

MANDALA/RAJAMANDALA THEORY AND THE THEORY OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS: DOES IT REFLECT THE MODERN APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO WAR, PEACE AND DIPLOMACY?

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Abstract

Kautilya was the first political thinker of ancient India who argued the importance of sovereignty, both internal and external, because it is sovereignty which defines, among others, the State. No *rashtra* can make progress until it is free to pursue its policies independently of others. The *mandala* theory is also influenced by the concerns of external relations and conquest for sovereignty without which the internal freedom to frame policies and take decisions would be unimaginable. This paper is an attempt to examine Kautilyan strategic thought and interstate relations in its entirety in the sense that it seeks to first understand and critically examine Kautilyan concept of *mandala* with reference to its contents, constituents, validity and efficacy as a theory of peace and war; Secondly, its purpose is to analyse Kautilya's approach to diplomacy with reference to *Sadgunya* theory (six principles of diplomacy and foreign relations) and the strategy of four *Upayas* and their importance in the conduct of interstate relations.

Keywords: *Mandala*, *Sadgunya*, *Upayas*, relative Power, national power, *Prakashyuddha*, *Kutayuddha*, *Asuryuddha*

Introduction

Kautilya is remembered the most by the political scientists, the foreign policy experts, researchers, political strategists and students of strategic culture and defence and security experts *such* as Sun zu is

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referred to and remembered in China. Kautilya was the first political thinker of ancient India who argued the importance of sovereignty, both internal and external, because it is this element which defines, among others, the State. No *rashtra* can make a progress until it is free to pursue its policies independently of others. This conception of 'external' sovereignty was well established in the Hindu Philosophy of the State. They realised that sovereignty is not complete unless it is external as well as internal, that is, unless the state can exercise its internal authority unobstructed by, and independently of, other states'¹. (Sarkar, 1919: 400)

Akin to this idea is Shukracharya's idea of self-rule which is the greatest source of happiness and the dependence on others as the ground of great misery.² When the state is subjugated by another State, Kautilya said: 'the country is not treated as one's own land, it is impoverished, its wealth carried off, or it is treated as a "commercial" article'³ (Book VIII, Ch. II). Thus, he treated sovereignty as an integral part of the state. This aspect has been discussed by Kautilya in his *Saptanga* theory of state. The *mandala* theory too is influenced by the concerns of external sovereignty without which the internal freedom to frame policies and take decisions would be unimaginable, though one can argue that *mandala* theory is concerned with both shared sovereignty with allies as well as conquest by the visigisu which of course is not an uncontested view. Generally, it is the later view that is given a priority. That is the reason why Kautilya underlines the duty of the king to preserve the state and uphold its paramountcy, a prescription also in modern realist theory of International relations.

The subject has been addressed by first dealing with Kautilyan concept of *mandala* with reference to its contents, constituents, validity and efficacy as a theory of peace and war as well as its scrutiny on the basis of the debate that *mandala* theory was an expansionist philosophy followed by an analysis of Kautily's approach to diplomacy with reference to his *Sadgunya* theory of diplomacy (six ways of diplomacy and foreign relations) and the strategy of four *Upayas* and their importance in the conduct of interstate relations. The issue of realism and idealism in the *Arthashastra*, with special reference to the modern theory of international relations and examination of the applicability or relevance of the theory in the modern world of politics, with references to prevailing global politics and political relations with the help of some examples from Asia, South and South-East Asia specifically and from the Western world in general, within the context of power politics, aiming at not only preserving and enhancing national interest but also to establish and promote balance of power in the field of international relations through the

techniques of diplomacy and war, are the other important dimensions of the discussion. The objective here is to identify Kautilya's strategic thought and its contribution to the understanding and explication of contemporary strategic thinking in a fast-changing world of international relations and politics within the perspectives of a multi-polar and multilateral framework and the emergence of a geopolitical environment in the South and South-East Asian region.

Mandala/ Rajamandala: Theoretical/Doctrinal Dimension and Strategic Explanation

The *Arthashastra* as primarily a treatise on the governance of a state comprehensively deals with internal administration and foreign relations and provides the ruler education in the ways of attaining the overriding goal of expansion of his kingdom. Though it is wide ranging and detailed in its practical guidance yet is not so binding as to instil rigidity in the face of changing conditions⁴. Many questions arise in the mind of the reader about *mandala* theory. For instance, can it be interpreted as a dynamic philosophy of asserting and maintaining equilibrium in international politics or was it a theory to explain dominance, self-assertion and a struggle for existence/survival at the level of running power game in the international arena.

In the first place, the *mandala* doctrine is said to be based on the principle of winning and expanding the territories of the kingdom⁵. This inference is drawn from the recommendations of Kautilya contained in Book VI which tell us that peace and activity constitute the source of acquisition and security when activity is that which brings the accomplishment of works undertaken and peace refers to that which brings about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works⁶. However, there are scholars who think that this view about Kautilyan philosophy of war and peace is untenable. For example Michael Leibig argues:

The characterisation of Kautilya as 'militaristic' and 'imperialistic' is not tenable. Kautilya's expansionism must be seen in the geo-historical context of the Indian subcontinent: Political unification or hegemonic control of the Indian subcontinent is the strategic aim. And that was realised first in the Maurya Empire, in whose formation Kautilya was a key actor. In the *Arthashastra*, no expansionist policy beyond the Indian subcontinent (upto Afghanistan) is propagated. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Kautilya was a battle-hardened military practitioner; instead he treated military issues more from a theoretical and strategic point of view. Kautilya's field was grand strategy, not military strategy and tactics-

in that regard he is more like Machiavelli and differs from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz⁷

It is averred that Kautilya advocated consistent power politics in order to secure and expand the power of the state internally and externally; in that he knew no scruples and would not have refrained from doing anything to achieve his purpose, yet he was wise enough to know that this very purpose be defeated by means unsuited to the end⁸. Lest it skips the attention of the reader, it needs to be underlined that the theory of *Mandala* was the product of (a) the existence of several states competing for supremacy or survival or what can be termed as the state of anarchy, and (b) the need for establishing political unification, to the extent possible, of territories. Sachin More explains: 'Keeping in perspective the concepts of the constituents of a state, state aspirations of growth, and the turbulent power struggle between the states, the *Arthashastra* propounded the theory of foreign policy called the *Raja* (king's)- *Mandala* (circle), more frequently called the circle of 12 states or the *Mandala*.'⁹

Kautilya developed his ideas about *mandala* keeping in mind the power, influence and capability of a state in relation to other states and how could these components of state's position be assessed and used to augment the cumulative power. Herein, he brings the importance of seven *prakritis* or constituent elements of state. It is the cumulative product of *prakritis* which provides *shakti* or power to a state, which Kautilya identified as *utshah shakti* (power to provide drive, energy and direction to the state and its elements and mainly relates to the ruler or the king; in modern day, it can be equated to the leadership of a state); *Prabhavashakti* (concerned with generating effects and related with the military and economic power and strength); and *mantrashakti*, (the power of the council and intelligence and knowledge).¹⁰ Out of these, the utmost significance is assigned to the *mantrashakti* by Kautilya as an arrow discharged by an archer may kill one person or may not kill, but intellect operated by a wise man would kill even a child in the womb.¹¹ But Kautilya did not undermine the other *shaktis* because in his view it is the application of all the three together in a varying manner that produce the comprehensive national power. Equipped with the cumulative power generated by the seven *prakritis* — *swami*, *amatya*, *janapada*, *durga*, *kosha*, *danda/bala* and *mitra/ally* — the State is positioned by Kautilya in the midst of its neighbouring states to make choices for foreign policies which should be rationally formed. If the policy is wisely chosen giving due weight to the calculation of the relative standing of the *prakritis* of the states — better acknowledged as cumulative power — coupled

with consideration of their position and intention (*bhavin*), Kautilya claims that the policy would succeed, the State would progress and would further facilitate augmentation of the *prakritis* of the state. This dynamic relationship between *shakti* or power and progress when extended to neighbouring states with application of right foreign policy is called *mandala* or *rajamandala* or theory of circle of states.

