

NEHRU, NATIONALISM AND THE INTEGRATION OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES INTO THE INDIAN UNION (1947-61)

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The Portuguese were the pioneers among the European powers who came to India for trade. They were also the first Europeans to set up political administration in an alien territory under a viceroy having his headquarters in a piece of land where a fortress was permitted to be set up by the local ruler, namely the king of Cochin. Within a decade of their arrival on the Malabar Coast, through force of arms they managed to obtain a territorial possession on the western coast of India, namely Goa to which they shifted the political headquarters after three decades of their contact with India. In course of time they brought under their jurisdiction a few geographical segments on the western coast of India and by hook or crook they managed to hang on to them till 1961 even after all the European powers had left India free.

The Indian national leaders who drove the colonial powers away through the practice of the long-cherished principle of non-violence introduced by Mahatma Gandhi could not tolerate the existence of the Portuguese in independent India. They were averse to use force of arms to reunite the Portuguese colonies with the Indian Union. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, despite the impatient attitude of his colleagues, followed a policy of "wait and see". The National Convention for the integration of Goa, Daman and Diu with India held in Bombay on 14th May 1961 reminded the Government of India that it was the 'sacred duty of the Government of India and the entire nation' to free the Portuguese colonies in India. At last after a long period of twenty-five years of wavering, in the defense of his own countrymen, he resorted to the "Operation Vijay" on 19th December 1961 and brought the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu directly under the Government of India. Nehru was criticized vehemently by a section of the international media for having violated the principle of non-violence in the reunification

of the Portuguese colonies to India and was branded as a hypocrite peace-maker in international diplomacy. I shall address some aspects of reunification and examine the points that may justify the “Operation Vijay”.

Territorial Possessions of the Portuguese in India

Afonso de Albuquerque, realizing the distance between India and Portugal and the inclemency of weather in India proposed the idea of setting up territorial possessions in India where the Portuguese and the mixed race born out of intermarriages could settle and work for the interest of Portugal. Though there was a suggestion on the part of the Portuguese king to acquire independent territorial possession in Cochin by subduing the local king, the then Portuguese Governor reported that it would be unfair to do it in Cochin since the king was the only one who offered willingly a place to start a factory and a fortress when they were driven away from Calicut. So, they decided to look for territorial possessions elsewhere. Albuquerque was of the opinion that people with Portuguese blood passing through Indian veins would be the best fighters for the good of the Portuguese nation. So, he conquered Goa and subsequently his successors obtained through force of arms and diplomacy other areas on the western coast of India. A quick survey of the way in which the Portuguese possessions in India were created is in order.

1. Goa

The Portuguese possessions in Goa consisted of areas which were known as old and new conquests.

- a) **Old Conquest (*Velhas Conquistas*):** Afonso de Albuquerque conquered Tiswadi in Goa in 1510 which is generally known as *Ilhas*. The Portuguese obtained Salcete and Bardes in August 1548 through the treaty signed with the King of Bijapur. All these three districts along with that of Mormugão were usually known as the Old Conquests (*Velhas conquistas*).
- b) **New Conquest (*Novas Conquistas*):** With a view to compensate for the loss of the Portuguese pockets on the Malabar coast to the Dutch, the Portuguese conquered the districts of Bicholim or Bhatagram, which was annexed to the Portuguese territories in 1781. The district of Satari, was also brought under the Portuguese in 1781. Ponda or Antruz was taken over by the Portuguese in 1763. Sanguem too came into

Portuguese possession in 1763. Quepem was brought under the Portuguese in 1763, while Pernem district came under the Portuguese in 1788 only. By 1788, what is known as the new conquest—Pernem, Bicholim, Satari, Ponda, Quepem, Sanguem and Canacona—was complete and the Portuguese were masters of the territory between Sawanhwadi in the north and Karwar in the south, and Supa in the east on the west coast.

In 1741, the Portuguese invaded Sadashivgad belonging to the rulers of Sonda and forced them to part with Paroda, Molem and Siroda. Later, in the wars between the Marathas and Hyder Ali of Mysore, the rulers of Sonda sought the help of the Portuguese in order to protect their small kingdom on the condition to cede to the Portuguese Antasruj alias Ponda and the Panchmahals i.e., Hemand Barsche, Zambaulim alias Ashtagar, Cacora, Bali together with Chandrawadi and Cancona. In lieu of this, the Portuguese agreed to give 20,000 *ashrafis* to the rulers of Sonda annually and to continue the grants and *inams* in the latter's kingdom, for the maintenance of temples and *agraharas*. The treaty was signed in 1791. Pernem, Bhatagram and the Satari Mahl became part of the Sawantwadi kingdom as a result of the fall of Adil Shahi in 1685. In 1746, the Portuguese attacked the territory of the Savants and seized the forts of Acaro, Tiracol, and the Satari Mahal.

