# THE STRUCTURE OF INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA) IN THE ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

Anil Kumar Tewari

## Abstract

The *Ātmatattvaviveka* (hereafter ATV) is authored by Udayanācārya, the Nyāya philosopher of 10th-11th century AD, to meet the challenges posed by the Buddhist logicians of his time particularly Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 980-1030 AD) in order to establish the existence of self (*ātman*). The method adopted in the text is to reconstruct four theories that seem to be an imminent threat to the Nyāya conception of the self and refute them. The theories in question are the doctrine of impermanence (*kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*), the rejection of external objects (*bāhyārthabhaṅga*), the rejection of the difference between substance and properties (*guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅga*), and non-cognition (*anupalambha*). The major part of ATV is devoted to the reformulation and refutation of these abovementioned theories. First of all, Udayana targets to reject the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness since it questions the possibility of the existence of anything unchanging, then he moves to examine the proposal of the unreality of the external world since the acceptance of mind-independent objects involves the possibility of denying the self as distinct from knowledge. The third theory is targeted towards the acceptance of indifference between the properties and the substance since it implies the denial of the self as different from its properties. Towards the end, he examines the suggestion coming from the non-apprehension of anything eternal which is also indicative of the non-existence of the eternal self and then briefly advances the Nyāya conception of *ātman*.

Udayana follows the method of reductio ad absurdum which seeks

* Assistant Professor, School of Philosophy and Culture, Shri Mata Vishno Devi University, Katra, Union Territory of Jammu and Kasmir.

to demonstrate absurdity in a position to declare it inconsistent. Generally, Indian logicians present an opponent's viewpoint (*pūrvapakṣa*) in order to refute it (*khaṇḍana*) before proposing their own viewpoint (*siddhānta/maṇḍana*). The main objective of the present article is to see the structure of reasoning adopted by Udayana in his ATV. The exploration intends to utilize the technique of the Venn diagram, wherever possible, for a diagrammatic representation of the pattern of argumentation besides using some nuances of symbolic logic. The article is confined to the refutation of the theory of momentariness in the Buddhist philosophy. The conjecture is that Udayana ends up refuting his own formulation of the opponents' position than theirs in letter and spirit, but in doing so, he has contributed to the logical development of various dimensions of at least one version of the doctrine which any Buddhist logician would have designed it.

**Key Words:** Åtmatattvaviveka, Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda, Momentariness, Pūrvapakṣa, Udayanācārya, Jñānaśrīmitra

<div align="center">Introduction</div>

In Indian philosophy, inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is a rational expansion of experiential knowledge. Inference or reasoning (*anumāna*) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) through which such expansion is brought about. This instrument is used to get the knowledge of one thing on the basis of its necessary relationship with the other thing. Similarly, we come to know an aspect of a thing on the basis of its invariable relationship to the aspects of other things. Thus, the crucial point behind inferential knowledge is the relationship of necessity between what is indubitably known to us (*hetu*, i.e., probans) and what can rationally be claimed on the basis of this familiar knowledge (*sādhya*, i.e., probandum). For instance, given the relationship of necessity between smoke and fire, the presence of fire in a place is inferred on the grounds of the observation of smoke in that place. The technique of inferential knowledge is used by the Indian logicians for various purposes ranging from the presentation of an opponent's viewpoint (*pūrvapakṣa*), its refutation (*khaṇḍana*) and also for advancing their own proposal (*siddhānta/ maṇḍana*). The objective of the present article is to comprehend and extrapolate the structure of the inferential reasoning adopted by Udayanācārya, the Nyāya philosopher of 10th-11th century AD, in his *Åtmatattvaviveka* (hereafter ATV) to meet the challenges posed by the Buddhist logicians of his time particularly Jñānaśrīmitra (c.

980-1030 AD) and Ratnakīrti (early 11th century AD) of Vikramaśilā (in present Bhagalpur, Bihar), for the existence of self (*ātman*).