Mandala, a sanskrit word, literally means a circle. According to Kautilya¹², every State has circles of states around it beginning with immediate neighbour in the front and the rear, Neighbour of the neighbour, neighbour of the neighbour of the neighbour and the state at the outer circle, Kautilya puts the neighbour in the category of enemy, the next to the neighbour in the category of an ally or a friend or enemy of the enemy. Explaining the circle of kings, he writes: the king endowed with personal excellences and those of his material constituents, the seat of good policy, is conqueror (*Vijigisu*)¹³. Encircling him on all sides, with territory immediately next to his is the constituent called the enemy. In the same manner, one with territory separated by one (other territory) is the constituent called the ally. Talking about the different types of enemies, he elaborates: 'A neighbouring prince possessed of the excellences of an enemy is the foe; one in calamity is vulnerable; one without support or with a weak support is fit to be exterminated; in the reverse case, fit to be harassed or weekend' (citation?). Explaining the concept, Arndt Michael writes: 'The *Mandala* is based on the geopolitical assumption that the *vijigisu* (the potential conqueror state) is located at the centre of the *rajamandala*; its immediate neighbour is most probably an *ari* (enemy); the state next to the immediate neighbour is the enemy of this neighbour and likely to be *vijigisu*'s *mitra* (friend). Behind this friendly or *mitra* state is located another unfriendly state (*ari-mitra*) and next to that a friendly state (*mitra-mitra*).¹⁴

The concept of *mandala* is made very clear in chapter 2.18 of book VI which tells us that, 'beyond him (the king), the ally, the enemy's ally, the ally's ally, and the enemy's ally's ally are situated in front in accordance with the proximity of the territories; behind, the enemy in the rear, the rear enemy's ally and the near ally's ally (One behind the other). In this scheme of Kautilya, one with immediately proximate territory is the natural enemy; one of equal birth is the enemy by birth and the one opposed or In opposition is the enemy made (for the time being), followed by one with territory separated by one other shall be the natural ally. These natural allies are further classified in ally by birth (one related through the mother or father); and ally made for the time being (one who has sought shelter for

wealth or life). The total number of kings thus comes to twelve. Kangle explains this complex puzzle in the following way¹⁵:

‘There are twelve kings: *vijigisu*, the would be conqueror; *ari*, the enemy, whose territory is contiguous to that of the *vijigisu*; *mitra*, the *vijigisu*’s ally, with territory immediately beyond that of the *ari*; *ari-mitra*, the enemy’s ally, with territory beyond that of the *mitra*; *mitramitra*, the ally of the *vijigisu*’s ally, with territory beyond that of the *arimitra*; *arimitramitra*, the ally of the enemy’s ally, beyond the *mitramitra*; *parshnigrah*, the enemy in the rear of the *vijigisu*; *Akranda*, the *vijigisu*’s ally in the rear, with territory behind that of the *parshnigrah*; *parshnigrahasara*, the ally of the *parshnigraha*, behind the *akranda*; *akrandasara*, the ally of the *akranda*, behind the *parshnigrahasara*; *madhyama*, the middle king adjoining those of the *vijigisu* and the *ari* and stronger than either of these and *udasina*, the king lying outside or the indifferent or neutral king, more powerful than the *vijigisu*, the *ari* and the *madhyama*’.

Kautilya further holds that there is a constellation of four circles each separate circle of the enemy, the middle and the neutral kings. The conqueror, the ally and the ally’s ally are the three constituents of this (circle of Kings); they, each individually united with its five constituent elements, (the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury and the army), constitute the eighteen-fold circle¹⁶. Put differently, there are four principal states, those of the *vijigisu*, the *ari*, the *Madhyama* and *udasina*. Each of these has a *mitra*, ally and a *mitramitra*, ally’s ally, thus making a total of twelve kings. However, one should not form an impression that a *mandala* necessarily needed the existence of twelve states; rather this narrative only tries to tell us the possibility of relationships that might occur when the *vijigisu* tries to attempt his supremacy to be established over the neighbouring states. In this view, each of the four kings with his two allies constitutes a subsidiary *mandala*, of which there are four in all (VI.II.24-27).¹⁷ A third view of the text states that there were forty eight states, twelve of each of the four, *vijigisu*, *ari*, *madhyama* and *udasina*.¹⁸

One may also say that *mandala/rajamandala* theory of interstate relations propounded in the *Arthashastra* is a presentation in a systematic manner of how the states in a condition of constant conflict of interests could behave and how to tackle them. Marko Juutinen clarifies that in Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*, *manadala* refers to circles of kings, and an international system based on strategic relations between them. The central nodes in the *manadala* system, the four circles of kings are four types of kings: conqueror, conqueror’s enemy, middle power and neutral power. Each of the

circles consists of the friends and allies of their nodal power, be it the conqueror, conqueror's enemy, middle king or the neutral power. In addition, king does not merely denote ruler but also, depending on the context, the whole state"¹⁹.

Juutinen identifies four nodes of Kautilya's *mandala* system having particular characteristics. The most powerful state, the so-called neutral king, has the material capabilities to resist and even to subjugate each of the minor kings individually, but is situated their territories and regards the lesser states with indifference because, for Kautilya, enmity depends primarily on territorial proximity. The middle king is the second strongest state, but it also shares territory with minor powers. Conqueror and his enemy are the lesser states that also share the common border."²⁰

It has been recognised that the conflicts of interests/friend-foe relationships for inter-state relations with his concentric, geo-political *rajamandala* scheme are presented by Kautilya systematically. How to deal with friends and enemies as well as neutrals and bystanders depends on the concrete circumstances and correlations of power. The status of the actors is constantly in flux: friends become enemies and vice versa, neutrals and outsiders become friends or foes, or vice versa.²¹ It is interesting to see that Kautilya's ideas on *rajamandala* (concerning war and foreign policy) are an exercise in understanding and application of the science of warfare and peace with special reference to inter-state relations. He anticipated the views of Machiavelli where he advises his prince to never ignore the matters of warfare and suggests that the king should deal with military affairs personally and that he should constantly attend to the Infantry, Cavalry, Chariots and Elephants by inspecting regularly their arts being carried out at sunrise.²² At the same time, Kautilya seems to be conscious of fair play in the conduct of war. For example, he advises the king not to attack those who have fallen down (*patita*), those turning their back on the fight; the *abhipannas* (surrendered persons); *muktakesa* (people with untied hair); *muktasastra* (those who have abandoned their weapons); *bhayavirupa* (persons whose appearance has changed through fear) and *ayudhyamana* (those taking no part in the fight).²³

The *mandala* theory is seen as one assuming every neighbouring country is an enemy and the enemy's enemy is the friend and the *matsya nyaya* and *mandala* theory are the twin evils²⁴. It is also viewed as essentially a doctrine of strife and struggle and a source of war when seen from the position of a *vijigisu*²⁵. The above interpretations of Kautilyan perspectives on the theory of *mandala* are only a half truth

as it does not take a comprehensively correct view of what Kautilya really implies in the theory. R.P. Kangle points out, based on his interpretation of Book 7, chapter 18, Sutra 29, 'That the neighbouring princes, *samantas*, may normally be supposed to be hostile. But it is possible that some may have a friendly feeling towards the *vijigisu*, while others may even be subservient to him. Neighbouring states thus fall in three categories, *aribhavin*, *mitrabhavin* and *bhrytyabhavin*, meaning hostile feelings/approach, friendly disposition and brotherly attitude respectively towards the conqueror. Echoing about the same opinion, Major General Ashok Joshi remarked that the statal circle concept has not been understood in its entirety²⁶. George Tanhum finds in the *Mandala* theory a nation's contagious neighbours as always enemies and their outer neighbours as friends in a series of circles. However, it is necessary to state that Kautilya has nowhere indicated what Tanhum has said about his theory. It is in fact a narrow and perhaps wrong interpretation of the *Arthashastra*.²⁷ A former External Affairs Minister, Yasvant Sinha, once said: 'Just as Kautilya talked of the circle of states, a useful conceptual framework for the consideration of India's foreign policy would be to view it as consisting of three concentric circles around a central axis- the first of our immediate region, the second of the larger world and the third of overarching global issues.'²⁸ Simply put, *mandala* can be taken as a set of the complicated interstate inter-linkages dependent upon varying degrees of amity and animosity; a microcosm reflecting the range of allies and adversaries of a state and, as an international structure, is the macrocosmic aggregation of these unit level *mandalas*²⁹.

The concept of *mandala*, as placed in the context of international relations and foreign policy, can be better grasped by extending its interpretation into seven elements of Kautily's foreign policy perspectives as has been done by a number of scholars such as Benoy Sarkar³⁰, Modelski³¹, Roger Boesche³², Zaman³³, P.K. Gautam³⁴, Subrat Mitra and Michael Leibig³⁵ whose study of Kautilyan foreign policy framework bring the reader closer to the understanding of the local and transnational influences over the determination of approaches to the pursuit of power in order to bring about balance of power and seek welfare and happiness of the subjects of the country/ies. These elements have been divided by Marko Juutinen into (1) a specific type of king, the conqueror; (2) four measures to overcome opposition (*upayas*); (3) the seven constituent elements of state; (4) six measures of foreign policy (*sadgunya*); (5) *mandala* system of international relations; (6) three ways of conquest; and (7) three ways of war.³⁶ *Vijay* or conquest is divided as *dharmavijay* (righteous

conquest), *lobhavijay* (conquest for some greed) and *asuravijay* (demonical) and so is divided the types of war into three: *Prakash yuddha* or open fight at a time and place indicated; *kuta yuddha*, concealed warfare involving use of tactics in battlefield and *tasnim yuddha*, silent fighting, implying the use of secret agents for enticing enemy officers or killing them.³⁷ This classification of conquest and war clearly explains the philosophy and ethics behind them. The *dharmavijay* envisages a war for the right goal irrespective of its consequences if the intention is right. For example, the *Mahabharat* and *Rama-Ravana yuddhas* can be cited as the ones fought for *dharmavijaya*, not for greed or *asuravijaya* by *Pandavas* and *Rama* respectively. For *Kauravas*, on the other hand, the *Mahabharata* was fought for greed. One can observe that the Second World War was fought for the sake of *dharma*/ideal as the alliances were engaged in war for defending or establishing democracy and not for extending the territories, necessarily.