2. Northern Provinces

The coastal regions of Gujarat were very important for maritime trade. Therefore immediately after getting possession of Goa, they cast their eyes on Diu which was considered to be the gate to India. But Bassein was offered to them by the ruler of Gujarat who did not want to part with Diu. There were four important areas in the Portuguese possession in north which came under generic name "northern provinces".

- a) **Bassein:** Nuno da Cunha attacked Bassein on 20th January 1533 and went back to Goa. When he got the news in Goa that Bahadur Shah had been making all the preparations to attack Chitor since its ruler had passed away and there was only a young boy to succeed him, he proceeded to the sultanate of Gujarat. By the time he reached Bassein in the month of December 1533, the Sultan of Gujarat sent an envoy called Sheik Iwas, offering Bassein. Presumably it was done

by the Sultan because of the fear that the Portuguese would conquer Diu and would do harm to the entire sultanate of Gujarat. Since the Governor saw that Bassein was important on account of its revenue as well as its nearness to Chaul, he accepted the offer and agreed to sign a treaty with the envoy who had all the powers for the same from the Sultan. The treaty was concluded on 23rd December 1533. Bassein was handed over to the Portuguese. It continued to be under the Portuguese till 1739 when it was conquered by Chimaji Apa, the Maratha General and in the light of the treaty of 1740 the Portuguese were allowed to retain Fort Daman along with twenty-two villages.

- b) **Diu:** Both Nuno da Cunha and Sheik I were the signatories of treaty dated 25th October 1535 in the light of which the Portuguese were allowed to build a factory in Diu. The latter said that in the previous year when Bassein was given to the Portuguese, a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded and to add to the existing friendship, the sultan was pleased to give a place for a fortress in Diu to the Portuguese king with all the conditions contained in the discussions with Simão Ferreira who, at the orders of the governor Nuno da Cunha, had been sent to the Sultan of Gujarat and agreed on the terms and conditions specified in the treaty.
- c) **Daman:** Daman lies 500 kilometers north of Goa; situated in 20° 21' 55" and 72° 54'16". It has an area of 72 square kilometres. The Portuguese deemed it necessary to acquire it for the safety of Bassein. It was under an Abyssinian captain employed by the sultan of Gujarat. The Portuguese governor Constantino Braganza (1558-1561) sailed against Daman with a fleet of more than hundred vessels with two or three thousand soldiers. They defeated the Abyssinian captain in 1559. The old fortress was pulled down and a new fortress was erected by the Portuguese.
- d) **Dadra and Nagar Haveli:** The Portuguese obtained in 1781, Nagar Haveli Pargana of seventy-four villages as a *jagir* for maintaining relations of amity with the Maratha Empire in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1779. Nagar-Haveli stands out as one of the important territories. Nagar-Haveli, in reality, was given by the Marathas to the Portuguese for collecting revenue. The Marathas did not transfer their sovereignty over it to the Portuguese. The treaty of 1779 and the two *sanads* of 1783 and 1785 make it abundantly clear

that the Marathas affected only a revenue grant called *Jagir* or *saranjam* and not a transfer of sovereignty. But the Portuguese interpreted the treaty of 1779, particularly art. 17 of the treaty, as constituting a transfer of sovereignty and treated Nagar-Haveli and other areas from this angle. But this interpretation of the Portuguese was rejected by the International Court of Justice in its judgment in the case of “right of passage over Indian territory”. The court said that from an examination of the various texts of art of the said treaty, placed before it, it is unable to conclude that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty over Nagar-Haveli and other areas to the Portuguese. There are several instances on the record of treaties concluded by the Marathas which show that, where a transfer of sovereignty was intended, appropriate and adequate expressions like cession “in perpetuity” or “in perpetual sovereignty” were used. The expressions used in the two *sanads* and connected relevant documents establish, on the other hand, that what was granted to the Portuguese was only a revenue tenure.

The Indian national leaders took the stand that India could not be considered totally independent unless the Portuguese and French pockets in India were liberated and integrated into the Indian Union. Mahatma Gandhi had written way back on 30th June 1946 that India could not allow the existence of the Portuguese rule in India. The Portuguese governor in Goa wrote back telling that the people of Goa did not want independence. The National Congress, which met at Jaipur in December 1948, resolved elaborate pattern for the solution of the foreign possessions in India. In categorical terms, the government of India requested the Portuguese Government in 1950 to leave their possessions in India to the Indian Union.