At the outset of ATV, Udayana mentions the four theories which are an avowedly imminent threat to the Nyāya conception of the self and then proceeds to refute them one-by-one. The theories in question are the doctrine of impermanence (*kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*), the rejection of external objects (*bāhyārthabhaṅga*), the rejection of the difference between substance and properties (*guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅga*), and non-cognition (*anupalambha*). The major part of ATV is devoted to the reformulation and refutation of these theories. First of all, Udayan targets to reject the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness since it questions the possibility of the existence of anything unchanging, then he moves to examine the proposal of the unreality of the external world since the acceptance of mind-independent objects involves the possibility of denying the self as distinct from consciousness or knowledge. The third theory targeted is the denial of a difference between the substance and properties since it implies the denial of the self being different from its properties. Towards the end, he examines the suggestion coming from the non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) which is allegedly indicative of the non-existence of the self.

To achieve the above objectives, Udayana follows the method of *reductio ad absurdum* which seeks to demonstrate absurdity in a viewpoint to declare it inconsistent. Generally, Indian logicians present an opponent's viewpoint (*pūrvapakṣa*) in order to refute it (*khaṇḍana*) before proposing their own viewpoint (*siddhānta/ maṇḍana*). The main objective of the present article is to see the structure of reasoning adopted by Udayana in his ATV. The article is confined to the refutation of the theory of momentariness of the Buddhist philosophy. The conjecture is that Udayana ends up refuting his own formulation of the opponent's position and in doing so, he contributes to the logical development of the doctrine which a Naiyāyika would have conceptualized it, but a Buddhist logician would not have fully agreed to it. The exploration utilizes the technique of the Venn diagram, wherever possible, for a perspicuous representation of the pattern of argumentation besides using some nuances of symbolic logic.

## The Background of the *Ātmatattvaviveka*

The classical Indian philosophical thinking is enriched immensely with a continual intellectual exchange, particularly from 4th to 12th century CE, between the Nyāya and the Buddhist tradition. Belief

in the existence of a permanent substance (as the locus of certain properties such as knowledge, for the Nyāya) turned out to be the real testing of their argumentative strength. The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama is the founding text of the Nyāya tradition. Among the known commentators of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Vātsyāyana (c. 4th century CE) is the oldest. Gautama and Vātsyāyana criticize Buddhism; however, they are targeted by the Buddhist logician Diṅnāga (c. 480–c. 540 CE). In his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, he refutes the realism of the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama along with Vātsyāyana's commentary. Diṅnāga's refutation is challenged by the 6th century CE Nyāya thinker Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika* (which, he says, is written to dispel the ignorance of the bad logicians—*kutārkikājñāna-nivṛttihetuḥ*).

The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (6th or 7th century CE) followed by Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila (c. 8th century CE) takes up the challenge posed by Uddyotakara. The debate is advanced by the 9th century CE multi-systemic thinker Vācaspati Miśra and also Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā tradition. Jayanta (c. 9th century CE) of Kashmir also enters at this stage and marks the debate with his rare wit and delightful lucidity. Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple Ratnakīrti respond to the Naiyāyikas. Following them, two great masters of the Nyāya tradition appear in 10th – 11th century CE Udayana and Śrīdhara, who would take the debate to its zenith as for as the development of metaphysical and epistemological thinking of Indian philosophy is concerned. The present study focuses on the way Udayana argues against the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness in his *Åtmatattvaviveka* (ATV).

Udayana appears in  the  scene  where   most of the major arguments between Nyāya, Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā are advanced. He is believed to have been intellectually active between the second half of the 10th century CE and the first quarter of the 11th century CE and is the younger contemporary of Jñānaśrīmitra whose phrases are apt in ATV. His contribution is considered to be the most pronounced one in the sequence of exchange. In ATV, where he seeks to defend the metaphysical reality of the self (*ātman*) against the scathing attack of the Buddhist thinkers particularly Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, Udayana begins with the probing of the doctrine of momentariness and devotes maximum space and energy in the text to refute the doctrine. He advances his conception of *ātman* only towards the end in a few paragraphs. It means his method is largely reductio ad absurdum, that is, reduction to absurdity. This is an indirect proof of a theory in which the opposite theory is shown contradictory or producing an absurd

conclusion with logical necessity.