Another tradition of thought on war is pointed out by Torkel Brekke in the form of consequentialist tradition followed by Kautilya which asserts that acts are good or bad only in respect of their results.³⁸ Differentiating between the two traditions of warfare, Brekke argues that the *dharmic* or deontological tradition sees *dharma* as the fundamental part of human existence whereas the other sees *artha* as the goal of all activity. One sees the war as an end and the other sees war as a mean.³⁹ So the philosophy and ethics of war is linked with the idea of justness and use or no use of violence and coercion.⁴⁰

The Kautilyan scheme of foreign relations visualises that the first and the foremost responsibility of the ruler is to defend the boundaries of his state and expand his influence, power and territory. Therefore the *vijigisu* must proceed with the issues of conduct of inter-state relations with these clear aims in mind. This is at the core of Kautilya philosophy of *mandala*. The conduct of foreign relations) in the Kautilyan concept of power (*mandala*), centres around the would be conqueror (*vijigisu*) who uses six-fold policy (*sadgunya*) to assume the position of a universal ruler (*chakravartin*)⁴¹ Kautilyan logic of war and interstate relations is elaborated crisply by P.K.Gautam in the form of an acronym or code UPSRVY with numbers 4-7-6-12-3-3 in which U refers to four *Upayas* (4); P stands for seven *prakrits* (7); S for *Sadgunya* or six measures of Foreign policy (6); R for *rajamandala* (12); V for *Vijay* or conquest (3) and Y for *Yuddha* or war (3)⁴². Before dealing with the elements of the acronym provided by Gautam in further detail, it is prudent to point out that Kautilya developed his

theory of *mandala* within the intellectual background of the origin of the state and its attendant social contract theory. As there was a need for some authority to achieve the goal of saving the weak from the excesses of the strong, so was the imperative in the arena of world politics to remove the environment of *matsya nyaya* wherein the powerful state, was expected to bring order between the states engaged in hostility by establishing authoritative influence, in some cases even annexation of territories as well. The application of social contract theory in the interstate relations, i.e., inter-state contract, also calls for the formation of alliances based on the concentric circles to restrain or support the powerful king. As in the state there was established the authority of the king to safeguard the interests of the society and follow the principle of ensuring happiness and welfare of the people of the kingdom, so was necessary to establish the supremacy of the *vijigisu* among the other states through power and righteous policies to protect even the conquered population, besides his own.

The role of the constituent elements of the state (seven *prakrits*) is difficult to ignore as their mutual interaction or lack of it could secure or lose the chance to win any war. Elaborating on the issue, Vinay Vittal asserts:

The Kautilyan model of constituents of a state also denotes the target structure for operations. Study of any war from this perspective highlights the significance of constituent interaction at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. For example, during the Battle of Britain, the strong political leadership of Winston Churchill, backed by a skilled council of ministers, with unwavering support of the population, tapping into commercial civilian resources cultivated from decades of government policy supports, assisted by an elaborate and continuously evaluated air defense infrastructure, prosecuted by valiant military operations, supplemented by extraordinary intelligence and spy networks, all coalesced to secure victory and shatter the myth of invincibility of the German Luftwaffe.⁴³

Thus, any king interested in promoting his state's interests vis-à-vis other states is to assess as to how closely are the constituents linked to the ideal; how effectively he could harness the power of the different constituents of the state and, at the same time, affect the constituents of the enemy adversely. It can be argued that his concept of the constituent elements is compared to the contemporary concept of national power. For example, these seven state factors appear homologous with Morgenthau's concept of national power whose components are the geographical setting, population size, raw

materials, agriculture, industrial potential and the armed forces of a state'.⁴⁴

Does *mandala* visualise a fixed circle of states treating neighbours as always enemies and their enemies, friends? In other words, is the *vijigishu* in a perpetual state of enmity with his neighbours? The answer in the affirmative would suggest the ignoring of the strategic dimension of Kautilyan *mandala* scheme. This misconceived idea of *mandala* focuses more on the physical arrangement of the states in circle and overlooks completely the background content of Kautilya's theories: first, the intrinsic value of *yogakshema*⁴⁵; the emphasis on the organic structure of a state; interrelated *prakritis* with their strive for the defined excellences; the emphasis on economic prosperity; and all pervading binding of Kautilyan ethics — the *dharma*. Second it misses the Kautilyan methodology for pre-selected choice of foreign policies rationally derived on the basis of Kautilyan calculations. Third, it further misses the primacy of *mantrashakti* and, fourth, but most noticeably, the place of *mitra* — the ally — as an inherent element of the state.⁴⁶

In recent times, the concept of *mandala* is assuming newer versions in the context of the emergence of new realities in the arena of world politics, particularly after the demise of the former Soviet Union-led block and the closure of the Cold War and the new *mandala* formations within the shifting poles of power from the uni-polar to multi-polar ones. Is the security and power struggle between the nations around the world moving around the Kautilyan model of *Mandala*? Do the new realities fit into the strategic prescriptions of Kautilya? Several regional formations and the position of a state or states within them can be used as a means to address these questions. The constituents of a regional *Mandala* can be both *ari* and *mitra* at the same time. The BRICS can be a case in point when China and India are members of that formation with differing economic and political goals and both being in race for attaining the status of superpower in the region. They are tied in the relationship of both conflict and cooperation; conflict locally and cooperation globally. So Kautilya is proved right that the inter-state relations are determined by national interests and the play of power games. Interestingly, it is noteworthy that maritime *Mandalas* are taking shape in the light of the struggle for marine sovereignty between China and other nations including her neighbours like Vietnam. Involvement and growing interests of America and India in that struggle again indicates that the circle of states is what is to be managed and established properly if the conqueror is to succeed in his campaign/s, referred as strategic

transactions in south-east Asia⁴⁷. We come across three maritime *mandalas* of India: Immediate *mandala* consisting of China and Pakistan; intermediate *mandala* made of East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and South-East Asia and the outer *mandala* comprising Japan, Russia and the USA. This new coinage of *mandala* still is not free from debate; the reflection of Kautilyan thought in strategic discourse cannot be ignored⁴⁸. Sachin More demonstrates how non-observance of Kautilyan methods in making policy choices leads to deterioration of a state — the case of Pakistan can be taken as a ready reckoner. Situating Pakistan in the position of *vijigisu* explains how Pakistan's emphasis on the wrong *sadgunya* policy of *Vigrah* and *dvaidibhava* towards India along with the increase in military strength, resulted in predictable decline, as calculable by Kautilyan methodology. Despite the seemingly achievement of its geostrategic goal decided by it for itself, while making a wrong choice of outward policy — of parity with India — but what ensued has been the deterioration of the state *prakritis* of Pakistan internally⁴⁹.

The Concept of *Shadgunya* and Four *Upayas*

The theory of *sadgunya* or the six measures of foreign policy, considered as the “backbone” of *Arthashastra*'s foreign policy analysis⁵⁰, is related with the theory of *mandala/rajamandala*. *Sadgunya* theory assumes significance in the light of the fluctuating nature of power equation: Foes become allies, allies become foes; middle/neutral kings may disappear or diffuse to take new forms; and fluidity rules dynamism. To exploit this fluidity, Kautilya introduces *sadgunya*.⁵¹ Kautilya maintains, he who sees the six measures of policy as interdependent in this manner⁵² plays, as he pleases, with the rival kings tied by the chains of his intellect.⁵³ However, Kautilya believed that the circle of constituent elements is the basis of the six measures of foreign policy.⁵⁴ Thus, *sadgunya* is based on the idea of six essential considerations of foreign policy: *samdhi*, *vigrah*, *asana*, *yana*, *samsraya* and *dvaidhibhav* which respectively mean making a treaty based on conditions, i.e., the peace policy; the policy of war or hostility; the policy of keeping quite; marching on an expedition; seeking protection or shelter with another king or in a fort and following double policy of making peace with one king and *vigrah* or hostility with another simultaneously.⁵⁵ Gautam and Leibig find a close relationship between *manndala* and *sadgunya* theory evolved by Kautilya⁵⁶. There is a bit of difference of opinion on the interpretation of *sandhi* among the students of *Arthashastra*.

For example, Mark McClish opines that *sandhi* is something beyond a mere peacemaking. It essentially signifies non-aggression pacts and strategic partnerships. According to Rangarajan, Kautilya's policy of *Sandhi* or peace is an enabling period for the *vijigisu* to build his power before attempting to conquer the enemy and that it aims at the progress of the *vijigisu's* state, strengthening alliances, awaiting favourable opportunity to conquer the enemy and as part of a dual policy⁵⁷. Referring to strategic partnerships, Kautilya writes in Book 7.4.19 about the alliances incorporating alongside the power of morality. Out of various kinds of alliance making, Kautilya gave preference to alliances based exclusively on word/honour⁵⁸. Here it may be commented that the element of morality in the process of alliance building takes Kautilya to the idealist plane from the position of a mere realist.

Kautilya further reflects on the uses of these *sadgunyas* in the international affairs. Recommending the better course of action within the existing situations/s it is said that when one is weaker than the enemy, the principle of *sandhi* should be adopted, in the reverse situation, he should follow the policy of *vigraha* or war; he should remain in the state of *asana*. In case both are equal in power, but if one is very strong, *yana* should be the policy. Similarly *samsraya* is the choice when one is very weak. Thus advises Kautilya: when in decline, as compared to the enemy, he should make peace. When prospering, he should make war. When he thinks, the enemy is not able to do harm to me, nor I to him, he should stay quite. When possessed of a preponderance of excellent qualities, he should march. Depleted in power, he should seek shelter and in a work that can be achieved with the help of an associate, he should resort to a dual policy⁵⁹. A weaker king should submit to the righteous conqueror, submit monetarily to the greedy conqueror and take counter steps for survival against a demonical conqueror⁶⁰ thus, as Coetzee describes, using 'strategic flexibility'⁶¹.

