

# MACHIAVELLI AND THE ART OF GOVERNMENT: ON MICHEL FOUCAULT'S NON-READING OF MACHIAVELLI<sup>1</sup>

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I guess there is no art of government in Machiavelli.  
MICHEL FOUCAULT<sup>2</sup>

## 1. Introduction

With the topic at hand I find myself entering a field of tension between two thinkers, who are both complex, innovative and controversial. My exposition will therefore remain within the orb of this dual constellation, with only one of the stars appearing in the light of the other, Machiavelli in the light of the somewhat persistent genealogy of power, which Michel Foucault tried to chart out in several attempts. This initial constraint will prevent me from unfolding my own reading of Machiavelli and compel me instead to show what happens to Machiavelli, when he lands on Foucault's genealogical dissecting table. This has two methodological consequences for the following essay: (1) In keeping with Foucault's discourse-analytical approach, I will have to resist the temptation of treating Machiavelli as the *author of a work*, contrary to a methodological norm, which is broadly established in the humanities. (2) Prior to unearthing the details of a discourse-analytical perception of Machiavelli, I will have to summarize the fundamentals of Foucault's archaeo-genealogical methodology, so as to be in a position to reveal any possible correlation between method and result in what I term Foucault's strange "non-reading" of Machiavelli.

For a start I would like to point out, how sparsely Foucault mentions Machiavelli, to be precise, only on three occasions, at least in the context of his genealogy of governmentality: once during his *Collège de France* lectures on the art of government in spring 1978<sup>3</sup>; and twice more during two American lectures in 1979<sup>4</sup> and 1982<sup>5</sup>. That is rather surprising, considering that Machiavelli is widely acknowledged as one of the founding figures of modern political reflection and that Foucault was mainly

concerned with questions of modern power in this particular phase of his genealogical endeavours.<sup>6</sup>

Foucault's main observations on Machiavelli in connection with the history of governmentality are to be found in a few stray remarks in the *Collège de France* lectures just mentioned. At first sight these remarks appear somewhat sporadic or unsystematic, and in fact somewhat paradoxical. For on the one hand it can hardly be overlooked, that Machiavelli is only rarely mentioned in these lectures, in fact, almost incidentally in what seems to be chance comments at the margins of an otherwise loaded genealogical argumentation and without the slightest tendency to undertake anything like a systematic reading of the Florentine thinker. On the other hand it does not escape an observant reader that Machiavelli plays almost a central role in the genealogical process focussed upon by these lectures: the birth of governmentality. In this connection I would like to underscore the following three traits in Foucault's treatment of Machiavelli.

*Firstly*, Foucault never refers to Machiavelli in his own terms, neither as an author nor as an "immediate" discursive phenomenon, but always as a contrastive background and point of departure for the process of constitution of governmentality. Accordingly, Machiavelli appears as a kind of contrastive foil with respect to the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century discourses on the *raison of state*, which is to be understood as a new type of reason characteristic of modern governmentality. In other words, Foucault is not concerned with Machiavellian thought in the first place, but rather with the manner in which a specific picture of Machiavelli surfaces in the mirror of these discourses, and further, with the mode, in which affirming or refuting Machiavelli has factually contributed to the constitution of these discourses.

*Secondly*, Foucault's strange art of "non-reading" seems to treat Machiavelli merely as the author of *Il Principe*, in seeming compliance with the strategy adopted by the historical discourses on governmentality in dealing with Machiavelli. This widespread and familiar technique of reduction, which played such a fateful role in the history of Machiavelli interpretations, never seems to be questioned in Foucault's genealogical analyses. Machiavelli, the author of the *Discorsi* is not brought to attention. Machiavelli, the republican and historian of his city, is not evoked, as is usually done to reveal the questionable nature of this reduction. Only once does Foucault – more in irony than anything else – point out, that in the historical context of the discourses on governmentality (sixteenth – eighteenth centuries), Machiavelli has "never been anything other than a Machiavellian"<sup>7</sup>, not unlike all those political and theoretical rivals, when they had to be effectively discredited. Thus Machiavelli appears as a kind

of *medium* to be used, whenever it was deemed necessary to affirm or refute the nascent concept of an art of government. Foucault depicts this strategy as a discursive technique of trying "to say something via someone else"<sup>8</sup>, which, as he notes in passing, is rampant in his own discursive environment of the seventies, in the mode of a discursive exploitation of Marx. "Our own Machiavelli in this sense", as he remarks, "is probably Marx."<sup>9</sup> However that might be, the historical reduction of Machiavelli to the author of *Il Principe* is considered by Foucault for methodological reasons as a *positivity* of discourse, which he does not intend to question in any way. He decides instead to treat it as an object of discourse analysis and to analyse the function exercised by it.

*Thirdly*, Foucault casually strews in his assessment of Machiavelli's historical status in the third of these thirteen lectures, which stands in stark contrast to the widespread appreciation of Machiavelli as a founding figure of modern political thought.<sup>10</sup> In the following lectures this finding will not only be not withdrawn, but will in fact be deepened and made more precise, as the details of the history of the art of government come to the fore. Foucault's assessment consists in the observation, that Machiavelli is not a modern thinker, but represents the threshold of decline of an older political discourse, which disappears with the emergence of the discourse on governmentality. In this perspective, Machiavelli appears as the representative of an archaic thinking, in which the central problem is not the *government of populations*, but rather the *security of the Prince and his territories*.<sup>11</sup>

All this is formulated almost word by word in the two American lectures mentioned above. I will quote from the later one delivered in 1982:

Machiavelli's *problem* in "The Prince" is to know, how to safeguard inherited or conquered territories against internal or external enemies. His entire analysis intends to merely determine all the factors, which can serve to strengthen the bond between the Prince and the state, in contrast to the question that emerged at the beginning of the seventeenth century along with the conception of a reason of state, which focussed on the existence or nature of the new entity called "state". Perhaps that is the reason, why the theoreticians of the reason of state tried to distance themselves as far as possible from Machiavelli, from someone, who had an extremely bad reputation and whose *problem* they could not recognise as their own, which was not the *problem* of the state, but rather that of the harmony between the Prince ... and his territory and people. And irrespective of all the controversies around the Prince and Machiavelli's work, the reason of state became an important factor for the emergence of a type of rationality, which was completely different form that, which Machiavelli envisioned. It was not the intention of this new art of government to enhance the power of the Prince, but rather to consolidate the state itself as such.<sup>12</sup>

The peculiarities of such an appraisal of Machiavelli can be lead back to Foucault's genealogical method in general and the conceptions of *problem* and *problematization* in particular. One can in fact expect a correlation between them and the technique of discourse analysis, which Foucault had been practicing and developing for almost two decades at the time of his *Collège de France* lectures. For this reason I would like to introduce a few methodological clarifications in the next section, before I turn to the issue at hand, which is *Machiavelli and the art of government*.

