state has been the front runner in expanding the

area of freedom and human rights, the marginalization of it is considered imperative in their part of the world. Moreover, they feel disturbed by the idea that there should be some kind of international management of the post-colonial societies. It was argued that in the face of globalisation, the state was not capable of sustaining its dualistic structure, and had no option other than to go along with the forces which are beyond its control. For example, Marcos says:

> In the cabaret of globalisation, the state goes through a striptease and by the end of the performance it is left with the bare necessities only : its power of repression. With its material basis destroyed, its sovereignty and independence annulled, its political class effaced, the national state becomes a simple security service for the mega companies.[8]

Law and Organization

The last one hundred years witnessed an unprecedented development of international law and organisation. The notion that the states of the world constituted in some sense a community or society became a common belief. But it was not a straightforward movement form war to law, or from anarchy to community.

In post-Westphalian Europe there was much uncertainty about the nature of political organization and the character of international law. This caused problems both in domestic politics and international relations. Confronted with this situation, the contemporary thinkers and jurists advanced a variety of ideas and suggestions for shaping international life, domestic society and politics of the then European states. These ideas were rooted in different socio-economic conditions of these states, and were of the nature of an intellectual response to the growing uncertainties to guide action of the ruling elite for realizing political and economic goals of the respective states.

The most important factor in the situation was the ability of the society in some states to make technological advances through invention and innovation which, when taken to industrial application, considerably enhanced their regulatory capability and territorial scope for commerce and communication. The consequent growth in inter-state commerce gave rise, by the second half of the 19th century, to the need for an intergovernmental system

of law and organization. Probably the first step was taken in 1856 when, after the Crimean war, the Paris Declaration on Maritime Law was adopted with the aim of protecting neutral shipping from damage caused by the belligerents. As the year passed, a number of international institutions were also set up in functional areas such as navigation, post and telegraph, weights and measures and health, to pave the way for further growth in commerce. These beginnings in regulation of international relations were important enough to take the process to other areas of emerging concern, especially war and the use of force, which were central to international law and organization in the twentieth century.

The Hague Peace Conferences were the first to address these issues. The First Hague Conference was held in 1899 and the Second in 1907. The underlying approach of these conferences was to limit the use of force and humanize war. These conferences were called by Nicholas II of Russia. The reasons for calling these conferences were his anxiety about the evolving international scene and the danger of a war breaking out, invention of new weapons and their high costs, and a situation arising in which Russia was faced with a military disadvantage. Ever since, the convening of international conferences—regional, worldwide and global—to consider issues of mutual and general interest, became an important feature of international relations and diplomacy. The conference diplomacy evolved into multilateralism, both ad hoc and institutionalized, and emerged as an important vehicle of politics and diplomacy, and, above all, of law and organization.

The First Hague Conference took the development of international relations to a higher level, as it succeeded in establishing a Permanent Court of Arbitration for settlement of disputes. The other achievement of conference was a Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Second Hague Conference took up such issues as arms limitation, laws of war and restrictions on the use of force. More than a dozen conventions were adopted. When World War I started, it was felt that the developmental process did not go far enough. The need was to prevent and abolish war and the use of force. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, therefore, the Allied Powers entered into a Covenant to establish the League of Nations which went further ahead in containing the sovereign right of states to wage war and resort to force. For this, the League Covenant articulated three new ideas: arms control, judicial settlement, and collective security. This was followed by

more steps. The Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of gas and biological weapons was adopted in 1925. Three years later in 1928, a General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg- Briand Pact) was signed, wherein the then great powers renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. Further onward movement of the process was halted and, in a way, shattered on the rocks of power and interest when World War II broke out. But the aspiration for a warless world survived.

The Allied Powers came out with new ideas and embodied them in a number of declarations. After the war, the United Nations was set up on 24 October 1945 when fifty states signed its Charter in a conference at San Francisco. From a reading of the Charter one could infer that it was based on recognition of two new ideas:

i. there was a relationship between the states system and the incidence of war; and
ii. socialization of the states system by embedding international norms and institutions into domestic societies, should create the necessary context for empowering the people to exercise democratic pressure in favour of social and economic objectives in public policy-making, thereby forcing the state away from its military and strategic obsessions.

The UN was not meant to be a forum of states only. It was meant to be a forum of the people also. The Charter preamble reads: 'we the people'. This analytic distinction between states and the people was a potent source of new ideas for future development of international law and organisation for mediating the complex and problematic relationship between the states system and the occurrence of war. In the sphere of inter-state relations, the UN system of collective security sought to advance these ideas by introducing four innovations :

i. relevance of non-military, coercive diplomacy;
ii. commitment of military forces to a common command within the framework of a regional or inter-regional alliance;
iii. collective authorisation of the use of force as an enforcement measure; and
iv. peacekeeping by forces drawn from several countries, acting under a common command, impartially as between the parties to a conflict, to execute its mandate for such

tasks as policing a cease-fire, preserving an armed truce in the course of communal or ethnic conflict, supervising the withdrawal of foreign troops from conflict - ridden societies, or even organizing and conducting elections as a measure of conflict resolution.

