

Gandhi's Strategy of Class Struggle in Colonial India

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Gandhi had no objection to a class struggle, as will be shown in this article, between tenants and their landlords, once India became free. But under the colonial rule he did not encourage such a struggle to take place. He knew very well that the tenants were harassed by their landlords, yet he advised them to remain in peace with their landlords. His strategy was to sacrifice class struggle for the sake of the national struggle for Hind Swarāj (India's home rule). In early 1980s long after India's freedom from the colonial rule, abolition of the princely states and doing away with land system *talūqdārī* (land system) and *zamīndārī* (land-ownership) systems, the Indian world of history saw the rising of what is known as the subaltern historiography.¹ Since then there is a mushroom growth of subaltern historians. In the name of writing or rewriting, the history of subaltern classes during the colonial rule, these historians have not hesitated in misinterpreting Gandhi. Their aim is to dwarf the towering image of Gandhi. In order to prove their point of view, some of these historians have concentrated on the peasant movements, particularly of 1920s. In the history of freedom struggle this decade is important for several reasons. However, India was reaching its coveted goal of freedom and emancipation from the colonial rule. It is during this decade that Gandhi was emerging as a major leader of Indian peasantry. His image was no more restricted to Champaran and Kheda. Even in his early phase of the Indian struggle Gandhi appeared quite unlike other urban leaders. No other urban or elite leader of national repute could create an aura around his personality or self in which the peasants could believe and develop faith in him. Incidentally, the Indian National Congress that launched the freedom struggle, started as a body of urban leaders. Jacques Pouchepadass, who has done an in-depth study of Champaran movement and its grassroot leadership, compares Gandhi with other urban leaders in the following words:

The difference between them and Gandhi lies first of all in the fact that the *raiya*s gave Gandhi their full trust and confidence. While the Indian peasant generally remains sceptical towards the demagogic politician or agitator who claims to be the representative of the downtrodden, he usually was at once convinced of Gandhi's unselfishness, as he viewed the Mahatma as a renouncer.²

The relationship between Gandhi and the *raiya*s (tenants, peasants) of Champaran in 1917 converts Gandhi into a class by himself. Later his horizon was extended. A time came when Gandhi won the confidence of the *raiya*s of the whole country. And it is through his instrumentality that a permanent interaction occurred between the rural or subaltern domain of politics and the urban or elite domain of politics. Prior to Gandhi's entry into the political scene of India this interaction was missing. The urban politicians were simply ignorant of what was happening in the villages of India. Consider Kripalani's remarks quoted by Pouchepadass in connection with Champaran:

In those days such was our nationalism that we did not know what was really happening in the villages. We, the educated lived more or less an isolated life. Our world was confined to the cities and to our fraternity of the educated. Our contact with the masses was confined to our servants, and yet we talked of the masses and were anxious to free country from foreign yoke.³

It is through the instrumentality of Gandhi that the interaction between urban nationalism and rural nationalism occurred in Champaran.

Like Champaran, the Pratapgarh peasantry of U.P. also organised itself without any help from the urban hands. No urban politician of that time knew about this rural mass organisation. A role similar to that of Gandhi was played by Jawaharlal in Pratapgarh. When he came to the villages of Pratapgarh first time in 1920, he reacted like Kripalani. Jawaharlal was surprised and amazed to see the organisation of the rural mass:

What was surprising to me then was that this should have developed quite spontaneously without any city help. . . . What amazed me still more was our total ignorance in the cities of this great agrarian movement. No newspaper contained a line about it: they were not interested in rural areas. I realised more than ever how cut off we were from our people and how we lived and worked and agitated in a little world apart from them.⁴

Thus till the last part of the second decade of the twentieth century the subaltern domain of politics was running parallel to the elite domain of politics. But through the efforts of Gandhi and

Jawaharlal these domains interacted. In due course they lost their independent identity, and became one and the same domain of politics. The subaltern historians do not like this interaction. According to Ranajit Guha, who happens to be the chief of the subaltern historians, the elite mobilise the subaltern 'to fight for their own objectives'.⁵ It is presupposed that the objective of the elite is different from the objective of the subaltern. Perhaps, the objective of the elite is to remove the colonial rule, whereas that of the subaltern is to remove the feudal lords and their agents. This means that the tenants cannot think in terms of freedom from the colonial rule, and the Congress cannot think in terms of removing the landlords. These are invalid inferences based on the illegitimate definitions of 'elite' and 'subaltern'.⁶