## 2. Methodological prelude: Foucault's concept of *problematization*

Speaking about an *author* involves the integration of a series of utterances ascribed to the author into a *work*. However we define a work and its limits: the *work* remains an indispensable correlate of the *author* and a fundamental category of the history of ideas. Integrating authorial utterances into a work is therefore connected to the *function* of the author and serves as an operational principle guiding the practice of reading an author.

One could of course follow Quentin Skinner and split the authorial function by distinguishing between a sense-oriented and an act-oriented (performative) intention of the author.<sup>13</sup> A methodological consequence of this distinction is the possibility of substituting the traditional question regarding what the author could have *meant* by quite a different type of question regarding what the author has actually *done* through a series of utterances. According to Skinner, the latter question can hold its ground against all deconstructionist critique due to the well-reasoned answers enabled by adapting hermeneutic techniques methodologically to such questions. But also in the perspective of an act-intention the author's utterances continue to be integrated into a work, even though they are additionally to be rated as discursive inroads into the historical debates contemporary to the author.

However, Foucault's methodological reserve with respect to the hermeneutic depth of a work is well known. The perspective, in which discourses/discursive strategies rather than intentional depths come to view, is quite different from the hermeneutic view-point, irrespective of Skinner's distinction between the sense and act-intentional approaches. In the following I would like to delineate Foucault's methodological position in 12 compact steps.<sup>14</sup> It is only against this methodological backdrop, that the specific value of Foucault's appraisal of Machiavelli can be convincingly presented.

- (1) Method is a *procedure* (*Verfahren*) in the act and instant of its application. Under *procedure* I understand a *realised strategy of thinking*.



- (2) Thinking always takes place, whenever and wherever there is a *problem*. Thus methodical thinking involves the application of a strategy of coming to terms with a problem.
- (3) A problem results on the one hand from a constellation of resistance and adversity. On the other hand, however, the problem itself generates the conflicting tendencies and forces dealing with it. Method therefore can be seen as the *phenomenality* of a strategy in a field of controversies and conflicts around a problem.
- (4) However, the category of the problem does not imply an a-temporal and continued existence of a controversy/adversity, which can be traced back to the a-historic essence of an anthropological constant. Instead, all problems are subjected to transformations, which are specific to them and which lie at the root of a specific *history* of the emergence and disappearance of problems. What turns into a problem in one age can cease to be one in the next. Thus the problem appears as a privileged instant of a historical process of *problematization*, entailing three distinct aspects: (a) something, which possessed unquestionable *evidence* in an earlier age, is no longer evident; (b) something, which is no longer evident, is suddenly also no longer known; suddenly, from within all that has been known and familiar till now, the *unknown* begins to surface; (c) something, which was known in earlier times and has now become unknown, is therefore also something, which is *dangerous*. A history of problematisation shows, how something that used to be evident becomes something, which is no longer evident and no longer known, which is ultimately something dangerous. It therefore does not come as a surprise, that a history of problematisation mobilises strategies of defence and security.<sup>15</sup>
- (5) Thus, wherever thinking takes place, a problem has surfaced. And wherever there is a problem, there is also a practice of problematisation at work. Problematisation is the process, in which something, with which people lived without any problem, something, in other words, with which people lived with trust, becomes problematic and, in the final consequence, dangerous. History of thought can be taken as a history of ideas. But history of thought can also be taken as a history of problematisations. We have here two distinct perspectives, from which a history of thought can be formulated.
- (6) Methodical thinking thus requires a specific and often unconscious practice of problematisation prior to it. However, practices of problematisation are visible and real only under the condition, that

- they involve the use of signs in general and language in particular. All use of signs, in which a previously unproblematic entity becomes a problem, can be termed a *discourse*.
- (7) Discourse is neither a *work*, nor a *text*, but rather an arrayal of forms of problematisation involving mainly the use of language and characterised by a regular and regulated emergence of series of objects, modes of speech, concepts and themes, which problematise through their sheer existence other, older series of objects, modes of speech, concepts and themes, but are in their turn also problematisable. The time of discourse is the time generated by problematisation.
- (8) The essential obstacle on the way to perceiving discourses and their correlative forms of problematisation is the familiar and evident practice of categorising *said things (choses dites)* according to the principle of the *author*. That is why discourses and discursive regularities can come to view and become *discursive phenomena* only under the condition that the principle of the author is put into brackets. That does not however mean a *negation* of the authority of the author. That also does not imply, that the reality of the author is simply whisked away by applying the traditional techniques of abstraction, attaining thereby higher levels of genera and generalisation. That simply means that the function of the author is temporarily *suspended*, to use a familiar Husserlian expression. In other words, the author is temporarily put out of function, in order to effect a methodological switch of perspectives, so that an alternative categorisation of *said things (choses dites)* becomes possible.
- (9) The "principle" of such an alternative categorisation is what Foucault terms a *discursive regularity*, which allows the categorisation of *said things (choses dites)* into epistemic ages or "epistemes" of distinct discursive rules.<sup>16</sup> For example, in the sixteenth century a historically specific type of discursive regularity was effected by the epistemic figure of *resemblance*, which regulated numerous discourses involving biblical, medical, cosmological knowledge.<sup>17</sup> Later on, a quite different type of discursive regularity was generated by a *problematization* of *resemblance*, incarnated by a relation of substitution of an object through an idea. The idea and the object no longer *resemble* each other, they are simply *different* from each other, the relation between them operating under the title of *representation*. The figure of *representation*, functioning as a form of problematisation of *resemblance*, regulated numerous discourses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>18</sup> The two distinct discursive figures of *resemblance* and *representation*, as well as the relation

of problematisation between them reveals the constitution of an epistemic age, which Foucault termed since the 60's as the *classical age* (*l'âge classique*), which – by means of its two thresholds at the end of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries – breaks up the monolithic unity of what is termed the *modern age* (*Neuzeit*) in the traditional history of ideas. It is known that Foucault uses the term *archaeology* for this type of historiography, which reveals such forms of problematisation or discourses and the corresponding division of historic time into epistemic ages.<sup>19</sup> Archaeology is thus a type of historiography, correlative to a *history of discourses*, understood as a *history of problematisations*.

- (10) However, archaeology itself, taken as the writing of a history of problematisations, can be seen as the application of a technique of problematisation specific to itself. Archaeological method is rooted in an act of problematisation of the “anthropological” evidences, which are constitutive for the history of ideas. One of these evidences is the principle of *authorship*. Thus what appeared as those lengthy and “anti-humanistic” diatribes launched by Foucault in the sixties, are simply expressive of a discursive process of problematisation of an “anthropological” historiography that reduplicates Man as its methodological foundation and its empirical object at the same time.
- (11) This background of problematisation shows, that the results yielded by the application of archaeological method can only be taken as *relative* findings. Foucault's archaeological historiography illustrates something like a *relativism of method*, standing in contrast to all familiar postures of scientific objectivism. That means, that the findings of an archaeological history of discourse are *relative* with respect to the specific, contingent and variable practice of problematisation at the root of a particular archaeological programme. If the “foundational” act of problematisation is different, then the corresponding distinction of ages in the flow of historical events is also different. For this reason, the themes, concepts, objects involved in the work of one and the same author can be associated with different sides of the same inter-epochal threshold, depending on the context of problematisation. Thus in *The Order of Things* Francis Bacon's theory of idols is associated with the epistemic age of *Renaissance*<sup>20</sup>, whereas in the *Collège de France* lecture of 1978 an essay of the same Bacon – on sedition and overcoming it by the application of the *reason of state* – is seen as belonging to the *classical age*<sup>21</sup>. The work of the same author is cut up by the threshold between two succeeding ages due to the different acts of problematisation at work in the respective historiographic descriptions.