It follows that he should resort to a policy which, in his understanding, would result in promoting his own undertakings concerning forts, water works, trade-routes, settling on waste land, mines material forests and elephant forests and in injuring these undertakings of the enemy; he should remain indifferent to the enemy's advancement in case he perceives, my advancement will be quicker or greater or leading to a greater advancement in the future, the reverse will be that of the enemy. In case the advancement takes the same time or bears an equal fruit (for both), he should make peace.⁶² Similarly, he, the *vijigisu* should not follow the policies

that might produce the reverse results such as ruin of his own undertakings.

In the same way, he advises that he should remain indifferent to his stable condition in case he perceives that he will remain stable for a shorter period or in such a way that he shall make a greater advancement, the enemy (will do so) in the opposite way and should make peace in case the stable condition lasts for the same period or leads to equal consequences for both. Kautilya further states that the *vijigishu* should secure advancement through peace if he perceives that he shall ruin the enemy's undertakings by his own undertakings bearing abundant fruits; or shall enjoy his own undertakings bearing abundant fruits or the undertakings of the enemy; or shall ruin the enemy's undertakings by the employment of secret remedies and occult practices; or shall easily entice away the persons capable of carrying out the enemy's undertakings by offering a greater remuneration from his own undertakings, with facilities of favours and exemptions; or, the enemy, in alliance with an extremely strong king, will suffer the ruin of his own undertakings.⁶³

Kautilya also advises his king to employ peace if he thinks: that, 'I can prolong my enemy's hostility with another king whose threats have driven my enemy to seek my protection; or being allied with me, my enemy can harass the country of another king who hates me; or oppressed by another king, the subjects of my enemy will immigrate into my country and I can, therefore, achieve the results of my own works very easily; or being in a precarious condition due to the destruction of his works, my enemy will not be so powerful as to attack me; or by exploiting my own resources in alliance with any two (friendly) kings, I can augment my resources; or if a circle of states is formed by my enemy as one of its members, I can divide them and combine with the others; or by threats of favour, I can catch hold of my enemy, and when he desires to be a member of my own circle of states, I can make him incur the displeasure of the other members and fall a victim to their own fury', then the king may increase his resources by keeping peace'.⁶⁴

When can a king keep open hostility with an enemy? Only if he is possessed of born soldiers and corporations of fighting men; owns such natural defensive positions as mountains, forests, rivers and forts with only one entrance; he is in a position of repelling enemy's attack easily; he could harass the works of his enemy; or if he believes that, due to internal troubles and loss of energy, the enemy will suffer early the destruction of his works; or he could induce the enemy's subjects to immigrate to his country when his enemy was attacked

by another king.⁶⁵ The policy of keeping neutral as an option can be adopted by a king who thinks that neither his enemy nor he can cause destruction of each other's works; or the king thinks that he can increase inflictions to the enemy without incurring any loss to his own works, in case the enemy comes to fight him like a dog with a boar.

We are further told by Kautilya (book VII.1.266)⁶⁶ that the policy of march can be undertaken by a king if he is convinced that by doing so it is possible to destroy the enemy's works and that he has made proper arrangements for the safeguards of his own works.

Besides, it will be prudent for a king to seek shelter/protection from a king of superior power and endeavour to pass from the stage of deterioration to that of stagnancy and from the latter to that of progress when he thinks that he was not in a position either to harass his enemy's works nor to defend his own against his enemy's attack.

Dvaidhibhava policy, according to Kautilya, should be taken recourse to in a condition when by making peace with one enables him to work out his own resources, and by waging war with another, he can destroy the works of his enemy.⁶⁷

The argument seems to be that the adoption of six-fold foreign policy measures by the king in the circle of sovereign states, may enable him to pass from the state of deterioration to that of stagnation, and from the latter to that of progress.⁶⁸

It is noteworthy that Kautilya gives good deal of attention to the issue of the nature of alliances in chapter II of Book VII. He prefers peace over war when the outcome of peace and war are equal in character. For disadvantages, such as the loss of power and wealth, sojourning and sin, are ever attending upon war. One notes an analogy of ideas of Kautilya and Chinese strategist Sun Tzu who held that the best victories were the ones where aims were achieved without bloodshed⁶⁹. Same holds true when one has to choose between neutrality and war. Similarly, he accords priority to the double policy (*dvaidhibhava*) over the policy of alliance as whoever adopts the double policy enriches himself, being ever attentive to his own works, whereas an allied king has to help his ally at his own expense.⁷⁰ As for entering into an alliance, the king must make one with a king stronger than one's neighbouring enemy and if there is no such king, one should ingratiate oneself with one's neighbouring enemy, either by supplying money or army or by ceding a part of one's territory and by keeping oneself aloof; for there can be no greater evil to kings than alliance with a king of considerable power, unless one is actually attacked by one's enemy.⁷¹

Elaborating further his theory of circles of states, Kautilya states that 'a powerless king should behave as a conquered king towards his immediate enemy but when he finds that time of his own ascendancy is at hand, due to a fatal disease, internal troubles, increase of enemies, or a friend's calamities that are vexing his enemy, then under the pretence of performing some expiatory rites to avert the danger of his enemy, he may get out of the enemy's court; or if he is in his own territory, he should not go to see his suffering enemy; or if he is near to his enemy, he may murder the enemy when opportunity affords itself. He goes on to assert that a king who is situated between two powerful kings shall seek protection from the stronger of the two; or from one of them on whom he can rely; or he may make peace with both of them on equal terms. He may then seek to put one against the other by telling separately that the other was a tyrant, causing utter ruin to him. Once divided, he may put down each of them by way of overt or covert means.

Again, the king shall be able to defend himself against his immediate enemy under the protection of two immediate kings of considerable power. Or, having made alliance with a chief in a stronghold, he may adopt the double policy. Or, he may adapt himself to circumstances, depending upon the causes of peace and war in order. Or, he may make friendship with traitors, enemies, and wild chiefs who are conspiring against both the kings. Or, pretending to be close friend of one of them, he may strike at the other at the latter's weak point by employing enemies and wild tribes. Or, having made friendship with both, he may form a circle of states. Or, he may make alliance with the *Madhyama* or the neutral king; and with this help he may put down one of them or both. Or, when hurt by both, he may seek protection from a king of righteous character among the *Madhyama* king, the neutral king and their friends or equals, or from any other king whose subjects are so disposed as to increase his happiness and peace, with whose help he may be able to recover his last position, with whom his ancestors were in close intimacy or blood relationship, and in whose kingdom he can find a number of powerful friends. Pointing out the best way to form alliance, it is averred that of the two powerful kings who are on amicable terms with each other, a king shall make alliance with the one who likes him and whom he also likes'.⁷²

Kautilya deals with the character of equal, inferior and superior kings as well as the forms of agreement made by an inferior king in chapter 3 of book VII and recommends that (a) the conqueror should employ the six measures of policy with due regard to his

power and (b) the king shall make peace with the equal and superior kings while attacking the inferior king. This policy is in the interest of the king as otherwise if he attacks a superior king, it will ruin him just in the same way as a foot soldier opposing an elephant is bound to be crushed; or a war with an equal king would be destructive to both just as the collision of an unbaked mud-vessel with a similar vessel is destructive to both, but a war with a weaker king is bound to achieve success like a stone with an earthen vessel. However, it may become necessary in certain conditions for a weaker king also to wage war just as it might be necessary for a stronger king to either make peace or allay the fear of war, if when at war, he were to see, 'The enemy's subjects, greedy, impoverished or rebellious, do not come over, being frightened of war'⁷³.

It is interesting to note that Kautilya argues very realistically that power decides peace between any two kings for no piece of iron that is not made red-hot will combine with another piece of iron.⁷⁴ In book XII he tells us when a superior king discards the proposal of an inferior king for peace; the latter should take the attitude of a conquered king, or play the part of an inferior king towards a superior. A peace should be made with an all submissive inferior king without causing him troubles and anger because if provoked by any such behaviour, an inferior king, like wild fire, will attack his enemy and will also be favoured by (his) circle of states.