The subaltern historians are not the first individuals of their kind who reject the interaction between the elite and the subaltern. This interaction was also not appreciated by the colonial administrators of 1920s. With the coming of the urban politics to villages, the rural politics got a proper direction, and the urban politics got a mass base. Such a situation posed a challenge to the British rule in India. V.N. Mehta, the Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh in 1920, exhibits unhappiness over the coming of the urban politicians to Pratapgarh villages. According to him Jawaharlal and Gaurishanker 'came and the *sabhā* of old was rehabilitated and put on proper lines . . . the backwaters were intermingled with the mainstream of metropolitan politics.'⁷ Mehta was quite unhappy. He reports that 'there was a change in the tone of applications filed before me.'⁸ Obviously, the applications to which he refers were those which were given by the tenants of Pratapgarh. Tenants became assertive, they were no more passive. Their consciousness was widened. The singularity of their subaltern consciousness was lost.

Very early in his political career Gandhi realised that the cry for Swaraj is hollow, if the country remains divided through its class struggle. Since the population of the colonial India was mostly rural, the class struggle between tenants and landlords effected the whole country. To stop this struggle became Gandhi's major concern. Instead of fighting with each other, the tenants and landlords should fight against the British. Gandhi's attempt at uniting these two diverse classes of people, one may argue, is an attempt to unite the exploited with their exploiters. How can there be such an unity? There can be no real or natural unity between them. According to Gyan Pandey, it

would be a 'forged unity'.⁹ Unity had not been forged, it had been quite natural, if Gandhi had united Indians on the basis of their class interest. If he had united the tenants against their landlords, the unity had been quite natural. So also the unity had been quite natural if he had united the landlords against their tenants. But Gandhi rejected both these instances of unity.

Not only the unity between landlords and tenants is forged, according to Pandey it is 'plainly rhetorical'.¹⁰ When the class interest of peasants differs from the class interest of landlords, how is non-rhetorical unity between them possible? Pandey's arguments are logically valid, but historically invalid. Logically valid in the sense that they would convince one if he is indifferent to historical reality. Historical reality clearly invalidates these arguments. Since Pandey is so much preoccupied with Gandhi and his Congress that he has no time to go through the Indian history of the nineteenth century, history of the First War of Indian Independence that took place in AD1857. In that war the peasants fought against the British under the leadership of their landlords. Then the unity between them was certainly not rhetorical. The reason is that the relationship between them was that of mutual trust. It was a relationship that holds between a *rājā* (king) and his *prajā* (subjects). *Taluqdārs* were rulers of men and not just the holders of land. As rulers they had commitment towards their subjects. Therefore their subjects too fought against the British. They wished to eliminate the alien rulers, and to bring back their *rajās*. Then the unity between them was natural or real, and not a forged one.

The relationship between the rulers and the ruled of Awadh had a qualitative change once the British defeated them. In Awadh the Rent Act of 1868, introduced by the British, converted the rulers of men into simple landholders and the ruled into the tenants-at-will without having any rights on land. Thus the British succeeded in converting the leaders of tenants into their enemies, thereby giving birth to the tenant-landlord struggle. Can the subaltern historians deny that the class struggle between the tenants and landlords was the creation of the colonial policies? At the close of the nineteenth century, Mr. Framantile, the Settlement Officer of Rae Bareli district of Awadh, writes that 'we have opened the courts to disputes between landlords and tenants, and so inevitably created ill-feelings between them, but in the last resort one of the parties, the tenant, is found to have practically no rights'.¹¹ Who is responsible for giving no rights on land to the tenant? Obviously the answer was: 'The British'. Then who is

the real culprit? The British Raj or the landlords? Gandhi was interested in catching the real culprit. For him no Swaraj was possible without punishing the real culprit.