(12) Thus, archaeological history reveals in the background *active* practices of problematisation, which then appear in the foreground as *reactive* practices of critique, exclusion or inclusion. The background practices of problematisation are essentially productive practices. An example is the background problematisation of madness, producing as a surface effect the historical constitution of psychiatric reason. Foucault has depicted this productive process in his history of madness.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, in Foucault's history of the prison, a background problematisation of crime generates by installing the dispositive of the modern prison delinquency as a surface effect.<sup>23</sup> Finally, a "governmental" problematisation of Machiavelli and the theoretical axioms unproblematic to Machiavelli himself can be shown to be at work in the background, to generate as a surface effects the discourse on governmentality and a correlative entity called the *reason of state*. This is what Foucault demonstrates in his history of governmentality and this is what I will now try to describe in the following.

### 3. *Situating Machiavelli in a history of problematisation*

As a first step I would like to trace back Foucault's strange non-reading of Machiavelli to his discourse-analytical attempt at situating Machiavelli in a *history of problematisation*. In an immediate sense, we are faced with a history of the practices of problematising Machiavelli, constitutive for certain typically Western – and obviously also modern – political reactions, which have retained their function till today, like the practice of attaching the malignant title "Machiavellianism" to certain morally questionable political practices.<sup>24</sup> In a more complex sense, however, such a history reveals a problematisation of certain Machiavellian pre-suppositions, which Machiavelli himself could not have problematised.

An important event in the history of problematising Machiavelli is the emergence and circulation of a veritable flood of anti-Machiavellian literature in the classical age. Foucault subjects these discourses to a careful analysis, which, however, differs in a significant manner from the familiar modernist critique of the moralism inherent in traditional anti-Machiavellianism. For he treats this anti-Machiavellianism as a *discursive positivity* and seeks to determine the strategies and productive forces at work in it, due to which his analysis results in certain rather unaccustomed deviations. Thus Bacon no longer emerges as a grateful advocate of Machiavelli, as a widespread platitude in Machiavelli scholarship would have it, but instead differs from him due to his economic conception of the *reason of state*.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Foucault's analysis is at odds with Friedrich Meinecke, who appraises Machiavelli as the actual initiator of the idea of



the *raison of state*.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, Machiavelli figures in Foucault's history of the art of government as a constant object of refusal, which is (negatively) constitutive for the discourses on the *raison of state*.

As already mentioned<sup>27</sup>, we have here a typically Foucauldian figure, surfacing for the first time in *Madness and Civilisation*<sup>28</sup> as the connection, in which occidental reason consolidates itself in two distinct waves through two different ways of relating itself to madness or whatever it determines as such. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reason consolidates itself through a politics of *security* consisting in the *exclusion* of madness and supported by the governmentality of a *police-state*, whereas it comes to itself since the end of the eighteenth century via a *clinical and psychiatric* practice of *inclusion* and *betterment* of madness, supported by the clinical and psychiatric dispositives of modern power. In a similar vein, the discourse on the art of government in the classical age consolidates itself through its inherently negative relation to Machiavelli's *Il Principe*:

This bone of contention, in relation to which, in opposition (to which) and (through) the repudiation of which the literature on government allowed itself to be categorised, this obnoxious text is of course Machiavelli's *Prince*. A text, whose history is interesting, or rather: it would be interesting to delineate the relations between itself and all the texts that came after it, which criticised and repudiated it.<sup>29</sup>

The historical discourse on the art of government is thus *essentially* anti-Machiavellian. Foucault's analysis makes it clear, that the interpretation of the anti-Machiavellian trend prevailing from the sixteenth century till Frederick the Great's *Antimachiavel*<sup>30</sup> as an expression of moral indignation merely responds to a surface effect. What actually takes place via the act of repudiation is the constitution of governmental discourse. In other words: the moral indignation accompanying the Machiavelli reception of the classical age is nothing but a strategy of constitution of governmental discourse. That is why anti-Machiavellianism does not set in immediately with the (posthumous) publication of *Il Principe* in 1532, but later on in the sixteenth century with the emergence of governmental literature. And it is for the same reason, that exactly at the end of the eighteenth century, when the discourse on governmentality enters a crisis, the anti-Machiavellian trend disappears and is substituted by a radically different assessment of Machiavelli, ranging from the neutral to the positive. According to Foucault, the reason for a renewed interest in Machiavelli in the aftermath of the French Revolution is to be seen in the Napoleonic context, which was created "by the revolution and the problem of the revolution"<sup>31</sup>. This post-revolutionary political context is determined by the question: "How and under which conditions can the sovereignty of a sovereign within a state be kept intact?"<sup>32</sup>

Thus the history of problematisation, in which Foucault attempts to embed Machiavelli, appears only at a first glance as a history of problematisation of Machiavelli. For, as the analysis progresses, the governmental problematisation of Machiavelli is seen to indicate the existence of further and more important practices of problematisation at work in the background and directed against the basic axioms of an older political thinking, which they attempt at dislodging. Foucault's genealogy of governmental thinking thus unfolds itself by anchoring Machiavelli in a history of problematisation, which goes further than a mere problematisation of the author Machiavelli. That is why such an anchorage cannot be achieved by a mere analysis of Machiavelli's works and why Foucault's genealogy must be characterised as an "art of non-reading". Instead, a genealogical anchorage of Machiavelli makes it necessary to analyse three "externals" constitutive for the discursive phenomenon Machiavelli. I have touched upon these only sporadically till now and would now like to treat them more systematically, in order to be able to assess their role and importance in Foucault's treatment of Machiavelli:

- 1) Machiavelli lives in a city and is mainly concerned with the conservation of a sovereign power at the helm of the city-state. But it is precisely this concern, which makes the city become a *problem* for him.
- 2) The history of the Machiavelli reception in the classical age is characterised by a reduction of Machiavelli to the author of the small tractate *Il Principe*, published five years after his death and nineteen years after he had written it. This reduction was so deep and far-reaching, that the term "Machiavellianism" still in use today refers mainly to the political options recommended in this work. Thus, Machiavelli becomes a *problem* only to the extent, that the *type of power* he is supporting in this work becomes a problem. This is the power of the sovereign, or, as Foucault often terms it, *sovereign power*.
- 3) In the context of the reception of Machiavelli from the beginning of the classical age till the eighteenth century, a body of anti-Machiavellian writings was constituted, which set the trend and became conspicuous through their air of moral indignation. However, as I have already said: what can actually be observed by looking through this layer of moralism and as the other side of the coin, so to say, is the process of constitution of governmental discourse.