Two major patterns of inference are used: Prasaṅga and Prasaṅgaviparyaya. In his commentary on ATV, Śamkara Miśra defines these patterns (Udayanācārya, 1986, p. 24):

*Prasaṅga-anumāna*

*Kuśulastham-bījamyadyaṅkurasamarthamsyādaṅkuramkuryāt, nacakaroti, tasmānnasamarthameva.*

If the seed in a granary is capable of producing sprout (C), it does produce it; it does not produce sprout (denial of P); therefore, it is not capable.

By following some notation of symbolic logic, the above argument can be produced as below:

1. C ⊃ P (⊃ is a symbol for implication)
2. ~P (~ is a symbol of denial) / ∴ ~C

This is the inferential theory of Modus Tollens, in which the denial of the consequent of a conditional statement enables us to infer the valid denial of the antecedent.

*(a) Prasaṅgaviparyaya-anumāna*

*Kṣetrapatitam (bījam) yadyasamarthamsyānnakuryāt, karoti ca, tasmān-nāsamarthamiti.*

If the seed in a field is incapable of producing sprout, it does not produce it; it does produce sprout; therefore, it is not incapable.

This argument can be rewritten as:

1. ~C ⊃ ~P
2. P / ∴ ~~C

By following the principle of double negation (P ≡ ~~P), we can substitute ~~P for P in the second proposition of the above argument, and thus the whole argument is shown to be a case of Modus Tollens which again produces the denial of the antecedent (~~C) on the basis of the denial of the consequent (~~P) of the conditional statement (~C ⊃ ~P) in the above argument. The conclusions of both the arguments (a) and (b) are however contradictory (*viruddha*), i.e., ~C and ~~C. As a rule, one and the same thing cannot be said to be the locus of contradictory properties. On this ground, the Buddhists argue that the same thing cannot be both *incapable* as well as *not incapable*, and therefore the observation of these contradictory properties are a legit claim to the variety of things. Udayana

would agree though that one and the same thing cannot have opposite properties at one and the same time, yet he denies that such an observation is  sufficient  to establish the theory of impermanence. Before going into the details of the process of argumentation, it would be beneficial to see the difference between impermanence (*kṣaṇika*) and non-eternal (*anitya*).

## *Kṣaṇikavāda* and *Anityavāda*

One of the basic tenets of Buddhism has been the denial of the existence of any unchanging reality. The denial of unchanging reality is primarily motivated by two general concerns: First, since there is nothing unchanging to be found in our experience, it is reasonable to believe that everything that exists is impermanent. Second, since the Buddhists believe that anything unchanging cannot be causally efficacious; to assert that something *exists* but is causally inefficacious or unchanging is to make a contradictory claim. Thus, the Buddhists propose the doctrine of impermanence and, on the basis of it, a dynamic conception of reality. What  could have appeared from such ideas despite phenomenal stability in the existence of certain things?

Radhakrishnan intuits: '[T]his idea might have arisen from reflection  on  consciousness  and  the  apparent  transitoriness  of all objects of nature' (Radhakrishnan, 1989, p. 368). Such an observation indicates the apprehension of the nature of things on the basis of our ordinary experiences which demonstrate temporal perdurance of the physical entities and a fleeting nature of the states of awareness. That is why the doctrine of impermanence, held by the Buddha, is often argued to be different from the doctrine of *momentariness*. While the former is said to involve duration, the latter hardly has any scope for it. In pronouncing the impermanence of everything, the Buddha says that consciousness is momentary, but not things. What perhaps he means is that consciousness changes rather swiftly, but in the case of material things, the change is not noticeably incessant. He says: 'It is evident that the body lasts one year...a hundred year and even more. But that which are called mind, intellect, and consciousness keep up an incessant round, by day and by night, of perishing as one thing and springing up as another' (Kashyapa, 1956, pp. 372-373). The Abhidhamma gives an interesting estimation by alluding to the change in consciousness as seventeen (or sixteen) times higher than the change in a material configuration.

Moreover, it is conspicuous that the famous analogy of flame is used only in the case of consciousness and not in the case of material things.