It is suggested by the political realist, that Kautilya is, that even the stronger should stay quiet when he does not find that resorting to peace or war is not going to either weaken the enemy or increase his strength and further that the stronger should make peace if he foresees that the calamities befalling him were greater than the ones falling on the enemy and that the enemy could overcome them easily and attack him. If the calamities of the enemy are irremediable, the weaker king should also attack him just as the stronger should seek shelter if his calamities were irremediable.⁷⁵

Four *upayas* — *sama*, *dana*, *bheda* and *danda* — are treated by Kautilya as integral to foreign policy strategy. *Sama* is explained as conciliatory approach; *Dana* stands for placating with rewards and gifts while *bheda* means sowing dissension and *danda* is taken as using force including coercion and sanctions.⁷⁶ He argues that *upayas* could be used either singly or in combination: a total of 30 different combinations, depending on the seriousness of the situation.⁷⁷ He explains that it is easier to employ an *upaya* earlier in order than a later one. For example, placating with gifts is twice as hard as conciliation, sowing dissension three times as hard and use of force

four times. Force also signifies waging wars, on which Kautilya brings greater theoretical uniqueness.⁷⁸

The importance and relevance of the four *upayas*, aid to *vijigisu's* thought process in choosing strategic policy options⁷⁹, has attracted the attention of a number of scholars. In the terminology of Modelski, the *upayas* (stratagems) are the 'influencing techniques' which can be applied to both domestic and foreign policies⁸⁰. Chinese foreign policy can better suit the understanding and application of *upayas* with reference to its approach to the weaker as well as the stronger states in her vicinity and beyond. These *Upayas* compare closely with Morgenthau's model for balancing power which talks of four methods: first, 'divide and rule' equates with sowing dissensions or *bheda*; second, 'giving compensation' equates to placating with rewards and gifts or *dana*; third, 'making alliances' equates to adopting a conciliatory approach or *sama*; and lastly, 'using armaments' equates to 'using force or *danda*'⁸¹. Jayantnuja Bandyopadhyaya⁸² goes a step further when he maintains that 'Morgenthau may have been influenced by Kautilya's concept of Udasina when he speaks of the 'splendid isolation' of the balance that waits in the middle in watchful detachment'. One may tend to agree with Malay Mishra's comments that 'there exist many contemporary examples of the four *Upayas*, like all four *upayas* have been utilised by the world actors in dealing with North Korea: conciliation process (*sama*); monetary incentives (*dana*); dissensions (*bheda*); and economic sanctions/ blockades (*danda*)... A successful application of *Upayas* is also evident in the latest resolving of the case of Iran imbroglio, where careful use of *sama*, *dana*, *bhed* and *danda* has seemingly led to an amicable solution, thus to the fruition of policy methods in application.'⁸³

It is fascinating to note the similarity between the Kautilyan idea of wars and the categorisation of the war in the modern IR theories. The modern warfare, for instance, takes due cognisance of the use of intellect or the *kuta* a concept used by Kautilya in his *kutayuddha*. Further, in modern times too, the countries in hostile relationship do not resort to open/direct war (termed *Prakashyuddha* by Kautilya) as a first resort but take recourse to many other manoeuvres like the *kutayuddha*, aiming at defeating the militarily powerful enemy. The modern theory of warfare uses several terms for *kutayuddha*, like 'indirect approach', manoeuvre warfare, asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare.

Similarly, Kautilya's *tusnimyuddha*, (can be considered as his distinctive contribution to the ideology of warfare), interpreted as 'silent war', occupies a significant theoretical place in the modern

political discourse. Roger Boesche points out the theoretical recognition of the concept of *tusnim yuddha* in the contemporary world due to the experiences of the real world in what saboteurs do, what intelligence operatives do and what is contained in wars like Pakistan's proxy war against India⁸⁴. The examples of cyber wars, misinformation and propaganda war, the use of deception and secret intelligence agencies (spies etc.) can be easily counted as a part of *tusnimyuddha* or silent war. Gautam, therefore, rightly calls Kautilya as the father of 'information warfare'⁸⁵. Kautilya's emphasis on evolving and using an effective system of intelligence as an element of *tusnim yuddha*, leads Leibig to accept Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as the text of pioneering value on intelligence and further elaborates that the ideas underlying modern intelligence are very much present in the *Arthashastra* as Kautilya provides key methodologies and theoretical concepts for intelligence analysis, assessment, estimates and strategic planning. Kautilya's work and Sherman Kent's work bear 'structural homology', though the latter is regarded as the father of modern intelligence⁸⁶.

Moving on, the strategist Kautilya prescribes that the conqueror king should extend the fair and just treatment to the people of the conquered territory to win over their confidence and support. He says in book 13, chapter 5:

'After gaining new territory, the king should cover the enemy's faults with his own virtues, his virtues with double virtues; he should carry out what is agreeable and beneficial to the subjects by doing his own duty as laid down; he should do as promised, for he who does not keep his promise becomes unworthy of trust for his own and other people, as also he whose behaviour is contrary to that of the subjects, hence he should adopt a similar character, dress, language and behaviour as the subjects; he should further show the same devotion in festivals in honour of the deities of the country, festive gatherings and sportive amusements as do his subjects; and he should honour all hermitages, and make grants to men distinguished in learning, speech and piety, and render help to the distressed, the helpless and the diseased.'⁸⁷

The latent presence of these strategic thoughts of Kautilya can be discerned in the modern day dictionary of 'conflict resolution', 'conflict termination' and 'stability operation' etc. across countries and enlighten the reader about striking a balance between expansion and consolidation of power and the State.

What follows from the foregoing passages of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is that his conceptualisation of *manadala* is governed by the strategic function of *mandala* postulating the possible strategic relations

between the states besides his general statement about the natural enmity of a state is with its immediate neighbour. Even if it may not be proper to agree with Kautilya that all neighbours are enemies, (in fact he also does not say so very explicitly) it still calls for a systematic analysis of the reasons for why Kautilya considered the neighbour as the enemy of the conqueror. Juutinen lists some of them as: 1) competition for the same resources like arable land, woods or metals; 2) dependence on the same source of water; 3) increases in population and 4) migrations and the potential colonisation resulting from it.⁸⁸ Yet it is not necessary that these causes are the general rule for neighbourly conflicts. The conflicts between the states may not be rooted in neighbourhood rivalries alone, but in the emergence of conflicting strategic interests, shaped and determined by the often changing economic and political scenes at the global level. 'While the basic unit in Kautilya's *mandala* is the state, the modern *mandala* also applies to international organisations and governance agencies in the global context of complex and inter-relational webs of political authority. Along with states, these webs of authority can be situated as parts of a state-centric *Manndala*, as elements of interdependent sovereignty 'affecting people and productive forces, treasury and allies. But they can also be interpreted as actors in transnational *mandalas*, where, instead of states, the focus is on trans-national agents or international organisations.'⁸⁹ For example, USA and China do not share boundaries with each other, yet remained enemies, or rivals, to be mild, during the entire period of the cold war and became friends after its end mainly led by economic interests, to be bitter critic, if not strictly enimical, again after the breakout of Covid19 in 2020.

Again, it is the strategic interests that have brought America closer to India and driven away from Pakistan, her earlier strategic partner. In other words, enmity and friendship is dependent on the continuity or discontinuation of the circumstances and assessment of the interests being served by the present alliances. Kautilya also appears to be conscious of the fact that circle of states and alliances do not have permanence. They are determined by power balancing needs.⁹⁰ This interpretation of *mandala* further leads us to another level, i.e., the transnational level of *Mandala* formations from the neighbourhood theory. So, while the concept of *mandala* revolves round the constitution or formation of circles of states and the relations between them guided by their conflicting interests, it is not wrong to further expand the concept to include the circles beyond the immediate local boundaries of states or interactions beyond the

proximate boundaries. Looking at the question of *mandala* from the angle of global governance and international agents, Daniel Elazar⁹¹ writes: ‘*Manadala* can account not only for inter-state relations but also for global governance and international organisation. This is an important observation, because one of the major implications of globalisation has been the transformation in the political sovereignty of states through various forms of shared authority and pooled sovereignty’. Referring about ‘governance without government’ Rosenau and Czempiel as well as Jan Scholte state that the concept encapsulates the resulting fragmentation of public authority and the emergence of new actors including non-governmental and private actors- in addition to trans-governmental (between for example state departments) inter-governmental, intra-regional, translocal (between for example two cities) and public – private hybrids.⁹² These arguments lead us to two conclusions: one that the concept of sovereignty is undergoing a change, especially the concept of external sovereignty wherein the inter-dependence — economic and strategic — among the nations has tended to interpret sovereignty differently from the traditional understanding in the present century and secondly, there have emerged, sometimes collaborative and at other times competitors, new *mandalas*, groupings or alliances, along with their contradictory and opposite political and geographical concerns to challenge the pre-existing dominant power relations around the world. For example, SAARC, ASEAN, BRICS, EU and several other regional alliances are operating as separate actors registering their presence in the power play internationally. Furthermore, the emphasis of the *mandala* theory is invariably on maximisation of power⁹³ because he thought that only a powerful state can guarantee the *yogakshema* of its people.

Thriving with three powers, the king becomes superior; reduced in them, inferior, with equal powers, equal. Therefore, he should endeavour to endow himself with power and success, or, if similar, (to endow with power and success) the material constituents in accordance with their immediate proximity or integrity or he should endeavour to detract (these) from treasonable persons and enemies⁹⁴. In the opinion of Juutinen,⁹⁵ ‘pursuit of power is one of the factors that render Kautilya a realist because one of the basic premises in realism is that states seek to maximise their power and influence.’ However, his realism is linked with happiness of the subjects which is defined as material prosperity, acquisition and augmentation of wealth. ‘Hence the king shall ever be active and discharge his duties; the root of wealth is activity, and of evil its reverse. In the absence of

activity acquisitions present and to come will perish; by activity he can achieve both his desired ends and abundance of wealth.⁹⁶

The policy of power maximisation, according to Kautilya, is associated with the efficiency and excellences of the state factors or constituent elements of the state, that is, the king; the government; people, country and the productive capabilities like agriculture; fortified city; the treasury, army and the allies. The first element refers to a king in possession of strong leadership qualities including his ability to command an effective and decisive influence over his people. In fact, it would be correct to assert that the support and morale of the people is a pre-condition for a successful march and victory of the *vijigisu* in the sense that the productive capabilities of the people would not only sustain the internal demands of the citizens, but it would provide support to a strong army. Strong industrial base, outreach to and influence, if not control, over the global markets, position in the regional and global value chains, the other competitive and productive elements like infrastructure, and cohesive society are the facilitators of the process of power augmentation even in the contemporary world and play a vital role in the power balancing activity.