I will now proceed to present Foucault's analysis of the phenomenon Machiavelli in the classical age by taking these three externals as a starting point.

#### 4. Machiavelli and the city

Foucault characterises the history of power in European societies since the sixteenth century as a complex struggle between three types of power: *sovereign power*, *disciplinary power* and *governmental power*. Even though governmental power can be said to be the youngest of these types of power, the history of power can in no way be taken as a mere succession of ages, each under the sway of only one of these types. Foucault characterises the history of power instead as a "series of complex structures", understood as specific "systems of correlation" between these three types of power, so that in each case one of them is effectively dominant with respect to the other two.<sup>33</sup>

However, one can simplify matters by distinguishing between the three types of power by naming their respective points of reference, keeping in mind the risk of unduly reducing the real complexity of their historical modes of appearance. In this vein, sovereign power may be roughly characterised as essentially targeting a *territory*; disciplinary power a *body* of individuals or groups of individuals; and governmental power a *population*.<sup>34</sup>

The operational target of sovereign power is to secure the link between the sovereign and his territory. Even if this type of power occasionally includes its subjects in its strategic calculus, then only to the extent that they figure as inhabitants of a territory or as internal rivals laying claim to a territory. Thus Foucault repeatedly draws attention to the fact that Machiavelli, the author of *Il Principe*, appears in the mirror of governmental discourses as someone, who is mainly concerned with the *security of a territory*, meaning the security and legitimation of the *link* between a sovereign and his territory. In contrast, the target of disciplinary power is to *dominate bodies* and render them submissive. And the target of governmental power is to *govern populations*.

The category of a *population* comes to view somewhat late in the sixteenth century<sup>35</sup> and confronts power with new types of problems, which can no longer be dealt with by the usual means available to sovereign power and its legal machinery: the practice of issuing decrees and bans to restore a relation of obedience. The new problems posed by populations can only be dealt with by means of a governmental intervention in the essentially *statistical* processes of a population. In the history of the art of government disciplinary power plays no significant role, so that the actual rivalry is that between a politics of territory and a politics of population. The essential option is therefore: *prohibition* or *administration*?

However, not only sovereign power correlates with a space, that of the *territory*, but also governmental power, which, due to its association with

the category of population, correlates with the space of the *city* required by a population for its statistical processes to surface. Thus Foucault's genealogy of population issues from the elementary opposition between the *territory* and the *city*, which is certainly one of the essential conditions for the emergence of governmental power.<sup>36</sup>

A rudimentary manifestation of this opposition is revealed by the fact that the city presents a space of fortification in contrast to the openness of the territory and its diverse zones. Fortification, however, is not to be reduced to the merely military objective of *exclusion* of the enemy. Besides and beyond that, fortification effects the *inclusion* of the citizen, which leads to far-reaching consequences. Whereas, for example, the transportation of goods in the open space of the territory can cause them to vanish into the distance, the limited space of the city offers them nothing more than the possibility of *circulation*. However, not only do goods circulate within the closed space of the city, but also humans, animals, vehicles and, above all, diseases. And since besides goods or humans also diseases circulate within the walls of a city, the space of the city is feared as a potential source of epidemics.

Circulation of goods, circulation of means of conveyance, circulation of diseases: the city reveals itself as the characteristic space of circulation, and the term retains till today its economic, transportation and medical connotations, as is exemplified by the present-day French expression *circulation*, standing alternately for "circulation of goods and money", "traffic" and "blood circulation". With growth in trade volume and the size of a city population, the phenomenon of circulation becomes an incontestable fact, consolidating by virtue of its circular dynamics the individuals affected by it to a *milieu*, in which the collective effects of a collection of individuals begin to surface as statistical events and their series. Foucault draws attention to the fact that in the same period, meaning the seventeenth century, in which the milieu advances to an increasingly perceptible social phenomenon, Newtonian physics explains long-distance effects between bodies by taking recourse to a physical milieu between them called *fluidum* or *aether* as the medium of conveyance of the effects.<sup>37</sup> This conceptual concoction of *milieu* and *circulation* can be given the title *population*, which is to be understood as a milieu functioning simultaneously as a vehicle and instrument of circulation.<sup>38</sup>

Whereas sovereign power reacts to problems specific to the territory – to the internal problems of territory through *juridical* means and to the external problems of territory through *military* means – the younger governmental power has to deal with problems specific to the new urban milieus by means of administrative and scientific techniques. For the problems assailing governmental power do not result from the bad will of



individual subjects, but rather from effects due to processes of circulation and possessing a consistency, which is normally ascribed to natural phenomena. This is why practices of governmental intervention in milieu processes are not juridical, but technical in nature. They are based on extensive statistical knowledge, which emerges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the context of a knowledge grounded in a new type of dispositive called the *police* (*Polizey*).<sup>39</sup> Here lies the reason, why the Physiocrats of the eighteenth century tried to reformulate economic problems in scientific terms on the basis of such a knowledge.<sup>40</sup> All those phenomena, which were reflected upon as *Fortuna's whimsies* in the Machiavellian context of sovereign power, are now treated as *statistical events* under the onslaught of governmental intervention.

With the transition of milieu knowledge into scientific knowledge, the city transforms from a rudimentary and fortified space of inclusion into a space perceived as a source of wealth to be tapped by well-coordinated and knowledge-based measures of governmental power. With the fringes of the city becoming increasingly permeable, circulation spreads out in great ring-shaped waves and consolidates the entire population of an entire land, so that at the end of this process governmental power no longer has the task of securing circulation within the enclosure of the city, but quite the other way round: its problem now lies in identifying a proper site for the city within the nascent economic space of circulation. Governmental power thus formulates the question of an optimal location for its headquarters in economic and administrative terms, and not primarily in the context of war and military strategy, as was previously the case with sovereign power. Foucault's genealogy points out, that one of the main problems, with which governmental power is confronted in the eighteenth century, concerns the correct method of "opening up and reconnecting (*désenclavement*) the city spatially, legally, administratively and economically", of "repositioning the city within (an enlarged) space of circulation"<sup>41</sup>

These connections show that in the mirror of governmental discourses Machiavelli's *Il Principe* can only be seen as a document of sovereign power, understood as an atavistic type of power, which is more medieval than modern. With the Machiavelli reception setting in at the threshold of the age of governmentality, the small treatise called *The Prince* gets caught up in an antagonism between two paradigms of political thought, in which the essential contradiction of this transitional period is expressed: the opposition between problems of the territory, which were the norm up to the sixteenth century, and problems of populations, which begin to surface during the sixteenth century and constitute the main target of governmental thinking. Machiavelli's problematisation reveals an

intensification of the territorial concern of securing the power of the *city-state*, for the traditional target of sovereign power was to conquer new territories and guard their integrity: to mark, fortify, protect and enlarge the territory of the sovereign. Protecting the territory was synonymous to protecting the sovereign and consisted therefore in the prevention of all movement that did not issue from the sovereign himself. Foucault formulates the problem of sovereign power, which can be identified as Machiavelli's problem and consists in the protection of a sovereign territory, as follows: "How (can I) prevent things from getting into motion, how can I make headway, without letting things getting into motion?"<sup>42</sup>

However, with its essential mistrust of movement, sovereign power does not only seek to protect itself against external enemies, but, on a different level, also against the dynamism of the circulation processes, which emerged with the birth of the city as space of enclosure. Thus Machiavelli's problem, seen in the mirror of the nascent governmental discourses, is also articulated in the question, how to exercise sovereign power *within the specific territoriality of the city*. From the standpoint of governmental power, Machiavelli treats the city not as an emergent modern space capable of generating a population and a milieu, but rather as a territory to be targeted by sovereign power.