It can therefore be said that the Buddha does not advocate the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) in all cases; rather, he emphasizes the feature of impermanence or non-eternality (*anityatā*) of everything. The Sanskrit term '*kṣaṇa*' is derived from the root '*kṣaṇ*' meaning 'to injure' or 'to cut'. The expression is described by Yāska, an etymologist of circa 6th BCE, as a definite unit of time which is acute, sharpened as an identifiable unit of time. While commenting on the Sūtra 3.51 in the *Sādhanapāda* of the *Yoga-sūtra*, Vyāsa defines *kṣaṇa* as 'the smallest particle of time just as the atom (*pramāṇu*) is the smallest particle of matter' or as 'a division of time in which minuteness reaches its limit'. Further, he gives a physical definition of *kṣaṇa* as a unit of time taken by an atom (*paramāṇu*) to move from its own place to the immediate next point of its size. It is sequential in as much as two moments (*kṣaṇas*) cannot exist together because between two simultaneous moments there cannot be a sequence. A sequence arises when a later moment succeeds an earlier without interruption.

The derivation of *kṣaṇa* is also linked to '*akṣan*' meaning 'to see' and thus it is also understood as a unit of time taken in a wink/blink. In this sense, *kṣaṇa* corresponds to the term *nimeṣa* which means 'a blink of eyes'. It is a very short unit of time. By extension now we can make sense of the term '*kṣaṇika*' which is a derivative of *kṣaṇa*, meaning the existent of such a short time that it does not have gap to realize even its fruit/result. Such reality is philosophically developed by the Buddhist thinkers, particularly of the Yogācāra tradition, into a sheer transitory reality. This notion is thus a logical refinement over the early Buddhist understanding. In the later Sarvāstivāda Buddhist tradition, for instance, the reality is understood as durational spread over the consecutive past, present and future moments, however it is believed to be causally efficacious in the present only. Subsequently, the momentary objects are recognized as things coming into being and vanishing without interval. Diṅnāga therefore says that reality is in the form of point-instant (*sat-kṣaṇa*). A moment is also defined as something which is substratum of its own origin only. Thus, momentary is something that is the negatum (*pratiyogīn*) of the destruction in the moment immediately after its origin. What we call as the objects are believed to be an uninterrupted flow of causally connected momentary things (*kṣaṇa-santāna*) of nearly the same nature.

Udayana takes up the Yogācāra theory of momentariness for refutation. The Yogācāra Buddhists Jñāśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti are his immediate opponents. This is evident from the expressions of ATV which seem directly barrowed from these thinkers. Jñānaśrīmitra,

in his *Nibandhāvalī*, says: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikamyathājaladharaḥ*, i.e., 'whatever is real is momentary, such as cloud' (Jñānaśrīmitra, 1956, p. 1). His disciple Ratnakīrti, in his *Nibandhāvalī*says,*yatsattatkṣaṇik amyathāghaṭaḥ, santaścāmīvivādāspadībhūtāḥpadārthāḥ*, i.e., 'whatever is real is momentary, such as pot and other controversial entities' (Ratnakīrti, 1975, p. 67). Udayana begins his refutation by saying *yat sat tat kṣaṇikamyathāghaṭaḥ, saṃścavivādādhyāsitaḥśabdādiriticet* meaning "whatever is real is momentary as for instance is the clay pot, and real in fact are things like words whose momentariness is disputed' (Udayanācārya, 1995, p. 7).

## The Basic Argument in Question

Buddhism suggests that whatever exists does so in virtue of its capacity to produce some effect. Any unchanging entity cannot produce an effect; for, production of any effect requires a change in the effect-producing entity. Therefore, every existent thing must be of changing nature. Thus, the Buddhists equate existence with causal efficacy. In fact, existence is defined in terms of causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva sat lakṣaṇaṃ*). A thing which produces something must have the nature of incessant change. For the sake of clarity, we can rewrite the argument in the following way:

> Whatever is real (*sat*), is causally efficacious (*arthakriyā-samartha*).
>
> What is causally efficacious is immediately productive or an active agent (*arthakriyā-kāri*).
>
> Anything immediately productive is momentary (*kṣaṇika*).
>
> Therefore, whatever is real (*sat*) is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), such as pot, cloud etc.