The Portuguese government went on hammering on their argument that they held Goa not as a colony as the British had held India and therefore there was no question of leaving Goa. They amended the Portuguese constitution on 12th June 1951 so as to make all their colonies into the “overseas provinces” of the metropolitan Portugal. Based on this assumption, Portugal rejected the demand of the Government of India on 1st May 1953 and reiterated that Portuguese possessions in India constituted overseas provinces of Portugal and hence were its integral part. India closed down its delegation in Lisbon on 11th June 1953.

Public opinion grew indignant and pressure was applied on the

Indian national leaders. Goan nationalists, imbued with the idea of non-violence, organized *satyagrahas*. Even though the French left their possessions in 1954, the Portuguese continued to hang on to their possessions in India citing other motives. They spread the information that Goa was the “bastion of European and Roman Catholic Civilization” though Indian Christians reacted saying that Christianity had reached India centuries before the arrival of the Portuguese. Nehru met the then Pope in July 1955 and got the issue confirmed that the problem of the Portuguese settlements in India was not a religious problem, but a purely political one.

Liberation and Reunification of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Dadra, which was given to the Portuguese by the Maratha rulers as a *jagir*, was not very far from the Portuguese possession of Daman. On 22nd July 1954 about thirty unarmed Goan volunteers entered the territory of Dadra. The Portuguese police officer directed his gun towards them. The nationalist inhabitants of Dadra supported the volunteers and overcame the police force numbering thirty-two (Note of MEA to the Legation of Portugal in India, 1954: 22). Thus Dadra was liberated from the Portuguese.

V.K. Krishna Menon declared in the United Nations General Assembly that it would be fantastic to imagine that a free and independent people of the Indian Union, who secured independence from Britain, would allow any other power to occupy a chunk of their land (UNGA, O.R. Session 10: 240). The Portuguese Legation in New Delhi submitted a note to the Government of India on 24th July 1954 demanding the grant of necessary transit facilities to the Portuguese armed forces staying at Daman to enable them to go to Dadra for the purpose of re-establishing the order, which had been disturbed, and to drive away the invader. Government of India replied stating that it could not permit the movement of foreign troops and police on Indian soil. It was made clear that the Government of India could not be a party to the suppression of a genuine nationalist movement for freedom from the foreign rule in part of the Portuguese establishments in India (Rubinoff, 1971: 57).

The volunteers of Azad Gomantak Dal along with some volunteers of *Jana Sangha* marched to Nagar Haveli on 31st July 1954 and liberated Naroli. The volunteers of People’s Party entered Nagar Haveli from southern border simultaneously and marched towards Silvassa, the capital of Nagar Haveli. The volunteers of Azad Gomantak Dal liberated Silvassa on 2nd August 1954 after capturing

155 Portuguese armed personnel, and hoisted the Indian Flag at Silvassa on the same day. The volunteers of Azad Gomantak Dal captured Khandwel on 11th August and completed the liberation of Nagar Haveli. The former Portuguese administrator of Nagar Haveli surrendered after crossing Nagar Haveli borders into the Indian Union along with fifty-five armed personnel (Case concerning right of passage, I: 100-103; III: 795-801). The liberation of these two enclaves enthused Goans as well as the citizens of the Indian Union.

The Portuguese tried to convince the world that those who liberated these two enclaves and launched the *satyagrahas* were not Goan patriots but were Indian intruders. With the support of the Government of India, Portugal got membership in the United Nations Organization on 22nd December 1955 and on the same day they filed a case against India in the International Court of Justice at The Hague regarding the right of passage over the Indian Territory between Daman and Dadra and Nagar Haveli. The case dragged on till 1960. The General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution on 15th December 1960 rejecting the Portuguese claim on the Portuguese possessions in India as their "Overseas Provinces". The court after several sessions totally rejected the Portuguese claim for the right of passage through the Indian Territory to Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Finally the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Haveli were formally incorporated into the Indian Union in August 1961.

Goa, Daman and Diu

A number of associations were formed in Goa by the local people to fight for their liberation from the Portuguese. They organized *satyagraha* and invited Indian national leaders like Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia to inspire them. Goa Congress Committee, Gomantakiya Tarun Sangh, Goa Seva Sangh, Goan Youth League, National Congress (Goa) and Azad Gomantak Dal were some of the organizations that led the fight for freedom from the Portuguese. They organized civil disobedience movement, *satyagraha* and so on. The role played by the press and women in the people's fight for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies in India is remarkable.