Such an observation, incidentally, cannot result from a hermeneutic historiography of *sense-horizons*, but rather from a genealogical historiography of *problem-horizons*. The question at the root of Foucault's genealogy is therefore neither what hermeneutic tradition would have us ask – "What does Machiavelli want us to say?" – nor the act-intentional question proposed by Skinner<sup>43</sup> – "Was is Machiavelli *doing* by saying, what he is saying?" –, but rather: "What is Machiavelli's *problem*?" It is only when a problem-horizon is laid bare, that it becomes possible to connect certain utterances by Machiavelli with a certain *discourse* and to disconnect a specific problem-complex from Machiavelli's *work* as a whole.

As a result of his genealogical reflection Foucault thus outlines Machiavelli's problem:

Machiavelli's problem was to know precisely, under what conditions it was possible, that upon a given territory, gained through conquest or inheritance, ... the power of the sovereign is not threatened. (...) Securing the power of the prince: that was the problem of *Il Principe*, and I believe that this was the political problem of sovereignty associated with the reality of the territorial power of the sovereign.<sup>44</sup>

These genealogical considerations thus result in Foucault's ultimate judgement on Machiavelli's historical status, which, as I mentioned earlier, radically differs from the widespread appreciation of Machiavelli as the author of the concept of *reason of state* and a pioneer of modern political

theory<sup>45</sup>:

... far from thinking that Machiavelli has laid the groundwork for the emergence of modernity in political thought, I would say that on the contrary he marks the end of an age, in which the problem consisted in the security of the prince and his territory.<sup>46</sup>

Governmental thinking, on the other hand, is based on an entirely different problem related to the emergent phenomenon of circulation:

Not to mark and fortify a territory, but rather to let the processes of circulation take their course, to gain control over them, to separate the good and bad forms of circulation – all these are ways of seeing to it that everything remains in motion and keeps changing and adapting itself incessantly and keeps moving from one point to the next, but in such a manner that the inherent dangers of this circulation are neutralised. The issue at stake is no longer the security of the prince and his territory, but rather the security of the population and those governing (it, P. M.).<sup>47</sup>

The problem-horizon of governmentality is thus quite different from that associated with a politics of sovereignty. This governmental preoccupation with the nascent phenomena of circulation and milieu, thus appears as the genealogical precursor of the subsequent discourses on political economics in the late eighteenth century.

##### 5. The reduction of Machiavelli to the author of *Il Principe*

We have seen that Machiavelli is not only a recurrent theme for the nascent discourses on the art of government in the sixteenth century, but also, that reducing him to the author of *Il Principe* is indispensable for the process of their constitution. The exclusive association with his treatise lets Machiavelli appear as the representative of a sovereign power that equates the protection of the sovereign with the defence of a territory. The sovereign, characterised by his unquestioned right to the territory, enjoys the highest possible standing. He is the principle and *raison d'être* of the political sphere. He stands above truth and lie, state and law, his subjects and his territory. In the classical age it is precisely this status of the sovereign that stands to be challenged by the emergent discourses on governmentality, which generate through their critique of the sovereign's right to sovereignty the populational rationale of the *reason of state* in opposition to the territorialistic rationale of pre-governmental sovereignty.

This tendency of all governmental politics towards a problematisation of sovereign power can be traced back to a fundamental transformation in the medieval conception of the power of the king as a *pastoral power*. Thomas Aquinas determined the pastoral power of the king on the basis of three analogies characterised by Foucault as "the analogies of government".<sup>48</sup> These are:

1. *The analogy with God*: The king governs his territory as God governs nature.
2. *The analogy with nature*: The king governs a land or a city as life-force governs "an organism, so that the stomach does not (go, P. M.) one way and the legs go another"<sup>49</sup>. He has to conduct the egoism of the individuals, incessantly striving towards their own specific well-being, towards a common welfare.
3. *The analogy with the pastor and the father of the family*: The king has been assigned by the history of God's grace to govern like a Good Shepherd or a guide of souls. The function of the king is to "provide welfare to the people by following a method, which ultimately allows them the attainment of celestial bliss."<sup>50</sup> The task of the king is thus similar to that of the pastor or the father of a family. In all his terrestrial and temporal decisions he must see to it, that the eternal salvation of the individual is not jeopardised, but rather enabled.<sup>51</sup>

It is this "analectic" continuum between divine sovereignty on the one hand and the practice of the king on the other, which confers on the king the authority to govern and provides him the models aiding him in his work. The power of the king is embedded in this continuum, functioning as a process, in which God's power is transmitted via the intermediary stations of nature and the pastor to the lowest rung, represented by the father of the family. However, the emergence of governmental thinking leads to a break-up of this continuum between sovereign power and government. God no longer reigns over the world in a pastoral manner via the king and the father of the family, but rather on the basis of *laws*. In physics and astronomy these laws were formulated by Copernicus, Galilei, Kepler as the mathematical *laws of nature*. In the field of natural history they were articulated as John Ray's taxonomical *orders* of plants and animals. In Antoine Arnauld's and Pierre Nicole's "General Grammar" they were presented as the logical *laws of discourse*. The world is no longer governed immediately by God, but by *laws*.<sup>52</sup>

The disappearance of God's immediate pastoral power over the world at the threshold of the classical age is, as Foucault puts it, compensated by a dual and antagonistic process of a *de-governmentalisation of the cosmos*<sup>53</sup> and a *governmentalisation of the res publica*<sup>54</sup>, the public sphere. The cosmos on the one hand is no longer conceptualised "politically", but rather scientifically, in the sense that it is now "governed" by mathematical and taxonomical *laws*. On the other hand, the public domain is governed by a new kind of art, the *specific art of the sovereign*, regulated no longer by the model of divine governmentality, but supported instead by the techniques of a specific craft. In other words: the sovereign is now expected to do



something quite different from "God with respect to nature or the pastor with respect to his lambs or the father of the family with respect to his children or the herdsman with respect to his flock".<sup>55</sup> The art of government in this sense is not merely *different* from the exercise of sovereign power, rather it is *more* than what the pre-governmental prince does. It is a specific practice with its own laws, belonging to the sphere of "neither the sovereign nor the politics of the pastor"<sup>56</sup>.