A study of the Kautilyan foreign policy theorisation suggests that conquest is the main foreign policy obligation of the *vijigisu*, would be conqueror or the king. In a way the *mandala* is a strategic constellation of diverse interests around a governance issue or a constellation of state relations with regard to a matter of governance, then to conquer means to solve this issue. A righteous conquest (*dharmavijay*) aims at the welfare of both the *vijigisu* and the country conquered.⁹⁷ In a righteous conquest, the *vijigisu* is not interested in taking over the territory as such; a *dharmavijay* is a just conqueror who is satisfied with mere obeisance.⁹⁸

Juutinen points out that a key objective of foreign policy is righteous conquest. He submits that in the context of multiple and overlapping circles consisting of transnational intertwined state factors, righteous conquest denotes successful leadership in optimisation of welfare in the interconnected political entities through win-win solutions for common problems. The modern *vijigisu* has mastery over the complex web of *mandalas*, knows how to keep them separate (e.g., does not mix political conflicts with economic cooperation).⁹⁹ However, it is pertinent to say that a situation of political conflict and economic cooperation may not always coexist in the modern system of international relations followed by contemporary *vijigisu*, rather the evidence is to the

contrary. For example, in the modern operation of foreign policy one finds that there is a break of relations between the states both politically and economically in a conflict situation (even when it is not a case of open war); conceding that the economic ties may not shatter completely and suddenly. Take the case of tensions between china and the USA in the post-Covid 19 period and India and China over the territorial issues. The steps taken by India to put ban on WhattsApp companies of China saying they are engaged in spying and stealing strategic information besides cancelling the contracts of many Chinese companies and making it further obligatory for them to seek India's permission before investing in any venture in the country, is proof of the preparations for any eventuality not only in terms of military and other infrastructure, but also to weaken and reduce the economic capabilities of the enemy.

Kautilya's pragmatism is evidently reflected in his strategic thought encompassed in his idea of *Mandala* with its validity in the contemporary times: the present day *vijigisu* also is more interested in *dharmavijay* instead of *lobhavijay*. The modern conqueror too generally seems to prefer subservience or allegiance by other states. So the intension is to extend the "power circle" — the zone of influence rather than annex the territories barring exception like China who still nourishes physical expansion of power with imperialist intensions. It can be maintained that just as Kautilya's *vijigisu* limited his expansion to *chakravartinkshetra*, today's rising *vijigisus* are also more inclined to keep themselves as regional *vijigisus* and dominate their regions. Kangle observes: If seen with a critical eye, Kautilya *Arthashastra* concept was more of uniting the subcontinent than expanding, but was regional in approach.¹⁰⁰

The endeavour for geographical dominance in South China Sea by China, in South Asia by India, in East China Sea by Japan and China both and in the Middle East by Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are examples of regional *vijigisus*. Kautilya was right too when he pointed out the formation of new alliances, *mitra* or *mitra-mitra* based on the application of *sadgunya* principles or measures. Some resort to *samshraya* (coalition/ alliance) like in the case of Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and NATO, few embrace *sandhi* like China- Japan and China Russia and few are playing *dvaidhibhava*-dual policy- like Pakistan seeking China's support to counter India. However, *dvaidhibhava* may not necessarily involve two action orientations involving friendship with one country and hostility with another; it can also be understood as a state with two intensions- overt and covert- one exhibiting friendship and covertly harbouring

feelings of hostility against the same state¹⁰¹, i.e., seeking conciliation or peace and strengthening and deploying the army at the same time. China and India are engaged in that exercise these days in the Ladakh region.

We can find the relevance and applicability of some principles of *sadgunya* in Indian context as well. For example it may be argued that India's 'Operation *Parakram*' in the aftermath of terror attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 which involved large mobilisation of the armed forces to the border conceivably on the pattern of *yana* form of policy strategy. The *asana of sadgunya* can be equated to the policy of non-alignment, a policy of remaining stationary or uninvolved.

Looking back at the overall perspective of Kautilyan analysis of international relations, one can safely agree with the general view that Kautilya's theory is in fact a timeless masterpiece in the field of International relations and his unique contribution in the area is being increasingly recognised in India and outside in both the academic and political world. The West is also coming to realise that it might have much to do with the foreign policy exposures emanating from the past of India as well as countries like China. The concept of Comprehensive national power can be rooted in the Kautilyan philosophy of *prakritis*. The whole model of Inter-state relations propounded by Kautilya and its relevance and influence on the modern world politics can be summarised as: First, Kautilya's imprint on the field of strategic thought and culture is clearly visible and acknowledged; second, his ideas on foreign policy and interstate relations should be viewed as symbiotically linked with national goals/interests and power politics (the change of their nature, scope and range notwithstanding); thirdly, Kautilya was a realist in his approach to dealing with questions of war and peace in the context of not only military power but in terms of the collective power of the seven *prakritis*, specifically the monetary strength, the health of the *Kosh*; fourthly, he establishes a close relation between interstate relations and Knowledge and intelligence. It would be true to say that Kautilya developed a vocabulary to define international relations in the *Arthashastra* that predated the Western theory of IR. His interpretation of power dynamics in international relations based on knowledge places him in the line of original theorists; fifthly, It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Western theory seems to be guided, if not shaped, by the Kautilyan ideology of managing interstate politics. Since *Arthashastra* emanates from ancient Indian scholarly traditions, it most certainly qualifies as a sample of systemic theorisation with some adaptations in accordance

with the realities of the contemporary modern and post-modern world before it can effectively break the myth of the Indian inability to formulate systemic theories.¹⁰² Sixth, he contends that it is the growing power of the country that decides its place and role among the other competing or cooperating states, at the local, regional and global level; seven, Kautilya lays stress on both strategic and tactical planning which have a short term and long term implications from the point of view of conducting relations with other states; and lastly, His argument that foreign policy, including the decision to wage war should be taken after collection and analysis of diverse inputs, including the assessment of the resources, capabilities and power of the enemy holds true in the modern context of world affairs.

Was Kautilya a Realist or Idealist or Both?

The question whether he was a realist or an idealist has been a matter of debate between the foreign policy experts, defence experts and the scholars on Kautilya studies and consensus still eludes the reader. Talking about the strategic approach to foreign policy and conduct of inter-state relations, Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty in his distinguished lecture delivered at IIM, Kolkatta on February 19, 2016 said:

‘I cannot help but mention that the first substantive written grand strategy in Indian history is Chanakya’s or Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* in the 4th century BCE, witness to the first sub continental Maurayan Empire. Kautilya, often called the Sun Tzu of India, composed the *Arthashastra*, a treatise that goes much beyond strategy. The chapter on foreign policy in this treatise is quite remarkable. Kautilya, a hard-nosed realist, regarded war not an extension of diplomacy (as Clausewitz argued later), but regarded every aspect of diplomacy as “subtle war”. Diplomacy, according to Kautilya, does not seek to avoid war, but to ensure victory in warfare, i.e., if victory is assured then one should go to war, setting aside any agreement or treaty signed previously.’¹⁰³

However, scholars like Jyrki Kakonen, who terms Kautilya as the first scholar or founder of systematic political economy or economy, political science and international relations disagrees with the Western International relations’ intellectual history that presents Kautilya as an ultra-realist or as one of the classics in political realism and is often referred as Indian Machiavelli instead of presenting Mechiavelli as a European or Italian Kautilya.¹⁰⁴ Kakonen asserts, and rightly so, that he (Kautilya) presented a kind of a model for an idealist or just and ethical society but he also presented the human system as it appeared for a realistic observer. Based on his realist

analysis he advised his king or ruler how to construct a society/state that can provide the best way security and welfare for ordinary citizens¹⁰⁵.

On the other side there are scholars who perceive that Kautilya was a neo-realist. For instance, Prof. M.P. Singh, drawing a parallel between Kautilya and the neo-realist or structural realist Kenneth Waltz, observes:

Just as Waltz postulated three levels of international politics, namely, the level where state behaviour is explained in terms of action and psychological motivations of individual functionaries of state; the level where international relations are shown to be a function of the domestic regime of state; and the level where international anarchy bereft of a sovereign power leads inter-state relations to be caused and conditioned by the structure of world politics, whether multi-polar, bi-polar or uni-polar, so do the notions of '*Saptang State*' and '*Rajamandala*' in *Arthashastra* show a sign of evolution in international relations.¹⁰⁶

Further, we have examples from the modern practice of foreign policy and conflicts at the global and regional level establishing Kautilya as a source of action. Chinese policy of aggression and expansion seems to be in line with Kautilyan and Sun Tzu's ideas on war and peace. Kautilya prescribed the practice of *kutayuddha* even during the peace time by constantly aiming at sowing dissensions and discord among the enemy's leadership. Further, Kautilya's emphasis that it is the money and military power of a country that determines its role and position in the international order makes him again a realist of the first kind and places himself much ahead of the Western theorists and enables the foreign policy and defence analysts to look towards the non-Western models of war and peace in so far as the origin of today's existing theories are concerned and acknowledge the profound contribution of the oriental political thinkers like Kautilya have made. Quoting from the introductory paragraph written by an American scholar, Dr Timothy Hoyt, on India's grand strategy, Chakravarty writes:

"India's emergence as one of the great economic powers in the international system and its military strength, position it to be a major player in the international system in the 21st century. However, its current policies, rooted in a vision of India's role in the international order... appear to reflect a mismatch between its growing means and its overall role in international affairs.... Drivers of change are many, but it remains to be seen which tips India from a passive regional power to a more assertive global one."¹⁰⁷