The above argument presents the doctrine of momentariness which is basically an *assertion* of the necessary relationship (called *vyāpti*–pervasion or invariable concomitance) between two classes 'existence' and 'momentariness' for the Buddhists. Udayana argues that there is no reliable evidence *(pramāṇa)* adduced to demonstrate an invariable concomitance *(pratibandha,* another expression for *vyāpti)* between the said two classes, namely, 'existence' and 'momentariness'. And he rightly says that unless the Buddhists accept this necessary relationship, they cannot propose the ever-changing character of reality and thereby its 'causal efficacy' (*arthakriyākāritva*). Real, being causally efficacious is momentary; it also means that the assertion regarding the existence of a non-

momentary thing is contradictory,  particularly in accoradanceto
the Yogācāra Buddhists because it is non-causally efficacious. Causal
efficacy is usually recognized as capability (*sāmarthya*) necessary for
an active agency (*kāritva*). But for a Buddhist, reality, causal efficacy,
and momentary means something which is opposite to unreality,
causal inefficacy, and non-momentary (unchanging).

If 'everything is momentary' is true, then its opposite 'something
is not momentary' is false. Both propositions in Aristotelian logic
are contradictory in that their values are mutually exclusive, if one
is true, the other is false and vice versa. In order to destabilize the
doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism, Udayana seeks to refute
the proposition 'everything is momentary' by not arguing for
the existence of a non-momentary thing; instead, he analyzes the
proposition to show that it is not correct since its various possible
meanings are logically problematic. He uses the analogy of seed and
sapling to instantiate his claim.

According to Udayana, the momentariness of the seed in the
granary and  the field would be shown by the Buddhists by suggesting
their opposite nature: the seed in granary does not sprout, in the
field it does. For, the production and non-production of the sprout
are contradictory properties; there must be a difference between
the seeds in the field and the granary respectively. Existence is
momentary in nature when the capacity to produce a particular effect
is understood as a capacity that  must be discharged immediately.
Then, any entity's existence will immediately be extinguished along
with the immediate production of the effect. Or, as Jñānaśrīmitra
states, an enduring entity is incapable of causal efficacy and so lacks
existence. Udayana responds to the *pūrvapakṣa* by denying the
concomitance between existence and momentariness.

The opponent (a Buddhist) is supposed to argue for an invariable
concomitance with a prasaṅga type of argument meant to show the
absurdity of the idea of an enduring entity. Using the example of a
granary seed and a field seed, the opponent is presented to argue
(in the form of a prasaṅga) that the  seed in the granary is incapable
of producing a sprout (since it does not do so as long as it remains
in the granary) whereas a seed in the field is capable in this respect
(since it does indeed produce a sprout). If, as Udayana would insist,
the granary seed and the field seed are understood as one and the
same thing, then it will become the locus of contradictory properties,
namely, capability (*sāmarthya*) and incapability (*asāmarthya*). For the
Buddhists, this is clearly an absurd position and hence, they must
be two different entities. Udayana's task is to reconcile the disputed
fact that the field seed and the granary seed are different, inasmuch

as one produces a sprout and the other does not, still they are the same.

Udayana considers the argument that if 'capability' and 'incapability' are really opposing features, they cannot belong to the same reality at the same time. Therefore, such ascription must be false. But if these features can be ascribed to the same reality, they cannot be said to be opposed. Udayana says that if the same object is causally efficacious at one time and inefficacious at the other time, then this is not a case of beholding opposite features by the same reality. He distinguishes between two meanings of efficacy: instrumentality or active agency (*karaṇatva*) and competence (*yogyatā*).

## Capability as Active Agency

If the first meaning is taken, it will make the probandum (*sādhya*) indistinguishable from the probans (*hetu*). Following is the explanation. The causal condition which is immediately connected to the effect is called instrument (*karaṇa*–defined as *asādhāraṇakāraṇa*). It is considered to be the last in the list of causal factors and there is only activity (*vyāpāra*), not any causal factor, between it and the effect. For example, the *contact* between the axe and tree is the instrument cause producing the effect of the *cutting of tree* and there is the *activity of hitting*. Udayana says that if 'efficacy' (*sāmarthya*) is identified with the instrumental causal factor or active agency (*karaṇa* or *kāritva*) immediately followed by the origin of the effect, then it would have been unhelpful inference in the form of: "…if the things were not immediately followed by the origin of effect,…it could not have been immediately followed by the origin of the effect"(Chakrabarti, 2001, p. 230). Thus, the difference between the cause (*contact* between the hitting axe and tree) and the effect (the cutting of tree) is collapsed.