Nehru and the Reunification

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru clarified the attitude of the Indian Union towards the problem of Goa when he made his statement in the Lok Sabha on 25th August 1954. He mentioned that the resistance

movement in the Portuguese possessions was entirely Goan, popular and spontaneous and its strength lay in that fact. He added that India adhered to non-violence since British Rule. However, he explained that adhering to non-violence did not mean that India would give up or allow any derogation of its identification with the cause of its compatriots under Portuguese yoke. At the same time, it also did not mean that the Indian Government might not pursue, favour or forcibly create the situation of violence. It was also not the wish of the government to think and resort to military action (Nehru, 1958: 373). In a reply to Acharya J. B. Kripalani's poser, he affirmed that his government was not pledged to non-violence (Nehru, 1958: 382).

It was quite natural to expect that Portugal, an ally of the British would follow the British and leave their possessions in India to the Indian Union. But, contrary to the general expectation, they tightened their hold on these territories. *The Times of India* (Bombay) published Nehru's categorical declaration on 15th August 1955: 'I declare here and now that we shall not send our army. We will solve this problem peacefully. Let everybody understand this clearly' (16/08/1955). He questioned the right of the Portuguese government, in terms of international law, to open fire on unarmed volunteers who were not at all attacking the territories (Chari, 1955: 1064). Though Nehru was against the entry of Indian nationals into Goa as *satyagrahis*, 4204 *satyagrahis* marched into Portuguese possessions in 1955 in small groups on the Indian Independence day. The Portuguese police opened fire without any warning and justified the act, saying that the volunteers had ignored the orders to halt and had continued to march into Goa (Lok Sabha Debates: 10250 & 14401). The bloodshed raised protest from everyone in India. Nehru condemned the savage and uncivilized firing of unarmed non-violent *satyagrahis*. India protested and asked for the closure of the Portuguese consulates in Calcutta and Madras. The Indian Consulate-General in Goa was withdrawn on 1st September 1955.

However, Nehru did not change his attitude towards the eradication of colonial rule from Goa. On 15th August 1954 from the ramparts of the Red Fort in New Delhi, he had observed that Goa was the oldest symbol of the colonial idea in India. It was an ugly pimple and if anybody suggested that India should continue to tolerate that pimple, then he had understood the mind and heart neither of India nor of Asia (Rajan, 1964: 521 ff.).

Nehru objected to the suggestion of plebiscite from some quarters. He was of the opinion that necessary conditions for plebiscite did

not exist in Goa where the people were scared to express their own opinion.

As a protest against atrocities committed on the *satyagrahis* in Daman, Government of India closed down the Consulate General in Goa on 1st September 1955 and on 6th September of the same year, the diplomatic relations between India and Portugal were severed. The Government of India declared that the liberation of the Portuguese pockets in India was the responsibility of the Government of India (New Leader 36: 6-9). Subsequent to the killing of the *satyagrahis*, Government of India banned the entry of Indians into Goa in support of the *satyagraha* for the liberation of Goa. Hence the struggle for freedom in Goa went further underground. Azad Gomantak Dal spearheaded the movement.

International Support

The Goans continued their efforts to get themselves liberated from the Portuguese yoke. This evoked keen interest among various peoples. The People's Republic of China, Latin America, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam denounced repressive measures of the Portuguese against the activities of citizens in the Portuguese possessions for freedom. They extended their support.

Soviet Union sympathized with the Goans trying to get freedom from the Portuguese. Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Communist Party secretary, visited India and had occasion to have first-hand information about the problem of Goa. In his speech at the civic reception in Madras on 28th November 1955, Marshal Bulganin expressed his view that the Portuguese presence on the Indian soil was a shame to the civilized people. He further offered his support to the Indian people for the liberation of Goa (Shirodkar, 1999: 141).

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo on 26th December 1957 urged Portugal to hand over Goa to India, as it believed that Goa was an integral part of India (Asian Recorder, 1958: 1833ff.). In December 1960, UN General Assembly adopted a 43 Nation Afro-Asian "Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" by votes to none with nine cases of abstention (Yearbook of the UN, 1960: 46). The UN General Assembly proclaimed the 'necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations'.