The disintegration of the continuum between God's sovereignty and the government of the king is the condition of possibility of the emergence of the *art of government* and the *reason of state* and goes back to the two major transformations mentioned above: (1) God no longer intervenes immediately in the physical processes of nature in an act, which is a mixture of grace and government; instead, he holds together the cosmos via the inherent rationality of natural laws. (2) The political sphere is no longer analogous to nature, but invested with its own consistency and regularity. The rationality of the natural and the rationality of the political have fallen apart into the mathematical and taxonomical rationality of the laws of nature, articulated in the concept of *mathesis universalis*; and the political rationality of the *reason of state*. From each of these follows an *objective* logic of the processes relevant to the cosmic and physical sphere on the one hand and the political on the other.<sup>57</sup>

Natural processes thus take place in an ontological sector governed by a reason common to God and Man and manifested in the *principia naturae*, the so called principles of nature.<sup>58</sup> In contrast, societies are politically dominated by a certain type of action guided by rules derived from a specifically political model and a specifically political type of rationality, both of which are external appendages to sovereign power. "This extra something is government, a government, which needs to seek out its own *raison*."<sup>59</sup> Thus, the order of things derives from the *principia naturae* on the one hand and from the *ratio status* or the *reason of state* on the other.<sup>60</sup>

Against the background of this major transformation of pastoral power, the problematisation of sovereign power can be seen to be constitutive for the *reason of state* as the specific rationality regulating the *government of populations*. What is implied in this conception of government and its rationality is a new type of *state*, existing by and for itself. The new prince is therefore merely the highest servant of the state, exercising a function that is at the top of an entire governmental hierarchy. This is the model of the prince represented for example by Frederick the Great. The opposition between these two different and incompatible conceptions of the prince – as an imitator of God on the one hand and as a servant of the state on the other – is articulated through identifying Machiavelli as the author of

*Il Principe*, deriving the power of the sovereign not from the politics of governmentality, but rather from that of the pastor.

It makes no difference, whether this identification of Machiavelli is associated with an acceptance or rejection of the idea of *reason of state*. Machiavelli functions here merely as an argument. The supporters of the idea of the *reason of state* in the classical age criticise in him a representative of princely interests and therefore an opponent of the idea of the *reason of state*. They say: "We(...) have absolutely nothing to do with Machiavelli. Machiavelli does not give us, what we are looking for. Machiavelli is, in other words, nothing other than a Machiavellian, nothing other than someone, whose calculations are adapted to the interests of the prince, and we reject him as such."<sup>61</sup> The opponents of the *reason of state* on the contrary – all of them "integralistic Catholics" like the French Jesuit Claude Clément, the rival of Richelieu and a supporter of Spain – criticise the supporters of the *reason of state* for their devotion to the state, which they see as a new cult to be called *statolatry*<sup>62</sup>, which they accuse of godlessness and lawlessness and which they regard as the emblem of an unabashed Machiavellianism. They say: "Go deeper into your idea of a specific art of government, as much as you want, you will only find Machiavelli."<sup>63</sup> For these critiques of *statolatry*, the *reason of state*, supported by their opponents, is nothing other than the old sovereign power of the pre-governmental prince behind the mask of a new rationality.

Thus, in connection with these governmental discourses, Machiavelli is to be ascribed a rather paradoxical status. On the one hand no art of government can be found in Machiavelli's own theoretical horizon. Foucault explains this absence by drawing attention to the history of problematisation discussed above: "Machiavelli's problem (does) not lie in the preservation of the state through itself. (...) What Machiavelli is trying to save and to preserve, is not the state, it is rather the relation of the prince to the object of his domination, meaning, that his objective is to save the principality as a *power relation between the prince and his territory*."<sup>64</sup> Nonetheless, Machiavelli as the author of *Il Principe* plays a major role, precisely to the extent that he is rejected in connection with the controversies around the art of government and the *reason of state*. "Ultimately", as Foucault observes, "he is at the centre of the debate during this entire period from 1580 to 1650-1660. But he is by no means at the centre of the debate within a context, which establishes itself *above and beyond him*, but rather one that articulates itself *through him* ... It is not he, who defined the art of government, rather it is *through* what he said, that whatever constitutes the art of government can be found."<sup>65</sup>

### 6. *The anti-Machiavellian counter-discourse*

An innate property of the governmental discourses is thus their explicit or implicit anti-Machiavellianism. The first anti-Machiavellian text in the age of governmentality, identified by Foucault by taking recourse to the researches of Luigi Firpo<sup>66</sup>, a historian from Turin, is a diatribe by a Dominican monk called Ambrogio Politi, who considered Machiavelli's treatise as one of those books that deserve to be abhorred by every righteous Christian.<sup>67</sup> Other books in this category were not only heathen literature in general, but also the works of its imitators like Petrarca and Boccaccio. The piece by Politi can be taken as one of the earliest signs of a rising tide of anti-Machiavellianism, which coincided with the birth of governmental thinking. In 1557 the original papal imprimatur for the publication of Machiavelli's *Il Principe* under Clemens VII. was withdrawn under the pressure of the Jesuits, so that the book had to be put on the Index. The fire of anti-Machiavellian polemics was sustained till the eighteenth century, finding a kind of climax in the famous commentary by Frederick the Great and Voltaire entitled *Anti-Machiavel*, the title itself signalling the essentially polemical trait of governmental discourse.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, typically governmental concepts like *population* or the *raison of state* are constituted by the sheer act of *opposition* of a counter-discourse, which constructs in a first step an antagonistic persona of the prince, which is not necessarily always explicitly ascribed to Machiavelli. In a second step this persona is rejected by projecting the image of a categorically different type of prince, whose function is to exercise government in the name of the new governmental state.

Thus, before the governmental practice of problematisation can take place, its target, the Machiavellian prince, has to be set up. It is obvious that this counter-discourse is not meant to do justice to the historical Machiavelli, but simply functions "to establish a representation of Machiavellian thinking, which in a sense is devoid of all content. You simply construct a Machiavelli or inflate him to an opponent, which ... is needed, so as to be able to say whatever is there to be said."<sup>69</sup> However, the function of negation is in no way crucial to this anti-Machiavellian literature. Far more essential is, what constitutes itself *through* it, which is why Foucault chooses to treat this literature in good archaeological manner as a *positivity*. It has "not merely the negative function of blocking and censoring, the function of turning down whatever is not acceptable ... all this is quite irrelevant in the anti-Machiavellian literature."<sup>70</sup> What really counts is, that this literature is "a positive genre equipped with its own specific object, concepts and strategy"<sup>71</sup>, which is why the archaeologist of this discourse has to learn to see it as nothing other than a positivity.