But the UN collective security system did not stop at the international borders. The focus on the people in the Charter required that the defences of peace were built within the domestic society of the state also. And so, the system of collective security incorporated another three innovations :

i. individual responsibility for war crimes;
ii. universal human rights and opposition to all forms of fascism and authoritarianism; and
iii. embedded statehood so that the states system gets socialised and becomes sensitive to social and economic, educational and cultural, issues affecting the lives of the people at local, regional, national and global levels.

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sought to further expand the scope of these arrangements when he submitted to the Security Council 'An Agenda for Peace'. It was thought that the cause of peace would be promoted through a more comprehensive but differentiated role of the UN in situations of conflict. It should make diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict, make peace when conflict was on, preserve peace once fighting stopped, and devise support structures for strengthening peace so that there was no relapse into conflict. Such a conceptualization of post-conflict peace-building process favoured resort to even humanitarian intervention, when necessary. And the UN did authorize such action in northern Iraq in 1991, in Somalia in 1992, and in Haiti in 1994. Towards the same end a system of conditional aid was also introduced. The great powers supported these efforts because working through multilateral institutions and cooperative ventures was understood as the only way to promote global values in the management of political affairs. In this context, the mention of global values implied reference to global standards laid down by the special sessions of the UN in a number of issue areas. The idea was to lay down parameters for defining national interest and culturally-rooted conceptions of good life.

But multilateralism suffered a setback when the UN was not able to take effective action in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. The fall of the two UN declared safe areas in Bosnia heightened

this sense of ineffectiveness. The unwillingness of member states to provide troops for peace-keeping missions, and the failure on the part of several states including the US to meet the financial commitments, worsened the situation. This also served as a context for articulating dissatisfaction with the UN, especially its unrepresentative character in a world which was significantly different from that in 1945. It was therefore expedient for the great powers to bypass it rather than go through it, while organizing and conducting value-driven multilateral action such as the one against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Another effect of the growing disenchantment with the UN led collective security measures was to push the foreign policy of the great powers increasingly into a more familiar mould—that of grounding national interest in a conception of security defined in terms of strategic flexibility and independence. An emphasis was now placed on strong bilateral ties with the key actors, with a view to maintain a balance of power in the regions so that the rising hegemons could be effectively contained. To this end, carefully calculated moves of a unilateral kind were also taken. And so, as the century drew to a close, the mood was not upbeat.

But, from the perspective of the last one hundred years, the scene was encouraging, not dismal. Throughout the twentieth century the leaders of government took recourse to multilateral diplomacy to embody peace-oriented new ideas into international legal rules and institutions as a means to mediate the sovereign right to resort to force or go to war. And during the last decade the process was extended to humanitarian issues which were now treated as the cornerstone of any peace structure. International anarchy has thus been progressively yielding ground to legal and institutional ties among states and networks of nations and groups of people, approximating the relations among them to those among members of a society—better still, a community. But the journey has been bumpy. Ever since the First Hague Conference in 1899, multilateral diplomacy as a generative mechanism of rules, norms and values had to negotiate a complex process of confrontation and accommodation with national power and interest. It has been zigzag process yet at the end of the day there is substantial enlargement in the area of international governance.

The direction which the future evolution of the international society takes, would, in no small measure, be influenced by the stand which India was likely to take. Both Gandhi and Nehru had

stood for a trajectory of state development for India which underlined the normative aspects of sovereign statehood to fortify India's quest for equality and difference, both in domestic politics and international relations. In domestic politics, the strategy is to bypass religious and class conflicts by redirecting public policies under democratic pressure to meet the standards of composite culture and social justice. In international relations the strategy rules out any movement in the direction of power politics or participation in conflict-ridden international relations. This is not a celebration of exceptionalism or support for a strategy of withdrawal and isolation. India does visualize for itself an active constructivist role which underpins its difference with the European path of nation-building and with the realist and neo-realist approaches in respect of major aspects of international relations. India emphasizes on a better appreciation of these differences by the more developed states,[9] as these are claimed to be of universal applicability in scope and effect. India, therefore, feels uncomfort-able with the way the great powers are pushing new ideas which in some way imply loss of state autonomy and international manage-ment of the third world :

i. interdependence in world politics was eroding the statist norms such as territoriality, independence and non-intervention;
ii. a state's right to independence should be weighed against its people's right to security;
iii. the growth in global communications and markets was leading to a shift in the framework of politics away from its core principle of sovereign statehood;
vi. a global civil society was beginning to emerge as non-state groups were finding ways to co-operate with their counterparts around the world.