Several African nationalists who met at the Seminar on Portuguese

colonies held in Bombay on 23 October 1961 extended support to Nehru for the liberation of the Portuguese territories in India. Some of them were Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique), G. Ferreira Viana and J. Savimbi (Angola), Adriano Araujo (Portuguese Guinea), Kenneth Kaunda (President, National Independence Party, North Rhodesia), Mbiyu Koinange (General Secretary, Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa), Nsilo Swai (Tanganyika) and Abdel Karim-el-Khatib (Minister for African Affairs, Royal Moroccan Government). The *Indian Express* (Bombay) reported that they expressed their solidarity with India in the fight against Portugal (24/10/1961). They even advocated use of force to eradicate Portuguese colonialism.

The trend of the UN towards the end of 1960 was against the Portuguese colonial attempts in the world and the resolution of 15th December 1960 insisted that Portugal should furnish reports on the colonial territories in view of the UN Charter. The Portuguese were urged to do it without any further delay. This attitude of the UN encouraged Nehru and he hoped that the Portuguese rule in territories in India would come to an end shortly. But he could not fix an exact date for its dissolution. Despite agonizing moments, he preferred waiting for the peaceful withdrawal of Portugal (Rajya Sabha Debates, 1960). The Congress Party too was enthused by the stand taken by the UN on colonialism. The 66th Session of the Congress held on 6th and 7th January 1961 at Bhavnagar adopted a resolution on Portuguese colonies and colonialism in which it condemned the Portuguese as the most autocratic and ruthless imperial power in the world (*Asian Recorder*, 1961: 3755 & 3757). Some newspapers like *The Hindu* commented critically on the attitude of the British who abstained from voting at the General Assembly of the UN when the Afro-Asian Resolution on ending colonialism was put to vote. *The Hindu* commented that perhaps international politics and too tender regard for Portuguese susceptibilities might have obstructed the way of Britain being outspokenly in favour of what was right (19/12/1960). All India Trade Union Congress too was vocal in expressing its concern over the delay of Portugal in liberating the territories in India. They insisted that the Portuguese pockets in India should be immediately liberated and returned to India (Proceedings of the AITUC 26th Session: 3761).

Portugal took steps to tighten its hold on the territories in India and formed corps of volunteers in each territory with a view to 'cooperating in the maintenance of order and the defence of the integrity and national sovereignty of the territory concerned'. Lisbon set up civil defence organizations in each of the overseas territory

under the direct supervision of the respective Governor General.¹

Nehru maintained a “wait and see” policy which was not tolerated by the people at large. The National Convention for the Integration of Goa, Daman and Diu with India held in Bombay on 14th May 1961 reminded the government of India that it was the ‘sacred duty of the Government of India and the entire nation’ to free the Portuguese colonies in India. The Convention adopted a resolution to this effect (Asian Recorder, 1961: 3983). The Congress party realizing the need for responding to the popular demand extended its full sympathy to the Goans in their fight for freedom and their wish to come to the fold of the Indian nation after liberation.

An historic development took place in India. On 12th June 1961, the *Varishtha Panchayat* at Free Dadra and Nagar Haveli passed a resolution urging the Government of India to incorporate those areas within the Indian Union. The Government of India yielded to their request and introduced the relevant bills and passed them in the Parliament². This decision was vigorously resented by the Portuguese government, which sent protest notes to the Government of India and also complained to the UN Security Council branding the action as ‘a typical case of international aggression’ (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1961: 18317).

On 17th August 1961, Nehru made it very clear that India would not allow the Portuguese to pass through the Indian Territory to reach Dadra and Nagar Haveli and warned that if anybody tried to enter the Indian Territory he would be ‘ejected with all speed’ (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1961: 18317). Realizing the need for the change of foreign policy, he declared in response to the debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on 17th August 1961: ‘...if I am asked at the present moment to give any kind of assurance that we shall not use armed forces in regard to Goa, I am not in a position to give it. I do not know what we may do at any time, but we cannot at present in regard to the development of events everywhere, rule out the question of using armed forces in regard to Goa’ (Lok Sabha Debates: 2775). During the discussion on Dadra, Nagar Haveli Enclaves Merger Bill and the Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Bill in Rajya Sabha on 16th August 1961, he added: ‘the time may come when we may decide even to send our army there. When that comes, it will be an open effort of ours, not a secret or furtive one’ (Indian Affairs Record, 1962: 2).

However, Nehru explained that India’s difficulty in this regard was moral because he had been saying that the country would not go to war unless it was attacked. He feared that if his government intended to resolve the issue by waging a war against Portugal, it

might result into either a war with other countries or a complicated situation (Lok Sabha Debates: 2774). Portugal, being aware of the attitudinal changes of India, decided to seek international help to protect their colonies. Portugal sent protest note to India, denying 'insinuations regarding the situation in Goa and the imaginary repressive measures adopted there'. It further stated that life in Goa was normal and that there was no doubt about the patriotism and firm decision of the population there to remain Portuguese and that they resented Indian threats of armed action against Goa (Asian Recorder, 1961: 4200). Government of India warned Portugal that if the situation in Goa worsened, threatening peace and security of the Indian subcontinent, it would have the right to resort to such steps as might be indispensable to face the situation. It expressed its unhappiness over Portugal's denial that there was any repression and suppression of liberties in Goa (Asian Recorder, 1961: 4200).