Relevance and admissibility of Kautilya's theory of International relations in the modern world with special reference to the Asian Region

Kautilya's political realism about the central role of the sound economic status of a country as the main plank of its foreign policy initiatives needs no reiteration. It can be observed that the economic and military might of China is one of the main determinants of her international policy and its desire to expand its boundaries with reference to about 14 of its neighbours. In case of India, China is following the *mandala* theory of Kautilya and in relation to Pakistan and other countries again it is expanding the circle of states on the same lines, if I may so. The country is also applying almost all the four *upayas* indicating the use of Dana as a tool of the expansion of her power and influence in the south Asia and to a lesser extent in the South-East Asia. China is making massive financial investments through various development/ infrastructure projects like One Belt, One Road, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or the investment in Srilanka and the intended relational change between India and Bangladesh and India and Nepal. It cannot be easily set aside that china has made massive transformation in terms of economy reflected in her big trade surpluses with almost all the major economies of the globe and the West has been facing diminishing returns. Viewed from this angle, China has thrown great political, security and economic challenges to India in relation to its relations with that country. Commenting on this, Chakravorty remarks, 'As China enters a phase of economic restructuring, it is attempting to integrate the Eurasian land mass... the ancient silk routes are being revived with modern infrastructure... The question arises as to how it will affect India? China's influence is on the rise through massive investment. There is always a strategic dimension to such projects.'¹⁰⁸

In order to counteract this significant rise of China, India has evolved a make-in-India Policy to make some change in the arena of economic permutations and combinations so as to influence China's trade and business. In the same line, there have emerged some international trading blocs like the US-led 12-country (includes Japan, Australia, Vietnam, among others and excluding India and China) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) signed in October 2015 whose aim is to implement new rules for conducting international trade. That these initiatives are bound to impact the nature of international relations as well as the military capabilities of the targeted states cannot be denied. The changing Asian and South-East Asian political, economic and security strategic realities, one

can notice the formation of new alliances, which Kautilya viewed as circle of states. For example, there are developing much closer ties between Japan, Australia, Vietnam and India as mutually cooperative group, so much so that there are joint military or defence exercises to exhibit solidarity with each other and it is quite possible that this closeness may give rise to new conflicts and formation of other circles.

The relevance of *mandala* theory can further be traced in the emerging approach to regional politics in the South and South-East Asia when one relates Chinese foreign policy to the countries like Taiwan, Malaysia, The Phillipines, Indonesia and Vietnam apart from East Mangolia and Hong kong. Many of these countries are in search of security protection/ shelter, to borrow from the *Arthashastra*, with a powerful strong government like America, may be supported by Japan and Australia, etc. India is also not discounting the over-imposing behaviour of China like a chakravartin Kshetra and is reformulating its strategy taking into account Kautilya, even if not mentioned into the body of the policy just as China might not mention Sun Tzu while practicing imperialist or expansionist policy in relation to her neighbours. Thus, China and India, the co-equals in the language of *Arthashastra*, in the race of positioning them in the regional or international sphere of political, economic and strategic supremacy are now in almost a new regional cold war attempting to contain each other in terms of power and influence. Both the countries seem to be led by their respective history of the local and world view of politics having been interpreted as a cultural and value based phenomena. The history of China and India gives a chance to ask how universal or exceptional is the European development into a Westphalian nation-state system compared to Chinese and Indian development into civilizational empire¹⁰⁹. There is an effort on the part of China to rebuild international relations on hegemonic pattern with a view to first break the hegemonic intentions of the earlier polar leaders- America and Russia and then replace them by its own with the help of enhanced economic and military resources. Henry R. Nay and M. Ollapally have examined afresh the worldview of such like aspiring powers as China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia to tell us about how in the emerging states own traditions have been brought up in developing IR theories as well as in interpreting own foreign policy.¹¹⁰ This aspect of changing international order has also been indicated by several other scholars of the field of IR.¹¹¹

One also notes a clear congruence between the foreign policy goals of China and that of the *vijigisu* of Kautilya. Michael D. Swaine

claims that china has her core issues in the protection of the basic system (existing socio- political order of China) and national security of the PRC state; the preservation of China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the continued stable development of China's economy and society¹¹² defined in the context preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of different forms of social strife; the defence against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territories and the attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps primary, state.¹¹³ These objectives, it can be safely asserted, correspond with the objectives of Kautilya's *Vijigisu* whose aim in the pursuit of domestic and external policies is to protect the territory, ensure well-being and *yogakshem* of his people and strengthen the economy and the military.

Thus, both *Arthashastra* and China emphasise that the strong national power should form central part of the agenda of a robust country deciding upon its foreign policy options. Further, like Kautilya, China considers military might as critical to the nation's march to achieving the status of a super power and that in case of a failure of diplomacy and other deterrence measures, military must be able to defend its interests and territories. It would be pertinent to indicate here another strategic thinking of China that is closer to the one enunciated by the classic Treatise, that is, the role of the *prakriti* (the constituent elements of state) the *vyasana* or calamity and *Bhumisandhi*¹¹⁴ (treaty for acquiring land) in the international relations in the geopolitical context. Gautam argues that China declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1962 and withdrew from the state of Arunachal Pradesh despite the country being in a winning position and so did India in case of Pakistan in 1947-48 when it decided not to recapture POK because of the inhospitable terrain and potentially hostile population¹¹⁵. In case of China too, the influencing factor could be identified what Kautilya termed *vyasanas* like ungovernable nature of the hostile Indian Population in Arunachal Pradesh. Seeking similarity between China's policy of authoritarianism and expansionism and Kautilya's concept of *prakriti*, Major Abhishek Kumar states¹¹⁶,

“CPC's dominant position in China's internal political structure is analogous to Kautilya's highest prioritisation of the state's leadership among the seven *prakriti*. Kautilya's support for the protection of the king's rule from internal strife and power struggles is similar to the Chinese core interests of protecting the CCP's rule over China. China's policy focus on its economy before military aggrandisement is also in line with Kautilya's concept of optimising the *prakriti* in their relative order

of priority. In Kautilya's order of importance for the prakriti, the treasury comes before the state's army. Having achieved a strong economy, China has started making heavy investments in modernising its military forces".

It can be averred that china, like many other contemporary *vijigisus*, has made many Kautilyan strategic ideas an integral part of her policies on war, peace, diplomacy and other inter-state relational dimensions. As Kautilya stressed on the combined use of all elements of national power- political, economic, military and cultural- to achieve the goals of the state, China has been exhibiting the same strategic dynamic approach to policy framework in relation to other states.

Conclusion

In nutshell, the research brings out the depth and range of the strategic thought of Kautilya on the issues of war, peace and foreign policy framework as it carries not only the directional and empirical value in the times of Chandragupta Maurya, but the experience of the post Mauryan empire, including the modern world, shows that his theory of *mandala*, *sadgunya* and stratagems (the four *Upayas*) is transcendental of time and space. The nature of international politics and policy in the regions like south and South East Asia is indicative of the farsighted approach of Kautilya to Foreign relations and his intellectual competence and ability to deal with his own times as well as to predict or visualise the future course and shape of the nature of struggles between nations around power, progress, balance of power and national interests, the core elements of the new concepts like comprehensive national power and of relative power. That *mandala* theory, whether named or not, is of critical operational value today can be discerned with the help of the analysis of China's relations with her neighbours and other countries like Taiwan, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Pakistan, specifically with reference to the tensions between them on the issues of South China Sea, East china Sea and border disputes with India and several others over decades, more open in 2020, on one side and the relations with America and Russia which can be seen as *Madhyama* and Neutral Powers. Kautilya's political realism as well as his idealist views regarding the treatment of the conquered country still holds valid in the contemporary world. His six Foreign policy measures (*sadgunya*) on war and peace and the four *upayas* can be seen as the basis of rational formation of a nation's policy on war and peace as to when it should be pursued actively, when to

remain quite, when to conclude peace etc.

Looking into Kautilya's contribution to the foreign policy in theory and practice, it is necessary felt *Arthashastra* on a larger scale to see as to how he was different from his contemporary thinkers in the field and how and in what way his ideas were more or less influence-enerating in his and later times, particularly in the present world. Further investigation into the utility of *Arthashastra* as a tool of study and analysis of the global realities in the area of international relations is also imperative.