To avoid the above allegation, the Buddhists would argue that the difference between the causal efficacy and the active agency with the help of their theory of exclusion (*apoha*). Apoha (literally 'exclusion') is the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to this theory, the meaning of a word is a conceptual image (*vikalpa*) which does not indicate an object directly but by way of excluding the other objects (*anyāpoha*): the word 'cow' means the exclusion of the animals other than cow and the word 'horse' means the exclusion of animals other than horse. In the above case, the probans is 'the negation of the non-causal efficiency' and the probandum is 'the negation of non-active agency.' These two are separate exclusions; hence, they cannot be identical. Udayana presents two reasons against this response:( 1) the basis of the difference of exclusions is

the difference of entities to be negated, the excludents (*vyāvartya*). This is not due to a mutual exclusion of the entities to be negated. 2) Such exclusions are neither justified in the absolute sense nor in the partial sense.

Suppose the exclusions between the capability and the active agency is understood in the sense of absolute exclusion between 'cowness' and 'horseness'. One and the same animal cannot involve these two properties/universals; the presence of one excludes the presence of the other. It will lead to the assertion of the existence of a seed being unproductively capable or it being productively incapable. We can draw a diagram (called Venn diagram) to show these absurdities: three overlapping circles are drawn in Fig. 1, in which the upper two circles represent the two features of 'capability' and 'active agency' respectively, and the circle below represents 'seed'. The yellow-shadowed area represents an absolute exclusion between the two features; the blue cross in the common area of 'capability' and 'seed' asserts the actual capability of the seed and the blue-shadow in the common area of 'active agency' and 'seed' shows the absence of active agency in the seed due to the presence of capability since they exclude each other as per the condition above (see Figure 1 below). The acceptance of seed being unproductively capable is absurd.



Figure 1

Similarly, if we claim the presence of active agency (producing the sprout), and due to its presence, capability gets excluded and other things being the same, it will lead to the absurdity of accepting a seed being incapably productive (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2

If active agency is negated through causal efficiency, it will generate contradiction, the presence of probans (capability) does not establish the probandum (active agency) in the (granary) seed locus (*bādha-hetvābhāsa*)—the undesirable predicament of incongruity (Udayanācārya, 1987, p. 8). Similarly, if the capability of (field) seed gets excluded because of the presence of active agency in it, it becomes the case of unfounded probans (*asiddha-hetvābhāsa*). Therefore, either we end up in proving something opposite or we lose the very basis of our inference. The above diagrams can be used to demonstrate the same logical problems in the case of exclusion between 'non-incapability' and 'non-inactive agency'. Moreover, an absolute exclusion between these excludents does not preclude the possibility of their absences being together in a locus. For instance, the absences of cowness and horseness can be said to be present in a camel, and therefore they cannot be said to be mutually exclusive (Udayanācārya, 1995, p. 11).

With the probing and rejection of the above argument related to the absolute exclusion, a partial exclusion between the above categories is examined. The case considered pertains to the relationship of the class inclusion between the lower classes its higher class and of exclusion between the classes under a higher class. For instance, treeness can accommodate 'mangoness' and 'guavaness' which exclude each other. Udayana argues that this does not hold good in the case of causal efficiency (*sāmarthya*) and active agency (*karaṇatva* or *kāritva*). If a relation of pervasion between them is accepted, there will be logical difficulties. If the former is pervasive of the latter, it would include active agency, but a part of causal efficiency would be devoid of active agency. And if the active agency pervades the causal efficiency, it would include causal efficiency and

a part of active agency (A) would be without causal efficiency (C). It can be depicted with the following diagram:



Figure 3

The left circle represents the entities with capabilities in which there is only one (A) involves active agency. Similarly, the right circle represents the entities with active agencies, but only (C) is capable. Both are absurd conclusions: (1) there are capable inactive agencies, and (2) there are incapable active agencies. How can capable be inactive and incapable be active? Thus, a partial exclusion between capability and active agency turns out to be illogical.