Portugal, interested in giving a legal and constitutional status to the colonies, conferred Portuguese citizenship on all the inhabitants of its overseas territories under the statute of 28th August 1961. Portugal raised the number of 120-member Portuguese National Assembly to 130 and of these additional seats, one was allotted to Goa, Daman and Diu.

On the other hand, Portugal stepped up repressive measures in Goa leading to a large number of arrests and deportation of an Indian political prisoner to Portugal, which was strongly objected to by the Indian government³. The Portuguese Governor General in Goa appealed to the Goans to muster strength to face the "Indian aggression" and started a systematic campaign in the territories against the Government of India⁴.

Nehru, who was slowly moving to the idea of non-peaceful action, declared that India would not tolerate Goa as a foreign base on the coast of India. He further clarified that the Government of India never considered that there was no possibility of the use of force to liberate Goa. It was not permanently committed to the policy so far pursued by it, and if necessary, it would resort to other methods too⁵.

Since the situation was turning explosive, as per the announcement made by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on 5th December 1961, the Government of India began 'precautionary' troop movement in view of the rising oppression and terrorism in Goa and the aggressive postures adopted by the Portuguese against Indian shipping and even fishing vessels (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1962: 18635). The Indian government asserted that it was obliged to take the precautionary step in order to fortify the defense on

the border and the coast (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1962: 18636).

Immediate Steps for Liberation

The Government of India on 12th December 1961 sealed two of its mainland routes to Goa for civilian population with a view to facilitating the movement of troops on the Goa border. The Portuguese Governor General, in his turn, assumed emergency powers and declared the evacuation of Europeans and locally born women and children of Europeans from Goa, Daman and Diu. He further announced: 'the military forces would need to act with the greatest possible liberty of movement as is convenient, in a fight that is likely to be characterized by the greatest toughness' (Indian Affairs Record, 1962: 3).

On 15th December 1961, Government of India sent a protest note to Lisbon against the oft-repeated acts of aggression and the mounting reign of terror and repression of the peaceful and freedom-loving Goans and the terrorization and interference with the Indian populations on the borders (Rajya Sabha Debates: 755ff). The United States of America tried on 18th December 1961 once more to stall military action suggesting a period of six months more and Washington would get a promise from Lisbon for the solution of the problem. India did not accept it since the nature of the solution was not clear. At last at zero hour on 17th-18th December 1961 the seventeenth division of the Indian Army with naval and air support made a three-pronged entry and entered into Goa, Daman and Diu. Gen. J. N. Choudhury, G.O.C, Southern Command was in overall command of Goa operation. Major General K.P. Candeth directed the Artillery operations. The Naval forces under Rear Admiral B.S. Soman provided support to the action. The Air Force under Air Vice-Marshal Pinto helped the action in giving cover to it. The *Times of India* reported Army Staff Gen. P.N. Thapar stating that the Indian army had gone there 'not as conquerors of a foreign land but as part of the Indian defence forces, who have always served their mother-land to defend the honour and security of our people' (18/12/1961).

The Government of India promised the Goans political liberty, economic progress and increasing prosperity, which would come from the common endeavour. It assured that the cultural pattern of Goa would be maintained intact under the Indian Constitution. The government reiterated that the action was justified and it had

not violated the UN Charter while Portugal did violate it. In view of the breakdown of law and order and the danger to which the Indian population was exposed, Government of India was constrained to send troops to Goa, Daman and Diu. According to the *Times of India*, the leaflets dropped by the IAF planes on 17th-18th December had the following message:

The defense forces that are now with you are for your protection. It is their task to defend the honour and the security of our motherland from which you have been separated for too long and which you largely by your own efforts again made your own. They will take every step to ensure your safety, uphold your dignity and honour whatever the cost. At this critical moment, however, Goans must remain watchful. The Portuguese will do everything to leave Goa in ruin and the Goan people in misery. They do not care what happens to Goa now, for they must and will depart. They have nothing to lose by sowing destruction in this land. Their Portugal is at a safe distance. They will try to destroy our bridges, our railways, our temples and churches, our schools and public buildings, and fine and God-given harbour. Crores of rupees and immense human endeavour will have to be re-spent to rebuild all that is destroyed. The Goans cannot and must not allow this to happen at any cost. Be calm and brave. Rejoice in your freedom and help to safeguard it. (18/12/1961)