Gandhi's call for unity, call for the landlords and peasants to join the battle for achieving Swaraj has agitated both the colonial administrators of 1920s and the subaltern historians of 1980s. How much the British depended on the landlords in 1920s becomes clear from a remark of the then Lieut.-Governor of U.P. According to him 'they are a very solid body . . . the only friends we have.'¹² How could the British appreciate Gandhi's call for unity? How could they relish that their 'only friends' should slip out of their hands? Like the Lieut.-Governor of U.P., Pandey too dislikes the entry of landlords into the Congress. This becomes clear from his remarks concerning the firing at Munshiganj, Rae Bareilly, U.P., in 1921. Pandey writes:

Nehru describes the landlord as 'half an official' and wrote bitterly of 'the twins' (the British Deputy Commissioner and the Sikh Landlord) who stood shoulder to shoulder at Munshiganj. Yet the Congress leaders looked to their landlord 'brothers' for support in the great struggle that was raging against the British.¹³

Though Pandey has used only a few ironical words, he has given a big moral discourse to the Congress of 1920s. Pandey has been shocked to see that the Congress should forget the massacre of peasants by the Sikh landlord. But being an elite body, according to Pandey, Congress allowed the landlords, because they too are elite. The movement of Congress in 1920-21 would have satisfied Pandey if it had refused the entry of landlords into the Congress; if it had allowed the landlords to remain friends of the British; if it had supported the peasant militancy against the landlords. How is Pandey different in his views from the colonial administrators of 1920-21?

Gandhi's call for the landlords to join hands with the tenants in the struggle for Swaraj did succeed in creating confusion in the enemys' camp. One by one the landlords started deserting the enemy camp. The impact of Gandhi's call can be seen by comparing the participation of landlords in the Non-cooperation Movement with their participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement. In the former one their participation was quite negligible, but in the latter one in the district of Pratapgarh (Awadh) alone the *taluqdars* of the two biggest estates, Kalakankar and Bhadri, joined the Congress and were converted to the faith in Swaraj. They burnt their foreign dresses in the presence of Gandhi.¹⁴ Not only Raja Awadesh Singh of Kalakankar

joined the battle for Swaraj, his two younger brothers, Brijesh Singh and Suresh Singh, were also committed men.¹⁵ Incidentally, Brijesh Singh was in the news when he married the daughter of Stalin and settled down in Russia. In the district political conference, held in June 1931 Raja Awadesh Singh 'advised the *zamindārs* and *taluqdārs* to compromise with the cultivators, as the estates belonged to the people and the *taluqdārs* are their servants'.¹⁶ The Raja was giving vent to Gandhi's idea of trusteeship.

Pandey has taken too much responsibility on his shoulders on behalf of the British. Consider his remarks:

What did the demand for Swaraj in fact signify? Is the idea of liberation from the colonial rule to be equated with the narrow vision of the eviction of the white man from India? Had this been the sum total of the nationalist demand the British would in all probability have been willing to submit to it long before they did?¹⁷

What was the demand of the nationalists of 1857? Call it narrow, call it wide, the nationalists demanded the simple eviction of the white man from India. Whether one was a Muslim or a Hindu, a tenant or a landlord, all were interested in removing the *firangis* from India. But the British did not leave India; they succeeded in suppressing the revolt.

Pandey is not interested in the nationalists of 1857, rather he is interested in the nationalists of the twentieth century. This becomes clear from his further remarks:

It is doubtful if a single one of the more important Congress leaders had a notion of Swaraj that was restricted to the simple physical eviction of the British from Indian soil. The concept of Swaraj had inherent in it the greater individual freedom, equality, and justice, and the hope of accelerated national and consequently individual development. Whether articulated by a Gandhi, as in his *Hind Swaraj*, or a Nehru, as in his socialist phase, or by the humblest nationalist sympathiser, the idea of Swaraj had built into it the dream of a 'new heaven, a new earth'.¹⁸

Whatever be the wish of the white man, whether to vacate India or not to vacate India, the nationalists wished Swaraj to be established in India. And Swaraj for the nationalists, even of the twentieth century in no sense, meant British rule (*rāj*). Swaraj was to replace the British *rāj*. But how was such a replacement possible? Was it possible without the physical eviction of the British from India? Of course, Swaraj does not mean the simple eviction of the white man from India, it means a lot more than this. But no nationalist ever thought that he would succeed in having Swaraj in India without the physical eviction of the

British. The eviction of the British from India was considered as a necessary condition, not the whole truth about Swaraj. Swaraj meant, as Pandey writes, freedom, equality, justice *et al.* But they were considered as impossible ideals under the British *rāj*. Neither Gandhi nor Nehru nor even an humblest nationalist ever thought that their dream of covering India into a heaven was possible under the British *rāj*. Therefore, Gandhi was led to give the call for 'Quit India', which meant the eviction of the British from India. The voice of the twentieth century nationalists ultimately echoed the voice of the 19th century nationalists.