Notes

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3. Cf Binoy Kumar sarkar, *Hindu Theory of International Relations*, 1919, p. 400.
4. Wing Commander Vinay Vittal, *Kautily's Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy* (A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, for completion of Graduation requirements), June 2011.
5. Binoy Kumar Sarkar, *ibid*, p. 402; *Mahabharata*, Book XII Ch. 56; *Arthashastra* VI, ch. XI Kamandaka, VIII, 1, 3, .
6. *Arthashastra*, VI.II. 1-3.
7. Michael Leibig, "Kautily's Relevance for India Today", *India Quarterly*, 69, 2 (2013), p. 103.
8. Jawahar Lal Nehru, *Discovery of India*, Indian Council of Cultural Realties, 1981, pp. 122-127.
9. Quoted in Major Abhishek Kumar, *The Arthashastra: Assessing the Contemporary Relevance of an Ancient Indian Treatise on Statecraft*, Thesis for the Master of Military Art and Science, 2016, p. 32.
10. Cf Malay Mishra, "Kautily's Arthashastra: Restoring its Rightful place in the Field of International Relations", *Journal of Defence Studies*, vol. 10, No. 2, April-June, 2016, pp. 77-109.
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12. *Arthashastra*, book VI.13-23, Kangle, Part II, pp. 318-319.
13. *Vijigisu* is said to be a kautilyan vocabulary.
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15. Kangle, *Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part III, p. 249.
16. R.P. Kangle, *Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part II, 1972 and 1992, p. 319.
17. Kangle, *ibid*, Part III, p. 248
18. W. Ruben, "Intestate Relations in Ancient India and Kautilya's Arthashastra", in *Indian Year-Book of International Affairs*, vol. IV (Madras), 1955, p. 139; Kangle

- terms this opinion as an outcome of a misunderstanding of the text. Part III, p. 249.
19. Mako Juutinen, "Emerging Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation in a Post-Hegemonic Age: A Kautilyan Perspective on BRICS", ORF Occasional paper no. 208, August 2019, p.8.
 20. Ibid, pp. 8-9
 21. Michael Leibig, "Kautilya's Relevance for India Today", *India Quarterly*, 69, 2 (2013) p. 103.
 22. Arthashastra, Book 5, chapter 3.35-36)
 23. R.P. Kangle, *The Kautily Arthashastra, Part 3: a Study*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, Second Edition, Bombay University, 7th reprint, 2010, pp. 259-260 cf.P.K.Gautam, *One Hundred years of Kautily's Arthashastra, IDSA Monograph Series No. 20*, July 2013, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, p.35.
 24. S.K. Bhakri, *Indian Warfare; An Appraisal of Strategy and Tactics of War in Early MedievalPeriod*, New delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1981, p. 207.
 25. P.C. Chakravarti, *The Art of War in Ancient India*, Delhi, Karan Publishers, 1987, p. 181.
 26. Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd.) "The Enemy Within", *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol.CXI, No. 579, January-March, 2010, pp. 122-123, cf P.K.Gautam, Ibid, p. 98.
 27. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Of Oral traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements", in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Matto (eds), *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice*, New Delhi, Manohar, 1996, pp. 174-190.
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 30. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relations", *American Political Science Review*, 13,, 1919, pp.400-414.
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 32. Roger Boesch, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra*, Lauham MD, Lexington Books, 2002.
 33. Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 25: 231-147, 2006.
 34. P.K. Gautam, *One Hundred Years of Kautily's Arthashastra, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 20*, July 2013, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.
 35. Subrat Mitra and Michael Leibig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*
 36. Marko Juutinen, "Emerging Dynamics of conflict and cooperation in a post-hegemonic Age:A Kautilyan Perspective on BRICS", ORF Occasional paper, August 2019, p.8 see P.K. Gautam, *One hundred Years of Kautily's arthashastra, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 20* July 2013, pp. 51-57.
 37. R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part 3: A Study*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1986, pp 258-259, cf P.K. Gautam, ibid, p. 57.
 38. Torkel Brekke, "Between Prudence and Heroism: Ethics of War in Hindu Tradition", in Torkel Brekke (ed.) *The Ethics of war in Asian Civilizations*, Abingdon, Oxon, 2006, p.131, cf P.K.Gautam, ibid, p. 49.
 39. Cf Gautam, ibid, p. 50.

40. For Kautilya also, war was a means, not an end. But once the war opens, the end, that is winning the war, justifies the means.
41. Gautam, *ibid*, p. 52.
42. See Gautam, *ibid*, pp. 52-57
43. Wing Commander Vinay Vittal, *Ibid*, p.38
44. Michael Leibig, "Kautilya's *Arthashastra*: A Classic Text of Statecraft and an Untapped Political Science Resource", working paper No 74, University of Heidelberg, 2014, p. 10; also see George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World", *The American Political Science Review*, 58, no.3, September 1964, pp. 549-560.
45. Welfare/wellbeing/prosperity of the subjects of the king.
46. Malay Mishra, *ibid*, p.92.
47. Vijay Sukhija, *Asian Maritime Power in 21st Century: Strategic Transactions, China, India and South-East Asia*, Pentagon Press, 2011, pp. 280-284
48. P.K. Gautam, *One Hundred Years of Kautilya's Arthashastra*, 2013, n. 51, p.101.
49. Sachin More, "Arthashastra: Lessons for the Contemporary Security Environment with South Asia as a Case Study", n. 62. Cf Malay Mishra, *ibid*, p.102.
50. Modelski, p. 553.
51. Malay, *ibid*, 94.
52. See book VII of the *Arthashastra*.
53. *Arthashastra*, book VII. 18.44, Kangle, Part II, n.5, p. 384.
54. Book 7.1.1, Kangle, Part II, p.321.
55. *Arthashastra*, Book 7.1.6-11; R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part 3: A Study, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1986, p. 25.
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57. L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra*, Kindle Location, pp.9548-49 and 9457-9462.
58. *Arthashastra*, 7.17.1-15; Kangle, Part II, n. 5, pp.375-76.
59. *Arthashastra*, Book 7.1.13-18; Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, part II, pp.321-322.
60. Rangarajan, Kindle Location, 11656-11696
61. Daniel Coetzee, *Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History's greatest Military Thinkers*, Westport, CT, Praeger, 2013, cf Major Abhishek Kumar, 2016, p.40.
62. Book 7.1.20-27, Kangle, *ibid*, p.322
63. R.P. Kangle, *ibid*, Part II, p.323
64. R. Shamasastri, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, (tr.), Mysore Printing and Publishing House, Mysore, sixth edition, 1960, p.294-295, Book VII, Chapter I.265.
65. R. Shamasastri, *ibid*, p.295.
66. R. Shamasastri, *ibid*, p.295
67. Book VII, Chapter I. The modern day example of *dvaidhibhava* is China who seeks cooperation with Pakistan and hostile relationship with India; policy of friendship with Malaysia and aggression with Vietnam over the South China sea; policy of peace with North Korea and hostility with Japan.
68. Shamasastri, *ibid*, p.296.
69. Roger Boesche, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India", *The Journal of Military History*, 67 (1), 2003, pp. 9-37.
70. Shamasastri, *ibid*, p.296.
71. Book VII.2.267; cf Shamasastri, *ibid*, p. 296.

72. Book VII.2.268; Shamasastya, *ibid*, p. 297.
73. R.P.Kangle, Part II, p. 327.
74. Book 7,3,269. Shamasastya, *ibid*, p. 298.
75. R.P.Kangle *ibid*, p. 328.
76. Book II, chapter 10..47, Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n 20, p. 91.
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78. Malay Mishra, *ibid*, p. 95.
79. Major Abhishek Kumar
80. George Modelski, p. 553.
81. P.K. Gautam, 'Understanding Kautily's Four Upayas', http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/understanding_kautily'sFourUpayas_pkgautam_200513.html, cf Malay Mishra, *ibid*, 99; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle Power and Peace*, third Indian edition, Calcutta, Scientific Book Agency, 1966, pp. 178-203.
82. Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, 1993.
83. Maalay Mishra, *ibid*, p. 99.
84. Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist*, Oxford, Lexington Books, 2002, p. 109.
85. P.K. Gautam, One Hundred Years of Arthashastra, n. 51, p. 36.
86. Michael Leibig, "The Kautily-Arthashastra and Core Concepts of Intelligence Analysis", n. 39. Kautilya provides a detailed methodology and Machinery of intelligence collection, see book I.12.1-25: Kangle, Part II, pp. 23-27
87. See also, L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: the Arthashastra*, n. 20, pp.491-93.
88. Juutinen, *ibid*, p. 9.
89. Juutinen, *ibid*, p. 18.
90. See book VI and VII of Kautily' Arthashastra.
91. Daniel Elazar, *Constitutionalising Globalisation: The Post-Modern Revival of Confederal Arrangements*, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. cf Zuutinen, *ibid*, p. 10
92. See James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and hange In World Politics*, London, ambridge University Press, 1992; Jan cholte, "Global Governance" in *Building Global Democracy Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance*, ed. Jan Scholte, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 11.
93. Kautilya categorises power into three components: *Mantrashakti* or intellectual strength which provides good counsel; *Prabhavshakti*, i.e., the power of the treasury and the army and *utsahshakti*, i.e., the power of valour or the power of energy., *Arthashastra*: 6.2.33 in Kangle, Part II, p.319.
94. *Arthashastra*, 6.2.35-37, cf. Kangle, *ibid*, p. 319.
95. Juutinen, *ibid*, p. 11.
96. See R.Shamasastya, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, p. 52.
97. Juutinen, *ibid*, p. 17
98. Nilima Chakravarty, "Chapter vi Kautilya", *Indian Philosophy: The Pathfinders and the System Builders (700 BC to 100 AD)*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1992, p.197, cf Gautam, Hundred Years of Kautilya's Arthashastra, IDSA Monograph series, No. 20, July 201356.
99. Juutinen, *ibid*, p. 18.
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107. Pinak Chakravorty, *ibid.*
108. Ibid.
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114. P.K. Gautam, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: Contemporary Issues and Comparison*, IDSA Monograph series, No 47, New Delhi, October 2015, pp.4-12.
115. Ibid.
116. Major Abhishek Kumar, *The Arthashastra: The Contemporary Relevance of an Ancient Indian Treatise on Statecraft*, A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U S Army Command and General Staff college in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Military Art and Science, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2016, p. 80.