Udayana examines another possibility of exclusions between non-incapability and non-inactive agency, that is, the difference due to some conditions (*upādhikṛtabheda*) such as the difference between effect- (*kāryatva*) and transience (*anityatva*). Effect or Effectiveness  is the property delimited by its prior absence (*prāgabhāvāvacchinnasattvamkāryatvam*) and transience is the property delimited by its posterior absence (*dhvamsāvacchinnamsattvamanityatvam*) (Udayanācārya, 2005, p. 8). Since capability and active agency is mutually pervasive (*samavyāpta*) there cannot be an adventitious property distinctively applicable to one and not the other. But, can we say that capability and active agency are merely words without any undergirding reality? Udayana says  in that case linguistic practice of the synonymity of words would not be possible since the synonymous words refer to one and the same entity. One would say that since the cognition of capability is different from the cognition of active agency, their cognitive difference can be considered as the condition for their difference. Udayana says that this response would give rise to another curiosity whether such a cognitive difference is due to the perseity of cognition or due to its content. In the first case, every occurrence of the cognition, in virtue of being cognitive, would be distinct and thus the differentiation would be inflationary. In the second case, cognition and content would be mutually dependent for their differentiation

is a defect. Now, if there is no causal, class, conditional, lexical and cognitional difference, should one say that the pragmatic difference in their exclusions is uncaused? If it is accepted as uncaused, then such differentiation would lead to over application in as much as capability and active agency may be differentiated from itself. Thus, Udayana rejects the meaning of capability as active agency and moves to examine the other possibility, that is, capability (*sāmarthya*) meaning competence (*yogyatā*).

Udayana says that 'competence' as the meaning of capability is not free from difficulty. With this meaning, the structure of reasoning would be the following:

If the seed in the granary is competent to produce sprout (C`), it should produce sprout; it does not produce sprout (denial of P); therefore, it is not competent.

The above reasoning successfully avoids the previous indistinguishability of the probandum from the probans since 'having the competence of doing something' is unambiguously different from 'actually doing it. But, it faces two other difficulties: (1) the competence of doing something is dependent on assisting conditions (*sahakārisāklya*), or (2) it is inherent in the very nature of things. The organization of reasoning in the first case would be the following:

If the seed in the granary is associated with the assisting conditions (C``), it will produce sprout; it does not produce sprout (denial of P); therefore, it is not associated with the assisting conditions.

But the above reasoning is so plain and observationally validated that it hardly requires any proof. Moreover, the assisting conditions such as air, moisture, soil etc. (the probans) is not accepted by the adversary in the case of granary seeds and everyone accepts that a seed produces sapling in association with the assisting conditions (hence *hetu-asiddha-doṣa*).Thus, the above argument (C``) is not appealing. Udayana proceeds to refute the other possibility, that is, the naturally inherent competence (*prātisvikī*) of the seed which can be understood in any of the three senses:

1. In terms of the universal "seedness": If there is seed, there is sprout; if there is no sprout, there is no seed. With this positive or negative concomitance, seedness may be taken to be adequate for sprout, OR
2. In terms of a different class character such as *kurvadrūpatva*, OR
3. Incapability due to a deficiency in the assisting conditions.

Udayana says that if the presence of the universal seedness were adequate to produce sprout by any entity, it would lead to an absurdity in the following way:

If an entity in the granary were the member of the seed class, it would have produced a sprout. It does not produce a sprout. Therefore, it does not belong to the seed class.

But, in the common practice, we call the granary grain a seed even if it is not producing sprout at a particular time etc. Moreover, the existence of any other class (such as *kurvadrūpatva*) is unacceptable in need of a valid source of knowledge for it. It is not perceptual because nobody claims to have seen it in the case of a seed in the field, nor its knowledge is inferential since there is unavailability of an invariable concomitance. Similarly, the third condition is also shown to be problematic. The denial of the role of the assisting conditions would lead to a self-contradictory claim that 'the seed in the granary would produce sprout in the absence of them', and if their role is accepted, such an acceptance will establish the endurance of the seed. This way Udayana deploys the method of reductio ad absurdum to destabilize the (Yogācāra) Buddhist theory of momentariness. He would use the same technique in his further scrutiny of various viewpoints in ATV.