Not only Gandhi and his Congressmen, even an humble peasant leader, whose identity is discovered through police records, talks about the eviction of the British from India. According to the U.P. Intelligence source, on 23 December 1923, Jhinguri Singh 'emphasised that they must have Swaraj as Government administration is faulty'.¹⁹ Again in 1928 Jhinguri Singh remarked 'Who is *pāhīkāstākār*? One who does not belong to the village but has come to cultivate the land. 'We are *pāhīkāstākār*'. But what would be the description suitable for the English who have come to India after crossing the seven seas? Are they not *pāhīkāstākār*?²⁰ He means that the English are *pāhīkāstākār* in India, because they have come from a foreign land. Therefore, following the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act, they should be evicted from India. According to the Oudh Rent Act, instituted by the British, a *pāhīkāstākār* is one who cultivates a land in some village to which he does not belong. He can be evicted from that land simply because he does not belong to that village. Though an uneducated villager, Jhinguri Singh exhibits the same sense of irony in his speech which is expected from an educated elite.

Though the subaltern historians have written so many books and articles, superficially in favour of the subaltern classes, their study of the freedom struggle is tilted towards the colonial rule. According to these historians the Gandhian Congress should not have suffered from the 'narrow vision' of the eviction of 'white man' from India. Instead, it should have developed the 'magnificent vision' of leading the popular resistance against the feudal forces. But Gandhi was a political strategist. A political strategy is not very unlike a war strategy. A bad warrior opens many fronts, a good one opens only one front at one time. Gandhi knew very well that the Indian landlords were hard nuts to crack. But the war against them could wait till the British leave India. Once the British leave India, the landlords would become weak,

and then it would be quite easy to remove them. His interview with Louis Fisher in 1942 clarifies that Gandhi only postponed the struggle of peasants against the landlords till India becomes free. Consider a part of the dialogue between Fisher and Gandhi. Fisher asked:

'What would happen in a free India? What is your programme for the impoverishment of the lot of peasantry?' Gandhi replied, 'The peasants would take the land. We would not have to tell them to take it. They would take it. There may be fifteen days of chaos but I think we could soon bring that under control.'²¹

In free India the Government would back the peasants (subaltern classes) as during the colonial days the British backed the landlords (elite classes). Gandhi's interview with Louis Fisher clarifies that neither it was Gandhi's ideology nor his affection towards the landed gentry that he refused to promote the peasant struggle during the colonial days. Freedom from the colonial rule was a necessary condition to save the subaltern classes from exploitation. Therefore, Gandhi tried to change the direction of 'popular unrest' against the landlords towards an unrest against the British. Ultimately Gandhi succeeded in his mission of freeing India from the British, and later the Congress succeeded in freeing tenants from their landlords. *Zamindāri* was abolished and the tenants got their rights on land.

One should not think that Gandhi's ideas were undergoing a change. He started thinking in terms of a class struggle between peasants and landlords only in 1942. Prior to that he was an orthodox freedom fighter, having mumbo-jumbo thoughts about trusteeship as a substitute for a class struggle. We should not forget the fact that Gandhi started his political career in India with his experiment on a class struggle. Even if he is not considered as the father of Champaran movement, he was certainly responsible for its success. Champaran struggle was certainly not a battle for Swaraj, it was a battle against the European planters. Referring to the views of the Champaran peasantry and Gandhi's involvement with it, Pouchepadass writes:

When peasants talked about the end of the British Raj, they simply meant that they wished the Europeans out of the district, and it is the planters rather than the British as a whole that they wanted to get rid of. Gandhi himself, moreover, voluntarily abstained from trying to initiate the peasants to nationalist politics.²²

Thus Gandhi was involved in a pure class struggle in Champaran. The only difference was that it was a class struggle between the Indian peasants and the European planters. Gandhi's fight against the

European planters was a step towards fighting against the European rulers of India. On a small scale Kheda presented him such an opportunity just a year after Champaran. But Kheda too cannot be described as a battle for Swaraj; it was only a step towards such a battle. However, Champaran and Kheda gave Gandhi courage to plunge into the battle for Swaraj, he transcended the stage of class struggle. Even in the class struggle of Champaran, peasants alone would have never succeeded in their goal. As Pouchepadass points, 'In 1917, the main leaders of the movement were as usual well off peasants, moneylenders, traders, and a certain number of 'half-educated' *mukhtārs* and teachers.'²³ In order to drive the European planters out of the district, class distinctions were forgotten. It was the united effort of the people of Champaran, irrespective of the fact whether one was a feudal agent or a poor tenant, that made Champaran movement a success. Champaran was a good example for Gandhi. Though it was only a small scale experiment, an experiment in a class struggle, it exhibited that the British could not be driven out of India unless people belonging to different classes joined hands with one another. It is the class unity and not the class tension that would bring Swaraj.