In the space of this counter-discourse, Machiavelli's prince acquires three distinctive features. *Firstly*, he has a status of transcendence and exteriority with respect to his principality for "he acquires his principality through inheritance, procurement or conquest; at any rate, it does not belong to him, but is something external to him. What binds him to his principality derives either from force or tradition or is founded upon contractual arrangements of agreement and consent with other princes."<sup>72</sup> From this follows *secondly* the fragility of the external link between the prince and his principality, for it can be attacked any time from without by other princes or from within by rebellious subjects. *Thirdly*, what follows from the first two features, is the unconditional imperative of protecting and strengthening the power of the prince. In the mirror of governmental discourses, the Machiavellian principality is in the first place neither a territory, nor the totality of its inhabitants, nor both. It is rather the abstract relation between the prince and his territory, so that the most important faculty of this constructed prince is his competence and aptitude at securing his principality. In any case, his function does not lie in the exercise of an art of government.

Foucault derives other important differences between the sovereignty of the pre-governmental prince and the prince as an agent of governmentality from a treatise, which he characterises as the first theoretically relevant representative of anti-Machiavellian literature in the age of governmentality. This is a treatise entitled *La Mirroir politique, contenant diverses manières de gouverner* written by Guillaume de La Perrière in 1555.<sup>73</sup> As an answer to the question as to who can be considered a governor, the text provides an entire range of possibilities: The governor "can be any monarch, emperor, king, prince, the lord of a country, a magistrate, a prelate, a judge ..."<sup>74</sup>. La Perrière's tractate reveals the following differences between sovereign and governmental power:

- (1) Whereas for the Machiavelli constructed by governmental discourse only one type of government, that of the prince, exists, La Perrière talks of a multiplicity of governmental forms and considers the prince merely as one of the possible modalities of governmental power. Contrary to the Machiavellian prince, who is *transcendent* with respect to his territory, the government of the governor can only unfold itself *within a society*.
- (2) The power of the Machiavellian prince is defined in terms of territory. For La Perrière, however, government is understood as the "correct disposition of things" and targets the sphere of *things*, which includes humans as well as all factors comprising their living circumstances. In La Perrière's understanding "things" seem to indicate the entity



that will figure in later governmental discourses as *population*.

- (3) The ultimate end of sovereign power is the Machiavellian prince himself. The exercise of sovereign power aims at securing the link between the prince and his territory and involves the enforcement of obedience. For La Perrière, however, the target of government is the correct disposition of things, meaning guiding and marshalling them optimally towards the ultimate end of securing wealth and welfare.
- (4) The person of the Machiavellian prince is characterised by anger, impatience and the right to kill, whereas La Perrière's governor is qualified for his function through his wisdom and zeal. These specifically governmental qualities involve a precise knowledge of the "things", which have to be brought into an optimal disposition by the act of government. To be able to govern, the governor must take note of the events constituting the sphere of the *population*.

These differences and oppositions concretise the extent, to which the distance from Machiavelli, as constructed by governmental discourses, is constitutive for the idea of government and associated concepts like *population*, *state*, *governor*. The point by point rejection of Machiavelli is part of the process of construction of his prince as the medium, in which governmental discourse is constituted.

### 7. Conclusion

At the end of this essay, I would like to sum up its main results. We have seen that the Machiavelli to be encountered in Foucault's genealogy never corresponds to anything like a "Foucauldian Machiavelli" or a well-balanced and complete description of Machiavelli as to be expected of a history of ideas. What is instead encountered, is the Machiavelli mirrored in governmental discourses, which surfaced in the sixteenth and lasted up to the eighteenth century. With a discursive status no different from that of madness in an archaeological history of madness, Machiavelli is that, which has to be produced by the discourses on governmentality in a first step, in order to be excluded by them in second step. As psychiatric reason in the history of madness, a specific type of reason is also constituted here through the discursive processes of production and exclusion of Machiavelli. This is the *reason of state*, which relates to Machiavelli and the Machiavellian view of power as its other. Thus also the Machiavelli mirrored in the governmental discourses is just another of those powerful fictions like madness, delinquency, sexuality, which have systematically effected the constitution of discursive and political realities in Western societies on

their way to modernity and have been repeatedly analysed by Foucault during his extensive researches into the history of truth.

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## NOTES

1. This essay is a translation and revised version of: "Machiavelli und die Regierungskunst. Zur Kunst des Nichtlesens' bei Michel Foucault" in Manuel Knoll & Stefano Saracino (eds.), 2010: *Niccolò Machiavelli. Die Geburt des Staates*, series: "Staatsdiskurse". Series Editor: Rüdiger Voigt, Volume 11. Stuttgart. Since the original was written in German and the English translations were not readily available, all citations from Foucault's works are my own renderings into English.
2. Foucault 2004: 353.
3. *Ibid.*
4. "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason", Foucault 1979.
5. "The Political Technology of Individuals", Foucault 1982.
6. Two years before his lectures at the *Collège de France*, in *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault regarded Machiavellian analysis as a genealogical precursor of his own analytics of power (Foucault 1977: 118). However, the problem-horizon here, which is that of *war* (in opposition to *law*) as a model for power relations, is quite different from that of governmentality. This is, by the way, Foucault's only *written* statement on Machiavelli, for the others I have just enlisted are, in a strict sense, *oral* remarks. Also the short allusion to Machiavelli in the lectures entitled *Society Must Be Defended* and held in early 1976 is to be rated as a stray *oral* remark in which Foucault observes that although Machiavelli described power relations as relations of forces, he did so "in the prescriptive terms of a strategy (...), which he perceived exclusively from the standpoint of power and the prince" (Foucault 1999: 195). Also here, Machiavellian thinking is for Foucault a rudimentary type of modern political reflection rather than its complete opposite, like the conceptualisation of a *territorial* power, which is essentially pre-governmental in nature and which Foucault found to be typical of Machiavellian thought in his 1978 lectures. See Senellart 2010: 283 ff.
7. Foucault 2004: 355.
8. *Ibid.*: 353.
9. *Ibid.*
10. This appreciation, or rather *renewed* appreciation of Machiavelli – which has been characterised in its hagiographic dimension as a "white mythology" (Waetzoldt 1943: 231) – is an *essential* symptom of the "anthropological age", which Foucault has revealed in all its epistemic idiosyncrasies in his "archaeology of human sciences" (Foucault 1971, part 2). The revaluation of Machiavelli in the Age of Man sets in towards the end of the eighteenth century, at the same time as (1) the emergence of a self-critical and self-limiting type of governmentality (Foucault 2004a, lecture 1) and (2) the return of the *problem* of sovereignty in the context