The “Operation Vijay” as the military entry into the Portuguese territories in India was called, lasted till 19th December 1961. According to V.K. Krishna Menon’s statement on 19th December 1961, the people of Goa, Daman and Diu welcomed the liberation army with great enthusiasm and helped it to complete the unfinished part of the Indian revolution (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1962: 18638). The entire operation lasted for 24 hours. There were light casualties on both sides. UN Security Council could not succeed in calling for a ceasefire on account of the strong support of Ceylon, Liberia, UAR and Russia, one of the permanent members of the Council. This was a great victory for India.

The Lok Sabha passed two Bills unanimously whereby Goa, Daman and Diu were declared as integral parts of the Indian Union and provisions for administration were made. Government of India conferred Indian citizenship on all those who were born or domiciled in the former Portuguese territories or either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents were born in those areas before 20th December 1961. Those who did not want to be Indian citizens were ordered to declare in writing that they would maintain the citizenship or nationality they possessed before 20th December 1961. Indian government agreed to make arrangements for the transfer of movable assets and personal property, withdrawal

of funds, free disposition of immovable property. It allowed the Portuguese military and retinues to leave India for Portugal on 2nd May 1962.

On the other hand, Portugal passed a bill in their National Assembly by which it refused to recognize Indian sovereignty over Goa, Daman and Diu. The Bill also made provisions by which Goa would continue to be represented by the three representatives of Goan origin. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who after a long period of patient waiting, had sent the forces to the Portuguese territories in India, was maligned by a few prejudiced parties.

Some sections of the international press joined hands in slinging mud on the face of India in general and Nehru in particular. India's action in Goa aroused strong reactions in many parts of the world. On the one hand, its action was highly welcomed by many of the Afro-Asian, Latin American countries and all the socialist states. They described India's act as an act of liberation of Goa from Portuguese colonialism. On the other hand, its action was strongly criticized by Portugal and the other Western states. They criticized India for aggression against Portuguese territory and thereby violation of international law as well as the UN Charter. Further, they were also critical of India for violating the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence, which India professed to preach as well as practise while pursuing its foreign policy.

Western powers like United States of America were very critical of Nehru's attitude. Arthur Schlesinger wrote: 'The contrast between Nehru's incessant sanctimony on the subject of non-aggression and his brisk exercise of *Machtpolitik* was too comic not to cause comment. It was a little like catching the preacher in the hen-house; and it suggested that Harrow and Cambridge, in instilling the British virtues, had not neglected hypocrisy. If such judgments were unfair, it was almost too much to expect the targets of Nehru's past sermons not to respond in kind' (Schlesinger, 1960: 527). *Washington Post* on 20th December 1961 accused Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru of a departure from his professed dedication to principle and morality. It added that with the integration of Goa into India, the Indians lost the credibility and commitment to non-violence⁶. The world press questioned his commitment to non-violence and vehemently attacked his "holier than thou" attitude immediately after the steps he took for integration of the Portuguese settlements.⁷

It may be argued that India did not violate article 2(4) of the UN charter because its action was not against the territorial integrity or political independence of Portugal. Goa was Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT), a colony, which did not form an integral part of

the territory of Portugal. Colonies in general do not form an integral part of the Metropolitan territory of a colonial power. Goa was only provisionally under the colonial administration of Portugal. There was no legal frontier between India and Goa, so there could not be any question of aggression against its own frontier and against its own people. In fact, it was an integral part of India. Goans were as much Indians as the people in the other parts of the country. Moreover, Portugal had no valid entitlement regarding Goa because a valid title cannot be acquired by military occupation.

Further, India's action was not in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN. India, by its action, rather helped in furtherance of the purposes of the UN. One of the purposes of the UN is 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people' (Art. 1(2) of the Charter). Portugal denied the Goans their right of self-determination. But India, by its action, enabled the Goans to realize their right of self-determination. This also means that India, by its action, assisted the Goans in attaining freedom from Portuguese colonial domination, finally merging with the rest of the country. Again one of the purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security (Ar.1 (1) of the Charter). Colonialism has been declared as the greatest source of threat to international peace and security. India by its action assisted in eliminating this source of threat, at least on the Indian subcontinent, to international peace and security and thereby helped in promoting one of the purposes of the UN. Thus, India while taking over Goa and other Portuguese possessions in India through force acted in accordance with the UN Charter i.e., Articles 73,1(2) and 55 and UN resolutions, particularly GA resolutions 1514 (xv) and 1542 (xv).