Gandhi's political strategy of separating the anti-feudal struggle from the anti-colonial, and sacrificing the former for the sake of the latter, has led his critics to brand Gandhi as an agent of feudalism. Sumit Sarkar, as quoted by Gyan Pandey, describes as modern India's greatest tragedy 'the failure to intermingle the currents of national and social discontent into a single anti-colonial and anti-feudal revolution.'²⁴ Sumit Sarkar and Gyan Pandey have so easily simplified the dynamics of the Indian freedom struggle. Gandhi would have added one more feather to his cap if he had tied the anti-feudal struggle to his anti-colonial struggle. But there is every possibility that by combining these two struggles Gandhi might have lost even his cap. If the views of Pandey and Sarkar are accepted, then Gandhi should have opened two fronts, one against the Indian landlords and others against the British. Thus an internal enemy would have been created, and the internal enemies are more dangerous than the external ones. Even if it is accepted that India would have won freedom against both (feudalism and colonialism), it would have taken much more time. India would have certainly not been free in 1947. As a matter of fact we cannot predict either the duration or the result of the single anti-feudal and anti-colonial struggle that did not occur.

Consider in the end the opening sentences of an opening article

in the third volume of the *Subaltern Studies*. The contributor of the article is Shahid Amin, a committed subalternist. He begins his article by attacking Gandhi:

Gandhi visited the district of Gorakhpur in eastern U.P. on 8 February 1921, addressed a monster meeting variously estimated at between 1 lakh and 2.5 lakhs and returned the same evening to Banaras. He was accorded a tumultuous welcome in the district, but unlike in Champaran and Kheda he did not stay in Gorakhpur for any length of time to lead or influence a political movement of the peasantry.²⁵

By leading or influencing a 'political movement of the peasantry' Shahid Amin means instigating peasantry against their landlords. For the subaltern historians this is the only language that produces the smell of politics. Initiating the movement for Swaraj does not have any smell of politics, or if there is a smell, it is rotten, it is the smell of elite politics. Gandhi invited all the Indians to the movement for Swaraj, landlords included. In his speech at Gorakhpur, as quoted by Shahid Amin from *Swadesh* of 13 February 1921, Gandhi said:

What happened in Fyzabad? What happened in Rae Bareli? We should know these things. By doing what we have done with our own hands we have committed a wrong, a great wrong. By raising the *lakṛī* (stick) we have done a bad thing. By looting haats and shops we have committed a wrong. We can't get Swaraj by pitting our own devilishness (*shaitaniyat*) against the satanic government. Our 30 crore *lakṛīs* are no match against their aeroplanes and guns; even if they are, even then we should not raise our *lakṛīs*.²⁶

In his speech Gandhi condemned what has been described by the subaltern historians as peasant militancy or popular resistance. Peasants in Fyzabad and Rae Bareli were involved in anti-feudal resistance, and in the course of this resistance they became violent. Gandhi condemned their attack on landlords, businessmen, shopkeepers, etc., not because he loved them more than the peasants, but because he considered peasant militancy as a great obstruction to the battle for Swaraj. *Lakṛī* is no match for the British guns and aeroplanes. But the alternative is not to acquire guns and aeroplanes from the foreign sources to match the guns and aeroplanes of the British. Swaraj was in condition to be imported, it was to be acquired by the Indians with their own souls and bodies. Gandhi wished to face the British government with the force of non-violence (*ahimsā*). His unarmed *satyāgrahis* were to face the armed forces of the British. Only

a satan would attack an unarmed man. Let the British prove that they are not satans. But Shahid Amin would not understand the political idiom of Gandhi. His idiomatic range stops at 'popular resistance', 'subaltern struggle', 'elite politics', etc. Even the idea of Swaraj is foreign to him, because such an idea cannot take its birth in a subaltern mind. A subaltern has obtained his Swaraj if he obtained his one square meal a day. For that meal he had to struggle the whole day.