These ideas did describe aspects of the evolving empirical reality, which was there even during the cold war, as was evident from the practice of the 'old globalists'. But to represent them as prime movers in future development of international law and organization, lending legitimacy to unilateral and arbitrary actions of a coercive kind directed against third world states waging relentless fight against forces of backwardness and political destabilization, was going a little too far, at least in the present context. In India's diplomatic perception these ideas were worthy of attention but the material conditions were not yet mature enough to push them as engines of a radical change. One quote should

suffice to prove the point. Jan Aart Scholte, while writing on global civil society, says, that the 'civic groups—even those that actively champion for a democratization of official institutions and market operations—can fail to meet democratic criteria in their own workings. For example, some civil associations offer their members no opportunity for participation beyond the payment of subscription'.[10] India was thus a little sceptical of the political and military instrumentalities which were trailing behind the post-cold war concern for humanitarian values in international relations. This scepticism leading to ambivalence towards the new ideas was likely to mediate India's diplomacy towards accommodation, integration and community-formation as the world turned into the twenty-first century.[11]

NOTES

1. No wonder, the post-cold war academic and diplomatic effort takes its cue from 'walk in the woods' syndrome and emphasizes on interactive workshops for generating new ideas through informal and leisurely meetings of leaders, diplomats, academics, journalists and students. This underlined the role of Track II Diplomacy and was the rationale behind the Neemrana process in South Asia.
2. The working out of these ideas in the former Soviet Union is briefly described in my 'introduction' in Sushil Kumar, ed., *Gorbachev's Reforms and International Change,* New Delhi, 1993. For details, see Gorbachev's *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues,* Moscow, 1987 and relevant articles in *Kommunist* during the late eighties.
3. Kofi Annam, UN Secretary-General, posed the question differently at the Hague on 18 May 1999, while addressing the Centennial of the first International Peace Conference held there. He spoke of the very worst of our century: crimes against humanity, mass killings, and the wholesale expulsion of an entire people simply for who they are. It is hard—in the presence of such terrors —not to lose faith in humanity altogether.

   He further said 'After all that this century has endured, if Europe at its end can still witness the crimes of Kosovo, can we be justified in speaking at all of human progress? How can we say that conferences such as the Hague have pulled us back from the brink of disaster, when the abyss is revealed before us on our television screens every hour of every day?' (United Nations, *The Question of Intervention,* New York, 1999, p. 29).
4. This had no relationship with cultural or racial differences with Europe.
5. The citation is from my article, 'A Retrospect : Imperatives for Reconstituting Statehood', in Sushil Kumar, ed., *New Globalism and the State: Considerations Towards Post-Cold War International Relations Theory and the Third World,* Research Press, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 288-9.
6. Quoted by J.W. Burton in his *International Relations: A General Theory,* Cambridge University Press, London, 1965, Indian reprint of 1971, p. 237.

7. The ferocity and illiberal overtones of the cold war related political and doctrinal conflicts, fought out mainly through local proxies, turned a third world state into a gladiatorial ring. The destructive impact of it on social and political structures of such a state was profound and, in some respects, irreparable. The US and the USSR, themselves committed to the neorealist separation of domestic and international spheres, tried to shape the domestic societies in third world states, less for reasons of ideological commitment and more for politico-strategic gains in the cold war. 'Similarly in each of the rival blocs, the old globalists of the North had aimed at globalisation respectively of democracy and socialism through such promotional strategies which sought to create structural imperatives for a third world state to look up to it for sustenance and survival. The idea was to support such mass perceptions of the social reality which tended to frustrate the policies of such a state aimed at social consolidation, with a view eventually to weakening its autonomous capability for resistance'. (Kumar, *New Globalism*, pp. 17-18).
8. Quoted by Z. Bauman 'After the Nation State—What ?' in John Beynon and David Dunkerley, eds., *Globalisation, A Reader*, Athlone Press, London, 2000, p. 251.
9. The claim to sovereign equality in the states system was not backed by an equal level of development—economic, technological and political. India backed this claim by rejecting the two fundamental principles of the European inter-state relations: hierarchy and hegemony, and pursued a double strategy of *exclusion* from power politics of great powers, and of *inclusion* for highlighting the normative aspect of international relations insofar as it pertained to the relations of developed countries with less developed countries. Hence India was perceived as seeking to transform the system of international relations.
10. Ngaire Woods, ed., *Political Economy of Globalization*, Macmillan, London, 2000, p. 194.
11. This ambivalence, however should not be taken to mean that India favoured a multi-polar or polycentric world order (despite occasional pronouncements along this line) insofaras such a political structure implied that each major power sought to jockey for position against other major powers through alignments which came close to classical balance of power, or to settle major issues in international relations by means of war or use of force. All along, India stood for evolution of international society for better realization of democratic values, effectiveness of international institutions, and responsiveness to global problems. And there was no likelihood of a departure from this stand. In other words, India's position could not be framed in neorealist terms. The recent attempts to so frame it had a parallel in similar attempts in the past: neorealist interpretation of the post-1962 emphasis on defence build up, as of Pokhran I and II. The idea was to portray India as a power-seeking state in order to invite disapproval of India's development and security policies. Cross-border terrorism also aimed to portray India's counter-terrorist response as movement away from its normative commitments. Such neorealist representation of India's behaviour was wide off the mark.