of the post-revolutionary confusions of the Napoleonic era and the constitution of nation states, primarily in Italy and Germany. Thus Machiavelli reappears "precisely at the end of the eighteenth century, or rather at the beginning of the nineteenth century at a moment, when people like Rehberg, Leo, Ranke and Kellermann translate him and write introductions and commentaries on him. The same applies to Italy and Ridolfi, as I imagine, in a context (...), which was on the one hand that of Napoleon, but on the other also a context, which was created by the Revolution and the *problem* of the Revolution: How and under what conditions can the *sovereignty* of a sovereign be retained within the framework of a state? In a similar manner, the problem of the relation between politics and strategy surfaces with Clausewitz, meaning the political significance of *force relations* and their calculability as a principle of the intelligibility and rational practice of international relations, all of which became apparent in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. And finally the problem of the *territorial* unity of Italy and Germany. – You know, that Machiavelli was one of those, who had tried to determine the conditions, under which the territorial unity of Italy could be achieved. It is under this climate, that Machiavelli reappears at the beginning of the 19. century." Foucault 2004: 137. (emphasis by Pravu Mazumdar) This tradition of an essentially post-revolutionary Machiavelli renaissance, brought about by the resurrection of the typically Machiavellian problems of *sovereignty*, *territoriality* and *force relations* as constitutive factors of politics, is exemplified in the nineteenth century by the following works: Herder 1881; Fichte 1835; Ranke 1824: 182–202; Hegel 1923: 110–113. In the twentieth century, the tradition continues with works like Cassirer 2007; Meinecke 1924; Strauss 1958; Gramsci 1996; Althusser 1999 and 2006; Münkler 1984; Skinner 2009. Contrary to this tradition, Foucault's genealogical distinction of epochs reveals Machiavelli's discourse as that, which has to be excluded, so as to enable the constitution of the specifically "modern" political reflection at work in governmental thinking in the "classical age". This connection will be discussed in the final sections of this essay. Such a process of exclusion of an Other situated in a "past" as a condition of possibility of discursive self-constitution is discussed at length in Mazumdar 2008 (chapters 14 and 15) as the figure of *non-positive affirmation*, functioning in Foucault's archaeo-genealogical historiography as a "motor" of a transformative and discontinuous history.

11. Foucault 2004: 101.
12. Foucault 1994: 817–818. (emphasis by Pravu Mazumdar). Noteworthy in this citation is the use of the expression *problem*, which plays a decisive role in Foucault's technique of situating Machiavelli genealogically, as is shown in the following section.
13. Cf. "Introduction: On Interpretation", Skinner 2009: 7–18.
14. For a more detailed discussion of Foucault's "methodology", specially the *ontology of language* as a constitutive dimension of discourse-analysis, see Mazumdar 2008.
15. See Foucault 1999.
16. See Foucault 1973, chapter 1.
17. See "The prose of the world", Foucault 1971, chapter 2.
18. See "Representation", Foucault 1971, chapter 3.

19. Cf. the late Foucault's famous characterisation of archaeology as a technique of analysing "neither behavioural forms, nor ideas, nor societies and their 'ideologies', but rather *processes of problematisation*, in which Being gives itself as whatever can and must be thought, as well as the *practices* leading on to their formation. The archaeological dimension of the analysis is concerned with the forms of problematisation itself; its genealogical dimension is concerned with the formation of problematisation processes based on practices and their transformations." Foucault 1986: 19.
20. Foucault 1971: 84 f.
21. Foucault 2004: 386-393.
22. Foucault 1969.
23. Foucault 1976.
24. Henry Kissinger, for instance, categorically rejected the suggestion made by one of his interviewers to the effect that there might be a Machiavellian influence in his thinking. See Skinner 1990: 11 f.
25. See Foucault 2004: 386-393.
26. See Meinecke 1924. Thomas Lemke claims that Foucault's discussion on the *raison of state* is based on Friedrich Meinecke's work. (Lemke 1997: 158, footnote 29.) Michel Senellart however rejects this by pointing out, that although Foucault does mention Meinecke in a footnote in "Omnes et singulatim" (Foucault 2005: 184), he says nothing about the content of Meinecke's work. Senellart suggests, contrary to Lemke's claim, that Foucault bases his assessment of Meinecke on the work of Etienne Thuau (Thuau, 1966). (See Senellart 2010: 286, footnote 22)
27. See above, end of footnote 10.
28. Foucault 1969.
29. Foucault 2004: 136 f.
30. Friedrich II 1740.
31. Foucault 2004: 137.
32. *Ibid.*. See footnote 10 of this essay.
33. Foucault 2004: 23. See further below, footnote 44.
34. *Ibid.*: 27.
35. "With the 16. century we enter the age of ... governments." *Ibid.*: 336.
36. *Ibid.*: 28 ff.
37. Diderot and d'Alembert draw attention to this connection in their article "Milieu" in the *Encyclopaedia*. See *Ibid.*: 40 and 49, footnote 37.
38. *Ibid.*: 40.
39. See lectures 12 and 13 in Foucault 2004.
40. Foucault 2004: 101 f.
41. *Ibid.*: 28-29.
42. *Ibid.*: 100. In his 1979 lectures, Foucault begins his analysis of liberal governmentality by quoting the British statesman Robert Walpole as saying: "Quieta non movere" ("What is quiet, should not be moved"). (Foucault 2004a, lecture 1: 13.) With the crisis of governmentality in the late eighteenth century, identified by Foucault as an essential characteristic of liberalism, the old

Machiavellian mistrust of *movement*, which can transform any time into an attack from without or a sedition from within, seems to return. To expand further on this would lead us beyond the scope of this essay.

43. See above, beginning of section 2 of this essay.
44. *Ibid.*: 100 f. However, this is not to be taken in the sense, that from the late 16. century onwards territorial power has simply been pushed away by governmental power. In the résumé of his 1978 lectures Foucault leaves no doubts on this issue: "The lectures were concerned with the emergence of a political knowledge, which placed the concept of population at the centre. Does that mean, that we are confronted with the transition from a 'territorial state' to a 'populational state'? Certainly not, for what we have here is not a *substitution*, but rather a *shift in emphasis* and the emergence of new objectives, meaning new *problems* and new techniques." *Ibid.*: 520. (emphasis by Pravu Mazumdar) It is important for the connection of this essay to note, that Foucault here draws attention to a *history of problematisation* as a dimension of the genealogy of governmentality.
45. See footnote 9 of this essay.
46. *Ibid.*: 101.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*: 338.
49. *Ibid.*: 339.
50. *Ibid.*: 340.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*: 345 ff.
53. *Ibid.*: 343.
54. *Ibid.*: 344.
55. *Ibid.*.
56. *Ibid.*.
57. *Ibid.*: 345 f.
58. *Ibid.*, S. 345.
59. *Ibid.*.
60. *Ibid.*: 346.
61. *Ibid.*: 353.
62. *Ibid.*: 352.
63. *Ibid.*, S. 354.
64. *Ibid.*: 352 f. (emphasis by Pravu Mazumdar)
65. *Ibid.*: 353. (emphasis by Pravu Mazumdar)
66. See Firpo 1967 and Foucault 2004: 167, footnote 11.
67. *Ibid.*: 138.
68. Friedrich II 1740.
69. *Ibid.*: 139.
70. *Ibid.*: 138.
71. *Ibid.*.
72. *Ibid.*: 139.
73. Perrière 1555. Foucault 2004: 140 ff.
74. *Ibid.*: 141.