Shahid Amin does not appreciate Gandhi's attitude towards the Gorakhpur peasantry. He stayed in Gorakhpur for less than a day, whereas in Champaran and Kheda he stayed for days together in each of them. Does it mean that the Gorakhpur peasantry did not suffer at the hands of their landlords? Shahid Amin should know that the Gorakhpur situation was quite unlike the situations of Champaran and Kheda. Gorakhpur landlords were neither European planters nor European rulers. In Champaran there was a direct confrontation with the European planters, and in Kheda too the Indian landlords were not involved. There was a direct confrontation with the European rulers. Gandhi had no wish to start a front against the Indians, be they princes or landlords. Then why should Shahid Amin fail to understand that in Champaran, Gandhi took the help of landed gentry, money-lenders, traders, etc., for the success of his movement. Then how could Gandhi have led a movement of peasants against them?

One of the designs of Shahid Amin's paper is 'to look at peasant perceptions of Gandhi by focussing on the trails of stories that marked his passage through the district'.²⁷ But comments on this issue lie beyond the scope of this article. However, it must be pointed out that Shahid Amin wishes to study the perceptions of those peasants who died long ago. Even the study of the perceptions of those who are living requires the removal of one's own subjective prejudices. Shahid Amin belongs to the class of educated elite. And the educated elite are very sensitive to brain-washing; their education makes them alienated from their soil. Their perceptions can easily get distorted. Trust that Shahid Amin has not superimposed his own prejudiced perceptions on the perceptions of the dead peasants. We should at least spare the souls of those innocent peasants who did what they liked because of the cry for Swaraj.

To sum up: Gandhi started his anti-colonial struggle by avoiding the anti-feudal struggle. His struggle succeeded. Later when India became free, feudal lords were eliminated through the constitutional means. Now the subaltern historians have opened the issue of the

alternative mode of acquiring freedom. Gandhi should have attached the anti-feudal struggle to his anti-colonial struggle. His failure to do so exhibits a great tragedy of Indian struggle. Instead of praising Gandhi for averting a tragedy, they condemn him for an imaginary tragedy. For their argument they use China as the model. In China, according to Gyan Pandey, it is through 'the warlords that the imperialists maintained their domination in the country'.²⁸ To compare the Indian landlords with the Chinese warlords is highly misleading. The Indian landlords were no kind of warlords; they were not in a position even to defend themselves. The British maintained their domination in the country through police and army. China required a struggle against their warlords, because they maintained their domination in the country. India required a struggle against the British, because the British maintained their domination in the country through police, army and the law-courts.²⁹ Once the British flee from India, the Indian landlords would become powerless. Thus the subaltern historians have not suggested an alternative way of acquiring freedom from the colonial rule. If Gandhi had accepted their alternative, India's freedom would have remained only a dream.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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5. Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", *Subaltern Studies -1*, Delhi, 1982, p.6.
6. See Nisha Rathore's attack on the theoretical structure of Ranajit Guha's historiography in "Ranjit Guha's Axiomatic Historiography: A Study in Elite and Subaltern Domains of Politics", *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, June 1996, pp. 175-85.

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10. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
11. S.H. Framantle, *Rae Barli Settlement Report*, Lucknow, 1897, p. 26.
12. Cited in Gyan Pandey's 'Peasant Revolt and Indian Nationalism', *op. cit.*, p. 160.
13. *Ibid.*, p.161.
14. See *The Pratap*, 24 November 1924 (published from Kanpur).
15. See information about the breaking of Salt Law in Rae Bareli by Suresh Singh in *PAI* (Police Abstract of Intelligence), Rae Bareli, May 1930, p. 470.
16. *Ibid.*, (Lucknow, 1931), June 20.
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19. *PAI*, (Lucknow, 1923), January 13.
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23. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
24. Gyan Pandey, *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh: 1926-34, A Study in Imperfect Mobilization*, Delhi, 1978, p. 217.
25. Shahid Amin, "Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern U.P., 1921-22", *Subaltern Studies -III*, Delhi, 1984, pp. 1-2.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
28. Gyan Pandey, *Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh*, pp. 197-98.
29. For a detailed criticism of the comparison between the Chinese warlords and the Indian landlords, see Nisha Rathore, "Gandhi, Peasantry and the Subaltern Historiography", *Gandhi Marg*. Delhi, October-December 1996.