As concluding remarks, it may be argued that the success of the national movement in British India and the acquisition of independence from the British played an important role in boosting the national sentiments of the people in the Portuguese territories in India. They adopted some of the techniques like Satyagraha, non-violence, civil disobedience and so on that were practiced in British India to get rid of colonial rule. The reunification of these Portuguese pockets with the Indian union was a natural consequence of the success of the national movement in British India. The leaders were imbued with the spirit of Independence and could not tolerate any foreign power in India. They all fought for national integrity.

Goa is analysed here as a symptomatic case in point, embodying the vicissitudes of transition, with an emphasis on politico-legal

problems in the aftermath of the end of the Portuguese Empire and the evolution of a new polity. The merit of such an exercise, besides analysing the political character of the state marked by the conflictive co-existence of opposing systems i.e. dictatorial and democratic, lies in the fact that it implicitly attempts to emphasize the limitations of colonial historiographies and epistemic approaches. These approaches make a fundamentally debatable assumption that the transition and integration of former non-British colonial pockets in India was without substantive problems in the absence of serious armed conflict as in the case of Portuguese Goa or smooth transfer of power as was the case with French Pondicherry on the east coast. This assumption which narrows down the framework of understanding the dynamics of human politico-cultural encounters, emerges partly due to perceived critical similarities in the civilizational aspect, geo-political and historical settings, socio-cultural, linguistic and religious affinities between India and these smaller territories, and partly due to the European intellectual preoccupation with the “Collapse of Empire”.

Notes

1. Decrees to this effect were issued in Lisbon 31st March 1961 (Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961: 18071).
2. The bills which were introduced in the Lok Sabha on 11th August 1961 were adopted by it on 14th and 17th August respectively. The Rajya Sabha passed them on 16th and 23th August 1961 respectively. The President gave his assent on 27th November 1961 (Rajya Sabha Debates: 736). See also Rajya Sabha Debates: 91. The legislation comprised two bills. One was The *Tenth Constitution Amendment* making Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the seventh Union Territory with retrospective effect from 11th August 1961 and the second was to amend the Representation of People's Act entitling the new territory to one seat in the Lok Sabha. Accordingly, the Union Territory would be ruled by an Administrator and the role of the *Varishtha Panchayat* would be advisory on the pattern of territorial councils. All judges, magistrates and other executive officers serving in the territories would continue their function under the jurisdiction of the Bombay High court. Pending the election of a member to the Lok Sabha, the president would nominate one.
3. It was Mohan Ranade who was deported to Portugal from Goa jail on 23rd August 1960 (Rajya Sabha Debates: 576; Lok Sabha Debates: 1228 ff).
4. Address to the Legislative Assembly in Panjim on 1st September 1961 (*Navshakti*, 12/09/1961).
5. Inaugural Address at the Seminar on Portuguese Colonies, New Delhi, 20th October 1961 (*Navshakti*, 23/10/1961).
6. 'Prime Minister Nehru has lost that power to influence the opinion of the world which derived from his life-long professed dedication to principle and morality... Portugal has lost Goa, but it would, in any case, have lost it hereafter.

It is nothing so tangible as an ally; it is nothing so material as land, or money or trade. It is something infinitely more precious and more rare. What is lost is fair in the essential goodness and morality of a new nation, whose record, hitherto was unsullied by any act of aggression' (National Secretariat for Information, 1962: 158-59).

7. The Cleveland Plain Dealers wrote on 10th December 1961: 'India's Prime Minister Nehru, famous for his non-violent approach to the solution of other nation's disputes, himself made what sounded like war talk on two Asian fronts' (National Secretariat for Information, 1962: 144). The New York World Telegram wrote on 18th December 1961: 'India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who made himself in world's no. 1 holier-than-thou moralizer and man of peace, can no longer act as the conscience of mankind. He ranged from critical to indignant when Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt, when Russia crushed the Hungarian revolt, and when the United States backed the rebel invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. Now, after yesterday's Indian invasion of tiny Portuguese Goa, he is in the same boat with those who condemned, Goa has 1537 square miles and 6,50,000 people on the south-west coast of India, a nation has 450 million people.... When he was Mohandas Gandhi's disciple he accepted the master's doctrine of non-violence as a political weapon simply because it happened to be the right policy at the time India was seeking freedom Britain. It was not something he believed in absolutely' (National Secretariat for Information, 1962: 148).

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