## Concluding Remarks

The structure of inference adopted in the refutation of the (Yogācāra Buddhist) theory of momentariness is obviously the reductio ad absurdum. Udayana use two versions of this method: Prasaṅga and Prasaṅgaviparyaya. The present article is bound to be inconclusive since it is part of a bigger project. However, its limited objective enables me to make some remarks with reference to Ratnakīrti's viewpoint since his articulation of the theory of impermanence and the nature of language is fairly representative of the intellectual tradition to which he belongs. According to him, what is real is in fact 'indivisible evanescent now' (i.e., *svalakṣaṇa*) and it is cognized through the mode of perception; the rest is the fabrication (*vikalpa*) of our mind and language is a grand fiction which refers to the nexus of interrelated mental constructions (the web of concepts). Inferential knowledge is hence an explication of the form of mentally fabricated inter-relationships (Ratnakīrti, 1967, pp. 3-5). The pragmatism of such knowledge lies in the invocation of thoughts in minds in an organized way, and also in indicating something beyond the domain of language. The causal efficiency is

possible only at the level of point-instant reality (*svalakṣaṇa*). If the real is momentary only, the non-momentary cannot be called existent. Does the ascription of non-existent demands any hypostatization of dubious entities? Ratnakīrti would deny the requirement of any such posits. For the purpose of argumentation, he would use the concepts the way they are used by the logicians of different traditions, but his articulations would not commit to any perduring entitative existents.

Udayana on the other hand, in common with other Nyāya philosophers, makes a distinction between an object (*dharmin*) and its properties (*dharma*). The adventurous properties such as cognition, desire, feelings etc. emerge in the eternal self in reliance upon certain conditions. If these conditions are not met, they will not arise. Sprouting is an emergent property which comes into being depending on the auxiliary conditions such as soil, heat, water etc. But merely auxiliary conditions will not give rise to effect. The demands pressed by Udayana in various arguments seem to be motivated by his peculiar metaphysical commitments. For example, when he argues for the capability of seed in both the situations of granary and field, he assumes the sameness of seed on the basis of uninterrupted presence of seedness in it. The universal seedness is a real entity in the Nyāya tradition, whereas in the Buddhist tradition it is merely a name adopted for the purpose of inference and reference. Considering perhaps the non-committal attitude of metaphysical entities, Udayana finds it suitable to adopt an indirect method of reasoning to deal with the issues with the Buddhists. A further exploration of ATV along with other works of Udayana would enable to argue with more certainty.

## Bibliography

Chakrabarti, K. K. (2001). *Classical Indian Pihlosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd.

Jhalakīkāra, B. (1928). *Nyāyakośa*. (V. S. Abhyankar, Ed.) Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Jñānaśrīmitra. (1956). *Jñānaśrīmitra-nibandhāvalī*. (A. Thakur, Ed.) Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Kashyapa, B. J. (1956). *Saṃyutta Nikāya ( Ånandasutta), Part-4* . Nalanda: Pāli Publication Board, Bihar Government.

Mccrea, L. J., & Patil, P. G. (2010). *Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pātañjali. (1998). *Pātañjali's Yoga Sūtra with the commentary of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra*. (R. Prasāda, Trans.) New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

Prasad, J. (1930, Jan.). Discussion of the Buddhist Doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyaya-Sutras. *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1*, 31-39.

Radhakrishnan, S. (1989). *Indian Philosophy* (Vol. 1). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ratnakīrti. (1967). *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists': Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddiḥ Vyatirekātmikā.* (A. C. McDermott, Trans.) Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Ratnakīrti. (1975). *Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvaliḥ.* (A. Thakur, Ed.) Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Udayanācārya. (1986). *Ātmatattvaviveka.* (V. P. Dvivedin, & L. S. Dravid, Eds.) Calcutta: The Asiatic Society.

Udayanācārya. (1987). *Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayana.* (C. V. Kher, & S. Kumar, Trans.) Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers.

Udayanācārya. (1995). *Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya.* (N. S. Dravid, Trans.) Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

Udayanācārya. (2005). *Ātmatattvaviveka.* (K. Tripathi, Ed., & K. Tripathi, Trans.) Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan.

Vidyabhusan, S. C. (1990). *The Nyāya Sūtra of Gotam.* Delhi: MLBD.

Vidyabhusana, S. C. (1978). *A History of Indian Logic.* Delhi: MLBD.